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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the mechanics and predominant theories (neo- 
functionalism and intergovernmentalism) at work in the process of European 
integration. Indeed, it provides an illustration of the difficulties in achieving 
the harmonisation of Member State legislation and identifies the intricacies 
and practicalities of successful decision-making in the European Union (EU). 
In the aftermath of the Single European Act (SEA), the beginnings of the 
Single European Market (SEM) and the Maastricht Treaty, it has become 
evident that financial service sectors need to involve themselves in the 
creation of the EU. 
Through grounded theory methodology, an empirical study of the European 
life insurance industry in general and of the Third Life Assurance Directive in 
particular, this thesis investigates the extent of sector involvement in the 
EU's decision-making processes and in doing so, critically analyses theoretical 
understandings of European integration. Grounded theory methodology is 
illustrated by the thesis in the following ways. First, through a comparative 
analysis which was achieved through the open coding (conceptualisation, 
categorisation and dimensionalisation) of individual Member States' life 
insurance regulations. Open coding leads to the formulation of a regulation 
table and matrix. Further coding, through a survey of Member State life 
insurance industries, refined and verified the matrix. This investigation 
raised questions as to how the legislative differences (that underpin 
regulatory structures) between Member States may be resolved. Secondly, 
through an interview programme, process was verified and illustrated 
through a series of models. The tables, models and the matrix provide the 
building blocks of the substantive theory. Thirdly, axial coding is illustrated 
by the matrix and models fitting together around the core category of 
European integration. The core category was identified through selective 
coding and is the category around which sub-categories are integrated. Axial 
coding draws all parts of the analysis together: it is the pivot or the axis of 
theory building. Finally, substantive theory is formulated through grounded 
theory techniques in relation to the formal theories of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism; this allows a reassessment of European integration 
and provides a clearer understanding of the formal theories. 
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Introduction and Overview of Thesis 
No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as 
such if it was made with a secret reservation of the 
material for a future war (Kant, 1995; p 95). 
Introduction 
From the late 1960s until the mid-1980s when one discussed European 
integration one usually emphasised intergovernmentalism. "Neo- 
functionalism and intergovernmentalism were contending theories of 
European integration in the 1960s but by the 1970s intergovernmentalism 
appeared to have carried the day, until in the 1980s the single market 
programme and the Single European Act led to a revival of neo-functionalist 
explanations" (George, 1994; p 1). This thesis wishes to enter the debate and 
seeks to illustrate the extent to which neo-functionalism or 
intergovernmentalism may be at work in the process of European 
integration. An analysis of a service sector (the life insurance industry) has 
been undertaken in respect of its relationships with the EU decision-making 
institutions. It is considered that through self-interest, national life insurance 
industries attempt to create a market in their own image. Through 
compromises, a single market is formed, European integration taken a step 
further and this enhances the welfare of Europeans in general. 
Fundamentally, in the perpetuation and evolution of the human species, 
self-interest and mutual assistance work hand-in-hand. 
Open coding began with a series of preliminary interviews with UK life 
insurance companies and the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and a 
comparison of Member State life insurance legislation and regulation. This 
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gave an idea of the UK sector's general understanding of Europe and allowed 
the compilation of a questionnaire. Interviews were later undertaken in 
Brussels, Paris and London where individuals involved in the decision- 
making processes were asked to comment on their part in the creation of the 
Third Life Assurance Directive. 
A major survey of the European life insurance industry provides an 
understanding of that industry in terms of how it approaches the EU, how it 
ascertains national self-interest in terms of market conditions, and the extent 
of compromise in the creation of the Single European Market (SEM). Less 
extensive surveys were made of European and national interest groups, the 
European Parliament and Permanent Representatives. 
Inductive investigation allows an overall picture of the EU and SEM to be 
established; subsequently this allowed deductions about the European 
integration process. Through the induction-deduction aspects of grounded 
theory methodology, further understanding of European integration is 
established. 
The thesis explores whether the EU is supranational and whether this 
supranationality, in tandem with spillover, is part of the integration process. 
European integration is worth revisiting -because of the renewed pace of the 
integration process, impending monetary union and the implications this has 
for political union. Additionally, the thesis questions how far interest groups 
and industries are either the willing or unwilling creators of European 
economic and political union and to what extent self-interest creates peace 
and welfare in Europe and ultimately the Kantian 'civic constitution'? 
Indeed, because of the renewed pace of European integration theoretical 
explanations need to be reassessed. 
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Neo-functionalism went into decline with the slowing up of the integration 
process. Now the pace has quickened, it may be possible to discern elements of 
neo-functionalism, in relation to intergovernmentalism, at work in the 
evolving SEM and EU. This thesis intends to determine the extent of neo- 
functionalism in the re-vitalised European integration process. Keohane and 
Hoffman (1990) emphasised the need for a theoretical framework for the 
evolving EU and indicated that neo-functionalism may provide this. 
However, they do point out that further empirical research is necessary. This 
thesis wishes to provide a part of that research. 
An Overview of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. The introduction outlines the thesis 
in terms of the philosophical and theoretical bases of the proposed analysis 
and provides an overview of the thesis. 
Chapter One provides the literature review: this covers the methodology 
(grounded theory); the political philosophy of Kant; integration theory 
(specifically functionalism, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism); 
and the life insurance industry and the EU. 
In Chapter Two, the methodology (grounded theory) is explained in line with 
the concept of self-interest and mutual assistance. In previous studies of neo- 
functionalism, the problem of a dependent variable and the charge of 
Eurocentricity have been major criticisms. This thesis recognises these 
deficiencies but wishes to look at neo-functionalism and integration theory in 
a different way. Initially, through inductive and later deductive procedures, a 
substantive theory is constructed through which our understanding of neo- 
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functionalism, intergovernmentalism and the European integration process 
may be enhanced. The methodology considers that the most important aspect 
of research is not explanation but understanding. Thus, the thesis does not 
wish to prove or disprove neo-functionalism nor intergovernmentalism: it 
simply wishes to comprehend them as theoretical frameworks and consider 
how they may further our understanding of the European integration 
process. As acknowledged above, the thesis also recognises the deficiencies of 
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism in respect of their application 
to the EU alone (or Eurocentricity) and considers that in this context they are 
substantive theories themselvesl. 
Initially, Chapter Three furthers the discussion regarding theory initiated in 
the methodology chapter. Through this discussion, it challenges some of the 
past criticisms of integration theory in general and more specifically 
functionalism and neo-functionalism. Additionally, it provides an analysis of 
integration theory, by comparing functionalism and federalism and illustrates 
how neo-functionalism is linked to and affected by these. Indeed, it posits that 
a number of aspects of functionalism and federalism make up neo- 
functionalism. It also investigates the links between realism and 
intergovernmentalism. Finally, it considers whether these theories are 
underpinned by Kantian political thought. The chapter illustrates the 
complexity of integration theory and its relationship with the five main 
theoretical schools. It considers that functionalism is peace-oriented and has 
much to teach us about non-violent means of solving international 
problems. Indeed, the chapter concludes that the EU decision-making process, 
through the use of interest groups, is a means of overcoming turbulence and 
consequently steps up political integration. This is taken further in Chapter 
1 Substantive theory is built through grounded theory processes to allow an analysis and further the understanding of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism (or formal theories) in the process of European integration. Both substantive and formal theories are defined further in the methodology chapter below. 
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Four where an analysis of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism is 
undertaken. 
Chapter Four analyses intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism in 
more depth and contends that in the aftermath of the Single European 
Market (SEM) and with the possibility of European Monetary Union (EMU), 
European integration should be reassessed. On the one hand, 
intergovernmentalism argues that inter-state agreements underpin the 
conditions necessary for European integration, i. e. that the primary source of 
integration is to be found with the Member States. On the other hand, neo- 
functionalism considers that integration involves the transfer of allegiance by 
political actors to a supranational entity and this provides a major impetus 
for European integration. Just as functionalism can be identified as being 
premised on peace, neo-functionalism can be considered a peaceful process 
toward the creation of larger peaceful political communities, i. e. a peaceful 
process aimed at a peaceful outcome. The concepts of spillover, 
supranationalism and the uses of sub-national actors are identified and 
critically evaluated. Finally, the chapter posits that neo-funtionalism and 
intergovernmentalism are not incompatible in understanding European 
integration and that this may be explored through empirical investigations. 
This is what the rest of the thesis sets out to accomplish. 
Chapter Five provides the foundations of the substantive theory through the 
construction of a regulation matrix. The chapter builds on the grounded 
theory techniques of categorisation: and dimensionalisation defined in 
Chapter two (see Table 2.1 p 43) and further illustrates the differences between 
Member State life insurance industries' regulation and legislation. The matrix 
posits convergence which illustrates the creation of an SEM through 
harmonisation. To the initial coding the results of a survey are added. The 
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survey allows verification through the use of frequency tables, cross- 
tabulations and chi-squared tests. The formulation of Tables 2.1 and 5.1 (p 43 
and p 138) and Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (p 157 and p 160) provide the initial stages of 
the substantive theory and set up a number of questions that are addressed in 
the following chapters. 
Chapter Six looks at interest groups and the supranational aspects of the EU 
decision-making institutions. As identified in Chapter Three, these are two 
major provisions in allowing a neo-functional understanding of European 
integration. Interest groups are defined as non-governmental bodies that 
attempt to influence the policies of public institutions i. e. as entities that 
apply pressure. Interest groups can be either sectional or promotional. 
However, this thesis concentrates on the sectional interest groups in those of 
the life insurance industry. Lobbying in Brussels is open to uncertainty: 
consequently, co-ordination and alliances with European counterparts are 
extremely important interest groups are to be successful. The discussions in 
relation to the legislation and regulatory regimes that should be pursued to 
create the most amenable regulatory structure for all Member States are 
monitored and commented on. 
Chapter Seven amends Easton's demand model (1965) and constructs a 
decision-making model. The demand model illustrates how interests, 
preferences etc, transform into demands at the EU level and adds to the 
substantive theory in abstract terms. The decision-making model, developed 
with the aid of a number of key player interviews (Richards, 1996), adds to the 
substantive theory in more concrete terms. The interviews were undertaken 
with individuals involved in the creation of the Third Life Assurance 
Directive and provide an understanding of the EU decision-making processes. 
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They also give some insight into the formal theories of 
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. 
Chapter Eight generalises the process indicated in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven. It considers the concept of spillover and the part this plays in the 
process of European integration. The chapter adds to the substantive theory 
through the construction of a spillover model which provides an 
understanding of spillover processes in the EU. The chapter investigates 
spillover and asserts that it plays a part in the creation of the SEM in financial 
services. This is accomplished through an analysis of EU financial services 
legislation. The chapter considers that there are delineations between 
horizontal and vertical spillover2 and intergovernmental and neo-functional 
spillover. It also contends that the revival of supranationalism has given an 
impetus to the integration process that spillover creates. Additionally, the 
part life insurance plays in the process of integration, and the difficulties in 
creating the Third Life Assurance Directive are illustrated. The chapter 
concludes that the integration of financial services is intrinsically tied to the 
success of EMU, and that even though neo-functional spillover is an 
important process it can only take European integration so far without 
further intergovernmental spillover in the form of further treaties. 
Chapter Nine sets out a substantive theory which illustrates the extent to 
which neo-functional and intergovernmental processes are at work in the 
process of European integration and how far sectors, through interest groups 
and the Commission, dictate the pace of integration. Additionally, there is a 
questioning of intergovernmentalism and nationalism and the extent to 
2 Neo-functional spillover is part of the integration process in that le 'slation in one area spills into another 
either vertically (inn the same industry/sector); or horizontally 
(from 
sector to sector). Furthermore, 
intergovernmental spillover also exists. This is where one treaty necessitates further treaties and where the 
neo-functional process pushes for further integration through the harmonisation of specific legislation which 
will eventually necessitate further treaties (see Chapter Four, Chapter Eight and the Spillover Model, 277-81) 
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which these accepted norms are historical realities. The research questions 
these historical constructs and posits that they are relativist entities that are 
being surpassed by larger political communities which in themselves are part 
of a general process of integration. Finally, the work will add to the 
understanding of integration processes in a regional setting, i. e. European 
integration. 
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Chapter One 
Literature Review 
The ultimate philosophy and the hierarchy of 
preferences invite discussion rather than proof or 
refutation; analyses of present facts or 
prognostications about facts to come, alter with the 
unfolding of history and the knowledge we acquire 
of it (Aron , 1985; p 236). 
Introduction 
This chapter overviews the literature that the thesis has drawn on while 
building a substantive theory and an understanding of European integration 
processes. The literature review is broken down into three areas, each of 
which interacts with the others to provide the overall underpinning of the 
thesis. The areas incorporate: the methodology literature; integration theory 
literature; and life insurance and European Union literature. The subject 
areas are covered in the order they appear in the thesis. 
Methodology Literature 
Grounded theory suggests that there is an over-emphasis on verification 
theory and wishes to demote the idea that the discovery of relevant concepts 
and hypotheses are a priori to research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser 1978; 
Charmaz, 1983; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Corbin and Strauss, 
1990; Glaser 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1994; Stern, 1994; Melia, 1994; Annells, 
1996). 
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Glaser and Strauss (1967) draw on the pragmatist school, particularly Dewey 
(1950) and Mead (1962). Dewey (1950) considered that theory cannot answer 
questions ". .. unless we are willing to find the germs and roots in matters of 
experience" (p 12). Furthermore, grounded theory can be based on symbolic 
interaction (Mead, 1962) and Blumer (1962; 1969). Symbolic interaction is 
distinct to human beings, it is part of what makes us human because we ".. . 
interpret or define each other's actions" (Blumer, 1962; p 179) rather than 
simply reacting to them. Furthermore, humans have and are able to act 
towards self . Mead considered that the ability to react to self was the central 
mechanism of existence. 
This mechanism enables the human being to make indication to 
himself of things in his surroundings and thus to guide his 
action by what he notes. Anything of which a human being is 
conscious ... he is indicating to himself ... The conscious 
life of 
the human being ... is a continual flow of self indications 
(ibid p 
180). 
Fundamentally, "... the formation of action by the individual through ... 
self-indication always takes place in a social context" (ibid 183). 
One now regularly takes an impartial and general standpoint in 
observing and evaluating one's own conduct ... (however) ... 
The organised community or social group which gives to the 
individual his unity of self may be called the generalised other 
which is the attitude of the whole community (Blau, 1952; pp 
162-163 authors brackets). 
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Symbolic interaction presupposes the following: 
(a) the individual has a self and an amalgamation of interpreted selves 
encompass society; 
(b) individual action is constructed through interpreting the situational 
context; 
(c) groups and collective action incorporate the alignments of individual 
actions that are formulated through interpreting the actions of others. 
Consequently, research should be pursued with this in mind, interpretations 
of situations change as individuals change (this includes the researcher and 
the researched). Indeed, with the knowledge that pure objectivity cannot be 
attained the research may be more objective i. e. any analysis that does not 
accept subjectivity can never be objective. Grounded theory attempts to 
understand social patterns on the basis of symbolic interaction and construct 
social theory. 
Grounded theory looks to the generation of theory through comparative 
analysis and does not attempt to undermine theory but to better it. Effectively, 
"... a theory's only replacement is a better theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; p 
28). 
Grounded theory is based on the systematic generating of theory 
from data, and itself is systematically obtained from social 
research. Thus the grounded theory method offers a rigorous 
orderly guide to theory development that each stage is closely 
integrated with a methodology of social research" (Glaser, 1978; p 
2). 
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Fundamentally, research should be approached with an open mind and as 
much objectivity and distance as is possible. However, it is acknowledged that 
such objectivity is difficult, as everyone has subjective tendencies. Yet 
recognising subjectivity is part way to overcoming it. This may be considered 
to encompass theoretical sensitivity which is initially gained by entering the 
research "... with as few predetermined ideas as possible, especially logically 
deduced, a priori hypotheses" (Glaser, 1978, p 3). Such enables the researcher 
to remain sensitive and ". .. record events and 
detect happenings without 
first having them filtered through and squared with pre-existing hypotheses 
and biases" (ibid). 
This, one may consider, is what may be labelled foresight or that which allows 
the researcher certain expectations of what may be discovered. As does the 
background or environment (fore-structure) which indicates possible ways of 
questioning (Heidegger, 1978). Additionally, Stern (1994) considered that 
grounded theory was an interpretative method and was underpinned by ".. . 
phenomenology, that is methods that are used to describe the world of the 
person or persons under study" (p 213). 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) consider that grounded theory is post positivist, 
while, Annells (1996) contends that our understanding of grounded theory is 
based on an ". .. awareness of the method's ontological, epistemological and 
methodological perspectives" (ibid; p 379) and that these may be broken down 
into four paradigms of enquiry. These are positivism, post positivism, critical 
theory and constructivism. Indeed, that one's understanding of methodology 
and consequently grounded theory is determined by one's metaphysical 
assumptions. Grounded theory involves the ". .. soliciting of emic 
viewpoints to assist in determining the meaning and purposes that people 
ascribe to their actions" (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; p 110). 
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Grounded theory methodology incorporates ... assumption(s) .. 
. concerning the human status of actors whom we study. They 
have perspectives on and interpretations of their own and other 
actors' actions. As researchers we are required to learn what we 
can of their interpretations and perspectives" (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1994; p 280 authors brackets). 
This thesis considers that this is the basis of grounded theory: an attempt to 
understand reality through social constructions and an attempt at objectivity 
through recognising the subjectivity of the researcher and researched in terms 
of their interpretative nature. 
Integration Theory Literature 
The main aim of this thesis is to reassess the main theories of European 
integration; neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. It is considered 
that the former of these grew out of the Kantian concept of the international 
civic constitution (Kant 1995, see Idea for a Universal History With a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose pp 41-53 and Perpetual Peace pp 93-115) and the latter 
through the Hegelian concept of the state (Hegel, 1967). Indeed, both are based 
on Enlightenment thought in general. However, the roots of the ideas of 
integration may be identified in Aristophanes (1970). In his play, the Goddess, 
Peace is released from the pit by the "farmers, merchants, labourers, 
craftsmen, aliens, visitors ... Now if ever panhellenic let us help each other 
out" (pp, 233-34). Peace is buried deep but through working together, through 
the integration of activity, Peace is be freed from her pit. This identifies neo- 
functionalism: a peaceful means in the pursuit of a peaceful end. 
Additionally, in reassessing European integration, it is necessary to examine 
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the extent of neo-functionalisms main theoretical disputant, 
intergovernmentalism, the basis of which is grounded in realism 
(Morgenthau, 1973). 
There have been a number of commentators who have written in the realms 
of integration theory and discussed how it relates to federalism 
functionalism, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism (Bulmer 1993; 
Claude 1956; George 1994,1995; Groom and Taylor 1975; Haas 1958,1964,1968, 
1971,1975,1976; Heathcote 1966; Hoffman 1966; Keohane and Nye 1990; 
Keohane and Hoffman 1990,1991; Lindberg 1963 1967; Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970,1971; Moravsik 1991,1993; Mitrany 1943,1944,1965,1970, 
1975,1975a, 1975b, 1975c; Nye 1971,1971a; Pentland, 1973; Rees 1992; Sandholtz 
and Zysman 1989; Sandholtz, 1994; Schmitter 1969; Schmitter and Streeck, 
1994; Sewell 1966; Sweeny 1984; Taylor 1968,1968a, 1983,1971; Wallace, 
Wallace and Webb 1977; Wallace 1990; Webb 1983). However, in general the 
debate revolves around neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism and 
which of these is most precise in describing the process of European 
integration. 
The initial proponents of neo-functionalism were Haas (1958) and Lindberg 
(1963). However, they were both to reconsider their understandings of neo- 
functionalism because of the re-assertion of the nation-state in the 1960s. 
Indeed, the actions of De Gaulle illustrated the deterministic nature of neo- 
functionalism and the absence of a dependent variabler (Heathcote, 1966). 
This led to ten years of debate and the temporary displacement of neo- 
functionalism. Yet, because of the impetus the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty 
created, commentators are once again turning their attention to neo- 
1 The dependent variable regarding European integration relates to some sort of end result. Neo- functionalism does not propose an end. It does not draw borders around Europe nor give it a specific form. It is a peaceful process pursuing a peaceful end. However, the material aspect of the end is uncertain. 
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functionalism. Indeed, Rees (1992) commented that the recent developments 
in Europe ". .. have led to renewed interest in theories of integration, 
especially neo-functionalism" (p 13). 
The modern understanding of functionalism2, in the realms of international 
relations, is commonly attributed to David Mitrany. Additionally, the ideas of 
federalism3 were re-formulated over the same period in history (see Bosco, 
1991 and Hodges, 1972) and in themselves provide a strand of neo-functional 
thought4. The thesis provides an analysis of neo-functional ideas that 
emanate from functionalism and federalism. Functional theories have also 
been posited by Claude (1956) who builds on Mitrany's work (1943) and 
considers international organisation as a process; and Sewell (1966) who 
attempts to test the functional process through an analysis of the World Bank. 
Haas (1958) proposed a concept of incrementalism which was based on his 
study of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); this placed an 
emphasis on 'functional integrationalism' (Burton, 1975). Out of Haas' 
2 Functionalism is the means by which change toward a goal of international collaboration is brought about; 
it is illustrated through organisations which would be designated a specific task that would evolve as 
functional needs changed. The system incorporates the premise of peaceful co-operation. The outcome may be a 
pluralist international community where national control is marginalised through functional linkages, or 
more extreme, where the nation-state disappears and is replaced by functional rationality. This is where 
organisational patterns are untertaken at the most rational level i. e. either continental, international or local. Effectively, functionalism is a process of internationalisation in terms of politics and the assurance of peace, 
whereas decisions, are carried out at the most rational or functional level. Functionalism does not adhere to the concept of constitution or regionalism. In Kantian terms, it pursues the concept of 'Perpetual Peace' 
without a civic constitution at a regional nor international level. Mitrany considered that human beings have 
no concept of what the end result of integration should encompass, so why invent one? Kant may be perceived 
as functionalist in terms of his pursuit of world government or internationalisation. However, he may be 
considered federalist in terms of-his wish for a constitution. 
3 Federalism, is based on the concept of peace and is premised on the Kantian ideas of both the civic 
constitution and 'Perpetual Peace'. Federalism may be understood in terms of the development of European history Initially, it maybe seen as an ideal denied by the nation state between the French-Revolution and the First World War; secondly, the inter-war period where it allows an understanding of the European crisis; 
and finally in the post-war period where its application could overcome the European difficulties with the 
nation state and war. The difference between functionalism and federalism is that the former identifies a 
process: the latter an end result in the federal state. Federalism provides for the enlargement of representative 
government; it allows administration to extend from one to many states. (see Bosca, 1991; p 5). If one considers 
a world federation flowing out of European federalism then one may be indicating a neo-functional end in that supranationality is not an end in Europe but part of the process toward internationalisation. 
4 Unlike functionalism, neo-functionalism posits that integration is most easily to be realised in a regional setting. Functionalists conceded that a supranational state would keep peace at the regional level. However, it would also create a power bloc and this would not ensure peace at the international level. In this context Mitrany criticised European integration. Haas accepted Mitrany's criticism when he wrote "... regional integration may lead to a future world made up of fewer and fewer units, each unit with all the power and self assertion that we associate with classical nationalism"(Haas, 1970). This relates to the difficulties created in terms of the lack of an independent variable. Neo-functionalism is the interaction between interest groups and the new supranational centres of power in the pursuit of a new market environment. 
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theories came an emphasis on neo-functionalism (Haas 1958,1964,1968, 
1971). Puchala (1972) likens integration theory to the story of the blind men 
and the elephant: ". .. each blind man concluded that the elephant had the 
appearance of the part he touched ... each had gained enough evidence 
from 
his own experience to disbelieve his fellows and to maintain a lively debate 
with his fellows" (ibid, p 267). Ultimately he posits a "concordance system", 
one in which actors find it possible to harmonise their interests consistently, 
from which an analysis of the dynamics of international integration may be 
launched (ibid, pp 276-283). Taylor (1968) contends that there are two broad 
theories for understanding Europe: (a) federalist/neo-functionalist (b) 
technocratic/functionalist. However, he does not come to any conclusions 
about which is the most useful, but he does clarify some aspects of integration 
theory. Nye (1971) considered that neo-functionalism should be used as a 
means of understanding integration and making comparisons: that if it is 
freed from the characteristics that linked it specifically to Europe, it would be 
useful for analysing integration in other settings. 
Neo-functionalism has also been influenced by systems theory (Easton, 1953) 
and envisages elites and interest groups that change their loyalties towards a 
supranational grouping, rather than national groupings alone. This is done to 
satisfy wants, preferences and interests that transfer into demands which in 
turn are transformed into decisions (Easton, 1965). Lindberg acknowledges 
this approach to the extent that there is a process by which "political actors" in 
different settings ". .. are persuaded to shift their expectations to a new 
centre" (Lindberg, 1976; p 6). He considered that as 
... a contributor to the European integration literature I have 
more and more come to feel as if I were excavating a small 
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isolated portion of a large, dimly-perceived mass, the contours of 
which I could not make out (Lindberg, 1967; p 345). 
To overcome this Lindberg uses Easton's model (Easton, 1965a, 1965b) to 
provide ". .. a framework of logically consistent and integrated categories" 
(Lindberg, 1967; p 346). He concentrated on Mitrany's idea that there should be 
no end result to aim for, and omits any reference to a political community. 
However, in both Haas and Lindberg, there is a change of emphasis in respect 
of the institutions on which the interest group or sector makes its demands: 
in this context, the European Union. 
Further understandings of neo-functionalism are based around Schmitter's 
(1971) concept of integration which he termed as 
... the process of transferring exclusive expectations of benefits 
from the nation-state to some larger entity. It encompasses the 
process by virtue of which national actors of all sorts 
(government officials, interest group spokesmen, politicians as 
well as ordinary people) cease to identify themselves and their 
future welfare entirely with their own national government and 
its policies (Schmitter, in Lindberg and Schmitter, 1971; p 238). 
Sweeny (1984) underpins the theoretical aspect of the EU with functionalism 
and defines it in terms of the distinction between the general will and the will 
of all. For functionalists, the general will resides with those concerned with 
the non-political welfare needs of all people. Webb (1983) considered that 
European integration had produced a policy-making system that was partially 
integrated, but that political integration was unlikely and neo-functionalism 
was obsolete. She suggested that only two realistic frameworks remained: 
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intergovernmentalism and interdependence5. However, there are a number 
of different interpretations of interdependence (Rosecrance et al, 1977; 
Keohane and Nye, 1977; Cooper, 1977; Taylor 1980). The main problem with 
the theory is ". .. that it tends to 
ignore the relationship between 
Gemeinschaft and Gesselschaft that is found in any political process. The 
form which this relationship usually takes is the modification of perceptions 
of self-interest by such factors as emotional ties, preferences 'we feeling' or the 
identification of mutual values" (Taylor, 1980; p 373). This thesis questions 
the extent to which there has, or has not been, a shift in the EU from a pure 
Gemeinschaft toward the Gessellschaft (a shift from interdependence ground 
in intergovernmentalism toward integration through neo-functionalism). 
In other words, the realisation that interests are mutual is 
expected to precede the procedural or constitutional 
arrangements, and interdependence is seen to involve a 
learning process by which decision-makers are brought to 
recognise common interests (ibid). 
Haas (1976) also identifies such a process in his concept of turbulence where 
clashing perceptions create confusion and ". .. everything is up 
for grabs" (p 
179). The complexity of the situation is not based on limited knowledge but 
on too much, "... turbulent fields are the existence of very large bodies of 
knowledge ... " which ". .. provide certainty 
for parts ... " but confuse the 
whole (ibid). Garrett (1992) considers the difficulties of co-operation and the 
problems of discriminating between outcomes but when he spoke of 
preferences he spoke of government preferences. Indeed, there was little 
5 Keohane and Nye (1977) examined the basic principles of interdependence and considered that in general 
terms the theory accepted the Gessellschaft theory of society rather than the Gemeinschaft. The former stresses 
the management of the market place in which conficting interests interact. The latter concentrates on 
consensus, stability and duty. It emphasises relationships between actors and considers that interests may be 
modified in respect of mutuality and preferred relationships. 
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mention of interest groups. However, Garrett and Weingast (1993) indicate 
how interest groups provide the basis for shared beliefs and "focal points" (p 
176) which assists in the creation of certainty and understanding, the outcome 
of which, is further integration. This area is also explored in Haas (1975) 
where knowledge and space are again questioned in relation to integration, as 
it is by Derrida (1992) with regard to the concept of Europe. What are the 
boundaries of Europe? What is Europe? Is it no more than a peninsula of 
Asia? Additionally, Graubard (1963) posits the need for a new Europe. He 
questions the first forty years of the twentieth century, the concept of 
nationalism and concedes the demise of both the socialist and liberal utopias. 
He considered that Europe should be optimistic and that ". .. the present 
efforts, seemingly chaotic, may in time be viewed as the uncertain strivings of 
an old society to renew itself, by taking what is best from its recollections of a 
not undistinguished past" (p 653). 
More recently, an interpretation of neo-functionalism has been proposed by 
Keohane and Hoffman (1990) who consider a more complicated 
understanding of 'spillover' between domains and sectors6. They contend 
that successful spillover necessitates prior agreements among Member States 
in terms of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty etc. This thesis considers that 
such is necessary and that the spillover process, in Wallace's (1991, pp 8-12) 
terms, the formal aspect of integration, or the intergovernmental process, is 
forced through the informal or the neo-functional process. This necessitates 
further formal integration, or further treaties. Consequently, an extension of 
the treaties, e. g. the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, creates an impetus for the 
informal, neo-functional process which through spillover puts further 
pressure on the formal (see Chapter Eight). 
6 The difference between domains and sectors could be percieved as the diference between intergovernmental 
spillover (domain) and neo-functional spillover (sector). This thesis takes this idea further by considering different forms of neo-functional spillover. 
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Mutimer (1989) revisits neo-functionalism and emphasises the importance of 
the SEA. He also considers that federalism is inappropriate when analysing 
the EU. However, he eventually dismisses neo-functionalism because ".. . 
even in amended form it is not sufficient" (ibid p 101); this, one may consider, 
is rather an ambitious statement given the evidence that his paper provides. 
Pederson (1992) considers that intergovernmentalism should be combined 
with elements of neo-functionalism to enable a new framework of analysis. 
Keohane and Hoffman (1990,1991) emphasise a pooling of sovereignty rather 
than its transference from the Member States to supranational institutions. A 
stronger intergovernmental stance is taken by Moravcsik (1991,1993) whose 
analysis of the SEA considers that the primary source of integration resides 
with the Member States themselves. A more neo-functional perspective is 
taken by Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) who contended that three groups 
reshaped the EU: industrial elites, EU institutions and Member State 
governments. Furthermore, Sandholtz (1994) investigates why Member 
States are prepared to give up their currencies and the sovereignty this 
entails. He contends that membership of the EU defines preference 
parameters and decisions. Intergovernmentalism alone fails to explain the 
impact that membership of the EU has on Member State preferences, interests 
and demands. Indeed, if European integration is to be fully understood a 
combination of approaches is necessary. This is a theme that has also been 
posited by Tranholme-Mikkelsen (1991), George (1994,1995), Garrett and 
Tsebelis (1996), Gehring (1996), Richardson (1996a), Ugur (1997) who also 
consider that further empirical work is necessary to enable greater 
understanding. 
In an empirical study of European integration over the late 1960s and early 
1970s, Kirchner (1976) argues that the ". .. logic and forces outlined by Haas 
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were generally found to be operative" (p 4). However, in a later work he 
contends that neither neo-functionalism nor intergovernmentalism 
adequately capture "... the existing overlap in decision-making between 
national and Community authorities, the sharing of joint tasks and interests, 
and the fusion of competencies between the national and Community level" 
(Kirchner, 1992; p 35). Pierson (1996) relies on neo-functional criticisms of 
intergovernmentalism and posits historical institutionalism as a means of 
understanding European integration7. Furthermore, Corbey (1995) amends 
neo-functionalism and argues that dialectical functionalism provides the 
impetus for European integration. Indeed, neo-functionalism considers that 
integration is ". .. a process of action (decision to act) and reaction 
(response to 
integration). Progress is generated by the mutual interaction of the 
institutions of the EU, member states, and interest groups, Since integration 
proceeds in stages, the dialectics of the process has to be given more attention" 
(pp 262-63). 
Peterson (1995) considers that "... the gap remains wide between theoretical 
models which seek to explain broad patterns of European integration and 
those which seek to explain the EU's policy-making process" (p 69) However, 
the debate has turned toward governance through the arguments initiated by 
Keohane and Hoffman (1991), Marks (1993) and Marks et al (1996; 1996a). A 
number of questions have been formed regarding the political order that is 
emerging in the EU and based on more general theories, policy-making has 
been investigated. Indeed, two theories predominate within the debate. 
On the one side, functionalists and neo-functionalists have 
conceived of the process of institutional innovation as one of 
7 Historical institutionalism is historical because things develop over time and institutional because this temporality is based in organisations through rules, structures and norms. Changes over time throu h changes in institutions or "... social processes understood as historical phenomenon" (Piersom, 1996; p 131). 
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integration in which supranational institutions compromise 
state autonomy and sovereignty by shaping institutional 
competencies, resources and decision-making rules. On the 
other side ... intergovernmental theorists have argued that 
member states and their executives continue to dominate 
decision-making in the European Community ... While they 
differ substantively, these contending accounts share a 
fundamental assumption about how to conceptualise the 
European Community. Both view the defining features of the 
outcome in terms of the relative role of supranational versus 
national institutions. They share a conception of the outcome of 
institution building in the European Community as varying 
along a dimension characterised by intergovernmentalism at 
one extreme and a supranational state at the other (Marks, 1993; 
p 391). 
Hooghe and Marks (1997) link neo-functionalism (through supranational 
actors and interest groups) to multi-level governance and 
intergovernmentalism to state-centric governance. They conclude that the 
state-centric approach is not capable of fully explaining European policy 
making processes; that EU decision-making and policy-making are of a multi- 
level nature. Indeed, Marks et al (1996) provide an interesting interpretation 
of the present situation. "Multi-level governance does not confront the 
sovereignty of states directly. Instead of being explicitly challenged states in 
the European Union are being melded gently into multi-level polity by their 
leaders and the actions of numerous sub-national and supranational actors. 
State-centric theorists are right when they argue that states are extremely 
powerful institutions that are capable of crushing direct threats to their 
existence" (p 371). However, it is not necessary ". .. to argue that states are on 
22 
the verge of political extinction to believe that their control of those living in 
their territories has significantly weakened" (ibid). (For a critical overview of 
European integration theories and the current state of the debate, see Cram, 
1997). 
Interest group studies have been undertaken in an attempt to allow further 
understanding of European integration. The growth in the validity of the EU 
as a decision-making entity is made evident by the proliferation of interest 
group activity in aftermath of the SEA (Mazey and Richardson, 1992; 1993; 
1996). Involved in the overview of the theories is the neo-pluralist and neo- 
corporatist schools (Schmitter, 1990; Streeck, 1989; Grant, 1990; Streeck and 
Schmitter, 1991; and Jordan 1991). There is also a strong emphasis on 
pluralism in the EU (Grant, 1989; Kirchner and Schwaiger, 1981; Sargent, 
1987). However, this thesis concentrates on intergovernmental and neo- 
functional processes. 
A number of theorists concern themselves with interest groups in general 
(Sidjanski, 1970; Averyt, 1975). Kirchner (1980) provides an analysis of the 
formation and development of interest groups at the European level and 
gives an indication of the characteristics of the groups and their interaction 
with the European decision-making bodies. He also provides an illustration 
of the top twenty-one interest groups at the European level, indicating in 
general terms how they attempt to influence decision-making in Europe (ibid, 
p 111). In more general terms there has been some analysis of interest groups 
in relation to the European Union (Lieber, 1974; Mazey and Richardson, 1992; 
Grant, 1995) each considering that further empirical work was necessary. 
Sidjanski (1970) proposed that groups establish themselves at the European 
level because they recognise a new centre of decision-making. As the EU 
began to affect certain interests, organisations congregated around the new 
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institutions "... sometimes ... prompted by invitation or even pressure from 
the Commission" (p 402). Following an empirical study of European decision- 
making processes Mazey and Richardson (1996) support the idea of interest 
group /Commission interaction and provide clear evidence that consultation 
and lobbying are prolific. Indeed, both Sidjanski and Mazey and Richardson 
support elements of a neo-functional process. 
Further work has recently been done in terms of identifying precise interest 
groups and analysing the process at the European level in terms of the 
harmonisation of specific industries. However, much of this has concentrated 
on industrial goods and procurement from a neo-corporatist standpoint. 
(Greenwood et al, 1992; Greenwood, 1995; 1997; Maloney, 1993; McLaughlin et 
al, 1993; McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995; McLaughlin, 1995). Some consider 
that interest groups at the EU level are far from the dynamic entities 
perceived by Haas (McLaughlin et al, 1993; Schneider et al, 1994). Greenwood 
and Cram (1996) point out that there ". .. have been cases where national 
associations have undermined the collective agreement of the European 
federation by going direct to the Commission" (p 460). Furthermore, in some 
instances, there is competition between national and European interest 
groups. Indeed, in certain sectors individual companies lobby the 
Commission directly. McLaughlin et al (1993) suggest that European interest 
groups are undermined by large companies entering the political system 
themselves. "However, collective action is shown to be an indispensable 
option for large companies lobbying in Europe" (p 191). Camerra-Rowe (1996) 
concludes that there are variations from sector to sector in patterns of interest 
group representation and analyses interest group potency in respect of the 
automobile and insurance sectors. Andersen and Eliassen (1991) offer a 
synopsis of the differences between financial sector and agriculture interest 
groups. Ultimately, they posit the need for further democratisation of 
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European institutions and point in the direction of the European Parliament. 
The insurance sector is considered to have a unified and influential interest 
group because companies are willing to accept interest group representation. 
Indeed, the Commission promotes interest group representation. However, it 
does prefer European-wide interest federations over representatives of 
individual or national organisations (OJ/93C 63/03). Furthermore, "... both 
the European Commission and the European Parliament frequently stress 
that they want to speak to European organisations" (Club De Bruxelles, 1994; p 
96). 
This thesis acknowledges these theoretical differentiation's, proposals and 
findings and wishes to provide further understanding of the issues. The 
above has overviewed the main aspects of the theoretical literature to 
provide an understanding of the discussions regarding neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. The main concern is to provide an understanding of 
the literature and point out how this thesis fits into the on-going debate 
regarding theoretical and practical processes of European integration. 
This thesis concentrates on the life insurance industry which has a number of 
interest groups at both the national level [Association of British Insurers 
(ABI) in the UK] and European level [Comite Europeen Des Assurance (CEA)] 
and [Bureau International Producteurs Assurances et Reassurances (BIPAR)] 
which is made up of smaller insurance companies and brokers. Through an 
analysis of this sector and the above interest groupings it attempts an 
understanding of European integration processes in theoretical and practical 
terms. 
25 
Life Insurance and Europe Union Literature 
The Treaties of Rome state that the "liberalisation of ... insurance services 
connected with the movements of capital shall be effected in step with the 
progressive liberalisation of capital" (Art 61 (2)) and that the "... movement of 
capital between Member States shall be freed from all restrictions by the end 
of the first stage at latest" (Art 67 (2)). If this is to be the case there are a number 
of areas to be taken into consideration in respect of Non-Tariff Barriers 
(NTBs). Through its concentration on the life insurance industry this thesis 
indicates the technical barriers in respect of legislated regulation that need 
harmonisation, if a SEM in life insurance is to be achieved. 
In Chapter Five, an insurance regulation matrix is constructed through the 
information supplied by Lloyds (1991), Munich Re (1988), Sigma (1988-94) BIIC 
and CEA working papers, Pool (1991) and a survey of the EU insurance 
industry undertaken by the author. Carter and Greenway (1991), Dickinson 
(1990,1994), Carter and Diacon (1991), and Ellis (1990,1994,1995) provide a 
general understanding of the insurance industry in Europe. Vipond (1995) 
outlines a view of insurance representation at the EU level and indicates how 
national positions are compromised in the European interest group CEA. 
Cecchini (1988) gives an analysis of the benefits to be gained from the single 
market and the extent to which insurance is an important aspect of this. A 
political emphasis is illustrated in the Commission White Paper (1985), the 
Treaties (1988), the Maastricht Treaty (1991) and the Commission Report 
(1992). Randone (1990) and Canzano (1994) indicate that the way forward is in 
planning and creating a strategy for Europe and along with Jur et al (1989) 
acknowledge the need for legislation that facilitates cross-border trade. 
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Pool (1992) illustrates the link between the evolution of the Union, its 
growing membership, its institutions and the progression of its legal 
framework. He describes how the Commission and the Treaties are part of the 
decision-making process but he does not indicate whether or not the 
insurance industry has a part to play in this process; the CEA contends that it 
does and that as an interest group, it is central to the process. 
Considering that diverse life insurance legislation existed throughout the EU, 
how was an SEM in life insurance to be achieved? Eltis and Spencer (1993) 
acknowledge this problem and consider mutual recognition and the co- 
ordination of essential minimum levels of supervision and co-operation 
between supervisors to be the way forward. Loheac (1992) considers that the 
third generation of insurance directives constituted a "cultural revolution" 
which affected all European financial sectors and that the operation of 
insurance would not be left unaffected by legal developments in the EU. 
Indeed, all Member State industries would be affected in some way by the 
changes in legislation and, as integration grew, differing legislative norms 
would become more apparent and the more difficult it would become to meet 
minimum conditions to overcome this diversity (Loheac 1991). In the latter 
work Loheac identifies regional grouping through integration and a 
convergence of regulation that he hopes will create further trading between 
Member States. 
Corley (1992) considered that the Third Life Assurance Directive would allow 
a SEM in life insurance, at least as far as supervision was concerned8. 
However, he contended that there were differences in the attitude to risk 
between Member States, which were not a result of regulation or economic 
8 The Third Life Assurance Directive is the latest legislation regarding cross-border trade for life insurance in the SEM. It allows home supervision and a licence to trade anywhere in the EU. It it defined further below (Chapter Eight). 
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development. Heseltine (1992) looked toward greater harmonisation in the 
SEM and proposed further consultation with business and welcomed 
constructive dialogue between the insurance industry and government 
stating that this was "... an absolutely essential foundation" (p 5) as were the 
close relations between the insurance industry and the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI). Heseltine considered that "... less legislation is the UK 
way" (ibid) and contended that he wished to persuade the rest of the EU of 
this. However, he did take into account the special nature of insurance and 
the need for a modicum of regulation. 
Palliser (1992) contends that the insurance sector has been shaped by 
legislation and "... that in time the harmonisation of regulatory frameworks 
should introduce open competition in the life insurance market across the 
Community" (p 4). Additionally, Majone (1990; 1996) Mayer (1995), McGowan 
and Seabright (1995) and Ogus (1993) provide an overview of regulation in 
general and how it has evolved especially in respect of the EU. 
Further work on the insurance industry in Europe has been undertaken by 
Drabbe (1994) and Canzano (1994) who investigated whether a single market 
in insurance is a realistic goal. Boleat (1995) considered whether a single 
market in insurance had been realised: the answer to which was "no". The 
potential of the market is discussed by Fitchew (1990), who indicated that the 
changes would not happen immediately and realised as early as 1990 that the 
completion of an internal market in insurance would not be completed by 
1993 but only be in its infancy. Frangoulis (1988) considered that there would 
be little change especially over the first four or five years. He thought that the 
industry would need time to acclimatise to the changes. This was reinforced 
by O'Leary (1988) but he contended that eventually the single market would 
be realised and the UK should ready itself for this occurrence. Russell (1988) 
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admitted that harmonisation was likely to happen and that two areas should 
be concentrated on with regard to regulation: protection and market 
opportunities. 
This thesis illustrates how the SEM is evolving and indicates how this may be 
part of integration processes that are creating further European union: that 
the Treaties force the process and through self-interest and mutual assistance 
industries and sectors are proactive in the formation of the SEM and this 
necessitates extensions of the Treaties and further integration. European 
information can primarily be found in the Official Journals Commission and 
Parliamentary publications. The interest group compromises can be perceived 
in CEA, BIIC and ABI briefing papers. 
Included in the process of integration is the free movement of services and 
this is where the need to harmonise the insurance industry springs from. 
Cecchini (1986) identified the losses that Europe incurs because of the NTBs 
that Member States create; this gave an economic impetus to union whereas 
the treaties exemplified the political will. This provides a means by which 
one may identify both intergovernmental and neo-functional processes in the 
creation of regulatory conditions. The life insurance market is an important 
area in the completion of the SEM. However, agreement in this sector is 
invariably difficult to attain. This study provides an empirical account of the 
decision-making processes regarding the Third Life Assurance Directive and 
the attempt to create a single market in life insurance and an analysis of the 
theoretical propositions that this empirical account creates. 
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Conclusion 
It has been necessary to break the literature review down into three parts: 
Methodology, Post-War Integration Theory and Life Insurance and European 
Union. This has been done to illustrate the extent of the literature used in the 
thesis and how each part relates to the other. Functionalism, neo- 
functionalism and interest groups are related because the theories rely 
heavily on interest group usage; this is especially so of neo-functionalism. 
Each part of the theoretical literature concludes that there is a necessity for 
empirical studies and considers that European integration should be 
reassessed through these empirical studies. 
This thesis revisits and reassesses European integration from both theoretical 
and empirical perspectives. The methodology has attempted to understand 
neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism from a grounded theory 
perspective. Grounded theory considers that theories are not proved or 
disproved but added to or detracted from. Theory is an on-going and an 
interaction between inductive and deductive processes. Through grounded 
theory methodology, some of the criticisms levelled at neo-functionalism 
may be overcome, especially with respect to the absence of a dependent 
variable. On an empirical level an analysis of the decision-making processes 
regarding the European life industry allows a better understanding of neo- 
functional and intergovernmental processes. The literature indicates the 
debates and channels of influence that were at work in the creation of the 
single market in life insurance and signalled the direction that the empirical 
study should take in the creation of a substantive theory. Basically, the three 
areas provide the means by which a better understanding of the European 
integration process may be achieved and indicate levels of understanding that 
have been managed to date. The next chapter introduces the methodology of 
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grounded theory and illustrates the data collection processes and 
interpretations that are the bases of the substantive theory. 
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Chapter Two 
Methodology: A Grounded Theory Approach 
Induction introduces us to first principles and 
universals, while deduction starts from universals. 
Therefore there are principles from which 
deduction starts which are not deducible; therefore 
they are reached by induction (Aristotle, 1983; p 
207). 
Introduction 
The main aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the thesis has applied 
grounded theory to European integration. To do this, the thesis, initially 
undertakes a comparative analysis and open coding of Member State life 
insurance legislation and through induction, deduction and verification 
formulates tables, matrices and models to illustrate harmonisation processes 
in the European decision-making process. Grounded theory wishes to 
construct substantive theory through coding data. Substantive theory 
necessitates four central criteria. Fit, comprehension, generality and control: 
the theory should be induced from diverse data and be faithful to reality (it 
should fit); secondly, the fit should be comprehendable; thirdly, the data 
should be comprehensive and interpretations conceptually wide (there 
should be generality); and finally, in relation to generality, it should be made 
clear when conditions apply to specific situations and phenomena (there 
should be control) (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Indeed, hypothesis proposing 
relationships among concepts should be ground from the data. This chapter 
explains how the thesis constructs a substantive theory and illustrates the 
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extent to which it (the substantive theory) relates to pre-existing formal 
theories. 
Substantive theory emerges from the analysis of a "... particular situational 
context", whereas formal theory "... emerges from a study of phenomenon 
under many different types of situations" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 174). 
However, it is recognised that theories are never completed but always in the 
process of construction. 
The Philosophical Roots of Grounded Theory 
The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967) ". .. provided a strong intellectual 
rationale for using qualitative research to develop theoretical analysis" 
(Charmaz, 1983; p 109). The approach provides the qualitative research area 
with a defined structure to enhance its credibility. Effectively, it was a 
demonstration against the predominance of quantitative research. Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) draw on Dewey (1950) Mead (1962) Blumer (1969) and the 
pragmatist tradition. Dewey considered that, ". .. 
flowers can be enjoyed 
without knowing about the interactions of soil, air, moisture and seeds of 
which they are the result. But they cannot be understood without taking just 
these interactions into account and theory is a matter of understanding" 
(Dewey, 1950; p 12). Theory cannot answer questions ". .. unless we are 
willing to find the germs and roots in matters of experience" (ibid). In the 
acquisition of knowledge, an essential element ". .. is the perception of 
relations, especially the relations between our actions and their empirical 
consequences. " (Scheffler 1974 p 197). By this means, the world around us and 
we as individuals take on deeper meaning; in this context, humans need 
experience and the means of storing that experience. However, experience is 
more than "... a passive registering or beholding of phenomena; it involves 
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deliberate interaction with environmental conditions, the consequences of 
which are critically noted and fed back into the control of future conduct" 
(ibid). 
Dewey, considered that from 
... the child's exploration of its environment to the scientist's 
theorising about nature the pattern of intelligent thought is the 
same: a problem provides the initial occasion of inquiry. Action 
is blocked, conflicts or difficulties create an unsettled situation. 
Deliberation is blocked; action turned inward; the resultant 
elaboration and competition of hypothetical ideas sparks action 
once more. Such action tests the idea that initiated it, for if the 
action settles the initial difficulty, the idea has worked in 
reorganising conduct in a more effective pattern ... Experiment 
for Dewey is, experience rendered educative (ibid, p 196). 
Indeed, grounded theory can be based on symbolic interaction (Mead, 1962) 
where the ". .. individual enters as such into his own experience only as an 
object not as a subject; and he can enter as an object only on the basis of social 
relations and interactions" (p 225). Through the language and structure of 
roles we become a generalised other; we attain a consciousness of self as a 
generalised other. This may allow the individual to take an impartial and 
general standpoint in observing and evaluating one's own conduct when one 
becomes a generalised other or the object of one's own reflection. At this 
point one has become self. 
One now regularly takes an impartial and general standpoint in 
observing and evaluating one's own conduct ... (however) .. 
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The organised community or social group which gives to the 
individual his unity of self may be called the generalised other 
and is the attitude of the whole community (Blau, 1952; pp 162- 
163 author's brackets). 
Blumer (1962; 1969) builds on the work of the pragmatist tradition and 
considered that, "... ordinarily human beings respond to one another, as in 
carrying on a conversation, by interpreting one anothers' actions or remarks 
and then reacting on the basis of interpretation" (Blumer, 1969; p 71). 
Grounded theory builds on this understanding and considers that the 
research should be grounded out of reality and that the researcher should get 
out into the field and discover/ comprehend what is going on. People have an 
active role in shaping the world and through interrelationships in terms of 
meaning, action and conditions the nature of experience continually evolves 
(this creates changes in understanding phenomenon) (Corbin and Strauss, 
1990). Indeed, grounded theory is primarily inductive and pursues the 
interpretations of those involved in the situation that is being researched and 
the interpretations of the researcher in relation to the data. Through this 
process grounded theory is pursued and substantive theory constructed. 
Grounded Theory as Methodology 
Grounded theory looks to the generation of theory through comparative 
analysis and does not attempt to undermine theory but better it. Indeed, "... a 
theory's only replacement is a better theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; p 28). 
"Grounded theory is based on the systematic generation of theory from data, 
and itself is systematically obtained from social research. Thus, the grounded 
theory method offers a rigorous orderly guide to theory development that at 
each stage is closely integrated with a methodology of social research" (Glaser, 
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1978; p 2). Through the general method of comparative analysis, grounded 
theory wishes to create a theory made up of general categories. It is not 
necessary to know the concrete situation better than those involved in it. The 
analyst simply wishes to develop theory that applies to relevant behaviour. 
Theory is never a finished product, but always in the process of development. 
Generating a theory from data means that most of the ideas or hypotheses are 
not only derived from the data but are worked out in relation to the data as 
the research progresses. 
While logico-deductive theory seeks to verify deduced hypotheses, grounded 
theory suggests that there should be a change of emphasis in respect of 
research methods and aims to emphasise the prior step of discovering what 
concepts and hypotheses are relevant to the area under research. Ultimately, 
the relationship between categories and sub-categories which are discovered 
during the research should be as a result of information contained within the 
data only, or from deductive reasoning which has been verified within the 
data, but not from previous assumptions which have not been supported 
(Cottingham and Hussey, 1996). 
Research should be approached with an open mind and as much objectivity 
and distance as is possible. However, it is acknowledged that such objectivity 
is difficult, as everyone is instilled with subjective tendencies; yet recognising 
subjectivity is part way to overcoming it. This may be considered to 
encompass theoretical sensitivity which is initially gained by entering the 
research "... with as few predetermined ideas as possible especially logically 
deduced, a priori hypotheses" (Glaser, 1978; p 3). Such enables the researcher 
to remain sensitive and ". .. record events and detect happenings without 
first having them filtered through and squared with pre-existing hypotheses 
and biases" (ibid). However, there is a problem here: each of us has 
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predetermined ideas as each of us has different levels of sensitivity which 
depend on 
... previous reading and experience with or relevant to the area. 
... Theoretical sensitivity refers to the attribute of having 
insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to 
understand, and the capability to separate the pertinent from 
that which isn't.... It is theoretical sensitivity that allows one to 
develop a theory that is grounded conceptually dense (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990; pp 41-40). 
In a later publication, Glaser expanded on his earlier definition. 
Theoretical sensitivity refers to the researcher's knowledge, 
understanding, and skill which foster his generation of 
categories and properties and increase his ability to relate them 
into hypotheses, and to further integrate the hypotheses, 
according to emergent theoretical codes. Accomplishing this 
result in relevance, fit and work are the criteria of grounded 
theory (Glaser, 1992; p 27). 
Grounded theory suggests that there is an over-emphasis on verification 
theory and wishes to demote the idea that the discovery of relevant concepts 
and hypotheses are a priori to research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; 
Charmaz, 1983; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Corbin and Strauss, 
1990; Glaser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1994). Grounded theory posits that 
theory is derived from data and consequentially illustrated through 
characteristic examples of data. Theory cannot be divorced from the process by 
which it is developed. Subsequently, most hypotheses and concepts are 
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generated through the data and worked out in relation to the data during the 
course of the research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
Initially, grounded theory is inductively derived from the study of the 
phenomena it represents. Data collection, analysis and theory are reciprocal 
with each other; one does not start with a theory which is then tested but an 
area of study from which what is relevant to the area becomes apparent. 
Induction needs to be grounded in social phenomena or observations and 
experience; hence the link between inductive and grounded theory (ibid). 
Charmaz (1983) reiterates Glaser and Strauss (1967) when she contends that 
data collection and analysis are undertaken simultaneously and that 
interpretation is formed through data discovery and vice-versa. The 
approach allows for emerging ideas because it provides for further data 
collection. It accepts that one of the main strengths of the grounded theory 
approach is one where data and ideas are derived through the research rather 
than through a priorism. Verification is secondary to understanding 
processes, not simply the processes of the phenomenon, but the 
understanding that social life itself is. a process. 
As such, theoretical analyses may be transcended by further work 
either by the original or later theorists. In keeping with their 
foundations in pragmatism, then, grounded theorists aim to 
develop fresh theoretical interpretations of the data rather than 
explicitly aim for any final or complete interpretation of it ... 
Although every researcher brings to his or her research general 
preconceptions founded in expertise, theory, method, and 
experience, using the grounded theory method necessitates that 
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the researcher look at the data from as many vantage points as 
possible (Charmaz, 1983; pp 111-114). 
Data should be analysed as it emerges and through coding, "order created" 
(ibid). 
This thesis acknowledges that it is easy to find a problem with a theoretical 
concept by identifying that certain data is missing. This could be the charge 
against most analyses. However, as Glaser and Strauss put it: "If each 
debunker thought about the potential value of comparative analysis ... he 
would realise that he has merely posed another comparative datum for 
generating another theoretical property or category" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
p 22). Despite what those concerned with evidence may say, nothing has been 
disproved, only another comparison created (ibid). 
An Application of Grounded Theory 
In general terms ". .. analysis makes use of constant comparisons. 
As 
incidents are noted, they should be continually compared against other 
incidents for dissimilarities and likenesses" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 9). 
Initially, a comparison of EU Member State life insurance legislation was 
undertaken and the extent to which this legislation allowed trading freedom 
in the national life insurance market identified (Oyen, 1990). A study of the 
European life insurance industry was undertaken and a convergence of 
Member State legislation asserted. The initial research relies on a comparative 
study of legislation and links this to national differences. This is a standard 
means of generating theory and is usually accomplished early in the study to 
put the "story straight" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; pp 
116-142). "Making comparisons assists the researcher in guarding against bias . 
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.. comparisons also help to achieve greater precision (the grouping of like and 
only like phenomenon)" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 9). Fundamentally, one 
is seeking regularities and this also creates order and helps with data 
integration. 
Theoretical Coding 
Theoretical coding is the basis of grounded theory. The essential relationship 
between data and theory is a conceptual code. The code conceptualises the 
underlying patterns of the data. "Thus, in generating a theory by developing 
the hypothetical relationships between conceptual codes (categories and their 
properties) which have been generated from the data as indicators, we 
discover a grounded theory" (Glaser, 1978; p 55). 
Coding illustrates ". .. the fundamental analytical process used by the 
researcher" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 9). Charmaz (1983) considers that 
coding incorporates ". .. the initial phase of the analytical method (and) is 
simply the process of categorising and sorting data. Codes then serve as 
shorthand devices to label, separate, compile and organise data. Codes range 
from simple concrete, and topical categories to more general, abstract 
conceptual categories for an emerging theory" (Charmaz, 1983; p 111). 
However, "... in grounded theory research there are three basic types of 
coding; open, axial and selective" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 9). 
Open coding examines phenomena through comparing and categorising data, 
whereas axial coding is the re-structuring of the whole process by finding 
connections between the data. Selective coding illustrates how the 
phenomenon fits around a core category (in this context, the existence of the 
EU and the SEM). Such leads on to 'process' whereby changes in the data are 
40 
monitored and made explicit. As noted above, grounded theory is both 
inductive and deductive, the deductive nature coming into play primarily in 
the pursuit of process. "As you have probably noticed while coding we are 
constantly moving between inductive and deductive thinking" (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990; p 111). When process is difficult to identify, the researcher may 
turn to deductive analysis so as to identify, possible situations of change, ".. . 
then go back to the data or field situation and look for evidence to support 
refute or modify that hypothesis" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; p 148). 
Open Coding 
"The goal of the analyst is to generate an emergent set of categories and their 
properties which fit, work and are relevant for integrating theory. To achieve 
this goal the analyst begins with open coding" (Glaser, 1978; p 56). Attention 
should be fixed on a category and the properties that emerge continually 
coded and analysed: these are the initial basic steps. Ultimately, one constantly 
compares and continually categorises. 
"The grounded theory approach is a qualitative research method that uses a 
set of procedures to develop an inductively derived theory about a given 
phenomenon" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 24). These procedures are coding 
techniques which, for this study, initially encompass a comparative analysis 
of the EU life insurance industry and the different regulatory systems of the 
separate Member States. The qualitative data on each regulatory environment 
is broken down in terms of open coding and restructured initially on a table 
and later refined in a matrix. The category of 'Regulatory Environment' 
emerged following an analysis of Member State legislation and regulations. 
Through further research conceptual labels emerged in terms of liberal, 
prescribed and state-controlled regulatory environments and each of these 
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was made up of the properties outlined in Table 2.1 (p 43). A category is a ".. . 
classification of concepts. This classification is discovered when concepts are 
compared one against another and appear to pertain to a similar 
phenomenon" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 61). Furthermore, conceptual 
labels are placed "... on discrete happenings, events, and other instances of 
phenomena" (ibid). Indeed, these concepts are made up of properties and 
characteristics that are indicated by the overall category. Finally, the Member 
States are given dimensions through the "... location of properties along a 
continuum" (ibid), in this thesis a regulation matrix (see Life Insurance 
Regulation Matrix One, Fig 5.1 p 157). This process was pursued through the 
use of code, theoretical, operational notes and diagrams; code notes illustrate 
separate types of legislation in the different Member States and how aspects of 
the legislation link together and fluctuate under conceptual labels; theoretical 
notes link different types of cultural existence to the conceptual labels and 
questions how compromises take place. Through the operational notes the 
need for further research is illustrated. The operational notes guided the 
research in respect of: who to survey; the questions to be asked; and further 
into the research, who should be interviewed and the structure the 
interviews should take. Overall, the research was visually represented 
through diagrams each of which illustrated the relationship between 
concepts. Indeed, the diagrams illustrate a ". .. visual sorting process that 
helps you identify how the categories are related to one another" (ibid p 197). 
In practical terms, the open coding process was used to create a scale of one to 
twelve on which a totally liberal regulatory environment is valued at one 
and a completely state-controlled or nationalised regulatory environment is 
valued at twelve. A prescribed regulatory environment is considered not to 
be one of primarily self-regulation, nor is it state-controlled: it is a market 
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Table 2.1 
Regulatory/ Legislative 
Environment Table 
(CATEGORY) 
Re ug latory Legislative/Regulatory 
Environments Stipulations 
Liberal (CONCEPTUAL (PROPERTIES) 
LABEL) 
1 Completely free market 
Approval of Company 
2-3 Solvency Margins 
Policyholder protection 
Evaluation of Liability 
& Rates 
3-4 Open Access to Insurance 
Information 
Prescribed 
5-6 Price Controls 
Marketing Controls 
Solvency Deposit 
7-8 Policy Approval 
Regulation of Contract 
State-Controlled 
9-10 State Controlled Companies 
Contractual Obligation to 
State 
10 -11 Intense Monitoring of 
Companies 
Proof of Ability 
12 Total State Control 
Member States 
(DIMENSIONAL- 
ISATION) 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
UK 
Eire 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Spain 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Portugal 
Greece 
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with tight government regulations (see the Regulatory /Legislative 
Environment Table 2.1 p 43 and the Data Collection Scheme, Table 2.2 p 
50). 
The higher the number on the table, the greater the regulation and state- 
control indicated in the Member State's legislative system. Through further 
comparative analysis and open coding each Member State was understood to 
be at some point on a matrix scale (see Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One, 
Fig 5.1 p 157). 
Once this had been accomplished, it was felt that some further investigation 
was necessary and a survey of the European life insurance sector was 
undertaken (see Data Collection Scheme, Table 2.2, and survey A, Appendix 
A, p 330). The matrix was subsequently revised taking into consideration the 
survey results which also raised further questions (Life Insurance Regulation 
Matrix Two, Fig 5.2, p 160). Ultimately, a secondary analysis was made of the 
data and further coding generated. In summary, through an analysis of each 
national market's legislation, a regulation matrix was created which could be 
verified and further analysed through a survey. The survey then added data 
to the regulation matrix and a greater understanding of the European life 
insurance industry regulatory structure was generated. 
Axial Coding 
Axial coding involves bringing the analysis together, to create a whole. It 
indicates the overall system of which the categories created through open 
coding are part. In this thesis, axial coding is verified through the interviews 
and further explained by the subsequent European Decision-Making Model 
(see Chapter Seven) It is inclusive of: 
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(a) Causal conditions. 
(b) Phenomenon. 
(c) Context. 
(d) Intervening conditions. 
(e) Action/ Interaction. 
(f) Consequences. 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990; pp 96-97). 
An application of axial coding in this thesis is identified through: 
(a) Membership of the EU. 
(b) The creation of the SEM and legislation to create regulatory environments. 
(c) The European decision-making process. 
(d) The harmonisation of different Member State concepts of market 
conditions (life insurance industries). 
(e) Interaction between Member States and decision-making bodies. 
(i) Goal orientation (purposeful) market as near to one's own. Interaction 
between Member states at the European interest group level. 
(ii) Evolutionary changes (processional) compromised issues. Interaction 
between interest groups and the EU decision-making institutions. 
(f) Outcomes or the creation of a harmonised SEM in the life insurance sector; 
a move towards greater European integration. 
In more specific terms, the causal conditions and phenomenon are 
membership of the EU and the on going evolution of the SEM. The context is 
the possible shift in sovereignty in terms of the decision-making process and 
market control. The intervening conditions are the necessities of 
harmonisation and the implications this has for integration; such is 
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illustrated through the compromises made by Member States in respect of 
regulatory environments. It portrays the need for action/interaction between 
Member States and the European decision-making institutions in terms of 
the evolutionary changes taking place i. e. the need to harmonise and create a 
SEM and the goal oriented interaction of creating legislation as close to one's 
own as possible. Finally, the consequences are the creation of the SEM 
through harmonisation and a shift toward greater European integration and 
closer European union. 
Glaser considers that axial coding ". .. undermines and confuses the very 
method that he (Strauss) is trying to build" (Glaser, 1992; p 61). This process 
forces the data and negates theoretical coding. The grounded theorist should 
code categories and properties and allow theoretical codes to emerge where 
they will. Strauss and Corbin consider that axial coding allows a more focused 
means of discovering and relating categories. 
That is, we develop each category (phenomenon) in terms of 
causal conditions that give rise to it, the specific dimensional 
location of this phenomenon in terms of its properties, the 
context, the action/ interaction strategies used to handle, manage, 
respond to this phenomenon in light of that context, and the 
consequences of any action/ interaction that is taken. 
Furthermore, in axial coding we continue to look for additional 
properties of each category, and to note the dimensional location 
of each incident, happening or event (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; 
pp 114-115). 
This research uses Corbin and Strauss' axial coding as a guide into which 
emerge the specific categories to the study i. e. those categories outlined above. 
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Selective Coding 
"Selective coding is the process by which all categories are unified around a 
core category" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 15). The core category in this study 
is the European Union and the process of European integration. The SEM in 
life insurance and regulatory environments incorporate ". .. other categories 
and stand in relationship to the core category as conditions, 
action/ interactional strategies, or consequences" (ibid). The selection of data 
and the creation of other categories have been processed with the core 
category in mind. "The core category represents the central phenomenon of 
the study. It is identified by asking questions such as; what is the main 
analytical idea presented in this research? What does all the 
action/ interaction seem to be about? " (ibid). The answers to which are: the 
integration processes at work in the EU, how Member States' 
action/ interaction create the SEM and how this adds impetus to European 
integration. These areas are identified and unified through axial coding. 
"During axial coding, one begins to notice certain patterns ... and a certain 
amount of integration naturally occurs" (ibid p 130). Indeed, a network of 
conceptual relationships already exists. Of course, the network may be unclear 
but these can be refined during selective coding. "It is very important to 
identify these patterns and to group the data accordingly, because this is what 
gives the theory specificity" (ibid). To clarify connections in the network 
grounded theory uses "... a combination of inductive and deductive 
thinking, in which we move between asking questions, generating 
hypotheses, and making comparisons" (ibid, p 131). Selective coding 
integrates the research, it puts the story straight, provides analysis, identifies 
the core category and illustrates how major categories relate, both to it and to 
each other. This can be further developed through understanding process. 
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Process: Self-Interest & Social Mutuality 
Process is also be built into the theory. "Process analysis can mean breaking a 
phenomenon down into stages, phases, or steps. Process may also denote 
purposeful action/ interaction that is not necessarily progressive, but changes 
in response to prevailing conditions" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 10). 
Consequently, when the life insurance sector and EU decision-making 
institutions are analysed, processes and action/ interaction are identified 
through interest groups. The changes and compromises made by interest 
groups and sectors are interpreted in relation to the changes the SEM has 
brought and is bringing about. 
The analysis identified process in the Member State markets because of their 
membership of the EU and the creation of a piece of legislation that would 
harmonise the different market environments. This would create the need 
for compromises; and the research sought to identify why and how these 
compromises and changes would take place. Consequently, a model was 
constructed through semi-formal interviews, participatory observation and 
the third survey (survey C, see Data Collection Scheme, Table 2.2, p 50 and 
Appendix A, p 330). Each of the surveys assisted in theory generation; the 
results of survey A (see Data Collection Scheme, Table 2.2, Appendix A and 
pp 158-68, for results) describe the processes at work which lead to theory 
generation and are used as secondary analysis with regard to the comparative 
analysis of Member State insurance industries. "Comparative analysis 
requires secondary analysis when populations from several different studies 
are compared, such as different nations or factories" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
p 188). Surveys B and C are used in the same way with regard to the decision- 
making model (see Data Collection Scheme, Table 2.2, and Appendix A). 
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From an assumption of the maximisation of self-interest, the convergence of 
legislation is examined. However, the research does recognise the difficulties 
with indicating self : interest alone as a motivator and considers that an 
ethical/welfare stand-point is a factor (Sen 1992). 
Through a compromise being reached at the European level, self-interest is 
sacrificed for the general good or welfare even though this is initially in a 
limited areal. However, ultimately welfare is realised throughout Europe in 
terms of peaceful co-existence and economic expansion. As Scheingold 
indicated ". .. integration was good by definition since it was directed at 
economic reconstruction and permanent reconciliation between nations 
whose conflicts had led to bloody wars ... A 'United States of Europe' seemed 
almost by definition likely to serve the cause of a peaceful and prosperous 
future" (Scheingold, 1971; p 30). 
The Data Collection Scheme. 
The data collection part of the research (or the methods used) is a balance 
between interviews, participatory observation and surveys. Indeed sampling 
has been based on the grounded theory technique of theoretical sampling. 
Theoretical sampling is undertaken on the basis that "... concepts have 
proven theoretical relevance to the evolving theory"(Strauss and Corbin, 
1990; p 176). Proven theoretical relevance identifies concepts that are 
significant enough to considered categories "... they are deemed significant 
because (1) they are repeatedly present or notably absent when comparing 
incident after incident (2) through coding procedures they earn the status of 
I Welfare in this thesis is based on the concept of the social contract, as in, the need for people to work and exist together so they are able to pursue their self interest. It is based on Kant's civic constitution, Durkheim's organic society and Rawl's veil of ignorance. It is giving up one's individual freedom in certain areas for the welfare or general good of all. 
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categories.... The aim of theoretical sampling is to sample events, incidents, 
and so forth, that are indicative of categories, their properties and 
dimensions, so that you can develop and conceptually relate them" (ibid, p 
177). Theoretical sampling involves three processes: open sampling which 
relates to open coding; relational and variational sampling which is 
associated with axial coding; and discriminate coding which is linked to 
selective coding. 
Table. 2.2 
Data Collection Scheme 
Survey A: Survey of European Union life insurance companies. Allows 
an understanding of market environment perceptions from separate 
Member States. Open sampling and relational and variational sampling 
urve B: Survey of European Parliament, Permanent Representatives, 
Member State insurance interest groups, Lobbyists and the Commission. 
This provides a picture of the parts played by organisations in the decision- 
making process. Relational and variational sampling 
Survey C: Survey of UK insurance companies to ascertain interest group 
utilisation. Discriminate coding 
Interviews: The interviews are supplemented by survey C and provide an 
in-depth understanding of the EU decision-making process with regard to 
the Third Life Assurance Directive. Relational and variational sampling 
and discriminate coding 
Observations and preliminary discussions: This incorporated three 
months in Brussels working with a European political consultant (GJW), a 
period with the European section of a UK company (Commercial Union) 
open discussions and close contact with the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI). Open sampling 
Following an inductive analysis of the different Member States' life insurance 
legislation and a survey (survey A, see Table 2.2 and Appendix A, p 330) of the 
European life insurance industry, a regulatory environment matrix was 
created. This part of the of the analysis illustrates open sampling where the 
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aim is ". .. to uncover as many potentially relevant categories as possible 
along with their properties and dimensions" (ibid, p 181) and the beginnings 
of relational and variational sampling. Indeed, the survey validates the 
relationships between the categories and identifies processes. From this some 
propositions were formed and the sampling gradually became specifically 
relational and variational. The sampling was undertaken purposefully. This 
encompassed choosing individuals and documentation that demonstrated 
variations in the categories and what happened when change occurred. 
Fundamentally, as with the coding process the distinction between relational 
and variational sampling and discriminate sampling became unclear. 
Discriminate sampling is direct and deliberate and is indicated by the choice of 
interviewees and survey C. "In discriminate sampling, a researcher chooses 
the sites, persons and documents that will maximise opportunities for 
verifying the story line, relationships between categories" (ibid, p 187). 
Sampling in grounded theory studies is concerned with the ". . 
representativeness of concepts in their varying forms. In each instance of data 
collection, we look for evidence of its significant presence or absence, and ask 
why? " (ibid, p 190). Grounded theory studies look ". .. for incidents and 
events that are indicative of phenomena" (ibid). Indeed, they pursue density 
and "... the more interviews, observations and documents obtained, then the 
more evidence will accumulate, the more variations will be found, and the 
greater the density will be achieved. Thus there will be wider applicability of 
the theory, because more and different sets of conditions affecting 
phenomena are uncovered" (ibid pp 190-91). 
This process subsequently set up a number of questions which were 
investigated through semi-formal interviews with key individuals in the 
creation of the Third Life Assurance Directive and through participatory 
observations of the European decision-making process. These gave an 
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understanding of the political process and enabled further construction of a 
theoretical model. Table 2.2 summarises the data collection process in terms 
of three surveys, the interviews and participatory observations. In survey A, 
three hundred questionnaires were sent to insurance companies in eight of 
twelve Member States, (the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Spain and Eire). Four Member States were omitted mainly 
because of problems with translation and difficulties in terms of acquiring 
addresses. The response rate was 35-40% which are listed and analysed below 
in Chapter Five. The survey wished to illustrate the thoughts of the Member 
States with regard to national life insurance regulation and the creation of a 
single market. It also aimed to determine the extent of freedom allowed by 
the amount of regulation within a particular Member State and to illustrate 
what the respondents considered to be the optimum regulation for trading 
and the amount of legislation necessary to enable this. 
A survey of the European life insurance industry was used instead of 
interviews, because a broad sample was required to add to the regulatory 
environment matrix which encompassed the industry's understanding of the 
SEM and the EU. Indeed, the survey provided an understanding of the 
differences in Member State normative thinking in respect of life insurance 
regulation and raised the question of where and how compromise takes place 
in the creation of the SEM. 
Indeed, the questionnaire follows self-interest rationality in terms of 
competitive advantage in the evolving EU: however, at the same time it 
attempts to recognise other aspects of motivation in the process e. g. welfare. 
(Sen 1993). 
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One may consider that an environment free of regulation is an impossibility, 
and in a post-cold war situation, total state control untenable. This may be 
indicated by competition policy at the SEM level. It may be argued that no 
trading structure can exist without some form of regulation which invariably 
indicates legislation. What the survey wished to ascertain was the extent to 
which legislation has an effect on the regulatory environment within which 
a Member States' company traded and what type of regulatory environment 
would be most amenable to all Member States at the EU level. 
In a second survey (survey B, see Table 2.2, and Appendix A), questionnaires 
were sent to interest groups, lobbyists and Permanent Representatives 
(Finance Committees). This survey was of a qualitative nature and was 
reinforced by interviews. 
Finally, a third survey (survey C see Table 2.2 and Appendix A) of the UK 
insurance sector attempted to ascertain how companies approached the 
European and national legislatures. Respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements using a 
likert scale: one=strongly agree; two=agree, three=disagree, four=strongly 
disagree. This survey was used to identify the extent to which interest groups 
were used in the process of legislation creation and looked to verify or 
question the idea that European interest groups are used in the process of EU 
decision-making. 
The Role of Surveys in Grounded Theory 
Within the grounded theory methodology, surveys and quantitative data play 
an ambiguous role. "The sociologist whose purpose is to generate theory may 
of course collect his own survey data, but, for several reasons, he is more 
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likely to analyse previously collected data-called secondary analysis" (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1987; p 187). However, the researcher should give him/herself 
the "... freedom in the flexible use of quantitative data or he or she will not 
be able to generate theory that is adequate... (and) in taking this freedom he 
must be clear about the rules he is relaxing (ibid, p 186). Indeed, such 
flexibility will allow the richness of qualitative data to become apparent ".. . 
and lead to new styles and strategies of quantitative analysis, with their own 
rules yet to be discovered ... For example, in verification studies cross- 
tabulations of quantitative variables continually and inadvertently lead to 
discoveries of new social patterns and new hypotheses that are often ignored 
as not being the purpose of the research (ibid). 
Basically, grounded theory wishes to relax the rules of verification and 
accuracy of evidence to enable further theory generation ". .. the way they are 
relaxed for purposes of generating theory could apply to many styles of 
analysis" (ibid, p 187). "One might use qualitative data to illustrate or clarify 
quantitatively derived findings; or, one could quantify demographic findings. 
Or, one could use some form of quantitative data to partially validate one's 
qualitative analysis" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; pp 18-19). Such may be realised 
through triangulation. Indeed, as grounded theory itself is a theory it may 
never be completed (this would contradict grounded theory). Consequently, 
although surveys are not purely grounded theory techniques, used in certain 
ways they may benefit theory generation. In this context, they may be utilised 
in a grounded theory study and eventually they may be considered as part of 
the technique. This, one may speculate, is the direction in which Glaser and 
Strauss pointed in 1967. In 1992 Glaser makes this clear. "To repeat, 
qualitative analysis may be done with data arrived at quantitatively or 
qualitatively or in some combination" (Glaser, 1992; p 11). And how they may 
be used ". .. together effectively ... depends on the research" (ibid, p 12). 
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The Interviews 
Interviews were used to investigate decision-making processes at the 
European level. Over an eight week period working for a political lobbying 
company (GJW Political Consultants) in Brussels, the author was able to gain 
access to decision-makers. Interviews were undertaken with the Commission; 
insurance interest groups; the UK Permanent Representative (Finance 
Committee), and lobbyists. Further interviews were undertaken in Paris and 
the UK. 
The interviews were 'moderately structured' (Carlson, 1984) and were based 
on a number of informal discussions with individuals from the UK 
insurance industry. In carrying out the interviews, the interviewer gave a 
brief outline of what was thought to be the process. Direct questions were 
then asked which allowed for further questions, further elaboration was 
pursued until little more could be ascertained. The direct questions asked 
were in the forms outlined in Appendix B. 
Each interview attempted to look at the same phenomenon from a different 
perspective and enable data saturation and triangulation. The interviews 
were conducted between surveys B and C and indicated the need for survey C 
(see Table 2.2 and Appendix Ap 300). The need for legislative convergence is 
indicated by the open coding process, the surveys and consequent matrix. 
Additionally, the interviews and survey C allow the construction of a model 
of EU decision making processes. Indeed, they illustrate verification and the 
processes of selective and axial coding. Subsequently, through the use of both 
the matrix and the model, a substantive theory is constructed that illustrates 
convergence and harmonisation procedures in the EU. Ultimately, a 
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substantive theory of European integration is illustrated that has aspects of 
both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism (formal theories). 
Substantive Theory 
The substantive theory is built through coding, categorisation and process. 
The matrices provide the basis of the substantive theory in that they 
acknowledge that separate Member States pursue different market regimes. 
This sets up the problem of understanding how compromise is reached. The 
interviews, participatory observations and survey C further construct the 
substantive theory with regard to the EU decision-making process. This 
substantive theory has implications for the formal theory of neo- 
functionalism in terms of spillover, supranationality and interest group 
utilisation. 
"A substantive theory generated from the data must be formulated, in order 
to see which of diverse formal theories are, perhaps, applicable for furthering 
additional substantive formulations" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; p 34). This 
illustrates that theories are never complete but processes in themselves. In 
this context, one may question the extent to which neo-functionalism may be 
labelled a formal theory, and question the extent to which it is a substantive 
theory of integration theory in that it has not really emerged from studies 
under different types of situations i. e. integration processes external to 
western Europe. Thus, one may question the extent to which neo- 
functionalism or intergovernmentalism may be labelled formal theories. 
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Formal Theory 
A formal theory is composed of a model plus an indefinite 
number of interpretations, and there is a sharp distinction 
between model and interpretation. A model is not affected by 
any of its interpretations, but can be understood and studied in 
abstraction from all of them ... A substantive theory ... is ... 
about something in the real world (Diesing, 1972; p 31). 
Consequently, substantive theory needs to be verified and if changes to the 
theory are to be made there must be references to empiricism. The formal 
theory ". .. can be understood and studied in abstraction ... one can ... make 
deductions, search for inconsistencies, study the effects of changes in those 
postulated, and add new terms without referring to anything empirical" 
(ibid). 
In the context of this thesis, the formal theory is broadly integration theory 
and, specifically, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. The 
substantive theory is being generated through an analysis of the EU life 
insurance industry and decision-making processes and the quantitative and 
qualitative data and wishes to understand or dispute the formal theories 
(specifically neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism) and eventually 
add to, or at least, question the European integration process. Theory is open 
ended because as new categories or properties are generated, there is a place 
for them in the scheme. However, this does not incorporate total re-design. 
This research wished to investigate, verify, question and ideally, further 
understand European integration through an analysis of European decision- 
making processes in relation to neo-functional and intergovernmental 
theory. 
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Theory Building 
"The purpose of grounded theory ... is to build theory that is faithful to and 
illuminates the area under study" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 24). As noted 
above, Glaser and Strauss (1967) considered that grounded theory was 
concerned with two types of theory: substantive and formal (conceptual); 
theory allows hypotheses and substantive concepts to emerge from the data, 
so analysis may identify concepts relevant to understanding the data. 
In discovering theory, one generates conceptual categories or 
their properties from evidence; then the evidence from which 
the categories emerged is used to illustrate the concept. The 
evidence may not ... be accurate beyond doubt ... but the 
concept is undoubtedly a relevant theoretical abstraction about 
what is going on in the area studied (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; p 
23). 
The object of research, according, to Strauss and Corbin, ". .. in a grounded 
theory study is a statement that identifies the phenomenon to be studied" 
(1990, p 38). However, this does not mean that qualitative and quantitative 
data are incompatible. "In many instances both forms of data are necessary - 
not quantitative to test qualitative but both used as supplements, as mutual 
verification and most important for us, as different forms of data on the same 
subject, which when compared with each other generate theory" (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; p 38). 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) emphasised that generating theory was 
accomplished through the collection, coding and analysis of the data and that 
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these three operations were done together as far as was possible. These areas 
should interact continually, from the beginning of the investigation to its 
end. The separation of these areas hinders theory generation whereas set 
ideas stifle it. In this study the aim is to generate a substantive theory in 
relation to intergovernmentalism and specifically neo-functionalism, (formal 
theories) and investigate them with regard to their applicability as general 
theories of integration and their relevance to the EU. 
Conclusion 
This thesis illustrates grounded theory processes in the following ways. 
Firstly, a comparative analysis through the open coding of individual 
Member States' life insurance legislation and regulatory regimes; with the 
subsequent creation of a legislation/ regulation table and a regulation matrix; 
further coding through a survey of Member State insurance industries 
verified and refined the matrix. This investigation raised questions with 
regard to how legislative differences between Member States may be resolved. 
Secondly, through an interview programme, process is identified and 
illustrated through the European Decision-Making Model. The model and 
the matrix provide the building blocks of the substantive theory. 
Thirdly, the axial coding and selective coding processes are illustrated by the 
matrix and the model fitting together around the core category of European 
integration through the creation of the SEM. Axial coding draws all parts of 
the analysis together: it is the pivot or the axis of theory building. Fourthly, 
substantive theory is formulated through the grounded theory processes in 
relation to the formal theories of intergovernmentalism and neo- 
functionalism and these are illustrated as substantive theories in relation to 
realism, functionalism and integration theory which in themselves could be 
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understood as substantive theories of Kant's 'Civic Constitution' in Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose and Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Sketch (Kant, 1995). 
In empirical terms this thesis investigates the process of European integration 
through supranationality, spillover and interest groups by analysing the shifts 
in decision-making in terms of the European life insurance sector and the 
creation of the Third Life Assurance Directive. Furthermore, for this analysis: 
(a) Neo-functionalism and Intergovernmentalism = formal integration 
theories; (b) The author's theory building through the thesis = substantive 
theory. Finally the thesis generalises the situation regarding the life insurance 
industry (the substantive theory) and posits elements of both 
intergovernmental and neo-functional spillover in the process of European 
integration. 
With regard to the UK insurance industry and substantive theory, certain 
legislation has to be effected to ensure its ability to compete in the SEM. 
Consequently, the need for advantageous legislation is fundamental. In this 
context the survey attempted to identify the industry's subjective interests on 
a European level and investigate how they were agreed upon. One would 
consider that subjective interests would be voiced by organisations that speak 
for their membership i. e. interest groups or large companies. 
Through grounded theory techniques a substantive theory is built to enable, 
an understanding of integration theory and allow a greater comprehension 
of the SEM, European Union and European integration. Open coding and 
comparative analysis which initiates a survey and provides a deduction (to 
create an SEM Member States need to compromise their normative 
regulatory environments). Axial and selective coding of the phenomenon 
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and processes suggest further induction through interviews and participatory 
observation. Finally, the induction procedures illustrate the need for a further 
survey which allows for data saturation and an in depth understanding of the 
phenomenon. Throughout the analysis induction and deduction go hand-in- 
hand. One is continually analysing the data in the process of building theory. 
One is continually challenging theory through collecting and analysing data. 
Ultimately, ". .. methodology is the theory of methods" and the ". .. 
grounded theory methodology is in itself a theory which is generated 
alongside the substantive theory it is generating" (Glaser, 1992; p 7). 
This thesis recognises the difficulty in giving precise definitions of induction 
and deduction and the point where the former begins and the latter ends (and 
vice-versa) and acknowledges the grey area between the two. Such is 
considered by Alfred Marshall when he spoke of the methods. 
You make all your contrasts rather too sharply for me. You talk 
of the inductive & deductive methods: whereas I contend that 
each involves the other & that historians are always deducing, & 
that even the most deductive writers are always implicitly at 
least basing themselves on observed facts (Marshall, cited in 
Coase, 1995; p 169). 
Ultimately, Marshall wishes to emphasise the mutual dependency of 
induction and deduction as do Strauss and Glaser but each with different 
weighting. This thesis accepts the interdependency of induction and 
deduction. Effectively, such a process is at work in this research. However, 
there is an inclination toward emergence but an acceptance that forcing may 
take place unwittingly. As with the problems of delineation between 
induction and deduction the same may be said in respect of emergence and 
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forcing. The same may be said in terms of the difference between objectivity 
and subjectivity with emergence concentrating on the pursuit of objectivity in 
distance from the area under research; and forcing recognising the 
impossibility of pure objectivity because subjectivity is always involved in the 
interpretations of those undertaking the research and those being 
researched2. 
2 There is a dispute between Glaser and Strauss that revolves around the issue of the emergence and forcing 
of data. Glaser considers that Strauss' and Corbin's "pet theoretical code violates relevance and forces data' 
(Glaser, 1992; p 28). He contends that such a structured outlook undermines the emergent, empirical and 
endless ways of relating substantive codes. "The researcher must be aware of the vast array of theoretical 
codes to increase his sensitivity to their emergence in the data" (ibid). However, in their work Strauss and 
Corbin address their book to those "... who are about to embark on their first qualitative analysis research 
project and who want to build theory at the substantive level" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; p 8). In other 
words, it is a simplification which may lead the researcher into the more difficult nuances of grounded theory. 
Verification also seems to be a sticking point between the scholars. However, on closer examination neither is 
pursuing pure verification; each wishes for it to add to theory generation not to negate or disprove "... but 
add variation and depth of understanding" (ibid p 109). Glaser considered that the "... two types of 
methodologies should be seen in sequential relation. First we discover the relevancies and write hypotheses 
about them, then the most relevant may be tested for whatever use may require it" (Glaser, 1992; p 30). 
Whereas, Corbin and Strauss saw it as an aspect of the grounded theory method; they considered that 
statements should be verified against data, not to ". .. necessarily negate our questions or statements, or disprove them, rather ... add variation and depth of understanding" (Corbin and Strauss pp 108-109). It is 
just as important to "... find differences and variation as it is to find evidence that supports our original 
questions and statements. The negative or alternative cases tell us that something about them is different so we 
must move in and take a closer look" (ibid 109). However, each considers that it is possible to utilise 
verification as part of theory generation, the latter as part of grounded theory and the former as a 
methodology in its own right (see Strauss and Corbin, 1990; pp 107-109, Strauss, 1987; pp 11-15 and Glaser, 
1992; pp 27-30). 
Strauss (1987) makes his position clear where he contends that induction, deduction and verification are the 
very basis of grounded theory. "Because of our earlier writing in Discovery (1967) where we attacked 
speculative theory - quite ungrounded in bodies of data - many people mistakenly refer to grounded theory as 'inductive theory' (however), as we have indicated all three aspects of inquiry ... are absolutely essential" (Strauss, 1987; p 12 authors brackets). "Grounded theory is of course inductive; a theory is induced or 
emerged after data collection starts. Deductive work in grounded theory is used to derive from induced codes 
conceptual guides as to where to go next for which comparative group or sub-group, in order to sample for 
more data to generate the theory' (Glaser, 1978; pp 37-38). 
Glaser and Strauss' disagreements are based around their emphasis on deductive and inductive processes; Strauss considers that induction, deduction and verification are essential elements of grounded theory. Induction is primarily based on experience with the same kind of phenomena at some point in the past. It may be apparent because of personal experiences, exploratory research into phenomenon, previous research or because of theoretical sensitivity (knowledge of technical literature). "As for deduction: Success at it rests not 
merely on the ability to think logica11 but with the experience in thinking about the particular kind of data 
under scrutiny" (Strauss, 1987; p 12 This means drawing on experience as well as thinkin about the 
phenomenon and may include comparative analysis to further the deductive powers (ibid). He also indicates 
that experience and learned skills are very important tfor verification. "If ... experience and associated learned skills at verification, deduction and induction are central to successful enquiry, do not talent-gifts- 
genius contribute to that success? " (ibid, p 13). 
The full extent of the difficulties emerge in the two latest works. Strauss and Corbin propose that in grounded theory there is a continual movement between inductive and deductive thinking and that their statements are deductively proposed and verified (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; p 111). There is a continual comparison of incidents "... there is a constant interplay between proposing and checking. This back and forth movement is 
what makes our theorygrounded" (ibid). Glaser posits that it is at this point that Strauss and Corbin indulge in "... full conceptual description by forcing the data and leaving the emergence of grounded theory out 
completely" (Glaser, 1992; p 71). The sticking point is the confusionbetween induction and deduction. Glaser 
charges that he (Strauss) ". .. confuses induction with testing deductive hypotheses which are forced on the data (and) that it is not inductive to say the data disproves an hypothesis, it is simply a verification (ibid). However, Strauss and Corbin contend that it is necessary to continually verify ". . concepts and relationships arrived at through deductive thinking must be verified over and over again against actual data.. we are building Founded theory and it is the grounding or verification process that makes this mode of theory building different" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; pp 111-112). In response to this Glaser charges that Strauss and Corbin are developing a verificational method. "It simply tests forced conceptual hypotheses" 
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Finally, one may consider, that grounded theory should be interpreted as it 
was by Glaser: "By its very nature grounded theory produces ever opening 
and evolving theory on a subject as more data and new ideas discovered. This 
nature also applies to the method itself and its methodology" (Glaser, 1978; p 
ix). 
Glaser wrote that the "... analyst must remember it is the idea he is using not 
the person it was borrowed from ... it is only a slight easy step 
for the analyst 
to get lost in referring to the man and his work and to forget the theory being 
generated and the work it took to establish an emergent fit (Glaser, 1978; p 8). 
Strauss considers he took the idea further Glaser disagreed. Interpretation is 
everything? "Interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance .. 
. understanding operates 
in ... an involvement whole 
that is already 
understood". Effectively the environment or background determines possible 
ways of questioning. However, interpretation is also ". .. grounded 
in 
something we see in advance - in fore-sight" (Heidegger, 1962; p 191). 
Additionally, interpretation is made on the basis of those around you 
through symbolic interaction. Indeed, one is both subjective and objective in 
this context. Interpreted by self in relation to society and interpreted by society 
in relation to self, that is through self-indication3. "Self-indication is a 
moving communicative process in which the individual notes things, 
assesses them, gives them a meaning, and decides to act on the basis of 
meaning" (Blumer, 1962; p 183). However, to accomplish this some fore-sight 
is necessary, even if it is only a comprehension of language or culture. 
(Glaser, 1992; p 92). It is not a method that generates theory but one that verifies; it is a theory that forces the 
data rather than allowing it to emerge. For Glaser it was crystal clear that Strauss and Corbin had created a 
verification method. 
3 There is a great deal of scope for research to identify the links between 
ý 
phenomenology and the pragmatic 
approach of symbolic interaction in relation to different methodologies. However I am afraid it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis 
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This is how the author has approached the data, with the acknowledgement 
of social interaction and foresight. Foresight takes into consideration the 
theories that already exist regarding integration and specifically European 
integration. These are perceived as formal theories. Additionally, the 
researcher brings to the analysis expertise, knowledge and theoretical 
sensitivity. However, also bringing minimal preconceptions especially in the 
form of deduced a priori hypotheses. Effectively, objectivity is continually 
pursued through the recognition of subjective influences throughout the 
research process. 
The main aim of the thesis is to develop a substantive theory and use it to 
further our understanding of the European integration process. Indeed, the ". 
.. research findings constitute a theoretical formulation of the reality under 
investigation rather than consisting of a set of numbers or a group of loosely 
related themes. (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; p 24). To do this the thesis analyses 
the harmonisation and integration processes in a specific service sector and 
relates the findings to a number of formal theories; and specifically the formal 
theories of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. This thesis's 
concept of theory is taken further in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Formal-Substantive Theory? 
Elements of Integration Theory 
Theory is always for some one and for some purpose. All 
theories have perspective Perspectives derive from a 
position in time and space ... Of course, sophisticated 
theory is never just the expression of perspective. The 
more sophisticated a theory is , the more it reflects upon 
and transcends its own perspective; but the initial 
perspective is always contained within a theory and is 
relevant to its explication (Cox, 1981; p 128). 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of theory and illustrates the differences 
between formal and substantive theories through an overview of integration 
theory. It indicates how the grounded theory understanding of theory 
building will be used in this thesis. And through this approach it illustrates 
how a number of difficulties with integration theory and especially neo- 
functionalism may be overcome. 
"Virtually every major international relations theory has been criticised 
because it does not successfully predict outcomes" (Luchner, 1992; p 34). 
Effectively, the subject area is saturated with ideological stances which 
continually slant the debate. "Depending on who is arguing, it is either power 
theory, integration theory or interdependence theory that is not precise 
enough" (ibid, p 43). Haas criticises power theory and questions its use as 
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either a guide for the states person or as an analytical theory. Keohane and 
Nye, whose theory of interdependence owes much to integration theory, 
argue there is no such thing as integration theory but only integration studies. 
(cited in Luchner, 1992). However, is this not the difficulty of all analysis 
within the social sciences? Luchner asks ". .. are international relations 
scholars ... continually reinventing the wheel, and 
if so why do we keep 
repeating ourselves" (ibid p 36). Why indeed? Is it not to develop better 
theory? If we are to build theory, do we not have to build on what is already 
there? Without past theory and the continual reassessment and re-analysis of 
it we have nothing. Of course, this raises questions of how theory as a concept 
may be defined. In the strictest sense, theory should have shared assumptions 
and predict outcomes. However, the extent of prediction and the methods 
that should be applied are serious bones of contention not only in integration 
theory but in most social sciences. All that can be said of most prediction in 
the social sciences is that they are generalisations or trends: to expect more 
would be to crave omnipotence. This illustrates a shift from the naive 
realism of positivism to the critical realism of postpositivisml. 
The more information one has regarding the likelihood of an event, the 
greater the generalisation may be. At present, EMU is far more likely to take 
place in the EU than political union. However, with the actuality of EMU, 
political union becomes more likely and generalisation in this direction more 
feasible i. e. the chance that it may be realised in one form or another becomes 
more realistic. Additionally, to contend that political union will definitely 
occur 12 months following EMU is unacceptable, but to consider political 
1 Positivism and postpositivism are paradigms of inquiry. Positivism considers that an apprehendable 
reality exists through which immutable and natural laws may be derived. Postpositivism also considers that 
reality exists but it considers that because of the human condition (the flawed human intellect) it cannot be 
apprehended perfectly. Consequently, reality must be subjected to wide critical examination so it can be 
understood as near as possible (but never perfectly). Of course, definitons of theory are different when 
understood from a critical theory or constructivist perspective. This analysis remains in the postpositivist 
paradigm in its use of grounded theory. (see Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
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union as a probability is far more realistic (which in itself is a generalisation). 
Consequently, the methodology used in this thesis posits that theory is not 
simply about predicting: it also deals with understanding and generalisation. 
Theory is never completed but continually added to. Ultimately, this thesis 
builds ä substantive theory in relation to formal theories through grounded 
theory techniques. 
To fully comprehend different ideas of neo-functionalism, it is worth noting 
the theories that generated it and are juxtaposed to it: these are federalism, 
and functionalism. Additionally, there is a school of thought that considers 
that any integration must be brought about by the nation-state. This is 
normally known as a realist understanding of international relations and is 
one that underpins intergovernmentalism. 
Firstly, this chapter discusses Kantian political thought to identify the 
underpinnings of federalism and functionalism. Secondly, it indicates how 
intergovernmentalism draws on realism. And finally, the chapter illustrates 
how neo-functionalism is akin to aspects of federalism and functionalism. 
Overall, this chapter will give an overview of the particular theories in 
relation to Kantian political thought and integration theories (functionalism, 
federalism, realism, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism) and 
provide some general principles. 
Kantian Political Thought; Universal History and Perpetual Peace 
In his work Perpetual Peace a Philosophical Sketch, Kant considered that no 
"... conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made with 
a secret reservation of the material for a future war" (Kant, 1995; p 93). Indeed, 
a suspension of hostilities does not guarantee a lasting peace. Kant considered 
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that to achieve perpetual peace, it is necessary for it to be formally instituted 
and this needed to be concretised in a legal civil state. Such a legal state 
should be based on a constitution which is founded on three principles ".. . 
firstly, the principle of freedom for all members of society (as men); secondly, 
the principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common 
legislation (as subjects); and thirdly, the principle of legal quality for everyone 
(as citizens) ... a constitution based on cosmopolitan right, in so far as 
individuals and states, co-existing in an external relationship of mutual 
influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind (ius 
cosmopoliticum)" (ibid, pp 98-99). This idea was first illustrated eleven years 
earlier in Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose. In this, 
Kant purports nine propositions that indicate a guiding purpose for history. 
In Universal History, Kant considered that ". .. all natural capacities of a 
creature are destined to evolve completely to their natural end ... (and) ... 
the unsociable sociability of man" moving toward the "... achievement of 
universal civic society which administers laws among men" is the highest 
problem nature assigns to humanity (ibid, p 16 author's brackets). Only once a 
civic society has been attained can nature's other problems be solved. 
Humans need to exist within society because this creates a feeling of being 
more than human (as more than the developed form of their natural 
capacities). At the same time humans are unsociable because they feel 
hostility to those around them and expect hostility in return. It is this process 
that forces humans to protect themselves by aspiring to hold rank among 
their peers. Need forces humanity into curbing its natural aspirations to 
ensure a peaceful existence, unsociability initiates the "just civic constitution" 
and this incorporates laws to which all are answerable and no one is above. 
However, Kant recognised that one nation may attain a "just civic 
constitution" but unfortunately antagonisms would still exist between states 
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(ibid). "The problem of establishing a perfect civic constitution is dependent 
on the problem of a lawful external relation among states and cannot be 
solved without a solution to the latter problem" (ibid, p 18). Each state will 
expect the same antagonisms which forced it into seeking its own civic 
constitution. Through war and the threat of war, the full potential of 
humanity cannot be realised: consequently humanity is forced to seek the 
means of ensuring an equilibrium. Through self-interest humanity is forced 
to accept mutual existence. This thesis considers that this is the basis of 
European Union: mutuality and peace created through self-interest. 
The theories in this thesis investigate past attempts at equilibrium, and those 
being pursued in the present, with an emphasis on peaceful co-existence in 
the future. The concept of the league of nations and a united Europe was 
initiated through such an attitude i. e. the pursuit of a civic constitution to 
ensure peace between nation-states. The premise of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) was peace: its objective was to alleviate the prospect 
of war in Europe by controlling the products necessary to conduct a war. 
Through the pursuit of peace, Kant perceives a world civic constitution and 
as indicated above, this thesis contends that Europe fits into such an 
understanding in that it is an evolutionary or dialectical movement away 
from the nation-state toward such an entity. 
Integration Theory 
Political integration may be perceived as a situation in which two or more 
entities form a new structure (Galtung 1968). In international terms, we are 
speaking of nation-states undergoing a form of metamorphosis: in other 
words, they do not have to change into the same thing (another larger nation- 
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state). As indicated by Kant, integration may create world government or 
some type of regional federation like the EU. 
On such a process, most integrationist theorists would agree. However, a 
problem arises when we examine the kind of political community to be 
aimed for and the strategies and conditions that allow integration to proceed. 
In the first case, there are those who consider that integration encapsulates 
the formation of a supranational entity and those who press for the 
interaction of peoples across geographical boundaries. The former may be 
seen as the federalist or the state model while the latter represents the 
functionalist or community model. In the second case, the problem is 
apparent for academia and the policy-makers alike: academics tend to concern 
themselves with the identification of independent variables that account for 
the process of integration, whereas politicians concern themselves with the 
tactics and strategies of political change: i. e. how does one engender and 
achieve a process of integration? 
Some consider that successful integration depends on the bargaining power of 
political elites and their abilities to reach compromises acceptable to the 
public. Others consider that technology, the economy and social entities drive 
the ' integration process. The political outcome is not determined by these 
elements but makes demands on existing structures and allows opportunity 
for political bargaining out of which an integrated community may gradually 
emerge (Pentland, 1975). 
Realism and Intergovernmentalism 
The debate at the international level revolves around the realist argument 
and the functionalist argument. Realism is based on the Hegelian 
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interpretation of the state and international relations. "International law 
springs from the relations between autonomous states ... The nation-state is 
mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality and is therefore 
the absolute power on earth" (Hegel, 1967; p 212). The intergovernmental 
critique emphasises the importance of the nation-state in the process of 
European integration and is based on a realist model and Hegelian 
understanding of international politics. 
For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them 
meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a 
foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination 
of political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of 
these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually 
done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can 
surmise what their objectives might have been (Morganthau, 
1973; p 4). 
Based on the concept of power, realism is encapsulated by the motives of 
nation-states. Effectively, international relations in the form of foreign policy 
are pursued by nation-states alone. Consequently, these are the motors of 
change. However, 
... political realism does not assume that the contemporary 
conditions under which foreign policy operates, with their 
extreme instability and the ever present threat of large scale 
violence cannot be changed ... Nothing in the realist position 
militates against the assumption that the present division of the 
political world into nation-states will be replaced by larger units 
of a quite different character, more in keeping with the technical 
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potentialities and the moral requirements of the contemporary 
world (ibid, p 9-10). 
But this may only be achieved through the forces at a territory's disposal and 
these forces are encapsulated by the nation-state. "The realist cannot be 
persuaded that we can bring about ... transformation by confronting a 
political reality that has its own laws with an abstract ideal that refuses to take 
those laws into account" (ibid, p 10). The questions are: will the nation-state 
make itself obsolete? And do such laws or such a reality actually exist? Indeed, 
Keohane and Nye (1977) argued that ". .. integration among states is slight 
and lasts only as long as it serves the national interests of the most powerful 
states. Transnational actors either do not exist or are unimportant" (p 24). 
The realist model identifies international politics as continually in a state of 
conflict, as dominated by struggle. Four assumptions underlie a realist 
understanding of international relations: 
(a) States are the dominant protagonists in international politics. 
(b) States act as coherent units. 
(c) Force is an effective instrument of international policy. 
(d) High politics such as foreign policy and military security will always out 
weigh low politics e. g. economic policy. 
(Morganthau, 1973; p 10) 
Based on the realist critique, intergovernmentalism considers a number of 
points. Firstly, it considers that regional integration should take global criteria 
into account. Secondly, it contends that the real power-houses in the process 
of European integration are the nation-states and that these would remain 
committed to national interest. Finally, intergovernmentalists think that the 
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transference between low and high politics will never take place; integration 
would be condoned in technical fields to ensure mutual benefit but would 
never move into areas like defence, monetary policy and national security 
(George, 1994). 
There is no need to dispute the first of these points as everything is affected by 
international variations and historical change. The second of these 
assumptions denies the neo-functional idea: that through sector bargaining 
the political process would shift from the national to the supranational and 
overcome the dichotomy that the realists create for themselves. Indeed, the 
realists consider that things will change, but only through the perpetuation of 
what already exists (the nation-state). However, if the EU encompassed a 
larger nation-state, then in this context it would fit into the 
intergovernmental perspective. The third assumption may be disputed with 
the potential advent of monetary union and the extensions of decision- 
making powers that the European institutions have incrementally accrued. 
Richardson (1996) argued that it was necessary to take low politics as seriously 
as high politics. Indeed ninety per cent of European integration is about low 
politics and to fully comprehend this process it is necessary to understand 
how a range of non-governmental actors interact and how low decisions and 
policies evolve into legislation. European integration is ". .. not simply the 
outcome of inter-state bargaining ... " (p 5) but a complex process involving 
numerous actors. However, modern government is not ad-hoc but a 
procedural means of dealing with different preferences. Thus, such 
procedures may involve neo-functional as well as intergovernmental 
processes. 
73 
Federalism 
Federalism has developed through Kantian ideas, the Enlightenment, the 
federalist Papers of the Philadelphia convention and British nineteenth 
century thinkers (see Friedrich, 1967; Hodges, 1972; Levi, 1991; Katz, 1991; 
Pinder, 1991; Bosco, 1991). With regard to its European perspective it was ".. . 
designed to explain why the European polity ought to have a federal system, 
particularly in the aftermath of WW II" (Luchner, 1992; p 50). However, the 
proponents of a federal Europe did not give enough thought to how a 
federation may be attained. Unlike functionalism which followed 
incremental steps toward integration, ". .. most federalists initially 
implied 
that the best path towards integration would be a meeting akin to the 
Philadelphia convention where a written constitution for the European 
Federation could be drawn up" (ibid, pp 51-52). Initially, federalism was 
perceived as a theory of war and peace. Continued harmony between 
independent unconnected sovereign states in close proximity to each other is 
not borne out by historical experience. Fundamentally, ". .. 
historical 
experience teaches that peace cannot be maintained among sovereign states. 
Peace requires federation" (Levi, 1991; p 32). Re-iterating Kant's ideas in 
Perpetual Peace, Levi contends that, 
... peace is not merely a negative state of affairs, i. e. the 
suspension of hostilities in the interval between two wars. It is a 
positive situation which rests on a specific political organisation, 
i. e. federation. It does not depend on goodwill. It can only be 
achieved by a legal order and by a democratic government with 
independent legislative, executive and judiciary bodies (ibid). 
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However, whether European Union ". .. will assume the character of a 
federation, whether it will be a historically unprecedented political 
community, or a slowly developing 'untidy' federation, is not yet known" 
(Luchner, 1992; p 51). 
Change in federalism occurs when the historical circumstances are ri ht and 
transferral is brought about by political elites alone. Compromises a5 reached 
and new institutions formed: all this occurs with an element of, public 
support. Federalists consider integration to be the formation of a 
supranational state, which is given form through constitutional authority 
being realised in the new state. This is usually illustrated through a 
comparison with the United States as an ideal type and the contention that ". . 
. the emulation of a process that supposedly aided the United 
States to become 
the dominant power in the wake of World War II" (ibid, p 52) would enable a 
United States of Europe which could counter the American challenge. In this 
context, there are links with intergovernmentalism in that federalism 
pursues the creation of a larger new state. Indeed, such considerations counter 
the premise of European Union (peaceful co-existence) and such an 
understanding would consider that the EU would perpetuate conflict. 
Additionally, the adherence to ideals can lead to impromptu conclusions 
about the success or failure of the integration process, because "... ideal types 
are not true dependent variables since they cannot yet be observed or 
measured in nature" (Haas, 1971; p 27). 
Federalism looks to both unity and diversity and draws on the need to pacify 
nation-states through the practice of federal government. Its supporters claim 
it to be a superior form of government in that there is the possibility of 
reaching world government with the minimal dilution of national identities; 
once again adhering to certain intergovernmental principles. 
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Finally, moderate federalism or neo-federalism, as it has been labelled, also 
aims at constitutions. However, neo-federalists illustrate greater interest in 
the integration process than their counterparts. Effectively, they think beyond 
the construction of a United States of Europe and adhere to the concept of 
regionalism. Fundamentally, they consider that ". .. the European nation 
state as the strongest European political unit, has to fear a loss of power not 
only because of centralisation of power in EC institutions but also because of a 
possible devolution of power to regional polities" (Luchner, 1992; pp 54-55) 
Overall, federalism is perceived as a model to be aimed for, either in the more 
general understanding of a United States of Europe, or as a more devolved 
unit as illustrated through subsidiarity, the conception of which is included 
in the Maastricht Treaty (Article 3b). Federalism is most usually associated 
with the theory of federal government. However, there are those who 
consider that federalism is more a way of thinking and acting and consider 
that federalism is an ideology. It is seen as an ideology with a view of a 
political pursuit that would ensure a precise social existence. Such was 
indicated by Albertini (1979) who considered that federalism can only become 
apparent in ". .. multi-state areas which have reached the material and ideal 
conditions for political freedom ... (only when the area is) ... at a stage of 
development of material production, and of the consequent human 
interdependence, in which the division of society into classes has already 
been overcome, and in which it is possible to overcome the division of 
humanity into nation-states" (Cited in Bosco, 1991; p 15). 
Albertini provides a general federalist theory and indicates three elements of 
federalism: 
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(a) A particular historical time, a period where class antagonisms had been 
overcome and national antagonisms were about to be overcome; 
(b) A general moral stance, the concept of peace; 
(c) A structural denotation, a federal government. 
(ibid). 
This is taken further by Levi who contends that the underlying principle of 
federalism is democracy and that further federalism requires a new stage in 
democratic government. 
Federal institutions open new possibilities in the struggle for 
peace. The achievement of international peace requires a new 
stage in the enlargement of democratic government ... The 
first 
stage was ancient democracy ... The second stage is 
representative democracy ... The third stage is 
federal 
democracy. Federal democracy is designed to establish peace 
among nations and continents. Federal institutions give 
mankind a new power, the power to build a democratic state as 
big as the world This was the discovery of the United States 
constitution. That constitution concerns only part of the world, 
but now it must be applied to the other continents which have 
not yet achieved political unity (European Community first of 
all) and to the whole world (strengthening and reforming the 
United Nations) (Levi, 1991; p 33). 
With regard to European integration, federalism enables the formation of a 
common goal and offers an understanding of institutional integration that 
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may be compared with historical processes. Additionally, neo-federalism 
recognises the importance of the regions and incorporates this in its approach 
to integration. Finally, on some issues there is a close relationship between 
federalism and neo-functionalism and these will be highlighted in the 
conclusion of this chapter. 
Functionalism 
Mitrany (1943,1944,1965,1970,1975a, 1975b, 1975c) concentrated on 
international institutions and perceived their existence as a means of 
international divisions being overlaid by inter-state agencies through which 
the interests of countries would gradually be integrated. The premise of the 
process was benefit: international welfare would overcome emotional 
attachment to the state and provide international institutions which would 
engender both prosperity and peace. Mitrany gives the example of the 
international organisation of communications as a functional heading e. g. 
railway communications would be administered at the "logical limit of co- 
ordination" obviously at the level of the continent. "Shipping, on the other 
hand, would be administered on inter-continental terms but not universally. 
Land bound states would have little to offer the function of the organisation. 
Telecommunications, broadcasting and air travel would be organised on an 
international scale" (Mitrany, 1975a; p 116). Effectively, administration should 
be undertaken at the most logical level to enable efficient functional 
decisions. 
Mitrany considered that the two main objectives of government were stability 
and the management of change. "As regards the first it would not be difficult 
constitutionally if the political will were there, to translate the -instruments 
and experience of national life into the needs of the international order; but 
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with regard to peaceful change the problem in the two spheres is utterly 
different" (ibid, pp 131-132). The task was perceived as the building up of a 
common interest in peace. However, universal organisations in the context 
of the League of Nations and the United Nations were not yet achievable, and 
this was born out by their failure. Mitrany acknowledges the federal system 
on the one hand but sees it of limited scope, and in logical terms "... at the 
expense of general unity" (Mitrany, 1975b; pp 121-122). For Mitrany, 
functional organisation would create integration and peace. 
As it became more apparent that the nation-state was able to assume, quite 
adequately, a wide range of welfare functions to ensure the well-being of its 
people. This led to a rethink of the state's position in the functionalist process. 
Indeed, it was concluded that rather than by-pass the state, it would need to be 
an element in the integration process. The welfare aspects of the state could be 
integrated on, if not world, then a regional basis; this was a shift from 
functionalism to functional integration (Mitrany 1944). 
It may be argued that functionalism allows for the changes and adaptations 
that social evolution creates: that it is pointless to work towards some specific 
end as is attempted in a federalist model because humanity is incapable of 
delineating the end point. All one may achieve is a concept of community 
that indicates organisational networks each designed to meet a specific social, 
economic or technical need. Functionalism looks to change through ".. . 
linking authority to a specific activity and seeks to break away from the 
traditional link between an authority and a definite territory" (Mitrany, 1975a, 
p 125). 
In 1943, Mitrany considered that the "... new approach toward the goal of 
international collaboration is free from dogma ... and offers a line of action 
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that might overcome the deep-seated division between the needs of material 
unity and stubborn national loyalties" (ibid, p 126). Mitrany provides a broad 
test for moves toward an international order, the means by which change is 
brought about and aptness of the change to the given time. This is also 
illustrated in the organisations necessary, each of which would be designated 
a specific task that would not remain static but evolve as the functional need 
changed. A political dimension would exist to direct the network e. g. in terms 
of planning and interaction. Through this process it was hoped that a system 
of peaceful co-existence would emerge. Through interdependence and the 
multi-involvement in solving socio-economic problems, the psychological 
and material bases of war may be alleviated. 
At the very least, the structure could be a pluralist international community 
where national control is marginalised through functional linkages; or one of 
greater extremity where the nation-state disappeared and was replaced by an 
international administrative body where organisational patterns were 
determined by functional rationality. 
As far as functionalism is concerned, the process of integration may be 
initiated at the intergovernmental level or at the transnational. 
Governments that cannot deal with international problems single-handedly 
or groups that have similar interests may create functional organisations. In 
either scenario, the main impetus of organisational growth is 'technical self- 
determination'. This incorporates the increasing autonomy of technical 
organisations in that ". .. administrative convenience and efficiency demand 
that an expert body be not unduly hampered in its investigations by the 
necessity of constantly new instructions and authorisations" or as Mitrany 
put it "... certain agencies are born with or achieve 'functional autonomy' by 
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virtue of the desirability of such an autonomous status" (cited in Sewell, 1966; 
pp 250-51). 
Functional 'needs' in the expression of 'demands' by social groups indicate 
social and structural goals that incorporate a means by which these structures 
may be met. These directions are adhered to by governments and experts 
which illustrate common needs rather than individual power. Functionalism 
is about building communities through collective education and technocratic 
management: it is based on the understanding that nation-states exemplify 
political tension and pressure and if they are not to lead to a catastrophe 
international political integration must take place. The beneficiaries of this 
process would exemplify greater support for the integration process and 
further co-operate as the process intensified. 
Functional theory constitutes: 
"... a body of propositions (still interconnected) which serve to 
map out the problem area and thus prepare the ground for its 
empirical investigation by appropriate methods. More precisely, 
the propositions serve to classify phenomena, to analyse them 
into relevant units, or indicate their interconnections and to 
define rules of procedure and schemes of interpretation. Theory 
here equals conceptual scheme or logical framework" (Haas, 
1964; p 7). 
In this context, functionalism is a scheme of procedure, a scheme of 
interpretation and a theory: a conceptual scheme or a logical framework. 
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Haas (1964) contended that disharmony prevails where authority is exercised 
by politicians rather than interest groups: that things can only improve when 
the government of humans is replaced by the administration of things. He 
points out that there is little hope of achieving a general state of welfare when 
human loyalties are bound to the nation-state. Once freed from a position of 
national insecurities, humanity would be able to strive toward the good of 
all. Functionalism is interested in bringing states together to engender 
peaceful co-existence, to actively encourage a state of peace. Efforts are initially 
directed toward economic and social reform in a bid to remove the causes of 
conflict. Welfare, rather than power, incorporates the functionalist ideal and 
technocrats concentrating on specific areas rather than polity would take 
centre stage. Technical interests would eventually become fused and this 
would engender change. 
Functionalism accepts that the concept of the nation-state will be difficult to 
overcome especially in respect of a move towards some form of world 
community. Most concede that the concept of a world community will be 
unrealistic until the idea of a world citizen is apparent. Likewise, with the EU: 
until the idea of the EU citizen becomes a reality true union will be difficult to 
achieve. On the one hand, Europe may be interpreted as an evolutionary link 
in the functional process, whereas, on the other, it could be perceived as 
dysfunctional in that it creates no more than another super-state which 
would add to rather than detract from the world's problems. However, 
functionalism and neo-functionalism are similar in that they stress: 
(a) Economic welfare. 
(b) Technical co-operation. 
(c) Utilitarian factors of integration. 
(d) Prerequisite of a pluralistic social setting. 
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(e) The role of technocrats. 
The two theories differ over the dynamics of integration rather than the 
result; functionalism adheres to a community model, whereas neo- 
functionalism primarily subscribes to a supranationalism. 
Neo-functionalism 
Neo-functionalism considers the integration process to be one where political 
actors are persuaded to allocate their loyalties and political activities towards 
another setting. Political actors are persuaded to do this through pressures 
from organised groups that express demands for further integration. The neo- 
functionalist model does not need overall consent: it is driven by self-seeking 
interest groups who are restrained only by the acceptance of the rules of the 
game, rules they themselves have a hand in creating. It has been posited that 
integration results through the process of institutionalised patterns of interest 
group politics undertaken in existing organisations. (Haas, 1964). The self 
seekers in this thesis are the individual Member State life insurance 
industries and companies. 
Haas (1958) presented the European dimension as one where 
... political integration is the process whereby political actors in 
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over 
the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of 
political integration is a new political community, superimposed 
over the pre-existing ones (p 16). 
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This stance accepted the concept of supranationalism and condoned the 
pursuit of a united Europe through functionalist means. However, not all 
neo-functionalists agree with the federal model as this seems to deny other 
outcomes; following the stagnation in European integration over the 1960s 
theorists have described integration in different terms. Haas described 
integration as leading to a common decision-making process among a group 
of states (Haas, 1971). 
The functional model lies at the heart of the neo-functional view of the 
integration process. Through observing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) it was 
agreed that the process of integration could not simply be explained in terms 
of technical self-determination and the learning of co-operation. Out of the 
acceptance of such came the set of ideas that underpin neo-functionalism. 
Haas (1958) provides an outline of neo-functionalism. Political parties and 
interest groups accept that action should be taken at the supranational level. 
Interest groups and political parties organise and function beyond the nation- 
state and define their interests in the new environment. Interest groups and 
political parties through their interaction sow the seeds of ideological 
agreement which overtake those based at the national level. There is an 
adherence to the rule of law by the parties involved which include 
governments and interest groups, and when decisions are opposed 
dissatisfactions are channelled. through legal avenues rather than issuing 
threats or ignoring the situation (Haas, 1958). 
There needs to be a reassessment of European integration's lost theory (neo- 
functionalism) if it is to be fully understood. Recently, some neo-functional 
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thinking has found "... its way back into our theorising after almost twenty 
years of neglect (which) indicates that judgements on integration theory were 
at times a bit too general" (George, 1994; pp 40-41 author's brackets). 
Additionally, Keohane and Hoffman (1991) have argued that many of Haas's 
ideas in respect of neo-functional processes have been open to distortions in 
the contemporary literature (George 1994). Hence there is a need to revisit 
neo-functionalism and assess it in relation to other integration theories. 
Consequently, the next chapter will analyse neo-functionalism in some detail 
before the thesis moves onto the empirical work. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined five theoretical schools, each of which encapsulates 
different values and goals. This investigation incorporates different elements 
of each theory, but relies heavily on an analysis of neo-functional and 
intergovernmental processes of change. It is apparent that functionalism, 
federalism and neo-functionalism have their roots in Kantian political 
theory. Where, realism and intergovernmentalism are more closely bound to 
Hegel. However, each attempts to understand international relations and 
proposes a means of generating a democratic international society. 
Federalism is apparent in the result that some proponents of European 
Union identify, i. e. a federal state (it is recognised that federalism accepts a 
world order, but this does not need to follow a defined European state). 
Functionalism is the general trend of areas of common interest creating 
reliance on each other in the international sphere. Neo-functionalism 
provides for the general functionalist theory to be used on a regional basis (in 
this case the EU). In so doing, it allows a supranational entity and spillover 
and emphasises interest group interference in the decision-making process. 
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This does not mean that the international perspective has to be discarded: the 
supranational body could be perceived as a means of transition from the 
national toward a larger entity. Indeed, this could be the dependent variable 
that intergovernmentalism might pursue. A larger nation-state, it is only the 
process that would be disputed. 
As an integration theory, neo-functionalism utilises aspects of pluralism, 
federalism, legalism and functionalism and allows an analysis of a specific 
creation, the EU. Neo-functionalism allows an adaptation of functionalism in 
that it provides a means by which the construction of propositions about 
regional integration may be understood. It allows for a dialectical shift away 
from the nation-state toward a supranational unit, the dimensions of which 
are to date unknown. 
Federalism European Union as state/then shift to world order 
through constitutions. 
Functionalism Coincidence of common goals through 
international institutions. 
Neo-functionalism Coincidence of common goals at regional level in 
federal /constitutional and plural terms through a 
functional/ institutional spillover/supranational 
process. 
Realism Power politics initiate the motives of nation-states. 
Larger units may be brought about but these will 
only be created by and become larger nation-states. 
Intergovernmentalism The major propellant in the shift toward European 
Union is the nation-state. Similar to a realist 
perspective, but at the EU level. 
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In realist and intergovernmental terms, international society is depicted as 
divided by conflict, nationalism and high politics (defence, foreign policy, 
etc. ). In functional and neo-functional terms, successful integration processes 
are described in terms of education, or the perceived advantages of a shift 
away from national governments that are learnt through experience. In the 
integration process they are tempted away from the national level through 
realising the advantages of co-operating at the international or, in the case of 
neo-functionalism, at a regional level. (Taylor, 1968). 
Functionalism is peace-oriented and through an emphasis on co-operation 
and integration looks towards a world system. As outlined in the 
introduction, this author considers that the process is built on the Kantian 
concept of "a just civic constitution" (Kant, 1995). 
Neo-functionalism is a theory of international relations and affects our 
understanding of the international environment. Haas considered that the 
... search for world order is nothing but an attempt to conquer 
turbulence. Theories of regional integration have a lot to teach 
us still about non-violent methods for collectively solving 
international problems, for coping. They can find a place in the 
intellectual armoury of studying alternative world orders. But 
this armoury must be stocked with new concepts as well. I shall 
suggest that this process has begun in the European Community 
at the level of policy, and that these policies and the institutions 
devised to implement them illustrate the attempt to deal with 
turbulence rather than deal with political integration (Haas, 
1975; p 180). 
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Functionalism identifies aspects of human interests needs and desires. Haas 
(1964) identifies function as the needs and purposes which relate the 
organisation to its environment. Out of this arises the concept of system: ".. . 
do we look for the impulse generating organisational action in the 
organisation itself or in the environment? " (Haas, 1964; p 7). 
This thesis concentrates on the operation of the changing life insurance 
industry. This is examined, on the one hand, as a social organisation in 
transition and on the other as an entity that through integration is involved 
in changing its own social environment. The analysis has identified a 
changing process through the Third Life Assurance Directive, how this was 
agreed upon and the compromises that each Member State industry needed to 
make to achieve the new environment. This, it is considered, is a process of 
integration. The thesis concentrates on the process of intergovernmentalism 
and neo-functionalism in the field of European integration and the extent to 
which these may be considered as means of integration. Consequently, the 
next chapter will explore neo-functionalism in terms of its credibility as a 
means of understanding European integration processes in relation to those 
of intergovernmentalism. 
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Chapter Four 
Intergovernmentalism, Neo-Functionalism and European Integration 
A conclusion of peace nullifies all existing reasons 
for future war, even if these are not yet known to 
the contracting parties (Kant, 1991; p 93). 
Introduction .s 
Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism were the two main 
contending European integration theories during the sixties and by the 
seventies it seemed evident that the latter had won the argument. However, 
the mid-eighties and early nineties have seen a resurgence in the integration 
process and this thesis contends that once again attention has been turned 
toward neo-functional processes. "The Single European Act led to a revival of 
neo-functionalist explanations ... " with regard to 
European integration 
(George, 1994; p 1). Indeed, it was considered that the abandonment of neo- 
functionalism "... left the study of European integration in a theoretical void 
... 
however, neo-functional concepts are again appearing in the writings of 
some EC-specialists" (Tranhome-Mikkelsen, 1991; p 2). Kirchner (1992) 
continues the debate when he identifies two contesting understandings of 
European integration in neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. "The 
former sees the progression of the EC as confirmation of the cumulative logic 
of sector spillover and an increasing transfer of competencies from the 
national to the EC level. Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, stresses 
that the pace and direction of EC co-operation is in accordance with national 
interests and is achieved through arrangements such as the Council of 
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Ministers and the European Council over which member states have full 
control" (p 35). 
Intergovernmentalism, State-Centricism and European Integration 
The process of European Union policy making is not purely neo-functional, 
... all negotiation and coalition-building takes place within the 
context of agreements between governments ... successful 
spillover requires prior programmatic agreement among 
governments, expressed in an intergovernmental bargain. Such 
a bargain is clearly important in accounting for the Single 
European Act (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991; p 17). 
However, this does not mean that an intergovernmental perspective 
provides a complete picture of European integration, but that these inter-state 
agreements do underpin many of the conditions necessary for European 
integration. There is an interaction taking place between the need for 
furthering the ability to trade freely throughout Europe and the political 
concessions to allow this. When the UK agreed to the SEA, it did so to further 
self-interest not to show ideological unity with Europe. Margaret Thatcher 
emphasised this when she was asked why she had agreed to the SEA: ". .. we 
wished to have many of the directives under majority voting because things 
which we wanted were being stopped by others using a single vote. For 
instance, we have not yet got insurance freely in Germany as we wished" 
(Financial Times, May 19 1989; editorial, cited in Keohane and Hoffman, 1991; 
p 17). However, what pressure was being put on the government by the 
insurance sector in particular and business in general? And does this 
interaction indicate a neo-functional understanding of the process? Two 
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elements of neo-functionalism continually recur in the process of EU reform: 
the pressure exerted by EU institutions and the uses of transnational business 
interest groups (such as European-wide interest groups). Consequently, it may 
be argued, that in theoretical terms we are observing an amalgamation of the 
two approaches. 
Moravcsik (1991) denies that neo-functionalism is part of the process, "... by 
testing and rejecting a particular variant of neo-functionalism, supranational 
institutionalism, which rests on the argument that international institutions 
and transnational interest groups play a vital and increasing role as 
integration progresses" (ibid, p 75). He posits an "intergovernmental 
institutionalism" and argues that the primary source of integration is to be 
found with the Member States and the influence they wield in Brussels (ibid). 
However, even this explanation is incomplete and warrants further research. 
This is taken further in Moravcsik (1993) where he considered that ". .. the EC 
can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage 
economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination" (ibid, p 
474). Indeed, he attempted to illustrate the limitations of neo-functionalism 
and present the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, ". .. a 
liberal theory 
of how economic interdependence influences national interests and an 
intergovernmentalist theory of international negotiation" (ibid). 
The intergovernmental approach adheres to the state-centric model. This 
considers that the ". .. overall direction of policy making is consistent with 
state control" (Hooghe and Marks, 1997; p 22). Furthermore, " ... the core 
presumption underlying the state-centric governance model is that European 
integration does not challenge the autonomy of nation-states. "State-centrists 
contend that EU membership preserves or even strengthens state sovereignty 
and that European integration is driven by bargains among member-state 
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governments ... In this model, supranational actors exist to aid member 
states to facilitate agreements by providing information that would not 
otherwise be available. Policy outcomes reflect the interests and relative 
power of member-state executives, not those of the supranational actors (ibid, 
p 21. For more on this see Mann, 1994; Millward, 1992; Streeck, 1996 as well as 
Moravscik, 1991 and 1993). 
If the state-centric model is the dominant means of decision-making in the 
EU, three conditions would need to hold: Member State representatives in 
the Council of Ministers should be able to impose their understandings and 
preferences on other European institutions; Member States should always be 
sovereign in relation to other Member States; Member States should be able 
to control sub-national interests (Hooghe and Marks, 1997). 
Garrett and Tsebelis (1996) argued that intergovernmentalism has "... tended 
to focus on the bargaining between national governments over the outcome 
of treaty negotiations. The epochs that treaties demarcate are considered a 
function of governments' preferences and their ability to further those 
preferences in inter-state bargaining" (p 269). Following the SEA and QMV 
intergovernmentalism started to look. at the mechanics of EU decision- 
making. However, analyses concentrated on the Council of Ministers and 
most studies that ". .. focus exclusively on dynamics within the Council of 
Ministers are likely to misperceive most policy dynamics" (ibid p 293). Indeed, 
there are a number of problems with the intergovernmental approach: firstly, 
an analysis of treaty bargaining only scratches the surface of the process of 
European integration. Secondly, it considers that all decisions are created and 
made in the Council of Ministers. Both of these problems stem from 
intergovernmentalism's fundamental premise that "... all decisions are 
products of bargaining among nations" (ibid, p 294). 
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This thesis explores whether the intergovernmental approach and state- 
centric governance alone are sufficiently able to explain integration fully. 
Indeed, it turns to neo-functionalism and multi-level governance as means 
of allowing a greater understanding of the process. 
Neo-functionalism and European Integration 
Neo-functionalism is considered to be a peaceful process toward the creation 
of larger peaceful political communities. This is different to communication 
theory (Deutsch, 1954) where the process of integration may be violent but the 
outcome is peaceful'. In this context, one is separating the concept of 
European integration from the process of integration in general. 
The rationale for separating the general concept of integration 
from that of European integration has its roots in the need for a 
theoretical framework that is applicable to both historical cases of 
integration and the unique process of European integration 
(Luchner, 1992; p 60). 
Of course, this carries certain difficulties in terms of generalisation and the 
uses of force in integration. However, European Union is historically unique. 
Firstly, its membership is made up of democratically elected nation-states 
who have joined through their own free will; secondly, nationalism is far 
more important concept in people's minds today than it was at the time of 
I Deutsch considers that at some time people question the size of their political community and such 
questioning may result in action. Integration may be achieved through peaceful or antagonistical means and ". . 
. political communities arise as the result of historical developments some of which have to be traced in 
centuries long past" (Deutsch, 1954; p 57). However, political integration is only limited by the speed that 
individuals learn. Simply because integration took centuries in the past it does not mean that it needs to today. 
Communications have changed drastically and the world is a smaller place because of this; maybe political 
communities should reflect these changes. 
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earlier integration efforts; and thirdly, it is a peaceful process. Indeed, it is a 
peaceful process aimed at a peaceful outcome. 
The term 'process' has advantages in that the outcome of integration cannot 
be identified. In this context, outcome and process become indistinguishable. 
Consequently, it is difficult to define independent and dependent variables. 
"For instance, is increased economic interdependence a precondition for 
integration or the outcome of integration? " (ibid, p 63). It is at this point that 
Haas provided his analysis of the process and progression of integration in 
the form of spillover and supranationality (Haas, 1958). 
Supranationality 
The concept of supranationality is a central idea of neo-functionalism and for 
Haas, it constituted a means by which a political community may be realised. 
He defined supranationality as 
... neither federalism nor intimate intergovernmental co- 
operation, even though the institutions it employs resemble 
those of a federation more than the United Nations or NATO. 
Supranationality is a unique style of. making international 
decisions, unique because of the nature of the participants, the 
context in which decisions are made and the quality of decisions 
produced (Haas, 1964a; p 64). 
Two features of the 1992 programme in particular suggested that 
there might still be explanatory force in neo-functionalism: the 
role of the Commission as a central bureaucratic actor 
manipulating circumstances to further integration; and 
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secondly, the role played by multi-national business interests in 
pressurising governments to complete the internal market. .. 
Ironically it was politicians who in 1957 first conceived the idea 
of a common market, often over objections from the business 
community. Now the situation has been reversed; it is 
entrepreneurs and corporations who are keeping the pressure on 
politicians to transcend considerations of local and national 
interest (George, 1994; p 7) 
Heathcote (1966) identified supranationality as ". .. an academic notion- 
predicted rather than experienced, and to be arrived at after a process of 
evolution" (p 162). Supranationality affects the process of decision-making as 
it evolves. Furthermore, ". .. (s)upranationality may never 
be realised, but 
the ideal has already enriched international affairs" (ibid, author's brackets). 
Through the actions of De Gaulle it was considered that supranationality at 
the European level had failed, that European institutions had failed to 
supplant their national counterparts. "The supranational organ of the 
Community, a Commission, 'proposing' to a 'disposing' Council, was in the 
event unable to introduce a 'new method' or style to international politics, let 
alone to erode the sovereignty of the surprisingly recalcitrant nation-state" 
(ibid p 168). The Gaullist boycott wished to weaken the position of the 
Commission: this it achieved and thereby obstructed the process of closer 
union. However, as today's position exemplifies, this only delayed the process 
of supranationality. As Haas points out; "In supranational systems ... the 
compromise pattern involves splitting the difference between the final 
bargaining positions of the participants. More significantly still, supranational 
systems feature a bargaining process which I call upgrading common 
interests" (Haas, 1964a; p 65). 
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Haas considered that De Gaulle's vision of the changes in Europe were 
neither supranational nor federal but confederal. As indicated by the 
... former Prime Minister Debre. In Europe, legitimate power is 
the power which comes from national sovereignty and against 
this power arbitrary outside tyrannies like the so-called 
supranational institutions can do nothing. European unity is 
becoming, and will continue to become, a reality through the 
will of those who legitimately wield power in each of the 
countries which together make up Europe (Press Conference 
Paris 1960, cited in Haas, 1964; pp 66-67). 
It was in response to such an understanding that Heathcote may have 
considered that: "Supranational structures may not survive into 1966 ... but . 
.. the Common Market need not entirely dissolve" (Heathcote, 1966; p 168). 
Nation-states join international organisations for increased protection, and 
then use them to enhance their national power and prestige. However, 
eventually she concedes that the model may succeed, providing that the 
leading power desires it. Is this the situation with Germany today? Self- 
interested Member States with the support of the leading power creating 
spillover and increasing supranationality. The leading power, in this context, 
(that is, Germany) is tied closely to further integration because of its political 
position (or lack of power at an international level). 
Both Haas and Lindberg "... drew attention to the distinction between power 
issues (high politics) and welfare issues (low politics) and argued that the 
latter ... bore the potential for the collective pursuit of common interests. 
Over time, progress in 'low politics' would produce fundamental political 
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consequences" (Gehring, 1996; p 228). This of course is exactly what the realists 
denied; that there could ever be a shift from low politics to high politics. 
Haas (1958) outlined the concept of supranationalism and condoned the 
pursuit of an integrated Europe through functionalist means. He did not 
contend that their should be a constitution or federal end. However, his 
language did indicate that loyalties would be transferred to a supranational 
government whose rules were legally binding. In this context Haas' political 
community is less of a prediction than it may first appear. Additionally, it is 
difficult to define dependent and independent variables in this context2. 
Lindberg, like Haas, does not delineate an end result or a dependent variable. 
His definition of integration is as follows: 
(1) The process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to 
conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each 
other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the 
decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the 
process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are 
persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a 
new centre (Lindberg, 1963; p 6). 
The difference between the theorists lies in the premises of their theoretical 
propositions. Haas based his analysis on the ECSC or sector-specific 
integration, whereas Lindberg concentrated on the general aspect of the EEC. 
Indeed, the latter approach entailed political as well as administrative 
mechanisms to enable decision-making to take place. 
2A dependent variable is an identifiable outcome and neo-functionalism is unable to illustrate this for the 
EU. Independent variables, in the context of European integration may include, the Treaties, direct elections, 
the SEM, EMU etc. However, these could be defined as dependent variables themselves i. e. they are or once 
were identifiable outcomes. 
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Lindberg's modification disentangled political integration from 
the fate of the participating nation-states and opened neo- 
functionalism for a more intergovernmental perspective. While 
it did not rule out that political integration might lead to a 'new 
political community', it emphasised the possibility that it could 
remain in a state dominated by collective decision-making 
(supplemented with some delegation of power) (Gehring, 1996; p 
230). 
This understanding has implications on later theories that consider the EU to 
be a confederal entity with intergovernmentalism, transnationalism and 
supranationalism working in tandem (Wallace, 1983). 
However, both Haas and Lindberg considered that integration was a peaceful 
process. Indeed, they both consider the necessity of central decision-making 
institutions and both leave their scale and scope open. Furthermore, they 
each indicate changes in the expectations and activities of the political actors. 
These considerations are illustrated through the dynamics of 
supranationality and spillover (spillover will be investigated further below). 
This thesis considers that the EU may be identified as a supranational entity 
in evolution and that this in itself is a process of decision-making. 
Supranationality is greater in some areas of the EU than others. Indeed, under 
the first pillar (e. g. single market, agriculture fisheries and transport) 
supranationality is at its most formidable. Under the second pillar (common 
foreign and security policy) supranationality is more tenuous. However, there 
are instances of supranationality in terms of common foreign policy e. g. the 
GATT negotiations. The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporates the Schengen 
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Agreement (the removal of internal frontier checks and enhances co- 
operation between police forces and legal systems. Moreover, ". .. (a) 
large 
part of co-operation in the areas of justice and home affairs (will be) subject to 
Community rules: the participation of all institutions, the legal review of the 
European Court of justice and the use of effective legal instruments" (EUR 
OP, 1997 author's brackets). The concept of supranationality is bound up with 
the different stages of integration the completion of the SEM was expedited by 
the SEA and it is in this treaty that the renewed pace of supranationality may 
be observed. Of course, supranationalty has been taken further in the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union and it will be taken a further step again 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Supranationality is not the antithesis of intergovernmentalism, but as Haas 
argued "... a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants 
refrain from unconditionally vetoing and instead seek to attain agreement by 
means of compromises upgrading common interests" (Haas, 1964a; pp 64-66). 
Indeed, structurally it encompasses ". .. the existence of governmental 
authorities closer to the archetype of federation than any past international 
organisation but not yet identical with it" (Haas, 1958; p 59). What it will 
become is unclear; supranationality is a. process rather than an end. This may 
be identified by the on-going accumulation of European treaties and their 
integrative affects. This indicates the difficulty of the dependent variable and 
the problem of teleology; neo-functionalism fails to posit a clear end toward 
which a regional system should move. Haas contended that the "... verbally 
defined single terminal conditions which we worked in the past - political 
community, security community, political union, federal union - are 
inadequate because they fore-close real-life possibilities" (Haas, 1971; p 633). 
Others considered the European programme as ". .. a pluralistic system in 
evolution from nationalism to regionalism using economic integration as a 
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means of promoting political unity" (Mally, 1973; pp 239-240). This thesis 
considers that supranationality has two levels of epistemology; on the one 
hand, it is material in that it is the decision-making institutions in existence 
at a given time; while on the other, it is part of the abstract process of 
integration. As Mitrany noted, we have no knowledge of what the end may 
encompass so why invent one? 
Spillover 
A second central idea to the concept of neo-functionalism is spillover. This is 
where integration in a sector creates its own impetus and necessitates further 
integration both in the same, and in other sectors. "Specifically, the term 
spillover describes the accretion of new powers and tasks to a central 
institutional structure, based on changing demands and the expectation on 
the part of such political actors as interest groups, political parties and 
bureaucracies" (Haas, cited in Kirchner, 1976; p 3). Effectively, there is an 
interplay between spillover and supranationality in that the ". .. 
establishment of supranational institutions designed to deal with 
functionally specific tasks will set in motion economic, social and political 
processes which generate pressures towards further integration" (Tranholm- 
Mikkelsen, 1991; p 4). 
Haas asserts that perceptions of self-interest are the driving force in the 
process and that this will only be generalised "... if the actors, on the basis of 
their interest-inspired perceptions desire to adapt integrative lessons learned 
in one context to a new situation" (Haas, 1964; p 48). "Neo-functionalism 
stresses the instrumental motives of actors; it looks for the adaptability of 
elites in line with specialisation of roles; neo-functionalism takes self-interest 
for granted and relies on it for delineating actor perceptions" (Haas, 1971; p 
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60). Haas considers that a new central decision-making body may evolve 
through earlier incremental steps; he also questions whether such may be 
foreseen by certain individuals and used to presage their designs. 
This thesis undertakes an analysis of the life insurance industry and its place 
within the European integration process. The SEA indicates that services are 
an important aspect of the harmonisation process. Much had been done in 
the area of goods, but little in the area of services and even less in financial 
services. Furthermore, life insurance is a product that needs to be regulated 
and the extent of regulation reveals nuances in Member State interpretations 
of the SEM. The three generations of insurance legislation provided the 
impetus for pensions' legislation and banking legislation which in turn 
created the need for further capital market legislation. This indicated a shift 
from services to capital. Once a country becomes part of the EU, the spillover 
effect comes into operation; if a Member State is to be part of the SEM, then it 
must adhere to European regulations which in themselves necessitate further 
legislation (for a further discussion of spillover specific to financial services 
see Chapter Eight). 
The extent to which pressures from sectors provide a positive impetus for 
integration (all of which are attempting to exploit the situation to their own 
ends) is determined by the benefit to the sector of being involved in the 
integration process. It may be that the spillover process then draws another 
sector into the integration process if the payoff is agreeable to the sector 
involved. If another sector does become involved in the integration process 
this extends the authority of the supranational entity. Fundamentally, the 
supranational authority is looking for consensus and a means of upgrading 
the common interest (Haas 1964). 
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With the intensification of the integration process in Europe, the spillover 
process and the supranational composition of the EU are, one may posit, 
more identifiable than ever. Helen Wallace (1990) considers that due to the 
internal market programme, "It could ... be argued that the neo-functionalist 
concept of spillover is now being vindicated" (p 219). 
For neo-functionalism, spillover is the means by which the integration 
process is achieved, where co-operation in one sphere spills into another. 
Spillover, 
... refers to the specific process which originates in one 
functional context initially separated from other political 
concerns, and then expands into related activities or it becomes 
clear to the chief political actors that the achievement of the 
initial aims cannot take place without such expansion (Haas, 
1958; p 523). 
Legislation in one sector creates the need for legislation in other sectors 
and/or further legislation in different areas of the same sector if a true SEM is 
to be achieved. January 1 1993 was not the end but a part of the spillover 
process. This is what Haas labelled the ". .. expansive 
logic of sector 
integration". Spillover is not instigated through the wish for a peaceful 
Europe under the enthusiasm for greater welfare, but the result of ".. . 
swapping concessions from a variety of sectors.... No statesman, even if he 
deeply dislikes the process, can permanently isolate his nation from a 
commitment to unity which is only partially implemented, unless he is 
willing to pay the price in diminished welfare" (Haas, 1958; p 243 and pp 283- 
317). 
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However, the extent to which changing incentives created by spillover 
allowed an explanation for task expansion has been a point of contention for 
neo-functionalism. Nye (1971) argued that the functional linkage of tasks has 
been a less powerful mechanism than was originally believed to be the case. 
Whereas, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) wished to deny that spillover led to 
the Common Market. However, this thesis wishes to ascertain the extent to 
which, in Helen Wallace's words, spillover "... has been vindicated". 
There are two main understandings of spillover outlined in this thesis; 
(a) Spillover occurs because of the impact it has on differentiated actors, 
including multinationals, interest groupings, the Commission and national 
bureaucracies. These actors form coalitions to increase EU decision-making in 
new sectors, in order to protect and enhance integration in sectors where 
agreements have already been reached. 
(b) Spillover is a result of new policies on Member States which remain 
coherent actors in the process and continue to make crucial policy decisions 
in the EU. (Member States remain central actors but they are dictated to by 
past actions). 
Neo-functionalists, such as Haas, purport to describe the 
mechanism of the linkage between integration in economic and 
political sectors through the concept of spillover. They use the 
concept to describe a dynamic and more or less automatic 
integrative process, gradually encompassing ever more 
functional sectors until, the final stage, a political union is 
reached (Kirchner, 1976; p 2). 
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This thesis considers that one may identify links in one industry, the 
insurance industry (vertical spillover); between the legislation in the services 
sector i. e. between insurance, banking pensions etc. (horizontal specific neo- 
functional spillover); and between sectors i. e. services and capital (horizontal 
general neo-functional spillover). It is also recognised that an 
intergovernmental process of spillover is at work within European 
integration i. e. in the guise of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, and that ".. . 
spillover requires prior programmatic agreement among governments, 
expressed in an intergovernmental bargain. Such a bargain is clearly 
important in accounting for the Single European Act" (Keohane and 
Hoffman, 1991; p 17). This type of spillover (spillover from treaty to treaty) 
may be labelled intergovernmental spillover (this is indicated by definition 
(b) above). However, it is apparent that wider transnational processes are also 
providing an impetus to harmonisation and integration. In this context, the 
thesis contends that intergovernmental spillover is usually confined to 
providing the environment for further neo-functional spillover (vertical or 
horizontal) to take place e. g. through the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty (this 
is illustrated by definition (a) above. It also considers that the Member States 
are pushed in this direction by the very dynamics of the spillover process (see 
the Spillover Model, Figs 8.1,8.2 and 8.3 pp 277-81). Fundamentally, one may 
posit, that there is an interaction between neo-functional and 
intergovernmental spillover which enhances and deepens European 
integration. 
As it becomes more difficult to pass further directives/ regulations in an area, 
further amendments to the treaties are needed. This was apparent with regard 
to the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty and, one may argue, will become even 
more obvious with the actuality of monetary union. 
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The current ascendancy of a qualified supranational style of 
decision-making is shown by the way in which, thanks to the 
Single Act, the Council now functions. ... The revival of a 
supranational style of decision-making and the strengthening of 
European institutions in the Single Act resulted most 
immediately from decisions by governments to press in their 
own interests, for a removal of internal economic barriers and 
for institutional change that would permit such a policy to be 
carried out (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991; pp 16-17). 
At the moment, an impasse is apparent regarding pensions, taxation and 
capital markets because they come under the unanimity rule. However, these 
one may assume, will have to be overcome either just before or, more likely, 
following monetary union (see the Spillover Model, Figs 8.1,8.2 and 8.3). 
This thesis attempts to illustrate the process of integration in respect of one 
sector and argues that supranationality and spillover may be discerned in this 
process. This is examined through an analysis of the decision-making 
processes in the European Union; an understanding of the life insurance 
sector in Europe and where and how it designated its emphasis in the 
creation of the Third Life Assurance Directive. It attempts to undertake 
empirical research to ascertain the extent of neo-functionalism in the creation 
of the EU, in terms of spillover and its supranational nature (for a further 
discussion of spillover explicit to financial services, see Chapter Eight). 
Multi-level Governance 
The multi-level governance model is based on certain aspects of neo- 
functionalism. It considers "... that European integration is a polity-creating 
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process in which authority and policy making influence is shared across 
multiple levels of government sub-national, national and supranational" 
(Hooghe and Marks, 1997; p 22). The model recognises the central role played 
by Member States in the decision-making process and considers that elements 
of control have been passed on to supranational institutions. Consequently, 
in certain areas Member States have lost aspects of their sovereignty. 
In short, the multi-level governance model claims that the locus 
of political control has changed. Individual state sovereignty is 
diluted in the EU by collective decision-making among national 
governments and by the autonomous roles of the European 
parliament, the European Commission, and the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) (ibid, p 22). 
If the multi-level governance model is to be accepted a number of premises 
must hold. Initially the supranational institutions (Commission, European 
Parliament and ECJ) should share authority with the Council of Ministers. 
Secondly, that the individual Member State executives should be unable to 
continually stamp their authority on collective decision-making. And finally 
(especially in respect of this thesis) we would require that ". .. that sub- 
national interests mobilise directly in the European arena (ibid, p 24). 
Neo-functionalism: Problems and Debate 
In the 1960s and 1970s, it seemed that the neo-functionalist process of 
integration had lost its way. However, with the speeding up of integration 
during the 1980s and the 1990s, one can perceive the re-emergence of the 
process in certain areas of integration. Elites draw up the parameters of the 
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system; consumers, voters and others illustrate their preferences once the 
parameters have been negotiated. 
Any study of integration is dogged by the problems of defining the dependent 
variable so that it is distinguishable from independent variables and the 
difficulties of concentrating on a specific region without considering external 
influences. The inability to overcome these difficulties in the aftermath of 
the Gaullist attack on European integration indicated the limitations of neo- 
functionalism. "Has De Gaulle killed the Common Market and with it the 
notion of a united Europe? " (Haas, cited in Luchner, 1992; p 66). In today's 
atmosphere, it is obvious that De Gaulle did not destroy European Union but 
he did damage the theorising about integration in general and neo- 
functionalism in particular (Luchner 1992). The De Gaulle incident illustrated 
that there were two weaknesses with neo-functionalism; firstly, that 
economic incrementalism was not always superior to political decisions; and 
secondly, the deterministic aspect of neo-functionalism was indicated. Indeed, 
European integration was shown not only to be an economic undertaking, 
but political also. Haas (1964) considered neo-functionalism to be one of the 
most promising methods of analysis. He posited that integration would take 
place in the EU and the process illustrated that, the validity of the nation-state 
was untenable in the post-war world. He considered that sovereignty would 
be gradually eroded through people's voluntary decisions or the intended and 
unintended consequences of such decisions, but, never by force. In this 
context he was deterministic. However, he does not delineate an end result; 
an outcome of integration. 
In this thesis, there is a concentration on the European political elite and an 
economic elite (in this instance, the life insurance industry). As Haas 
identifies, 
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In our scheme of integration 'elites' are the leaders of all 
relevant political groups who habitually participate in the 
making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers in 
government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen of political parties. 
They include the officials of trade associations, the spokesmen of 
organised labour, higher civil servants and active politicians 
(Haas, 1958; p 17). 
Does the above illustrate the European process, can or will individuals ever 
learn to think in non-national terms because of technical co-operation? This 
investigation explores how realistic this is by undertaking an empirical 
analysis of the life insurance industry in the EU. Of course, we will not be able 
to illustrate whether a world affiliation may be realised but, we may be able to 
map out a transference from the national to the European which may have 
implications for an embryonic world citizenship. 
Mitrany (1944) considered that if people are given a modicum of what they 
need for survival they will keep the peace. He emphasised that this has been 
done regularly at the national level yet it has not been tried internationally. 
In this context, one may identify the idea behind European integration in the 
post second world war period. Out of the more general international 
functional process grew the concept of regional integration or neo- 
functionalism which emphasised the evolving EU. 
Integration in the EU would be brought about not simply through the efforts 
of politicians but through the interaction of governments, interest groups, 
bureaucracies and technocrats. The process would be undertaken 
incrementally by rational administrators rather than ideology. Individual 
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ideologies would be brought to the decision-making processes but these 
would need to be compromised in a technocratic Europe. Bureaucratic rule in 
the EU should not suppress political conflict but provide a better means of 
resolving conflicts successfully, one more apt than parliamentary democracy. 
Haas (1964) stressed the need for institutions whose task it would be to 
channel conflicts into merged ideological patterns. This concept was taken up 
in his later works in respect of overcoming turbulence and creating wholes 
(Haas, 1975; 1976). 
As touched on above, there are, it has been suggested, two main limitations to 
the neo-functionalist approach: its confinement to Western Europe; its ability 
to predict. Neo-functionalists do not agree on a dependent variable and 
consequently differ on the extent of integration. The processes of 
supranationality and spillover have been indicated, but the extent to which 
this encompasses a regional community depends on one's concept of the 
dependent variable (Haas, 1971). 
Ultimately, Haas denies neo-functionalism and considers it obsolescent and 
that European Union was linked closer to interdependence3 than integration. 
Haas does not suggest that incrementalism is dead but that it had been ". .. 
infected with a different and more holistic decision-making rationality as the 
original objectives of the actors are buffeted by the condition of turbulence" 
(Haas, 1975; p 177). 
Haas considers that if the functional and neo-functional theories are to 
remain relevant, 
3 Interdependence theory like neo-functionalism contradicted the realist concept of power politics. Its premise 
concentrated on functional cooperation and the participation of non-state actors in the decision-making 
process. (For further discussion see Keohane and Nye 1972 and1974; Taylor, 1980; Gehring 1996). 
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... two conditions must hold: (1) institutional outcomes must be 
open in the sense that various end states are possible, provided 
only that the collective decision-making mode adopted will be 
more centralised than was true at the beginning of the process; 
(2) the pressure for including common tasks and programs 
directed against external forces and states must not be resolved 
in such a manner as to detract from regional centralisation 
(Haas, 1975; p 178). 
Through his concept of the turbulent field, Haas goes on to explain that the 
logic of incrementalism and regional self-containment is no longer applicable 
to certain areas of the EU. Turbulence identifies the ". .. confused and 
clashing perceptions of organisational actors which find themselves in a 
setting of great social complexity ... and confusion 
dominates discussion and 
negotiation" (ibid, p 179). In such an area or ". .. space it is very 
difficult for 
organisational actors to develop stable expectations.... If one is not sure of 
one's own goals, it becomes very hard to adjust one's behaviour to the goals 
of negotiating partners who are no more certain of their objectives" (ibid). 
How far does this exist in an EU that has agreed the SEA, Maastricht, the SEM 
and put into operation a timetable for Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU)? As Haas himself contended: "... if a common monetary policy is 
agreed as a result of the pressure for maintaining the customs union, we 
would have a classic case of spillover" (ibid, p 178). With the new direction 
the EU has acquired is it still a turbulent field? Is "... everything still up for 
grabs"? (ibid, p 179). 
To overcome this, Haas considers the idea of creating wholes and initially 
quotes Du Gard; 
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I believe that though all the phenomena of life have not yet 
been analysed, they will be analysed one day. As for the first 
causes of these phenomena, I believe they lie outside our range, 
and no research, however thorough, can elucidate them. Owing 
to his limited place in the universe, man is by nature a relative 
and finite being, incapable of forming conceptions of the 
Absolute and the Infinite. He has invented names for what 
transcends himself, but these have not got him any further; he is 
a victim of his terminology, for those words and names do not, 
so far as human understanding is concerned, correspond to 
coginizable reality (Jean Barois, cited in Haas, 1976; p 828). 
Derrida (1992) makes a similar but more specific point. "Something unique is 
afoot in Europe, in what is still called Europe even if we no longer know very 
well what or who goes by this name. Indeed, to what concept, to what real 
individual, to what singular entity should this name be assigned today? Who 
will draw up its borders? " (p 5). 
Haas contends that wholes are sought to give some understanding to the 
world and that these are approached through system theory; he contends that 
the type of system theory he finds useful ". .. features the inductive method 
in the construction of reality and uses the perceptions and actions of concrete 
human beings in grappling with reality as its main data. ... They are 
constructed in the sense that the theorists considers them as heuristic 
approximations rather than networks of determinative 'laws' constraining 
choice" (Haas, 1976; p 839). Whole systems or determinant variables are not 
cast in stone: they are "... not an infallible guide to international political 
action" (ibid, p 840). If one looks at humanity's attempt to understand itself, 
one will notice the short time that this has been pursued; the paradigm that 
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humanity sets up as a means to understand itself is only two hundred years 
old. "If human evolution is so recent a thing, how much more space is there 
to be traversed before it makes sense to think of some end state? " (ibid, p 841). 
In this context, why should neo-functionalism need to identify some end 
state to encompass a valid means of understanding aspects of European 
integration? The methodology used in this thesis complements Haas's 
comprehension of theory. Grounded theory pursues an understanding of 
phenomena, from the starting point of induction. Through an interaction 
between induction and deduction it builds a substantive theory which allows 
an understanding of the process of European integration without delineating 
an end-state or dependent variable (see Chapter Two above). 
Sweeney (1984) argues that neo-functionalism does not lend itself to 
systematic analysis because: (1) it shifts its emphasis over time; (2) its 
hypotheses are developed by theorists who disagree; (3) theorists develop 
their own set of definitions and terminology. It is posited that neo- 
functionalism fails to indicate one clear end point toward which they expect a 
region to move. There is much debate about ends but there is no clear 
indication of the final goal. Schmitter (1971) identifies two levels to the 
dependent variable and considers ". .. whether member states will expand or 
contract the type of issues to be resolved jointly ... or whether they will 
increase or decrease the authority for regional institutions" (p 841). Nye (1971) 
considers that the neo-functional approach is more appropriate in the 
analysis of common markets where ". .. significant institutions have been 
created or market forces released" (p 192). 
Over the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of neo-functionalism was refined. 
However, it still carried difficulties indicative of its inception; criticisms that 
were levelled were its inability to be used in analysing the changed Europe of 
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the 1960s and that it was Eurocentric. It has been suggested that neo- 
functionalism can be modified so it may be used in a comparative framework: 
(1) the dependent variable is stated less ambiguously (2) the idea 
of a single path from quasi-technical tasks to political union by 
spillover is dropped and other potential process forces and paths 
are included; (3) more political actors are added; and (4) the list of 
integration conditions is reformulated in the light of 
comparative work that has been done on integration processes 
in less developed areas (ibid, p 193). 
The problem is that the dependent variable reflects the preferences and 
interests of those that pursue the option. Those that perceive economic 
interdependence as the means of alleviating war may consider economic 
integration as the dependent variable; those who perceive policy co- 
ordination as the means of achieving this may perceive political integration 
as the dependent variable. Of course, within these two broad areas we have 
different concepts of what political and economic integration entails. 
Sweeney (1984) argues that there is no. clear labelling of the neo-functional 
goal from Schmitter, Lindberg, Nye or Haas. However, the first three attempt 
to revise the model whereas Haas considers the difficulties of identifying any 
dependent variable and contends that theoretical systems are for overcoming 
the very turbulence that human investigation creates. As Mitrany insists we 
do not know what the end result will be, so why invent one? Haas does 
however provide choices of outcome in the theories "... between federation, 
return to national sovereignty, and the actual situation which prevails in the 
European Community" (Haas, 1975a; p 175). 
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This thesis does not deal with scientific prediction and recognises the 
difficulties in identifying an end or conclusion to the European integration 
process. However, it does intend to put forward a number of propositions. 
While most scholars could agree to differentiate between the 
process and the outcome of integration, they did not agree on 
what this outcome should or would look like ... Haas argued 
that the integration process might lead to a 'new federal 
organism' although the emergence of a political community 
need not pre-suppose the emergence of a federal state ... Since 
no universally accepted dependent institutional variable could 
be devised, the described integration outcomes were ideal types 
.. rather than scientific predictions (Luchner, 1992; pp 68-69). 
This problem led some scholars to abandon the subject because it was felt that 
the outcome of the process needed to be explained in institutional terms. 
However, does this really need to be the case? Does theory always need to 
encompass prediction? This thesis considers that theory can be built to 
enhance understanding and that this may shed light on the process in 
relation to formal theories. "In sum, it is reasonable to agree with Haas that 
the search for a -dependent variable and its distinction from independent 
variables is difficult at best and at worst futile" (ibid, p 71). 
European Integration Theory: A Synergy 
With the advent of the SEA, neo-functionalism once again seemed a means 
of explaining European integration. Even though Keohane and Hoffman 
(1991) considered that the EU was an "... experiment in pooling sovereignty, 
not in transferring it from states to supranational institutions" (p 277), they 
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also indicated that "... the concept of supranationality that Ernst Haas 
developed 20 years ago remains relevant, although it has so often been 
stereotyped, misinterpreted or ignored. The European community can best be 
viewed as a set of complex overlapping networks in which a supranational 
style of decision-making characterised by compromises upgrading common 
interests can under favourable conditions lead to the pooling of sovereignty" 
(ibid). However, Moravscik (1991,1993) considered that intergovernmental 
institutionalism was the major dynamic in the European integration process 
and that this was made up of: intergovernmentalism; lowest common 
denominator bargaining; the protection of sovereignty; international 
institutionalism and domestic politics. He also argued, that ". .. the primary 
source of integration lies in the interests of the nation-states themselves and 
the relative power each brings to Brussels (ibid, 1991; p 75). Furthermore, 
Where neo-functionalism emphasises domestic technocratic 
consensus, liberal intergovernmentalism looks to domestic 
coalition struggles. Where neo-functionalism emphasises 
opportunities to upgrade the common interest, liberal 
intergovernmentalism stresses the role of relative power. 
Where neo-functionalism emphasises the active role of 
supranational officials in shaping bargaining outcomes, liberal 
intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive institutions and 
the autonomy of national leaders (ibid, 1993; p 482). 
Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) and Sandholtz (1994) disputed Moravscik's and 
Keohane and Hoffman's understandings of European integration. However, 
they consider that competing ". .. explanations often represent ... different 
levels of analysis. In the end it is not a matter of which one is better, but of 
whether the right questions are being asked" (p 127) Indeed, their paper 
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attempts to frame the right questions and indicate analytical links between 
them. They contend that in respect of European integration the process is ".. . 
one of bargains among nations and elites within the region (ibid). 
Furthermore, they consider that this effort has been ". .. guided by three 
groups: Community institutions, industrial elites and governments. The 
Commission proposes and persuades. Important business coalitions exercise 
indispensable influence on governments" (ibid). Unlike the early neo- 
functionalists, they do not consider that outcomes are determinable but ".. . 
dependent on the timing and dynamics of a long series of contingent 
decisions. But the story, and consequently the analysis, concerns political 
leadership in creating a common European interest and then constructing a 
set of bargains that embody that understanding" (ibid, p 519). Furthermore, 
Sandholtz (1994) considers that if decision-making was purely 
intergovernmental, monetary union would not have been entertained. The 
SEM programme ". .. produced a renaissance in pro-EC sentiment and that 
enthusiasm coupled with broadly supportive public and business opinion" 
(ibid, p 288) allowed the conditions for monetary union to be taken seriously. 
The 1992 programme ensured that the ". .. Commission's 
depiction of EMU 
as a necessary complement for the single market could reach a receptive EC 
audience" (ibid). In this context, both spillover and supranationalism were at 
work in the process of European integration. 
The above theorists illustrate three understandings of the integration process: 
one that is totally intergovernmental (Moravscik, 1991; 1993); a second that 
illustrates both neo-functional and intergovernmental tendencies but puts 
more emphasis on intergovernmental processes (Keohane and Hoffman, 
1990; 1991); and a third, which also illustrates both theories but puts more 
emphasis on neo-functional processes (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; 
Sandholtz 1994). Through an empirical analysis, this thesis reassesses these 
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difficulties and comes to conclusions in respect of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism. 
Supranational Institutions (the Commission, Council, ECJ and European 
Parliament) and European Integration 
The EU encompasses three major decision-making institutions: the 
Commission which initiates legislation; Parliament which gives an opinion 
on legislation and sometimes more (the precise role of the European 
Parliament in the legislative process depends on the Treaty article on which 
the proposed legislation is based); and the Council which adopts legislation. 
The European Court of Justice should also be included. (See further Chapter 5, 
pp 127-147 Treaties of Rome HMSO 1988). The Commission is: 
... appointed every four years (and) according to article 11 of the i Treaty, the method of appointment must be by common accord 
of the governments of the member states. In practice ... 
Community consciousness is neither achieved nor attempted ... 
in theory the Commissioners are collectively appointed, they are 
in fact national nominees (Nugent, 1995; p 56, author's brackets). 
Theoretically, the Council and Commission have different allegiances. The 
Council incorporates the most precise intergovernmental element of the EU 
institutional structure and was devised to ensure an intergovernmental 
dimension to the Union Treaties. Article 152 of the EC Treaty states that the 
Council may request the Commission to undertake any studies the Council 
considers desirable for the attainment of common objectives, and to submit to 
it any appropriate proposals. Some consider that the clause is over-used by the 
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Council and is against the spirit of the Treaty. However, the Council is an 
important institution and usually its wishes are followed by the Commission. 
The main and initial emphasis of the Treaties is that the 
... Community shall 
have as its task ... by establishing a 
common market and an economic and monetary union and by 
implementing the common policies or activities referred to in 
Articles 3 and 3a to promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious development of economic activities sustainable 
and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high 
degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of 
employment and social protection, the raising of the standard of 
living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity among Member States (Article 2, EUR OP, 1992). 
The SEA added impetus to the harmonisation and integration process when 
it provided that "... the Common Market shall be progressively established 
during a transitional period of 12 years ... divided into 3 stages of 
4 years. " 
(HMSO, 1988; Article 8a). And, ". .. adopt measures with the aim of 
progressively establishing the internal market ... on 31st December 1992. 
" 
(ibid, Article 8b). This recognised that the Common Market was not a 
common market at all, but because of the trade barriers i. e. administration 
costs, customs etc, it was no more than a glorified customs union. 
Consequently, it was necessary to harmonise or remove the disparate Non 
Tariff Barriers (NTBs) that created problems for cross-border trade. Indeed, the 
EU needed to face wide-scale re-regulation, which in some areas constituted 
deregulation. The SEA was a political means of overcoming barriers to trade. 
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It builds on existing policy and extends the powers of the Parliament. Its 
provisions included: 
1. Constitutionalisation of the European Council. 
2. Co-operation Procedure including Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV). 
3. An outline for 1992 and the following programme. 
The Maastricht Treaty picks up the programme at this point, and adds: 
1. Subsidiarity. 
2. Single Economy. 
3. Single Currency. 
4. Common Policy. 
5. European Citizenship. 
6. Social Charter. 
7. Co-decision Procedure. 
In each Treaty amendment, the powers of the European Parliament are 
extended and the involvement of the Member States diluted. This, it may be 
argued, is an intensification of supranationality. Even though there is 
Member State input the pooling of sovereignty or the sovereignty shift is in 
the direction of an institution that continually broadens its remit and 
subsequent sovereignty. 
Through the pursuit of the SEM, the EU organised a structured system of 
legal rules with its own sources, and its own institutions and procedures for 
making, interpreting and enforcing those rules. The EU Treaties have 
incrementally created an evolutionary legal system which, on the entry into 
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force of each Treaty, became an integral part of the legal system of the Member 
States and which their courts are bound to apply (Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL 
[1964] ECR 585,593). At the Hague Conference in May 1948, it was held that 
the time had come for the nations of Europe to transfer certain sovereign 
rights in order henceforward to exercise those rights jointly. "The states have 
thus conferred on the Community institutions powers to take measures ... 
thus submitting their sovereign rights to a corresponding limitation" (Case 
17/67 Newman v Hauptzollant Hof [1967] ECR 441,453). 
The mechanisms that create legislation essentially come under two headings: 
regulations and directives. The Treaty defines a regulation as that which will 
have ". .. general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all member states" (HMSO, 1988; Article 189). This was 
emphasised in a 1970s judgment where it was held that a regulation ".. . 
renders automatically inapplicable ... any conflicting provisions of current 
national law - in so far as they ... take precedence ... in the territory of each 
member state" (Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629,643). Indeed, it is clear, that national law is 
subordinate to the wording of a regulation. However, in respect of directives 
the Treaty provides that they shall "... be binding, as to the result to be 
achieved upon each member state to which it is directed, but shall leave to 
the national authorities the choice of form and method" (HMSO, 1988; Article 
187 (3)). 
The main difference is that a regulation is automatically imposed upon a 
Member State in its entirety; whilst a directive must be transposed into 
national law within the prescribed implementation period. Consequently, 
one is of an integrative nature while the other leans toward harmonisation. 
120 
However, with the mechanism of mutual recognition at some point the 
directive will need to become all encompassing. 
Keohane and Hoffman (1991) considered that the EU had gained an element 
of Member State sovereignty. "Its institutions have some of the authority that 
we associate with institutions of sovereign governments: on certain issues 
individual states can no longer veto proposals before the Council; members 
of the Commission are independent figures rather than instructed agents" (p 
278). Indeed, a number of commentators consider that European institutions 
have played a central role in creating the new impetus toward European 
integration. 
In 1984 the European Parliament submitted a draft treaty 
establishing the European Union, followed only a year later by 
the Cockfield White Paper laying out the plans for creating a 
genuine barrier-free internal market by the end of 1992. In 1986 
an Intergovernmental conference was convened to negotiate the 
Single European Act (SEA). These three significant steps deeply 
influenced Community processes, peoples and structures and 
clearly transformed what was universally viewed as a sclerotic 
and ineffectual entity into a dynamic force in European and 
world affairs (Cafruny and Rosenthal, 1993; p 2). 
The main debate regarding the extent of supranationality revolves around 
how far this dynamism was down to European or Member State influence. 
Moravscik (1991) contended that the supranational model emphasised the 
European Parliament and that "... government representatives, abetted by 
the Commission, deliberately excluded representatives of the Parliament 
from decisive meetings" (p 20). However, it is clear that the European 
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Parliament did have a role in the process and wielded much greater influence 
than it did on its inception. Furthermore, it gained much decision-making 
influence through the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty and in this context one 
may question the extent to which the Commission was manipulated by 
government representatives in the negotiations. 
Spillover, Supranationality and Interest Groups: Processes of European 
Integration? 
The EU has changed dramatically since its conception and one may consider 
that this has been achieved through the interaction of supranationality and 
spillover. European institutions have grown in their ability to initiate and 
pass legislation of a European nature; the European Parliament has accrued 
greater decision-making powers regarding European policies and has become 
a relevant element in the decision-making process. Indeed, spillover has been 
at work in respect of the supranational bodies themselves. Interest groups 
proliferated around the European institutions in the mid-eighties and early 
nineties. Why they did this is open to interpretation. However, the most 
obvious reason would be the affects of the SEA and decision-making 
procedures (qualified majority), the SEM, the Maastricht Treaty and the 
possible advent of EMU. 
This thesis has interpreted supranationality as an abstract and material 
process that goes hand-in-hand with spillover; both the European Parliament 
and European integration allow examples of this process. The European 
Parliament began life as an advisory body and slowly evolved into what we 
have today, a democratically elected body with some decision-making powers. 
However, it is impossible to say what it will ultimately become in terms of its 
supranationalism. One may posit that it should be a decision-making 
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institution on behalf of the European 'citizen' and that this is its ultimate end 
which would link in with a federal Europe and the more general interaction 
(in spillover-supranational terms) that has been taking place. However, the 
European Parliament has accrued powers through the Treaties and 
intergovernmental agreements or through intergovernmental spillover. The 
intergovernmental aspect of the spillover process provides an environment 
for neo-functional spillover and neo-functional spillover provides an 
impetus for further intergovernmental spillover (see the Spillover Model, 
Figs 8.1,8.2 and 8.3). Indeed, there is an interaction between 
intergovernmental and neo-functional spillover which intensifies European 
integration and enhances the position of the decision-making institutions 
and supranationality. 
The process of interaction between spillover and supranationalism can be 
identified in the process between the Treaties, Member States and economic 
sectors. The Treaties have been necessary to enable a customs union and, 
through the SEA the foundations of a common market or the SEM. 
Additionally, they allow the free movement of services, labour, capital and 
goods and the prospect of monetary union. With the realisation of the SEA 
and SEM, sectors /industries recognised the increased importance of European 
integration and participated in the harmonisation process through lobbying 
both the national and the European institutions. This enhances the 
supranational status of the European bodies (Richardson and Mazey, 1996). 
As integration intensifies, the stakes become higher; EMU, as Maastricht 
identifies, incorporates a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and a 
European Central Bank (ECB). Eventually, the ECB will take over from the 
ESCB and will determine European monetary policy. The problem is of 
course accountability: should an unelected body have such unrestrained 
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power? If not, to whom or what should it be accountable? If it is accountable 
to the Council of Ministers, this may undermine its ability to function as a 
European entity in charge of a European currency. Effectively, national 
considerations will blur certain issues and undermine the very concept of a 
united economic policy. In this context, the European Parliament could 
extend its supranationality and become a democratic entity that makes 
decisions on behalf of its electorate in respect of European issues. The extent 
to which it attains and manipulates power will be determined by its electorate 
and the Member States. However, on this logic, monetary union necessitates 
a shift of sovereignty, in certain areas from the national to the supranational. 
Much of the pro-European optimism of the 1960s with regard to European 
integration and union has re-emerged over the 1980s and 1990s. If we accept 
Lindberg's definition of political integration that 
... the essence of a political system ... incorporates ... the 
existence of a legitimate system for the resolution of conflict, for 
the making of authoritative decisions for the group as a whole 
(and) 
... political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded 
to shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre 
(Lindberg, 1963; p 22 author's brackets). 
then a political system is in the process of formation. 
In the above context, the optimism of the past is being transformed in the 
present to give some form to the future. Indeed, turbulence is being 
overcome and wholes are being created. Much has changed in terms of the 
environment (the EU) as the process has moved forward. The new Europe 
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... interacts 
far more intensively, economically and socially; and 
that interaction is likely to intensify further within the next 
decade. But the dynamics of such integration are not peculiar to 
Europe: interaction within national societies and economies, 
within the global economy and its associated networks of social 
transactions and communications, respond to the same 
technological and economic changes (W. Wallace, 1991; p 20). 
It is contended that there is more intensity to the process in Europe, but the 
process is a world-wide phenomenon and as this interpretation suggests, 
regional integration through neo-functionalism is part of international 
integration through functional processes. 
Member States no longer have total control over all authorities in their 
territory, nor are they independent of outside bodies. Through the SEA, the 
Maastricht Treaty and the SEM, the supranationality of the EU has been 
intensified. It is not a federal state nor a confederation, but in the process of 
becoming: this it achieves through neo-functionalism. The process was 
intiated through the formation of the ECSC and the EEC. Its intensification 
has taken place through the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty, the SEM and 
potential monetary and political union. 
In this situation, the difficulty in establishing a SEM in financial services can 
be seen. In the more accommodating areas, compromises have been reached. 
However, there are many problems to overcome with a number of Member 
States entrenched in normative cultural /economic existence. Consequently, 
there will be difficulties to overcome for many European financial 
institutions. The idea of a SEM in financial services is extremely appealing 
but each of the Member State's industries are experienced at trading in distinct 
125 
market environments and each will be loathe to give their adversaries a 
competitive edge by relinquishing too much of what they are accustomed to. 
It could be considered that financial services legislation has reached an 
impasse and that without the impetus of the greater integration that the 
Maastricht Treaty allowed, the harmonisation process would have slowed 
down considerably. However, even with the Maastricht Treaty, it is now 
apparent that only the less problematic areas of harmonisation have been 
achieved in the existing phase of integration. If an SEM in financial services is 
to be realised, further harmonisation will be necessary. As the Treaties point 
out, single markets in banking and insurance are closely linked to the free 
movement of capital. However, to enable the free movement of capital, one 
may contend that a single currency is essential and until such exists, the idea 
of free capital movement is unrealistic. Only once monetary union has been 
realised can taxation and pension issues really be discussed and compromises 
pursued, and only in the aftermath of further treaties will the harmonisation 
programme be intensified. Effectively, there are two processes of spillover at 
work: one at a state level and one at a supranational, sector and interest group 
level. The former may be identified as intergovernmentalism, the latter as 
neo-functionalism. The latter may be broken down into three areas: general 
horizontal spillover (services to capital, etc); specific horizontal spillover 
(insurance to banking, i. e. sector bound); and vertical spillover (within 
insurance) (see the Spillover Model, Figs 8.1,8.2 and 8.3). Indeed, if the 
impetus of spillover in relation to financial services is taken into 
consideration along with plans for the free movement of capital one may 
posit that European integration is on-going and may be unstoppable. 
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Conclusion 
Neo-functionalism emphasises the role of sectors in the international 
economy and the extent to which a supranational authority would engender 
economic benefit and political acceptance of the process. Consequently, these 
factors add impetus to further integration in other sectors until a single 
economy emerges. This single economy will necessitate a single political 
authority and through the idea of spillover, one may argue, this will 
eventually be achieved. 
Changes that have been influenced by the alterations in the USSR and 
Eastern Europe will necessitate new institutions to facilitate economic and 
social interactions. These will be ". .. decisively influenced by the capacity of 
the core institutions of West European co-operation: a structure which is 
gradually acquiring the stability and coherence of a political system, under the 
cumulative impact of internal integration and external challenges" (W. 
Wallace, 1990; p 21). This thesis explores whether there are supranational and 
spillover processes which engender European integration through grounded 
theory techniques and an inductive/ deductive investigation of a specific 
industry that has become part of the process over the last twenty years: the life 
insurance industry. 
There is undoubtedly the need to comprehend what is necessary if all 
participants are to understand which directions should be pursued. "This 
context provides for the potentially pivotal role of ideas. Shared beliefs may 
act as 'focal points' around which the behaviour of actors converge. 
Moreover, given that most agreements are likely to be incomplete ... shared 
beliefs about the spirit of agreements are essential ... Shared belief systems 
and focal points, however, do not always emerge without conscious efforts on 
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the part of interested actors" (Garrett and Weingast, 1993; p 176). This is how 
the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty overcame the problems of turbulence in 
general terms and how interest groups interact and form the basis for 
compromise, in more specific terms. This thesis tracks the initial uncertainty 
involved in the creation of the Third Life Assurance Directive and questions 
the extent to which ". .. institutions not only provide individuals with 
critical information ... but also help construct a shared belief system that 
defines for the community what actions constitute co-operation and 
defection" (ibid). Effectively, Garret and Weingast consider that by 
comprehending how shared belief systems are created we can provide a 
means of overcoming ". .. the deficiencies of functionalist logic" (ibid p 177). 
They contend that to understand the process of European integration it is 
necessary to consider how interests and ideas are integrated. Their argument 
is that a Europe based simply on hedonistic self-interest would not sustain a 
process of integration. Indeed, divergent preferences undermine co-operation 
and act as a barrier to integration. Understanding how this barrier can be 
overcome requires analysis of institutions in the broadest sense: the 
embodiment and propagation of co-ordinated expectations about the internal 
market (that is, the creation of a shared belief system) (ibid). If such is created 
then, as Haas proposed, wholes may be created and turbulence overcome. 
Interest groups are capable of overcoming these barriers through 
communication, signals and incomplete information. They provide salience, 
enhance different perspectives and reduce uncertainty. "Lawmakers operate 
in highly uncertain electoral environments ... interest groups offer to help... 
. They provide political intelligence about ... preferences" (Hansen, 1991; 
cited in Ainsworth, 1993; p 44). 
This thesis investigates the above through ascertaining the different 
regulatory environments that Member States considered the most 
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advantageous regulatory structure for themselves, and how these different 
preferences are compromised and a shared belief system created. Ultimately, 
we consider if such a process has neo-functional or intergovernmental 
tendencies. Additionally, it examines the extent of multi-level and state- 
centric models of governance in Europe. Usually the state-centric model is 
attributed with intergovernmental features, while the multi-level with neo- 
functional. However, one may posit that intergovernmentalism and neo- 
functionalism are not mutually exclusive and incompatible means of 
understanding European integration. Indeed, one may consider that they are 
different sides of the same coin. At the very least, intergovernmentalism 
must accept that the Commission and the European Parliament are 
important actors in the European decision-making process. "It is only by 
analysing the effects of institutional rules on the interactions among these 
institutions that one can understand the policies that are produced every day 
in the EU and hence the nature of the integration process itself" (Garrett and 
Tsebelis, 1996; p 294). Additionally, ". .. an international 
institution 
established by states may differentiate so much that sub-state and non-state 
actors actually begin to dominate relevant decision processes. However, this is 
not a suitable matter for deductively generated assumptions but an issue that 
should be settled by empirical investigations" (Gehring, 1996; p 252). Such an 
understanding negates the state-centric view and points toward a multi-level 
understanding of the processes. If supranationality is accepted then elements 
of neo-functionalism are visible. Indeed, this leads on to the main aims of the 
thesis, which are to: 
(a) Construct a substative theory to ascertain the extent to which neo- 
functionalism/intergovernmentalism is in operation in the process of 
European integration . 
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(b) Create tables, matrices and models to illustrate certain assumptions that 
may be used to demonstrate the extent of neo-functional/intergovernmental 
processes. The tables, matrices and models are the building blocks of the 
substantive theory. 
(c) Illustrate how far the EU is a supranational construct /process and the 
extent to which it interacts with spillover in its formulation. 
(d) Provide verification of the tables, matrices and models through empirical 
research which includes interviews and surveys, and add to the substantive 
theory to allow further understanding of European integration. 
(e) Illustrate clearly how the substantive theory is juxtaposed and linked to 
the formal theories of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. 
An empirical analysis that sets out to explore the above questions will be 
undertaken in the rest of the thesis. In the next chapter, the object is to 
indicate how the different legislative structures of the individual Member 
States provide differing regulatory environments. It is argued that regulatory 
environments are identifiable through individual Member State legislation 
and through this can be differentiated between themselves and in relation to 
the evolving SEM. Additionally, a survey of the EU insurance industry 
verifies and adds to the open coding of Member State legislation and 
enhances the regulation matrix. Indeed, along with with Table 2.2 (p 50) the 
matrix is the basis of the substantive theory. 
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Chapter Five 
Regulation Matrix Development: Foundations of Substantive Theoryl 
You Greeks oh isn't it great to be rid of plots and battles? 
Before another pestle dishes us, come let us wrestle 
And pull peace out of her pit, who is so beloved by all. 
You farmers, merchants, labourers, 
Craftsmen, aliens, visitors ... Come one and all to a man. 
(Aristophanes, 1970; pp 233-234). 
Introduction 
Ellis (1994) inquired whether "... the Single European Market is a cohesive 
unit subject to a unified set of laws, or whether it is in fact, really made up of 
twelve separate national markets with - distinct legal systems? " (p 41). The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine the different legislative environments 
and consequential regulatory regimes with regard to life insurance in the EU. 
However, prior to this we must classify the types of regulation which 
underpin the insurance law of the EU. Regulation may be classified into three 
constituent parts: Insurance company law; insurance intermediary law; and 
insurance contract law. "The aim underlying insurance company law is to 
protect the policyholder ... by ensuring the finical stability of insurance 
companies ... In the case of insurance intermediaries ... protection may 
extend to the supervision of insurance selling practices" (Ellis, 1995; pp 46-47). 
Indeed, these two areas were dealt with by the Third Life Assurance Directive 
I In this chapter there is a comparative analysis of Member State regulations pre-third life insurance 
directive. It is recognised that since this analysis there have been many changes to individual Member 
States legislation and subsequent regulation. Indeed, this factor substantiates the author's understanding 
of the harmonisation processes. Each Member State has needed to bring it's regulatory environment into 
line with that indicated by European legislation. 
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whereas the area of contracts was not. A contracts directive was proposed but 
agreement could not be reached (the implications of this are discussed further 
below). Consequently, this chapter deals primarily with the implications of 
the first two forms of insurance regulation. 
In this context, legislation underpins regulation because interpretation of the 
legislation creates the regulatory environments and the subsequent trading 
structure. In general, policy-makers find ways of overcoming conflict through 
negotiation and compromise. Indeed, because societies cannot be based on 
conflict alone, as Jordan and Richardson put it ". .. the logic of negotiation 
appears inevitable" (cited in Mazey and Richardson, 1996; p 201). 
This may be especially true in a policy-making system such as 
the EU where European-level officials face unique problems in 
formulating laws which can be made to work (and are 
acceptable) in ... very different Member States. Each of these 
states has different regulatory styles and traditions and it is an 
exceptionally difficult task to produce proposals which can 
mobilise the necessary winning coalition.... One way of doing 
this it to integrate interest groups directly into the various stages 
of the policy process from problem identification through to 
policy implementation (ibid). 
Through a comparative analysis of Member State legislation in respect of the 
life insurance industry, theoretical coding (see Chapter Two) and a survey of 
European life insurance companies, a regulation matrix is constructed that 
pursues further understanding of the European integration process and the 
extent of state interference in Member State life insurance markets. Such will 
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establish the underpinnings of a substantive theory which will be developed 
further in the following two chapters. 
The initial questions that need to be asked when one broaches the subject of 
regulation in the EU are: what are regulations, how would one define them 
and how do regulations and the EU fit together? Additionally, the concepts 
need to be understood in their historical context, with regard to their 
theoretical underpinnings and their more practical applications. 
First, the chapter will give a brief definition of regulation. Secondly, it builds 
on Table 2.2 and further defines what a regulatory environment entails. Each 
Member State's life insurance industry undergoes comparative analysis and is 
coded in a regulation type category. The 12 (pre-enlargement) Member State 
life insurance industries are then pin-pointed on a regulatory environment 
matrix (see the Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One, Fig 5.1 p 157). This 
displays the amount of regulation on a scale of 1-12. Each unit of the matrix 
indicates the regulatory regime of the given Member State and displays the 
type of legislation that indicates the regulatory environment. 
Thirdly, a survey (via a postal questionnaire) of European life insurance 
companies in eight Member States is added to the existing coding. Indeed, this 
verifies the matrix and creates a more precise understanding of the area 
under analysis. This is illustrated through the augmented matrix (see the Life 
Insurance Regulation Matrix Two, fig 5.2 p 160). Indeed, the coding process 
takes into consideration the legislative positions of the Member States and in 
the case of eight Member States allows individuals from separate life 
insurance sectors to contribute their own perceptions of the legislation that 
underpins their regulatory environments. The regulation matrix is intended 
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to reflect the Member States' regulatory positions during 1993-94 i. e. prior to 
enlargement and the enactment of the Third Life Assurance Directive. 
In the questionnaire, respondents were also asked to indicate which type of 
life insurance regulatory environment prevailed in their own Member State 
and what type would be most advantageous (a) for their own company, (b) for 
the European Union (c) to allow greatest consumer protection, and (d) to 
enable greatest consumer choice. The results added to the coding and 
categorisation process, assist in identifying a compromise convergence point 
and allow some verification of the pre-suppositions accrued through the 
comparative analysis of the Member State regulatory environments. (The 
methods and methodology were illustrated in greater depth in Chapter Two) 
Regulation: A Definition 
Regulation has a multitude of definitions. However, for the purposes of this 
thesis it shall be considered as ". .. a politico-economic concept and, as such, 
can best be understood by reference to different systems of economic 
organisation and the legal forms which maintain them" (Majone, 1990; pp 1- 
2). Regulation is an attempt to correct. market failure in the form of ". .. 
monopoly power, negative externalities, failures of information, or 
insufficient provision of public goods such as law and order or 
environmental protection" (Majone, 1996; p 263). Furthermore ". .. market 
activities can be regulated only in societies that consider such activities 
worthwhile in themselves and hence in need of protection as well as control" 
(ibid). 
Additionally, it may be argued that, there is a delineation between social and 
economic regulation. Social regulation "... deals with such matters as health 
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and safety, environmental protection and consumer protection" (Ogus, 1994; 
p 4). Some regulatory regimes are of a liberal nature whereas others are state- 
controlled and have been allowed a modicum of monopoly or oligopoly. 
Regulation can be traced back to the Tudor and Stuart periods, e. g. through 
guilds. However, by the late nineteenth century, this tradition had largely 
disappeared and regulation emerged in coincidence with industrialisation 
and urbanisation. Dicey (1962) considered that the growth of regulation 
illustrated a collective disenchantment with laissez-faire that was fuelled by 
the expansion of suffrage. However, on this there has been disagreement and 
some consider that there "... never was an age of laissez-faire, and state 
intervention did not result from any abrupt shift to collectivist ideology but 
rather emerged gradually, throughout the nineteenth century, as a pragmatic 
response to social problems: England stumbled into the modern 
administrative State without design" (Ogus, 1994; p 7). 
Twentieth century Europe saw an immense growth in the use of regulation 
resulting from Keynesian ideas and the transferral to nationalised utilities. 
Such encompassed a shift in economic regulation toward the social in terms 
of government direction and political accountability. Additionally, over the 
last fifteen years we have witnessed a process of deregulation or, as some 
would argue, a process of re-regulation. "Many so called deregulating 
measures have involved not the removal of external constraints but rather a 
change to less interventionist methods and forms ... Some areas of social 
regulation have continued to grow, notably those pertaining to the 
environment and financial services" (ibid, p 10). 
Finally, the evolutionary process toward the SEM and its impact on 
regulatory frameworks need to be taken into account. Different regimes create 
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barriers to trade. Consequently, harmonisation of regulations was posited. 
However, harmonisation proved a lengthy business and through the SEA, 
which initiated Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), and mutual recognition 
the whole process was speeded up2. 
Industrial societies generally accentuate a tension between two systems of 
economic organisation: the market system and the collectivist system. The 
former is where individuals and sectors are allowed to function with 
minimal interference in the pursuit of their own goals whereas the latter 
looks to control and direct behaviour through intervention. Of course, there 
are gradients of these perspectives in the EU, each Member State illustrating 
its own cultural tradition in the legislation and regulation they adhere to. 
As noted above this thesis takes into consideration the special nature of life 
insurance and other financial services products. Indeed, the thesis posits that 
products such as life insurance and pensions are closely linked to individual 
cultures. "Differences in the way distinct countries subjectively value 
insurance products have not come into being by chance. They have evolved 
out of historical developed differences in values between one national society 
and another" (Hofstede, 1995; p 423). This situation exists between the 
separate Member States and relates to other financial services products. It is 
from this starting point that it is assumed that through a study of the life 
2 Mutual recognition is a ruling by the ECJ which states that if a product meets the stipulated standards in 
their höme member State then it may be sold anywhere in the Union. Mutual recognition encapsulates an 
important mechanism in the pursuit of the SEM as it gives a framework for the enablement of compromise. 
However, where diversity is so great, there will be a need for greater rather than less harmonisation of 
Member State legislation. The principle of mutual recognition ... pre-supposes agreement on a number of basic rules ... these minimum harmonisation requirements ... are only possible 
because common interest, 
mutual confidence and a high degree of economic convergence exist between EEC member states (Loheac, 
1991; p 409). One has to question if"minimum harmonisation requirements" have been met in respect of the life 
insurance market. The achievement of such requirements is extremely rare and even if there is a "high degree of 
economic convergence" in the life insurance market, the practical realities of achieving an SEM through 
mutual recognition alone are apparent. A convergence process must be undertaken prior to the actions of 
mutual recognition coming into play (ibid). The idea -behind mutual recognition suggests spontaneous 
legislative adaptation; however, it does not deal with all regulation and as a convergence point is necessary 
for it to be effective it could be conceived as an impetus that encourages legislative change and compromise. 
This convergence point is indicated in (Figure 5.1 and 5.2) 
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insurance industry generalisations concerning the EU may take place. 
Furthermore, the thesis uses a qualitative methodology and generalises from 
one situation to others (this is made clearer in Chapter Two above and 
through the use of the Spillover Model see pp 277-81). In this chapter there is 
a comparative analysis of Member State regulation regarding life insurance 
and it is suggested that the conclusions may be used to understand regulatory 
convergence to financial services in general. 
Coding and Categorisation: Member State Life Insurance Industries 
"Numerous alternative economic rules could have been used as the basis for 
EC trade liberalisation, from pure laissez-faire to the creation of an 
encompassing set of EC regulations and standards" (Garret and Weingast, 
1993; p 177). This chapter defines these alternatives and indicates their 
existence through theoretical coding, a comparative analysis, a survey and the 
creation of a regulation matrix. 
Following the initial comparative analysis of the Member States life 
insurance legislative environments and regulatory structures, they were 
coded into three categories each designated the preferred type of legislation 
which indicated their regulatory regimes. These were: (a) liberal, (b) prescribed 
and (c) nationalised (state-controlled) (the initial coding is illustrated in Table 
2.1 p 43). 
Through the open coding, each Member State was allocated a position on the 
matrix between one and twelve. A perfectly free market would be at point one 
on the scale, while a state-controlled market would be at point twelve. This is 
not to say that there are no differentiation's within each market type, as 
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Tables 2.2 and 5.1 display, but it does allow a general means of defining 
different regulatory environments. 
Table. 5.1 
Regulation Scale 
1-2 = self-minimal regulation 
3-4 = minimal regulation; independent regulatory bodies 
5-6 = moderately regulated without state ownership 
7-8 = highly regulated without state ownership 
9-10 = highly regulated with minimal state ownership 
11-12 = highly regulated with a profusion of state control. 
Initial open coding (see Chapter Two) allowed a comparative analysis of the 
regulatory environments of the individual Member States and to illustrate 
the process involved in the pursuit of a single market in relation to the 
normative perceptions of legislation and market norms. Each state has a 
different cultural tradition in relation to financial institutions and 
investment. These are illustrated through historical attitudes and economic 
ideologies which in turn are exemplified through legislation and the 
subsequent regulation relating to life insurance. Basically, through this coding 
the research is identifying particular phenomena in the data and grouping 
concepts around them. This reduces the number of units with which the 
research needs to work. "The process of grouping concepts that seem to 
pertain to the same phenomenon is called categorising" (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990; p 65) (see Table 2.1). 
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Once our attention is fixed on a category, we begin to examine 
and discover emergent properties about the category by 
constantly coding and analysing. Such categories and properties 
only conceptualise what we see, but with the theoretical codes 
we form the connections between them which yield hypotheses- 
which in turn suggests how the incidents and categories thereof 
may be related to each other (Glaser, 1992; p 39). 
Liberal Regulatory Environments 
A liberal regulatory environment lies between one and four on the twelve 
point scale and is characterised by the basic premise of self-regulation with 
minimal legislation. Four EU life insurance industries are identified as 
having relatively liberal environments in respect of their legislation and 
subsequent regulations. They are Eire, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
UK. These life insurance regulatory structures are perceived as relatively 
liberal in comparison with other EU Member States. However, one may 
consider that the Irish system, although until 1936 extremely free, is close to 
the prescribed regulatory environment. Neither the UK, Luxembourg, nor 
the Netherlands are disposed to regulations which demand governmental 
approval with regard to policy design or premium rates, and traditionally the 
Irish regulation was left in the hands of an actuary, though in 1984 financial 
tests were implemented in Eire. 
The UK industry was supervised primarily through the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) with regard to solvency control which relied on the 
principle of 'freedom with disclosure'. In general "... insurers are free to 
compete as they choose in the marketplace, provided that they meet certain 
requirements designed to ensure the continuing solvency of all entities 
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underwriting policies of insurance" (Financial Times, 1992; p 291). However, 
following membership of the EU and a number of company failures, the 
regulatory framework was intensified ". .. partly through the perceived need 
to protect policy-holders ... and partly as a result of changes arising from the 
implementation of European Community directives" (ibid). The minimum 
valuation of liabilities has been delineated by a supervisor and the life office 
'freedom with disclosure' allowed the actuary relative liberty to initiate: 
reserve calculations; premium calculations; product design; investment 
choice with regard to reserves. The actuary is, however, statutory bound to 
ensure office solvency and meet minimum reserve levels and asset cover. 
Fundamentally, prior to 1936, 
... the general character and operation of the Irish market 
resembled that of the UK ... In 1936, however, the Irish 
insurance market became protected so far as entry was concerned 
... an insurance company would not be granted a licence. In 
Ireland there are technical reserves, minimum solvency and 
guarantee funds for life insurers. However, the regulatory 
authority has the power to take action if the solvency level of a 
life company is endangered (ibid, p 153). 
The Irish regulatory environment is not as free as the other liberal 
environments. This is due to the process of Europeanisation that has been 
apparent in this market. The Irish market has brought in, to a far greater 
extent than the UK, the European Union's (Life Insurance) regulations on top 
of the EU Minimum Solvency Margin Directive (1979) and therefore one may 
argue that it borders the prescribed regulatory environment. 
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Traditionally the minister left detailed financial control of 
authorised life insurers in the hands of the company actuary. 
Here again, the European influence has brought about change 
through the introduction of three financial tests: technical and 
mathematical reserves, minimum solvency margin and 
certification of returns for all life insurers (ibid, p 156). 
However, ultimately it was judged that the Irish life market was not 
prescribed because life insurance company returns are completed and 
submitted to the ministry which, as with the UK and Dutch regulatory 
environments, ensured solvency margin requirements. 
Luxembourg also adhered to EU legislation and its legislation of 1984 
incorporated two Directives; the Co-insurance Directive 78/4733 and Life 
Assurance Directive 79/2674. However, it is primarily concerned with the 
separation of life and non-life insurance with only a passing interest in 
solvency margins. 
One may consider that Luxembourg regulation was the most liberal in Europe 
as neither policy wording nor rates were open to supervision. Luxembourg 
mainly relies on the industry itself to undertake supervision and where 
problems arise, the Officer of the Commissioner for Insurance (OCI) is 
consulted. However, the OCI does have some power and can force insurance 
companies to comply with Article 18 of Insurance legislation (24 Feb 1984) and 
may ultimately withdraw approval. This legislation ". .. modified existing 
legislation in order to bring it into line with existing EU directives" (ibid p 
202) (Co-insurance Directive and the First Life Assurance Directive). It was 
3 OJ L 151 07/06/78 
4 OJ L 063 13/03/79 
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considered that the first of these enabled EU risks to be covered through a lead 
insurer by a number of Member States. 
Since it is the lead insurer who agrees the premium rate and 
conditions, the State (Member State) of the risk would have been 
able to use the mechanisms applied to insurers established in its 
territory to ensure that the insurance product contained in the 
co-insurance contract matched in every way what locally 
established insurers provided. The participation of insurers from 
other states would thus have no effect, from the customer's 
point of view, apart from making it easier to find direct cover 
(without recourse to reinsurance) for large risks (Pool, 1990; p 39 
author's brackets). 
Fundamentally, Luxembourg companies are closely monitored and must 
adhere to Article 4.1 of the 1984 legislation which states that ". .. undertakings 
shall not be granted approval unless they assume one of the following forms: 
limited company, company limited by shares, mutual insurance association, 
or co-operative society" (Financial Times, 1992; p 204). Even the liberal 
markets adhere to some form of regulation. However, in the case of 
Luxembourg it is minimal in respect of life insurance and external companies 
are taking advantage of this factor. "The market ... is liberally regulated with 
little involvement in the supervision of policy wordings or rates ... 
Supervision is based on firm principles but exercised in a flexible way, 
minimising unnecessary bureaucracy" (ibid). 
The Dutch industry is supervised by an independent agency called the 
Verzekeringskamer (VK), and companies report to this agency which enables 
governmental control over investment regulations and solvency margins. 
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Each of the Member States' regulatory systems rely on some reporting to the 
regulatory body. 
Supervision in all four liberal regulatory environments is based on the 
concept of self control, self-regulation and self-determination in respect of 
both products and premiums. This is interposed by a regulatory structure of 
minimal prescription, which mainly determines insolvency regulations and 
supervisory bodies. With regard to the Netherlands the main legislation over 
the last 70 years has been 'Wet op Levensverzekering-bedrijf' (WOL) 
established in 1922 in the wake of two company insolvency's. This legislation 
was superseded in 1987 by the 'Wet Toezicht Verzekerings-bedrijf' (WTV) 
which monitors company insolvency margins through VK supervision and 
brought Dutch legislation into line with that of the EU. This indicates that 
European legislation affects the national and consequently impinges on the 
normative experience of the Member State. Such is also clear within the Irish 
market where all of the most recent legislation has attempted to bring it in 
line with that of the EU. 
In the Netherlands, supervision 
... is of a predominantly liberal character, with the emphasis on 
retro-active financial supervision. The insurance company can 
therefore in principle determine its own company strategy (such 
as premiums and conditions) in accordance with its own 
opinion within the limits and rules laid down in the law.... 
The liberal supervision appears to protect the insured public 
adequately, and is efficient from an economic point of view, in 
that most Dutch insurance products are generally priced lower 
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than in other European countries which operate stricter 
supervision (ibid, p 213). 
In the UK, the Insurance Companies Act (1982) and the Insurance Companies 
Accounts and Statements Regulations (1983), ensures publications of balance 
sheets, a life fund account and annual valuations. The Policy-holders 
Protection Act (1975) as amended by the Policyholders Protection Act (1997), 
determines that in the event of insolvency a fund is available, paid into by 
the industry as a whole, which covers 90% of policy-holder losses. 
The Financial Services Act (1986) initiated trading supervision through the 
Life Assurance and Unit Trusts Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO) and the 
Financial Intermediaries Managers and Brokers Association (FIMBRA). The 
Financial Services Act polarised agents into two categories; independent 
brokers were tied to FIMBRA and company representatives who sell only the 
products of a certain company to LAUTRO. The Act ensured that 
independents follow certain regulations which include detailed record 
keeping, disclosure of commission and best advice (this may be described as 
an undertaking by the broker to ensure that the proposed investment meets 
the customer's 'needs at least to the extent that any other product may). 
However although these bodies are independent in name, they are effectively 
tied to the insurance business. This has been illustrated by the shift toward a 
body with greater independence, the PIA. Of course, this has recently been 
surpassed by the Labour party's plan for a regulatory body which will oversee 
the whole of the sector; the Financial Services Authority (FSA) Indeed, 
through these provisions, one could argue that the UK is shifting towards the 
Belgian model. 
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Adherence to such regulations proved to be expensive and to cut costs, many 
small and medium independents tied themselves to insurance companies. 
Many banks and building societies have also given up their independent 
status, although many banks have moved further into the life and pensions 
market by initiating their own subsidiary life offices. Consequently, there was 
an element of co-operation between banks and insurance companies in the 
UK market, although this was tainted or slanted with a growing propensity 
towards competition. 
Although there are similarities between these four Member States in that 
they each fall into the liberal category, there are also differences between 
them. As it is generally agreed that a totally free market is an abstract notion 
(as some form of regulation is always apparent), none of the Member States 
can be given a number one on the matrix scale (see Life Insurance Regulation 
Table 2.1, p 43 and Fig 5.1, p 157). Consequently, the most liberal market 
(Luxembourg) is at point two. Luxembourg is totally self-regulated. However, 
when problems do arise, the Officer of the Commissioner for Insurance (OCI) 
is consulted under its general insurance legislation. In considering the 
Luxembourg situation, one must be aware of the small size of the market and 
the ease with which it may be monitored. 
The UK and the Netherlands have very similar regulatory environments and 
both may be positioned at point three (see Table 2.1 and Fig 5.1). As indicated 
above, the UK predominantly relied on 'freedom with disclosure' which 
allowed an actuary the discretion to initiate reserve calculations; premium 
calculations; and investment choices regarding reserves. The actuary was, 
however, obliged to report this information to the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) and is statutorily bound to ensure solvency levels, minimum 
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reserve levels and asset cover. Of course, as indicated above, this is in the 
process of change. 
The Dutch life insurance industry was also supervised through a regulatory 
body which, although independent, was still sympathetic toward the industry 
and is mainly concerned with minimal supervision of insolvency 
regulations. Legislation is minimal, however the most recent brings it into 
line with general European legislation. 
The Irish environment was the most closely regulated in the liberal category 
and borders that of the prescribed. Traditionally, Irish supervision (which 
corresponds with the number four on the table and matrix) was left in the 
hands of an actuary (see Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One, Fig 5.1, p 157 
and Table 2.1, p 43). However, it has tighter regulations today and is more 
closely in line with EU legislation than any of the liberal markets. In Eire, 
there are required technical reserves, minimum solvency delineation's and 
guarantee funds. Ultimately, the authorities can take action if the solvency 
level is threatened. 
Therefore, liberal regulatory environments are similar in respect of ideology 
i. e. they have a free market ethos and limited legislation. However, despite 
these similarities each market has distinct differences. It could be argued that 
the reason for this lies in the regulation which has been defined by Member 
State legislation. One may consider that the differences relate to a cultural 
existence that is manifest in the economic sphere through definite legislation, 
regulation and institutional norms. The differences between the Member 
States in this area do, however, seem to be diminishing, as the European legal 
system becomes more apparent. All four above Member States have had to 
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bring themselves into line with EU legislation which, for them, means 
moving towards greater rather than less regulation. 
Prescribed Regulatory Environments 
This section provides an explanation and codification of what may be 
described as prescribed regulatory environments. Germany is the Member 
State with the most prescriptive regulation whereas Spain and Denmark 
have a little less; Belgium leans further in the direction of the liberal. Indeed, 
one may consider Belgium as a compromise between the liberal and 
prescribed regulatory environment types and one which could typify future 
European regulation. 
A prescribed regulatory environment lies between five and eight on the scale 
and within this range one is looking at moderate to tight legislation but 
without or with limited state interference in the companies themselves. The 
comparative analysis and open coding has identified four Member States with 
lesser or greater degrees of prescription and identified their position on the 
matrix. They are Belgium, point five on the scale, Spain and Denmark, point 
six, and Germany, point eight. One may argue, that through its legislative 
programme the French regulatory environment falls into this category. 
However, at the time of the study, it still had a preponderance of state 
ownership and will be treated as a nationalised regulatory environment. 
In the past the Belgian environment has had liberal life insurance regulation 
and until 1930 supervision of the system was not contemplated. However, in 
general, the regulatory environment has been indicative of the state of play at 
the European level because in the post-war period the Belgian structure 
evolved in line with EU directives. 
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The Spanish regulatory environment is similar to that of Belgium, although 
it does have its own distinct historical route. Until the death of Franco in the 
mid-seventies and the implementation of the new Spanish constitution in 
1978, insurance was supervised by legislation passed in 1912. Indeed, it was 
not until the Socialist party attempted a reformation of the regulatory system 
in the early 1980s that any real legislation was formalised. The Insurance 
Control and Supervision Act, (Ley de Ordenaciön del Seguro Privado) was 
implemented in 1984 and with a royal decree in 1985 formed the basis of 
control and supervision in the Spanish market. This legislation looked 
towards a number of changes in Spanish regulations; these included solvency 
fields, policy-holder protection, professional standards and the re-grouping of 
companies through mergers. Supervision in Spain is straightforward: 
companies apply to operate in the market then seek registration. Once 
registered, companies are monitored in respect of solvency, advertising and 
products, etc by the Direcciön General de Seguro which reports directly to the 
ministry. 
In Germany, life insurance is tightly controlled and companies have to seek 
approval with regard to product design and policy terms. There are two main 
pieces of legislation which relate to insurance. These are 
Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG), which relates to regulating the 
relationships between insurance companies, the insured, policy-holders and 
beneficiaries; and the Versicherungsaufssichtsgesetz (VAG) which is directly 
responsible for the regulations relating to the supervisory body 
Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Versicherungswesen (BAV). "The underlying 
principle of the insurance supervisory law is the system of 'substantive state 
supervision' (materielle Staatsaufsicht)" (Financial Times, 1992; p 103). 
Within this framework ". .. the operations of an insurance company are 
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controlled legally, economically and financially from the beginning of its 
activities to the end of its winding up procedure" (ibid). 
The BAV designates premium rates, a specified mortality table for each 
product, and maximum interest rates and expenses. Such a situation induces 
a small differentiation in the prices of products and leads to limited 
competition regarding product range. Because most companies have a 
complete product range, competition emanates from bonus distribution. 
Between 95% and 98% of profit is distributed to the policy-holders. A general 
regulation indicated that 90% of total profit should be distributed, but 
competition forced bonuses up. 
In Belgium, supervision was extended in 1975 and all insurance was brought 
under the auspices of the Office De Controle des Assurance (OCA). The OCA 
is monitored by the Minister for Economic Affairs. However, the process is 
undertaken through a committee which interacts with the ministry and 
indicates necessary changes in respect of legislation and how it should be 
administered. The committee consists of six members who are drawn not 
only from insurance but other areas: the legal profession, other financial 
institutions and academia. As many areas as is possible are taken into 
consideration; consequently, profitability is not the only benchmark, but it is 
an important consideration. Indeed, the OCA undertakes the close 
supervision of existing regulations. It does not determine policy rates, it 
simply ensures that legislation is activated and adhered to through three 
main areas: 
(1) Technical Supervision. 
(2) Legal supervision of compliance with regulations. 
(3) Financial supervision. 
149 
One may contend that the Belgian method displayed a consultative (and 
more democratic) dimension and one that gives an indication of how 
legislative decisions and supervision may be conducted in the future. Indeed, 
as noted above, the Belgian approach may display the traits of the evolving 
SEM in life insurance and illustrate an attainable compromise between the 
different life insurance regulatory environments. 
Denmark was supervised through a legislative framework which established 
a number of acts. These include the Insurance Companies Act (1981) which 
prescribes public supervision and company format; the Business Competition 
Act (1989), which supervised monopoly and price control; the Insurance 
Contracts Act (1930), which concerns relationships between insurance parties, 
i. e. each other and customers; the Marketing Act (1975) under which the 
ombudsman may adjudicate whether insurance company marketing 
activities are in line with accepted practices. To ensure adherence to 
legislation and compliance with law 127 (3) the industry is supervised by a 
division of the Danish Ministry of Finances. 
As mentioned above, the Spanish life insurance industry was supervised by 
the Direcciön General de Seguros, an insurance board directly responsible to 
the Ministry of Finances. Spain has recently developed the fastest growing life 
insurance industry in premium income terms in recent years indicating the 
largest growth rate in the EU. In the latter part of the 1980s, this was as high as 
70% (Sigma, Swiss Re; 4/90 - 1/92). The reason for this growth was the social 
security crisis which has prompted individuals to arrange their own pensions 
and subsequently improved sales. 
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In Belgium, formal approval regarding conditions and rates was abandoned 
and the principles in relation to insurance governance reformed. Belgian 
legislation was specific in content but it allowed general applications in 
respect of product by product profitability and the process of contractual 
obligations in individual cases. Effectively, supervision was non-systematic 
and allowed for both prudence as well as profitability. Consequently, both 
company and consumer needs were dealt with through the existing 
legislation. The Danish regulatory environment was a little more prescribed 
in respect of this and Danish companies submit detailed financial statements 
which include annual accounts and group reports. However, in respect of 
solvency margins, technical reserves and capital adequacy, legislation was 
denoted by EU directives. 
The Danish life insurance market was not as liberal as its non-life insurance 
market and this illustrates the limited onus the Danes put on EU legislation 
to indicate their regulatory structure. There are more comprehensive 
directives in respect of non-life insurance which the Danish have 
subsequently implemented. 
The German environment was highly regulated. This ensured high 
consumer protection and safe but low-yielding products. Historically, 
Germany has undergone two periods of hyper-inflation. This may have 
much to do with a risk-averse attitude and the factor of limited product 
innovation. Once again, the prevailing legislation and consequent regulatory 
structure was indicated by cultural and socio-historical circumstances. 
As with the liberal regulatory environments, the prescribed environments 
illustrate the changes that EU legislation is bringing about with extreme 
clarity. The lesser prescribed markets have the fewest changes to make and 
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this is apparent in their adroitness at bringing in European directives. This 
was particularly so of Belgium. However, in this respect this it was followed 
closely by both Spain and Denmark. Until 1990 a life insurance company in 
the Danish Market was state controlled. As EU legislation changed, so too did 
the Danish market. Consequently, an interaction is apparent between 
national legislation, European legislation and regulation formulation. 
The Danish market was marginally tighter than the Belgian with respect to 
legislation and has consequently been allocated point six on the scale (see Life 
Insurance Regulation, Matrix One Fig 5.1 p 157 and Table 2.1 p 43). In the 
Belgian (point 5 on the scale) market, supervision was non-systematic and 
negotiation was apparent, whereas, the Danish market called for detailed 
financial statements i. e. annual accounts and group reports. However, in 
respect of solvency margins, technical reserves and capital adequacy 
legislation, Denmark and Belgium were very similar as both provided 
extensively for EU Directives. 
Spain has undergone a legislative transformation since the late 1970s and this 
brought about many changes in life insurance regulations. Changes have 
included the introduction of solvency fields, policy holder protection, and 
professional standards. Effectively, the Spanish regulatory environment was 
very similar to the Danish and was consequently, also given a six on the scale 
(see Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One, Fig 5.1 and Table 2.1). 
Within the prescribed market environments there are differing amounts of 
prescription in that some border on the liberal and others on the nationalised. 
Germany is the most prescribed (point seven/eight on the scale), whereas in 
Spain and Denmark, (point six on the scale) although regulation is tight, 
more flexibility is allowed. As mentioned above, Belgian regulation (point 
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five on the scale) indicated most succinctly the impending single market 
environment in respect of its existing legislation. What was apparent was the 
consultative nature of Belgian supervision and how this did not negate but 
was indicative of EU guide-lines. As with the liberal environments, a 
convergence procedure can be detected with regard to EU legislation and 
consequent regulatory requirements. 
Nationalised (State-Controlled) Regulatory Environments. 
The nationalised or state controlled regulatory environments were placed 
between nine and twelve on the scale; and the open coding process placed 
four Member States in this category. These are France, Italy, Portugal. and 
Greece. At the time of the study, each had a state-controlled element to its life 
insurance market in that there was a preponderance (45-50%) of state 
ownership in respect of life insurance companies. 
In France, nationalisation was a post-war phenomenon, while in Portugal 
nationalisation did not occur until 1974. The Greek market had not been 
formally nationalised, but the market was state-controlled. Within the matrix 
the Member State markets are defined in respect of legislation on the one 
hand and the percentage of the market controlled by state run companies on 
the other. Thus, France is at point nine Italy, at point ten and Greece and 
Portugal at point eleven (see Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One, Fig 5.1 
and Table 2.1). 
In France, regulation was extensive. However, this was changing continually. 
"French insurers used to be seen as ... hidebound by regulatory red tape of 
the former all powerful Direction des Assurances ... this over simplified 
153 
view is now dating rapidly" (Financial Times, 1992; p 81). The principles of 
state-control were laid down by statute in the 1930s and 
... pertain both to contractual obligations and to the financial 
structure of the companies. As regards the legal status of 
insurance contracts, the controlling authority (until July 1991 the 
Direction des Assurances) had wide prerogatives, from the 
drafting of the legislation to the enforcement of compliance by 
the companies. .. An important aspect of this control was the 
obligation of insurers to obtain official approval for all new 
products or types of contract. The controlling authority also 
regulates and watches over the financial and prudential 
requirements (equity, computation of reserves and investment 
strategy) prescribed by the Code des Assurances (ibid, p 87). 
The Greek and Italian life insurance industries were state-controlled in that 
state-owned companies exist in the market and enjoy certain benefits because 
of this. In Greece, 45% of the market was controlled by eight state controlled 
insurance companies (Financial Times, 1992). "The Greek market has 
traditionally been highly regulated ... this situation is in large part a legacy of 
heavy government control ... [which has] led to administrative rigidity and 
as a consequence high operating costs" (ibid, p 143). 
In Italy, insurance companies surrendered a percentage of their business to 
the state controlled Instituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni (INA). Following 
1 April 1987, life companies writing life business for less than 6 years give 30% 
of new business, for 6-10 years, 20% and for over 10 years, 10%. This led to 
unfair competition in the market and allowed the evolution and 
maintenance of a dominant position (Munich Re, 1988). The Italian market 
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was supervised by the Instituto per la Vigilanza sull Assicurazioni Private de 
Interesse Collectivo (ISVAP). This was set up by the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce and gives approval to insurance matters on its findings. There 
was no legislation in respect of this but the process was universally accepted 
by the market. 
Each Member State was highly regulated (even though Italian regulation is 
not legislated, it is universally accepted). However, each Member State was 
becoming less regulated as EU legislation dictated. In Portugal, the position 
was that 51% of the sector remained in the hands of the state and 33% in 
France (Munich Re, 1988). In all cases, the state-controlled institutions were 
the largest in the Member State life insurance markets. 
Regulation in France was supervised by the 'Direction des Assurance' which 
was set up by the Ministry of Economy. Rules were strict with regard to 
individual life insurance business. Approval was needed for product design, 
premiums and policy conditions. However, changes were underway to 
alleviate these restrictions. There was also much consultation with regard to 
regulation changes, and prior to any changes the 'Conseil National des 
Assurance' (made up of representatives of the insurance industry and 
authorities) was referred to. There is also a powerful consumer lobby in 
France which was also consulted. 
The Portuguese environment was supervised by the 'Instituto de Seguros de 
Portugal' (ISP). This was founded in 1982 and consequently initiated the 
'Plano da Explarocao' in 1985 this outlined a standard basis for life offices. The 
ISP exercised complete control over the life insurance market; approval for 
product design, premium rates, and policy wording had to be applied for and 
quarterly returns inclusive of profit projections had to be submitted to it by all 
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life insurance offices. This, one may argue, was a market in which a company 
was open to total scrutiny. Since June 1988 there has been greater liberty 
regarding expenses although the ISP still determined the mortality base, and 
the technical interest rate. However, it was expected that because of extended 
freedoms with regard to non-life tariffs these would follow in the life 
insurance market. "The insurance market is tightly controlled by government 
regulation. All insurance businesses must be approved by the Portugese 
Ministry of Finance" (Financial Times, 1992; p 232). The latter consults with 
the ISP prior to any approval 
All four state-controlled life insurance regulatory environments were 
moving towards a more liberal trading structure (even though in certain 
areas of certain Member States, the markets had to be pushed). Each 
recognised the changes needed to facilitate competition in the single market 
while EU directives attempt to harmonise supervision in the direction of free 
market trading. The French environment could be described as the weakest 
nationalised regulatory structure. This could be illustrated by the failure of 
the French government's attempt to force a merger between two insurance 
companies where market benefit was not discerned by the companies 
involved. But it succeeded in relation to a bank and insurance company 
merger where market benefit was recognised. Greek life insurance, as with 
the financial sector as a whole, was"highly regulated. One may consider that 
this is the legacy of heavy control in the immediate post-war period. 
However, regulation is slowly being liberalised to comply with EU legislation 
usually following European Commission insistence. 
In both France and Portugal, the banking sector had recognised its potential 
with regard to distribution. This was especially so in France where the market 
was more developed. These distribution channels have been mainly used in 
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rural areas and as Portugal is mainly a peasant-based society they could be 
used to penetrate this market. In Greece, the insurance sector was dominated 
by the banks which were in turn controlled by the state. 
Fig 5.1 
Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One 
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Matrix compiled from an analysis of Munich Re: (1988), Financial Times 
(1992), Sigma Re: (1988-93), Pool (1991) BIIC and CEA Working Papers. 
Regulation was tight in all four, state-controlled life insurance regulatory 
environments and is typical of a nationalised ethos. Yet in each Member State 
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changes were underway to allow greater freedom and enable competitive 
markets in line with the single market environment. Of the four state- 
controlled Member States, France had the most lax regulation in respect of life 
insurance. Each of the state-controlled structures had a different nationalised 
tradition and on the regulation matrix, they range between eight and eleven 
(see Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One, Fig 5.1 above). However, each 
Member State within this category was changing its legislation which would 
allow greater freedom in line with the impending SEM. 
Regulatory Environment Survey and Analysis 
To supplement the categorisation and provide further coding of the EU 
regulatory environments, a survey (survey A, Appendix A) was conducted to 
investigate the perceptions of life insurance companies throughout the EU. 
The main purpose of the questionnaire was to gain an understanding of how 
the Member State industries viewed their own regulatory environments and 
what they considered would be most advantageous for them at the EU level. 
The survey was sent out between Nov 1993 and Jan 1994 and was made up of 
300 questionnaires (the sample was constructed on the availability of 
addresses) and a total of 121 completed questionnaires were received, broken 
down by Member State as follows; 
UK=36 
Germany = 25 
Netherlands = 15 
Italy = 12 
France = 17 
Belgium, Spain & Eire (Other) = 16 
Total =121 
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No responses were received from Greece, Denmark, Portugal or Luxembourg. 
In the first three cases, this was due to translation problems and in all four 
Member States, there was a limited number of addresses for life insurance 
companies. 
To provide a more objective analysis of the data, the results of the survey 
were added to the coding and comparative analysis undertaken above. This 
enabled a postpositivist analysis in that there is the recognition of an abstract 
reality juxtaposed with the inability of the human intellect to perceive it 
perfectly. Consequently, the thesis recognises that a perfectly objective 
comprehension of reality is always undermined by the subjectivity of the 
researcher and the researched. The comparative analysis indicated both the 
subjectivity of the author with the objectivity of the data itself, i. e. the 
legislation and subsequent regulatory environments. The survey results 
illustrate the subjectivity of the questions with the pursued objectivity of the 
respondents. These two sources compiled together attempt as objective 
understanding as possible, of the Member States' regulatory regimes and what 
they wished of the embryonic SEM in life insurance. 
Table 5.2 Perceived Regulatory Environment 
Liberal 
% 
Prescribed 
% 
State Controlled 
% 
Mean (SD) Categorisation 
in Fig. 5.1 
UK 66.7 33.3 0.0 4 (1.3) Liberal 
Germany 4.0 52.0 44.0 8 (1.9) Prescribed 
Italy 0.0 66.7 33.3 8 (1.0) S/Controlled 
Neth 93.3 6.7 0.0 3 (1.0) Liberal 
France 12.6 18.8 67.8 8 (2.3) S/Controlled 
Other 31.3 62.6 6.3 5 (1.6) Lib/Prescribed 
All 38.1 40.5 21.5 6 (2.4) N/A 
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Fig 5.2. 
Life Insurance Regulation Matrix Two 
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Matrix compiled from an analysis of Munich Re: (1988), Financial Times (1992), 
Sigma Re: (1988-93), Pool (1991), BIIC & CEA Working Papers and survey of EU life 
insurance industry. 
The respondents were asked five questions: 
Ouestion_One asked how liberal or state-controlled 
national life insurance regulatory system to be. As with the comparative 
analysis, the responses were categorised into liberal, prescribed and 
nationalised markets, for each of the eight responding Member States. The 
results of question one are summarised in Table 5.2. 
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The responses summarised in Table 5.2 (Perceived Regulatory Environment 
p 155) were subsequently used to amend the regulation matrix (Life Insurance 
Regulation Matrix One, Fig 5.1 p 157). The means of the responses illustrated 
in Table 5.2 were averaged with the assessment indicated in Fig 5.1. This gave 
equal weight to both the initial coding and categorisation of the regulatory 
environments and the further open coding regarding the perceptions of the 
life insurance industry. Indeed, the further coding procedure led to only 
marginal changes to the categorisation of the markets, indicating a degree of 
agreement between the two sources of data (see Life Insurance Regulation 
Matrix Two Fig 5.2 p 160). 
Question Two asked the companies where they would position the SEM at 
that moment in time in respect of its regulatory environment. Again, this 
was on a scale of 1-12 and categorised the market types as liberal, prescribed 
and nationalised: the responses are summarised in Table 5.3. In general, there 
was agreement that the SEM as it stood was located between 7.0 and 5.0 with 
the mean of the responses of all Member States equal to 6.0, and a standard 
deviation of 1.5. 
Table 5.3 Perceived EU Regulatory Environment 
Liberal 
% 
Prescribed 
% 
State Controlled 
% 
Mean (SD) Categorisation 
in Fig. 5.1 
UK 13.9 69.5 16.7 6 (1.3) Liberal 
Germany 36.0 64.0 0 5 (1.5) Prescribed 
Italy 26.7 73.3 0 5 (1.6) S/Controlled 
Neth 35.7 64.3 0 5 (1.7) Liberal 
France 12.6 62.6 25.0 7 (1.3) S/Controlled 
Other 25.0 68.8 6.3 6 (1.9) Lib/Prescribed 
All 28.3 61.7 10.0 6 (1.5) N/A 
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Question Three asked the respondents to indicate which type of regulatory 
environment would give their company its greatest advantage. The results 
are summarised in Table 5.4. 
Generally, the Member States pursue market environments that are less 
regulated than or similar to their own. However, there are differences 
between the amount of liberality that each state considers should be allowed. 
This suggests that a compromise needs to be reached between the prescribed 
and liberal markets (such a compromise is shown in the Life Insurance 
Regulation Matrix, Two Fig 5.2, p 160). 
Table 5.4 Perceived Most Advantageous EU Regulatory Environment 
Liberal Prescribed State Controlled Mean (SD) Categorisation 
in Fig. 5.1 
UK 72.2 27.8 0 3 (1.6) Liberal 
Germany 32.0 68.0 0 6 (1.3) Prescribed 
Italy 66.7 33.4 0 4 (1.9) S/Controlled 
Neth 92.9 7.1 0 3 (0.5) Liberal 
France 29.4 70.6 0 6 (1.4) S/Controlled 
Other 50.0 50.0 0 5 (1.2) Lib/Prescribed 
All 58.3 41.7 0 4 (1.5) N/A 
Question four asked what type of regulatory structure would allow the 
greatest consumer protection. Question five asked which would allow the 
greatest consumer choice. Each of these enabled an understanding of what the 
respondents considered a regulatory environment should entail and gave 
insight into their perceptions in respect of the first three questions. Responses 
are summarised in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. 
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Table 5.5 Best Perceived Environment for Consumer Protection. 
Liberal 
% 
Prescribed 
% 
State Controlled 
% 
Mean (SD) Categorisation 
in Fig. 5.1 
UK 22.2 63.9 13.1 6 (2.3) Liberal 
Germany 20.0 56.0 24.0 7 (2.1) Prescribed 
Italy 50.0 50.0 0 5 (1.2) S/Controlled 
Neth 20.0 80.0 0 5 (0.9) Liberal 
France 11.8 52.9 35.3 7 (2.2) S/Controlled 
Other 25.0 62.5 12.5 6 (1.1) Lib/Prescribed 
All 30.8 53.3 15.8 6 (1.7) N/A 
Table 5.6 Best Perceived Environment for Consumer Choice 
Liberal 
% 
Prescribed 
% 
State Controlled 
% 
Mean (SD) Categorisation 
in Fig 5.1 
UK 86.1 13.9 0 2 (1.5) Liberal 
Germany 96.0 4.0 0 2 (0.9) Prescribed 
Italy 83.3 16.7 0 4 (0.8) S/Controlled 
Neth 100.0 0 0 3 (1.0) Liberal 
France 70.6 17.7 11.8 4 (2.4) S/Controlled 
Other 88.1 12.5 0 3 (1.4) Lib/Prescribed 
All 87.6 10.5 1.7 3 (1.1) N/A 
These responses seem to suggest that the respondents were aware of what was 
meant by the term regulatory environment. Furthermore, there was a form 
of hegemony when it came to understanding the survey and the concept of a 
regulatory environment. However, this is more explicit in terms of the 
understanding of consumer choice. Indeed, in the construction of the Third 
Life Assurance Directive, it was around these very issues (the extent of 
interference regarding choice and protection) that the debates revolved. This 
is further illustrated in the next chapter. 
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Additionally, a series of cross-tabulations were undertaken and a verification 
of the independence of question one to the other four questions was 
performed. Two verification methods were utilised. Initially, verification was 
concerned with whether the respondents' perceptions of their current 
regulatory systems (question one) was independent of their perceptions of: 
(a) the then present perceived EU regulatory system (question two). 
(b) the preferred regulatory system (question three). 
(c) the best regulation to ensure consumer protection (question four). 
(d) the best regulation to ensure consumer choice (question five). 
Firstly, the responses to question one were cross-tabulated sequentially with 
the responses to questions 2-5. Secondly, in each case, a chi-squared test of 
independence was undertaken. The results are illustrated in Tables 5.7-5.10 
Table 5.7 
Q1- Q2 
Perceived Existing SEM Regulatory Environment 
Perceived current 
regulatory 
environment 
Liberal Prescribed Totals 
Liberal 14, 32 46 
Prescribed 9 40 49 
State Controlled 6 20 26 
Totals 29 92 121 
x2 = 2.07 (7-2 Grit = 
5.99) 
In this case, the hypothesis of independence at 5% level of significance cannot 
be rejected. 
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In general terms, prior to the Third Life Assurance Directive, the Member 
States did not consider that their regulatory environments were similar to the 
SEM in general. 
Table 5.8 suggests that Member States, when pursuing the SEM, would 
generally look for a regulatory environment either similar to or a little more 
liberal than their own. This is supported by the dependency ratio which 
suggests that the responses to question one are not independent of the 
responses to question three. That is, if respondents thought they had a liberal 
environment, they would like the SEM, to be more liberal or created in their 
own image. This is also indicative of the prescribed regulatory environments. 
However, the state- controlled Member States are generally looking for 
prescribed regulatory environments and some for the more liberal. Indeed, 
there is a shift toward more liberal/prescribed regulatory environments, with 
none wishing to remain state-controlled. Consequently, in the creation of the 
SEM, the sticking point would be found between the degree of prescription 
and liberality within the new environment. 
Table 5.8 
Q1-Q3 
rrererrea atw regulatory environmen t ror company 
Perceived current 
regulatory 
environment 
Liberal Prescribed Totals 
Liberal 40 6 46 
Prescribed 21 28 49 
State Controlled 8 18 26 
Totals 69 54 121 
x2 = 28.14 (X crit = 
5.991) 
In this case the hypothesis of independence can be rejected at 5% (and 1%) 
levels. 
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Tables 5.9 and 5.10 illustrate that there is a general perception that prescribed 
environments are better for consumer protection with 64% of those in liberal 
environments agreeing with this. Additionally, there is nearly unanimous 
agreement that liberal environments allow for the greatest consumer choice. 
In both instances, the thesis was able to reject independence at the 5% level 
between the responses to questions one and questions four and five. 
Table 5.9 
Q1- Q4 
Regulatory environment best for consumer protection 
Perceived current 
regulatory 
environment 
Liberal Prescribed/Nat Totals 
Liberal 15 27 42 
Prescribed 6 43 49 
State Controlled 7 23 30 
Totals 28 93 121 
x2 = 6.86 (X2 crit 5.99) 
In this case the hypothesis of independence can just be rejected at the 5% level 
of significance (but not at the 1% level). 
A final area of verification was concerned with investigating whether the 
respondents' preferred SEM regulatory system (question three) was 
independent of questions four and five. In both of these tests, independence is 
rejected. Thus there appears to be a link between the type of market preferred 
at the European level and what the industry considers as best for the 
consumer in terms of protection and choice. 
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Table 5.10 
Q1- Q5 
Regulatory environment best for consumer choice. 
Perceived current 
regulatory 
environment 
Liberal Prescribed Totals 
Liberal 45 1 46 
Prescribed 40 9 49 
State Controlled 21 5 26 
Totals 106 15 121 
x2 = 8.01(x Grit 
2=5.99) 
In this case we can reject the hypothesis of independence at the 5% level of 
significance (but not at 1% level). 
r 
Table 5.11 
Q3 - Q4 
Regulatory environment best for consumer vrotection 
Preferred SEM 
regulatory 
environment for 
our company 
Liberal Prescribed Totals 
Liberal 25 3 28 
Prescribed 33 41 74 
State Controlled 8 11 19 
Totals 66 92 121 
x2 = 16.6 (x Grit -2=5.99) 
The hypothesis of independence can be rejected at the 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 5.12 
Q3 - Q5 
Rec ii1 fnrv environment best for consumer choice 
Preferred SEM 
regulatory Liberal Prescribed Totals 
environment for 
our company 
Liberal 68 1 69 
Prescribed 38 14 52 
Totals 106 15 121 
2 
x2 =17.7 (Xcrit = 3.84) 
Again the hypothesis of independence can be rejected at 5% (and 1%) levels 
Conclusion 
Through the comparative analysis of Member State legislation, open coding 
and categorising, the information accrued from the survey and study of the 
Member States legislation, we have constructed a regulation matrix. This 
thesis proposes that through the political impetus of the SEA, legislation is 
being reformed to meet the needs of what is becoming the normative 
perception of the evolving SEM. However, it also proposes that the 
normative concept of the SEM is tempered by the ideas that the industries 
have of their own trading structures and that these will differ from one 
Member State to the next, because each is used to trading in a distinct 
regulatory environment. This is explicit in the Third Life Assurance Directive 
with reference to both the process of formulation and the end result. As a 
nationalised market environment is out of the question in respect of the basic 
tenets of the Treaties and present competition policy, the compromise is 
taking place between the prescribed and liberal regulatory environments and 
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it is here that agreement was being reached and a new environment formed, 
through the concepts of harmonisation and mutual recognition. 
The nationalised and greater prescribed environments indicate the 
convergence process with the greatest clarity as these markets are being forced 
into bringing their supervision into line with the less regulated markets. 
However, the more liberal regulatory environments also need to change 
legislation to bring them into line with European directives. The less 
prescribed and less liberal markets have the fewest changes to make and this 
is apparent in their adroitness at bringing in the directives. This is particularly 
so of Belgium and Eire and to a lesser extent Spain, Denmark, the UK and the 
Netherlands. 
The responses'to the survey from the UK and Dutch life insurance industries 
do reveal a preference for a more liberal market than is perceived to be the 
case in much of Europe, and one very similar to what is generally understood 
to be their home market conditions; in short the liberal life industries want 
the new market to be as similar to their own as possible to allow greater 
certainty and profitability. The prescribed markets want greater freedom but 
not enough to put them at a disadvantage in relation to the liberal markets. 
Finally, the state-controlled industries want less regulation on their trading 
structure. However, the Italians seem to want to pursue a liberal 
environment, whereas the French would remain with one that was highly 
prescribed. 
The matrices and tables attempt to identify a compromise point between the 
Member States. They also allow a more elucidating comparison between the 
Member State legislative regimes in relation to a specific market. Indeed, it 
contends that compromise between the Member States allows a directive to be 
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established between 4.5 and 6.5 and that through mutual recognition these 
points are integrated at the compromise convergence point (5-6 on the 
matrix) (see Life Insurance Regulation Matrix, Two Fig 5.2 p 170). However, in 
the initial negotiations, Member States and national industries are generally 
looking for legislation as similar to their own as possible, i. e. the UK pursuing 
a three and Germany a six. Through compromise and a recognition of what 
the Commission and Europe perceive as necessary, the parameters of a 
directive are established (this will be discussed further in the following two 
chapters). This adds an impetus to integration through the recognition of a 
European market and calls for harmonisation in further areas. This illustrates 
spillover to the extent that further legislation will be necessary in life 
insurance and other financial sectors i. e. banking and capital markets. It also 
illustrates supranationality because the needs of the Commission and Treaties 
are built into the legislation. No one Member State gets all of its own way: the 
legislation is both a compromise and one which reflects a European 
perspective. 
In general, the frequency tables and cross-tabulations support the view that 
each Member State is pursuing its own self-interest in the creation of the new 
market. The thesis now asks where and how does compromise takes place? 
To answer this question, we examine the creation of the Third Life Assurance 
Directive in Chapter Six, and through a number of interviews undertaken at 
the European decision-making level in chapter Seven. The thesis considers 
that through identifying interaction between interest groups, supranationality 
and spillover, neo-functional and intergovernmental processes may be 
defined, explored and understood. 
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Chapter Six 
Institutional Roles in EU Decision-Making: A Case of the Life Insurance 
Industry 
Behaviour is ultimately a social matter ... and 
thinking in terms of what 'we' should do, or what 
should be our strategy, may reflect a sense of 
identity involving recognition of other people's 
goals and the mutual interdependencies involved 
(Sen, 1992; p 85). 
Introduction 
"Wyn Grant has noted that the relationship between pressure groups and the 
European Community has, so far, been a relatively neglected subject. In 
Britain, there are very few general studies of groups trying to influence EC 
decision-making" (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; p 93). "Direct lobbying of EC 
institutions constitutes an important part of the decision-making process 
within the Community and has the effect of increasing EC autonomy over 
the interests of Member States. There has been a rapid expansion of such 
activities over the last few years. However, although this, phenomenon has 
attracted a lot of attention, there is surprisingly little systematic research on 
the topic" (Andersen and Elliassen, 1991; p 173). In addition to a number of 
recent studies this thesis is attempting to address this neglect (see Greenwood 
et al, 1992; Greenwood, 1995; 1997; Maloney, 1993; McLaughlin et al, 1993; 
McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995; McLaughlin, 1995). 
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This chapter provides an overview of the workings of the EU decision- 
making processes regarding the negotiations and formulation of the Third 
Life Assurance Directive. In this context, it identifies embryonic 
supranationalism in the EU institutions and the extensive use of interest 
groups in legislation formulation. Interest groups will be defined as non- 
governmental organisations that attempt to have an influence on public- 
policy. They are entities that provide an institutional linkage between sectors 
and government. More precisely they are "... those types of organisations 
whose political task it is to reflect the interests of the economic or 
occupational sections they represent" (Lieber, 1974; p 29). Indeed, interest 
groups are described'as, 
... those organisations which are occupied ... in trying to 
influence the policy of public bodies in their own chosen 
direction.... European interest groups ... are centrally organised 
associations of interest groups ... each of which represents either 
a number of similar groupings or both national groupings and 
European industry committee groupings (Kirchner, 1980; p 96). 
Interest groups apply pressure. Consequently, the terms pressure group and 
interest group will be used inter-changeably. Interest groups can either be of a 
sectional or of a promotional nature. We concentrate here on the sectional 
interest group category which usually represents the interests of professions, 
producer groups, occupations or trade unions. In particular, we concentrate 
on the sectional interests of the life insurance industry. 
In the 1990s, following the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, a number of 
research projects on European business interest groups were undertaken. 
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Mazey and Richardson (1993) conducted a number of empirical studies but 
according to Grant (1995) overall the research picture was still opaque. 
There is little consensus about the importance of different types 
of interest groups, about the influence they can exert on the 
politics and policies of the EC and the effect their activities have 
on the development of the integration process (Kohler-Koch, 
1994; p 166, cited in Grant, 1995; p 99). 
However, the importance of interest groups in the European decision-making 
process had been recognised, hence the time and effort that is now being spent 
on them. 
Since the early 1980s ... growing numbers of organised interests . 
.. have come to recognise the increasing importance of 
European Community legislation "... It is no longer possible to 
understand the policy process ... without taking account of the 
shift in power to Brussels (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; p 191). 
Indeed, the SEA created an impetus for the use of interest groups. With 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and the SEM programme, lobbying in 
Brussels became imperative. "However, as several groups discovered to their 
cost, lobbying in the European Community is far from a simple matter" (ibid). 
In Europe, the process of lobbying is far from a 'cloak and dagger' scenario, it is 
quite the opposite. In Brussels, lobbying is open, uncertain and unpredictable. 
"Thus, in order to be effective Euro-lobbyists, groups must be able to co- 
ordinate their national and EC level strategies, construct alliances with their 
European counterparts, and monitor changing national and EC policy 
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agendas" (ibid, pp 191-192). Indeed, the European institutions (especially the 
Commission and the Parliament) have been 
... approached directly ... (and) the two EC institutions have 
developed a comprehensive network of contacts that cut across, 
and are independent of, member countries. Increasingly it is 
necessary for lobbying to be based on broad alliances representing 
a more European perspective. We might think of this process as 
Europeanisation (Andersen and Eliassen, 1991; p 174 author's 
brackets). 
Some commentators consider that sovereignty has increasingly been ceded to 
the European institutions and that decision-making in the European Union 
is a balance between intergovernmentalism and the supranational 
institutions. In the majority of economic areas, it is generally impossible for 
one Member State to pursue total self-interest because self-interest has 
become bonded to the other Member States; ". .. national self-interest has 
partly become a collective European interest ... forty years of working 
together has resulted in collective outputs being produced and recognised by 
the parties involved" (Greenwood, 1995; p 2). The European Commission and 
Parliament consider that speaking to European organisations allows an 
understanding of European-wide interests. Indeed, to ensure effective 
lobbying it is necessary to build coalitions. 
Both the European Commission and the European Parliament 
frequently stress that they want to speak to European 
organisations. Where possible, therefore, you should seek to 
build coalitions, and the more representative they are in terms 
of the sector(s) a proposal will affect, the better. Of course, your 
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interests might be at odds with other companies ... operating in 
the same sector as you ... (and) if they have a good argument 
and their interests are at stake, companies may be forced simply 
to lobby on their own behalf (Club de Bruxelles, 1994; p 96 
author's brackets). 
Camerra-Rowe (1996) points out that different sectors can undertake different 
strategies when it comes to lobbying European institutions. She considers that 
on the one hand, the insurance and pharmaceutical sectors have well run 
interest group representation at the EU level. While on the other, the likes of 
the bio-technological and automobile sectors companies represent themselves 
directly at the EU level. Direct lobbying more accurately indicates a company's 
choices. However, this is expensive and there is no certainty that the 
Commission or European Parliament will listen to an individual company if 
its proposals are not similar to the EU's or the sectors objectives. But this does 
illustrate that on certain matters the concerns of individual companies will be 
taken into consideration. "While the Commission prefers dealing with 
associations, its officials have been relatively open to lobbying by individual 
large firms. Thus, firms often have an incentive to lobby directly. ... 
However, it is rare for a firm, even a large one, to rely on one channel of 
representation" (ibid, p 6). This provides the basis for a number of difficulties. 
Companies that lobby directly: 
(a) undermine the role of interest groups because the message they carry may 
not represent the whole sector; 
(b) have limited incentives to compromise their positions in the collective 
because they are able to lobby themselves; 
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(c) force the association to reach consensus; this may lead to the acceptance of 
the lowest common denominator and undermine the effectiveness of the 
interest group. 
Small and medium-size enterprises or companies that are incapable of 
lobbying the EU directly intensify the role of the interest group. Members are 
forced to accept sector compromises and they cannot use the interest group to 
pursue private advantage. European interest groups ". .. therefore 
have 
greater flexibility in the- types of positions they take ... it means that the 
association has greater political weight because it can claim to speak on behalf 
of all members" (Camerra-Rowe, 1996; pp 6-8). Of course, the other extreme is 
where the interest group is so diverse in its membership that agreement can 
never be reached. As in most things, balance is of the essence. 
The European insurance sector is mainly made up of small and medium-size 
enterprises and with the exception of Allianz, lack the political clout and 
resources to undertake direct action in Brussels. As a result, both national and 
European interest groups have a greater influence on the Commission and 
their membership. Companies need to accept the interest group's ". -- policy 
position even if it does not take account of their particular interests because 
they cannot effectively represent their own views. As a result, and 
paradoxically, the more fragmented insurance sector was better able to 
undertake collective activity in pursuing Community policy" (ibid, p 21). 1 In 
I It is considered that the less concentrated a sector is the less difficulty it has in overcoming the problems of 
collective action. For instance, the automobile, biotechnological and consumer electronics sectors interest 
groups have been relatively weak, whereas in the pharmaceutical and insurance sectors interest groups have 
F eater influence. (for further see Camerra-Rowe, 1996; McLauchlin and Jordan, 1993; Greenwood and Ronit, 992; and Cawson 1992). There is an interesting dilernma with regard to these different ways of lobbying the EU. If one uses interest grou s successfully then is the sector adhering to neo-functional processes? Alternatively, if a com any IoNies the EU directly is it adhering to neo-corporatist processes? This thesis 
considers that both unlerstandings are very similar as each has lobbied a supranational institution and each has taken part in a marginal shift in sovereignty. It may be argued that it is this shift that is important, not how it was achieved. Týe EU is an evolutionary process as are its institutions and this is illustrated by the 
uncertainy of the final (if such occurs) formalisation of relations between interest groups and the EU. Camerra-Rowe (1996) considers that it is unlikely that interest groups will be the prime movers in interest 
representation in the EU. That the ". -. initiatives the Commission and other EU institutions undertake to re0ate interest groups will be critical in determininý the future form and shape that business representation takes.... In short, effective collective action may originate not from the desire of firms in these sectors to 
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this chapter, we examine the initial discussions regarding the legislation and 
regulatory regimes that should be pursued to create the market most 
amenable to all Member State life insurance industries. Fundamentally, we 
consider how effective interest groups were in the creation of legislation and 
the consequent regulatory environments. 
The Comite Europeen des Assurances (CEA) 
Insurance interest representation at the EU level is primarily undertaken by 
the Comite Europeen des Assurances (CEA) which has operated since 1953. 
Indeed, it is an organisation that existed before the creation of the EEC and 
this is reflected in its membership (this is not made up solely of Member 
States). "Nevertheless the single most important function of the organisation 
is to work through its 'Common Market Committee' which is officially 
recognised by the EU and through which all insurance directives pass" 
(Vipond, 1995; p 105). This is reflected by the Commission which considers 
itself as an organisation that is always open to external input and 
Commissioners welcome this input. Indeed, the Commission has ". .. a 
reputation for being accessible to interest groups ... (because) it 
is in the 
Commission's own interest to do so since interest groups can provide the 
services with technical information and constructive advice" (OJ/C 63/02 
author's brackets). 
The DGs see the CEA as the main representative of the insurance industry. 
Such was reiterated by Leon Brittan in 1989, 
speak with a common voice on common interests, but from the desire of EU officials to create common 
collective interests from a multitude of private ones" (p 23). Either way there is an emphasis on creating 
certainty and even though there is a detraction from pure neo-functionalism, it is a supranational entity 
creating the rules and a shift in allegiance has taken place (Haas, 1958). 
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the CEA has proved its worth ... as a standard 
bearer for the 
insurance industry at the European level. I know that DG XV 
has come to rely greatly on the CEA and its officials ... as an 
organisation which is fully representative of the insurance 
industry, which puts your views and concerns to us frankly and 
powerfully and defends them tenaciously (Sir Leon Brittan, 
speech given to the CEA November 1989; cited in Camerra- 
Rowe, 1996; p 18). 
These sentiments were supported in a number of interviews undertaken by 
the author (see Chapter Seven). Indeed, they reflected the results of a set of 
interviews undertaken by Camerra-Rowe in which a Commission official 
said that "... they (the Commission) have almost institutionalised corporatist 
- like relations with the CEA" (ibid, p 18 author's brackets) and those provided 
by Mazey and Richardson (1996). 
A Single Market in Life Insurance: The Initial Discussions 
The discussions about a single market in life insurance began in earnest 
between 1987 and 1988, and it is at this point, that interaction between the 
different elements of the decision-making apparatus becomes more 
recognisable. In this study each of the decision-making areas are investigated 
and the means by which they interact with the others is overviewed. The 
thesis concentrates on the following aspects of the decision-making process: 
national interest groups; European interest groups; national supervisory 
authorities; the Commission; European Parliament; and the Council of 
Ministers. Because of the impetus the SEA and the White Paper (1985,1986) 
gave to the construction of the internal market, there was a greater emphasis 
on creating a single market in financial services. This was accompanied by a 
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streamlined decision-making process which necessitated compromise and 
interaction between the Member States on most issues. Hence, there was a 
shift towards a more concerted effort in the creation of an SEM in life 
insurance. 
The starting point was the realisation that regulation differences were the 
main factors undermining the creation of a SEM in insurance. With regard to 
this, the Commission considered that its main objective was to create co- 
ordinated insurance supervision throughout the EU. Little work needed to be 
done on reinsurance because Member State reinsurance markets were least 
different in legislative terms. However, at the other end of the scale: 
... divisions appeared most marked in life insurance, where 
national ideas on consumer protection, the promotion of the 
economy, currency protection, social objectives and taxation 
were combined with different attitudes to composite insurers 
and even divergent conceptions on the scope of life insurance 
itself ... for this reason ... life insurance has been left until last 
at each subsequent stage (Pool, 1992; p 179). 
Freedom to provide services throughout the EC is intended to 
make it possible to exploit the local advantages of production 
vis-a-vis the customers of other sectors. In both cases the trade 
barriers contained in the legal framework conditions should be 
reduced as far as possible by harmonising laws.... In this respect 
the efforts of the EC Commission to achieve harmonisation 
have ... been duly recognised. Yet - however much one 
approves of the objectives of the EEC Treaty - harmonisation has 
its limits, particularly because of differences in legal culture, 
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sense of justice and the extent to which Member States are 
prepared to comply with the law (Jur et al, 1989; p 16). 
Dickinson (1990) contended that a common market in life insurance means 
... both the freedom of insurance companies to supply and the 
freedom of consumers to buy in any country within the 
Community ... In addition, an insurance company should be 
free to supply any life insurance and private pension product 
that it considers has a market demand. This should be combined 
with the freedom to price and market that product, using a 
distribution channel that it considers appropriate (Dickinson, 
1990; p 97). 
The products a life insurance company may supply are defined by the local 
insurance company acts. "Legislative environments vary significantly across 
the Community . .. this variation is due to differing local market and 
regulatory traditions (ibid, p 98). Dickinson was indicating the need for a 
liberal life insurance services directive. 
The Treaties illustrate the political dimension of the process. It is the 
responsibility of the Commission to pursue the tenets of the Treaties and in 
doing so bring to the process legislative ideas of their own. Effectively, there is 
an interaction between the industry (in European and national terms) and the 
Commission. However, there are differences both between the Commission 
and the industry and among the different Member State industries. This is 
because of the national perspectives of what life insurance is and how the 
industry should be governed. 
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Life Insurance and European Interest Groups 
Pool (1992) considered that "... insurers are certainly much better organised 
as a pressure group than the other players in the insurance markets. Even 
they, however, have not always found it easy to arrive at a common 
perception of what a common market should mean for them" (p 11). For 
many years the CEA has acted on behalf of its membership with regard to 
European issues. There are also Member State national interest groups that 
are affiliated to the CEA. The main objectives of European interest groups are 
two-fold. Firstly, they should "... promote the exchange of information and 
try to find common denominators (consolidate strength)" (Kirchner, 1980; p 
109). Secondly, they should ". .. co-ordinate and exert pressure for adopted 
policies through the European organisations and the national affiliations on 
both the EC and the national government" (ibid). Interviews, undertaken by 
the author indicated that it was very rare for European interest groups and 
national governments to interact; this is done more usually by their affiliates 
(the national interest groups). 
European interest groups attempt to keep their membership informed about 
developments in the sector and on EU activities. They achieve this through 
holding seminars and conferences on important issues. Essentially, they try to 
"... instil a spirit of co-operation and cohesion into their affiliates" (ibid, p 
110). In this context, they are performing the role assigned to them by neo- 
functionalism: a means of integrating ideas, creating compromise and 
interacting with a supranational body. They act as a catalyst in the transferral 
of allegiances by national actors away from the national to the European 
decision-making arena. As discussed above in Chapter Four (see Haas, 1958), 
the supranational entity in this context is a coalition of the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and European Parliament. This is the 
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shift toward a supranational decision-making entity and it is in this context 
that we examine the formulation of the Third Life Assurance Directive and 
the actions of those involved in its creation. 
In 1995, the Director-General of the ABI (Mark Boleat) asked whether or not 
the Single European Insurance Market had arrived and if trade associations 
and legislators could-". .. sit back and let insurance companies get on with 
putting the new freedoms to practical use" (Boleat, 1995; p 45). His answer to 
this was "no": the industry needed to remain diligent because insurance is a 
complex financial service and has the potential to impact on many parts of 
our existence. To this extent, many proposed directives would have 
implications for the industry which should consequently "... influence the 
debate ... be aware of new proposals and ... submit their views at an early 
stage so that the implications can be properly considered and any necessary 
changes made before the proposals become set in stone" (ibid). 
"Commerce, which has enriched English citizens, has helped to make them 
free, and this freedom in its turn has extended Commerce, and that has made 
the greatness of the nation" (Voltaire, 1980; p 51). Frangoulis (1988) points out 
that such a heritage is still apparent and for the 
... British insurer freedom is the `zero option', meaning 
minimum interference with market forces in a capitalist society 
and the right of free choice for the buyer. Without free choice, 
commerce cannot be extended, whether within or outside the 
Community (p 1). 
He considers that the most difficult element in creating a single market in life 
insurance "... is the existing differences in supervisory regimes" (p 2). 
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However, it was recognised by the CEA that differences ". .. in the 
supervisory practices of Member States could lead to distortion of competition 
between insurance undertakings. Harmonisation of supervisory methods 
therefore appears necessary" (CEA Working Paper, 1990; p 4). 
In 1988, Frangoulis predicted that over the first four to five years there would 
be little change. Initially, ". .. buyers, brokers, carriers of insurance, will have 
some difficulty in coming to terms with the rules of the game" (Frangoulis, 
1988, p 6). This is because ". .. the structure of future programmes of 
insurance will call for a totally new approach in terms of comparability of 
cost, contract terms, quality of security etc. These things take time" (ibid, p 7). 
This was reinforced by O'Leary who suggested that ". .. we start with a rather 
more limited form of freedom and gradually progress towards the ideal of 
complete freedom (O'Leary, 1988; p 2). Effectively, there will be difficulties for 
insurers when they attempt to formulate new strategies as new regulations 
are bound to affect operations. It was felt that this would also be the case for 
UK insurers and that they would need to revisit their tactical and strategical 
operations in a post-1992 environment. 
Initially, it was thought necessary to revisit the accepted division between 
home and overseas markets and the view that companies are not interested 
in offering cross-border services because they are designed to operate through 
establishments: this leaves a large hole in the corporate structure. "The 
market place is not there to accommodate insurers, it is the insurers who 
should fit the market" (ibid). Additionally, new skills would be necessary to 
enable market penetration i. e. the EU markets would need to be understood. 
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O'Leary2 (1988) drew attention to the feelings of many UK insurers and their 
inability to take the SEM as seriously as their continental counterparts. His 
hope was that such would not continue to be the case as change is continual 
in the creation of the SEM and it was crucial that the UK had an input into 
the formulation of the market. He recognised that in Member States the two 
areas legislation is concerned with are consumer protection and limitation of 
policy-holder risk. "However, the way in which this is done differs from 
country to country" (ibid, p 1). For instance, in the UK, companies were 
allowed a large amount of freedom in relation to some of their EU 
counterparts. In other Member States, this was not the position. Instead, the 
regulatory structure was much tighter. However, most consider that the UK's 
system of consumer protection is insufficient. 
Now I hold exactly the opposite view, I think that our system is 
better for the consumer and that the result of the continental 
system is that the company is protected from failure ... and that 
although the policy-holder is protected from loss this is at a very 
high price.... Our policy-holders have higher returns ... a 
wider choice ... (and) a high level of guarantee that their return 
will be adequate even if the company gets into trouble (ibid, p2 
author's brackets). 
On the other hand, the prevalent system in the EU allows high security for 
both the company and the policy-holder but at the cost of restricted policy 
choice and indifferent investment returns. 
2 O'Leary was the representative of the British Insurers International Committee (BIIC). The author has 
interviewed him and the results are transcribed below in Chapter 7. 
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O'Leary (ibid) considered that there were a number of problems between the 
UK and more prescribed Member States with regard to legislation covering 
the Third Life Assurance Directive. These included problems with uniform 
premium rates: this is where the supervisory authority indicates the bases to 
be used in premium calculations so creating nearly identical premium rates 
across the product. The UK does not have these restrictions. Secondly, he 
pointed out that in most Member States the authorities also control policy 
conditions and this has undermined the adaptability and range of products. 
Thirdly, in a number of Member States, the authorities indicate the extent of 
the companies' investment policies. In each of these areas, the UK has less 
regulation and in most cases no such restriction. Consequently, for a free 
market to be established, a harmonisation process has to be undertaken. Other 
difficulties that were being dealt with at the time (1988) included a uniform 
approach to reserving and the transmission of premiums from one Member 
State to another. Additionally, insurance contracts caused a problem, as they 
did throughout the early 1990s. 
Article 25 contains a marketing rule for insurance products ... to 
the single case of contracts in conflict with legal provisions 
protecting the general good in the Member State in which the 
risk is situated. The concept of general good ... must be 
understood in the light (that) ... derogation's to freedom laid 
down by the EEC Treaty are only allowed where there exists in 
the area considered, mandatory reasons linked to the general 
good (consumer protection rule) providing that this interest is 
not already safeguarded by rules to which the undertaking is 
subject in the Member State in which it has its head office ... 
and providing that the same result cannot be obtained by less 
stringent rules (CEA Working Paper, 1990; p 2. For further on 
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this see ECJ's decision Case 205/84 Commission v Germany (Re 
Insurance Services) [1986] ECR 3755 in particular recitals nos 27- 
29 author's brackets). 
Indeed, the 
... general good is a judge-made concept, developed in the case 
law of the EC Court of Justice. It allows Member States, in the 
absence of harmonisation of the rules applicable to services or of 
a system of equivalence, to maintain certain national measures, 
although such measures may constitute a barrier to the free 
movement of goods, services and establishment, and workers 
(Van Schoubroeck, 1994; p 149). 
In the field of insurance services, the concept of the general good has come to 
play an important role. This is so, ". . first of all, because Community 
insurance directives regulate only partially cross-border insurance activities, 
and leave room for Member State regulation. Secondly, these insurance 
directives refer explicitly to the general good in relation to the regulation of 
insurance activities in general and insurance products in particular" (ibid, p 
152). 
Basically, it would be necessary to monitor the concept of general good very 
closely if it was not to become an NTB. 
Another area felt to undermine the idea of the creation of an SEM in life 
insurance was taxation; 
(a) taxation on premiums. 
(b) taxation of benefits. 
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(c) taxation on the insurance companies. 
Theoretically, these problems could be overcome by taxing the policy-holder 
in terms of residence and taxing the company with regard to where the head 
office is situated. However, this was largely academic because tax legislation 
was excluded from the Third Life Assurance Directive because its inclusion 
would have necessitated unanimity instead of a qualified majority. 
In 1988, it was unclear what would be included in the Third Life Assurance 
Directive. What was necessary was dialogue with the insurance industry. 
When Pool spoke at a meeting of the Double Century Club with regard to the 
directive he contended that: 
... he did not know what was going to be in the directive and 
that he was open-minded and listening to the views of the 
market ... he felt that research is required to identify the legal 
framework or frameworks existing in each Member State ... and 
he has asked the CEA to study the position (O'Leary, 1988; pp 4- 
5). 
However, at a later date Pool pointed out some fundamental problems in the 
pursuit of a SEM in life insurance. 
One such pair of apparently incompatible goals is the desire for 
increased competition coupled with greater consumer 
protection. Of course, in many areas of commerce increased 
competition is itself the best consumer protection. This will be so 
where the buyer can easily compare products and prices and can 
judge for himself what he is getting for his money. This is not so 
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easy in insurance, where the policy-holder pays money in 
advance in return for promises expressed in a contract (Pool, 
1990; p 9). 
For this reason, market forces are seldom perceived as the most satisfactory 
solution. The problem is that controls both reduce competition and create 
protectionism. "It is also true, however, that different perceptions of public 
interest and different degrees of State intervention produce a situation in 
which mutual recognition ... is hard to attain" (ibid, p 10). Consequently, a 
degree of harmonisation was necessary to bring separate Member State 
industries into the same legislative realm. Pool, felt that there was a growing 
view in some Member States ". .. that some of the tight controls exercised in 
the past had been too restrictive of competition and of little practical use in 
protecting the public interest" (ibid). Such was indicated in Chapter Five 
above. 
"In the UK there is considerable opposition to any illiberal restrictions. In the 
continental countries there is a great fear of the UK as competitors and a, 
genuine if misguided, belief that strict supervision is the only effective 
method of consumer protection" (ibid, p 6). Ultimately, it was considered that 
there was "... the need for a high degree of harmonisation"(ibid). The 
interests of the UK lay with a free liberal regime and the British Insurers 
International Committee (BIIC), the negotiating arm of the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI), with regard to Europe, pushed for this position to be 
adopted. Of course, other Member States also pursued their ideal solution. 
The problem was to achieve a single market in life insurance through the 
harmonisation of legislation that determines their individual regulatory 
regimes. 
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In insurance the existing national markets differ significantly in 
the nature and amount of regulation. They also differ in the 
nature and variety of products that can be offered. The problem 
we confront is therefore how to reconcile the objective of 
liberalising the markets, and of offering the consumers as wide a 
range of choice as possible with that of satisfying the authorities 
in all Member States that there is adequate protection for the 
policy-holder and third parties (Fitchew, 1988; p 1). 
The Deputy Chairperson of the then EEC standing committee of the Bureau 
International des Producteurs D'Assurances et des Reassurances (BIPAR) 
considered that the UK insurance industry did not seem to be taking the EU 
seriously. Gale (1988) emphasised the role of BIPAR in the creation of 
legislation and the extent to which this organisation interacts with the 
Commission. He indicated that the Treaties have supremacy over national 
law and that Member States cannot be part of the club and disobey the rules. 
"Suffice it to say that as a result of representations made by me and my BIPAR 
Common Market Committee, DG XV will be mounting a concerted exercise, 
initially of persuasion, to establish a more level legislative playing field" (ibid, 
p 7). Primacy of EU law, for Gale, should benefit the whole of the EU ".. . 
since it must result in the rapprochement of our diverse legal systems which 
will eliminate many doubts and disparities which currently bedevil us, 
particularly at the commercial level" (ibid). Indeed, Gale points out the 
supranational aspect of the EU in that it negotiates on behalf of the Union at 
the international level e. g. GATT, now the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Given the importance of the negotiations to the insurance industry, he has 
regular contact with those in the Commission that were responsible for 
negotiations. Ultimately, as Deputy Secretary of BIPAR, Gale looks to the 
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interests of his membership who through interest group membership 
ensured that their interests were on the table. "1992 equals opportunity ... but 
only if you understand exactly what you are doing and are well aware of the 
details of the environment in which you will be operating" (ibid). In this 
context, each industry will be pursuing legislation as near to their own as is 
feasibly possible given the remit of the Treaty. Therefore, each Member State 
should be involved in the creation of each directive to ensure their advantage 
in the embryonic SEM. 
This had become much clearer by 1990 and was illustrated by the extent to 
which interest groups were involved in the European decision-making 
process. It was accepted that the industry could learn from itself as the CEA, 
and other European insurance associations, were invited by the Commission 
to give their views. And where the European insurance industry as a whole 
was supportive of the opinions expressed by the Commission, one had a 
strong suspicion that they would shape the outcome. 
The CEA, the Commission and the European Parliament 
This section of the chapter will overview the interactions between the 
interest groups and the supranational institutions. This is further analysed in 
Chapter Seven where interviews with those involved in the actual process of 
creating the Third Life Assurance Directive are summarised and discussed. 
"A major problem for groups is the unpredictability of the EC policy-agenda .. 
. Keeping track of EC policy initiatives is therefore a major undertaking for 
groups" (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; p 206). For instance, changes may be 
brought about because of European Summit decisions or because of different 
political agendas that certain Member States may have. Additionally, the 
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Commission's policy agenda is also unpredictable because of its make-up or 
its compartmentalisation into DGs. In the national sphere, interest groups 
face similar difficulties to those indicated above. However, the difference is of 
degree and the difficulties incorporated in dealing with fifteen Member States' 
inputs to the policy process and its openness and size (it is relatively small 
and lacks expertise and technical knowledge regarding all Member States). "It 
is therefore reliant upon external evidence from groups or experts ... the 
desire on the part of Commission officials is to consult as wide a range of 
groups as possible, means that it is virtually impossible for any single interest 
or national association to secure exclusive access to the relevant officials" 
(ibid, p 209). Interest groups provide information for the Commission and 
give an overall picture in this instance (a compromised view) of the most 
amenable regulatory structure for European life insurance. Only European 
interest groups can do this as only they are able to have even a marginal 
understanding of what the majority wish to pursue. 
Through its central position in the legislative process, the Commission is able 
to comment on ". .. the feasibility of new EU policies, a role that requires the 
(it) to solicit expertise ... (from) state executives ... sub-national authorities, 
and a large variety of interest groups (Hooghe and Marks, 1997; p 28 author's 
brackets). Furthermore, ". .. its position as interlocutor ... gives it 
unparalleled access to information" (ibid). The Commission considers that it 
is always open to external input and that the process is invaluable in the 
creation and development of policies. 
The Commission has in particular a reputation for being 
accessible to interest groups and should of course retain this ease 
of access. Indeed, it is in the Commission's own interest to do so 
since interest groups can provide the services with technical 
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information and constructive advice.... The Single European 
Act along with the White Paper programme, prompted a sharp 
increase in lobbying at Commission level. At the same time 
there was a shift in the need for information from a general to a 
specific level. Evidence of this is that independent consultants 
began to obtain monitoring contracts from clients. Moreover, 
organisations sought to exert influence.... In addition some of 
these special interest groups serve as a channel to provide 
specific technical expertise to the Commission from a variety of 
sectors, such as the drafting of legislation (OJ 93/C 63/02). 
Leon Brittan outlined the Commission's position at a CEA meeting in 
November 1989. He contended that there were two broad objectives: firstly, 
policy-holder protection in terms of the products offered and the financial 
position of the insurance undertaking; and secondly, ensuring the maximum 
flexibility of product in terms of nature, price and service. This should allow 
the policy-holder a wide choice of products at competitive prices. The 
problem was that most Member States (with a little fine-tuning) considered 
that this was exactly what their regulatory regime achieved. Obviously, this 
agreement hides underlying discord with regard to the means applied by the 
separate Member States. The problem reflected the historical and cultural 
differences within the Member states. 
In general, there are two broad approaches; the liberal approach and the 
prescribed approach. The UK, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Eire illustrate 
gradients of the former and the other eight Member States have elements of 
the latter (with Italy, France, Greece and Portugal bordering on state-control). 
This situation was outlined in the previous chapter and indicated the 
difficulties apparent in negotiating a SEM in life insurance. These differences 
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of opinion can be identified in the overall stance of the CEA and become 
explicit in the negotiation processes. Obviously, the more different the 
viewpoints, the greater the difficulties for the Commission in its task of 
creating a system which is both agreeable to them and allows mutual 
recognition of the different systems. Consequently, agreement has to be 
reached at the industry level through the CEA and this agreement needs to be 
compromised with Commission objectives. Effectively, the European 
insurance industry along with the Commission and Parliament is looking for 
agreements and compromises that will carry a qualified majority at the 
Council level. 
Initially, a broad framework was proposed by the Commission; then through 
the CEA, the European life insurance industry responded (this was the 
collective opinion of twelve Member State industries). The Commission 
concentrated on three areas: a single licence, home country control and the 
abolition of prior approval of premium rates and conditions. Additionally, 
technical reserves needed to be standardised. The CEA's response to this came 
under the auspices of five areas. 
(a) Assets 
(b) Reserves 
(c) Premium rating 
(d) Policy conditions 
(e) Supervision 
The non-life insurance directive enabled the framework for CEA discussions 
in the area of assets. Agreement was close to unanimous on a majority of 
important issues. There was unanimous agreement that a list of admissible 
assets should be defined by the Commission to supervise all Member States 
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and that these regulations should be pursued under home country control. 
Unanimity also prevailed in opposition to minimum limits on any specific 
category of investment. There was also general agreement in terms of the 
liberalisation of capital movements and allowing companies to benefit from 
the advantages of different financial markets. The two systems (current 
market value and investment at cost) that exist regarding asset valuation 
were covered by the accounts directive which considered that they should co- 
exist. Market value should show values at cost and vice-versa. 
In terms of supervision, most Member States considered that an 
environment close to the prescriptive system of strict supervision would be 
best for the SEM. This would mean the Member State authorities stipulating a 
maximum technical interest rate which, following consultation with the EU, 
would be fixed by the supervisors. The more liberal states, including the UK, 
thought that this was too rigid and that a more flexible system, that gave 
more of a role to the company and actuarial judgement would allow local 
economies to be taken into consideration. This problem needed to be 
overcome if mutual recognition was to be realised, and all Member States 
were to feel that the supervisory provisions throughout the EU gave adequate 
security. This area proved a sticking point and much negotiation was 
necessary. On other matters concerning reserves, the Member States were 
unanimous, i. e. no need for a European mortality table, or local regulation of 
tables. 
In the area of premium rates, once again, there were differences of opinion. In 
a number of Member States it is the practice to apply the same technical rate 
to both premiums and technical reserves with the supervisors placing 
ceilings on the rates that can be adopted. In the more liberal countries, such 
was not the case; companies were free to fix premium rates, subject to prudent 
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mathematical reserves, as there was no need for the rates used to calculate 
premiums and mathematical reserves to be the same. 
The more prescribed Member States wanted the supervisory authorities to 
continue determining policy conditions and in some instances the host 
Member State should be allowed to intervene and have some say in policies 
sold in their own Member State. On the other hand, the UK wished to 
minimise legislative interference in the regulatory process; this implies 
minimum host country control and intervention. The CEA fully supported 
the abolition of prior approval for contractual conditions and rates as 
outlined by the third framework directive and its replacement by a system of 
notification (CEA, 1990). The CEA considered that under a system of single 
licence it becomes the responsibility of the authorities in the Member State 
where the head office is to supervise its activities. 
The basic principle sought by the Commission was one where policies would 
be written under the legislation of the country of risk or normal country of 
residence. However, with regard to life insurance one is dealing with long- 
term contracts which may be taken out in different periods and will co-exist. 
Consequently, it was acknowledged that individuals should be able to take 
out contracts in line with their own Member State legislation even though 
they had changed their residence. It was agreed that profit sharing should be 
left to the company as this would enhance competition. However, the CEA 
did note that there was a minority that considered a more prescribed attitude 
in this context in that profit-sharing should be co-ordinated for long-term 
contracts. 
With regard to supervision, the majority of Member States considered that 
the host Member State should have a part in the determination of contracts to 
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be sold in their territory. They thought that unless they could control 
contracts they would be unable to protect policy-holders. The UK, of course, 
did not share this viewpoint. However, the majority agreed terms which 
allowed supervisory co-operation so that host countries could be aware of 
products being sold in their Member States. With regard to business rules, it 
was agreed that the host Member States would take responsibility. 
During the CEA discussions, it was evident that the UK contended that the 
continental system in general was too restrictive and anti-competitive. The 
main difficulties were: 
(a) Prior approval of policies versus post notification checking. 
(c) The maximum reserving rate of interest. 
(d) The control of premium interest rate assumptions. 
In these cases, the arguments indicated liberal and prescribed attitudes. The 
UK and its supporters pursued the more liberal objectives and the Germans 
and French, along with their supporters, a system of prescription and 
intervention. The creation of the insurance directives in general and the 
Third Life Assurance Directive in particular should not indicate winners and 
losers, but one where all Member States give and take to maximise their own 
and the consumers' positions within the newly evolving market. This is 
where the interest groups come into play: they are consulted on the proposed 
legislation and forward changes to the Commission. They are a pivotal entity 
with regard to the decision-making institutions and the insurance industry 
(for further see CEA Working Paper, 1990). 
Through an interaction with the life insurance industry, during the early 
1990s, the Commission was attempting to ". .. lay down rules for the exercise 
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of cross-frontier life assurance, balancing the needs of freedom to provide 
services and consumer protection and thereby developing the internal 
market in life assurance" (Commission Report, 1992; p 43). This is illustrated 
in the negotiations around the Third Life Assurance Directive and the 
accepted need for ". .. the co-ordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance" in the SEM (ibid, p 
46). However, interaction is continually in process as the SEM in financial 
services is incrementally constructed. 
The European Treaties outline the necessity of a single market in insurance if 
a true SEM is to be realised. The Rome Treaty emphasised that its objective 
was to create an internal market in the then European Community. This 
objective was outlined by, inter alia, Articles 52-59. These indicate the 
freedom of establishment and freedom of services. 
In its proposal for the Third Life Assurance Directive, the Commission 
contended that the 
... completion of the internal market in insurance represents a 
primary goal of the Commission in view of the importance of 
this strongly expanding sector, particularly in life assurance, and 
the work already carried out in other financial services fields 
with regard to the creation of a single financial market 
(European Parliament Working Paper, 1992; pp 25-26). 
Effectively, the Commission considered that the 
... European financial common market is an essential part of 
the frontier-free single European market, and encompasses not 
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only the free movement of money and capital for all citizens but 
also freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide cross- 
border services for brokers and financial undertakings. If the 
Community succeeds ... Banks and insurance companies will be 
free to offer their financial products without restrictions ... in all 
Community countries (European Documentation, 1989; p 5). 
Thus, the financial common market was a cornerstone of the SEM 
programme. 
Financial markets and particularly the life insurance market are highly 
regulated. Two reasons for this are to protect consumers from institutional 
failure and imprudent policies. However, ". .. sharing the same objectives 
does not mean that these are obtained by the same means and you will be 
aware that insurance legislation differs from country to country" (Drabbe, 
1994; p 135)3. 
The very specific nature of financial services is a ... reason 
for 
particular difficulties in the integration of financial markets. In 
contrast to trade in goods, insurance and banking services in the 
individual Member States are strongly influenced by varying 
traditions of company supervision and investor and consumer 
protection (European Document, 1989; p 6). 
"With regard to whether an SEM in life insurance is attainable the answer is 
yes. Even without the harmonisation of contract legislation the legal 
framework created by the directives gives the industry the opportunities to 
3 Humbert Drabbe was head of the team that drew up the Third Life Assurance Directive. He was a key figure in DG XV. 
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realise it in practice" (Drabbe, 1994; p 141). Indeed, the EU has set up a 
Community filter to enable the protection of consumers on the one hand and 
competition on the other. The Community filter encompasses the need for 
restrictive practices to adhere not only to the 'general good' but to two further 
criteria as well. "Firstly, there should be no duplication of Member State rules 
or controls. And secondly, the same protection cannot be met through less 
restriction. Basically, it needs to meet a proportionality test" (ibid, pp 139-140). 
However, Drabbe pointed out that the difference in ". .. tax treatment of 
insurance products clearly raises major difficulties for a proper functioning of 
the single market" (ibid, p 141). If life insurance products can only be sold in a 
Member State if it 'qualifies', i. e. it ensures that policy-holders benefit from a 
favourable tax treatment, ". .. the tax regime effectively determines policy 
conditions and the marketability of assurance products. These have to be 
geared to the different tax requirements of each Member State ... this is an 
infringement of the fundamental Treaty principles of free movement of 
persons and the free provision of services, " (ibid). Harmonisation of tax bases 
and levels could overcome the problem (in principle at least). However, with 
taxation closely tied to the concept of sovereignty, it is unlikely that Member 
States would want to take this road in the short term. Yet it does point in the 
direction of closer ties in the area of financial services and indicate a spillover 
process. Initially, one may consider pragmatic solutions, where 
harmonisation is not a realistic option, a pragmatic answer could possibly be 
provided by ensuring that the tax authorities concerned receive the 
information necessary to draw up the tax form and collect the tax due" (ibid). 
However, further talks are still underway in this area. 
By 1992, the specifics of the Third Life Assurance Directive were generally 
understood. Some considered it to be a "cultural revolution" (Loheac, 1992; p 
2). Indeed, the Third Life Assurance Directive removes "... a priori control of 
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policy and rating conditions and replaces it with a non-systematic a posteriori 
communication system; this means that a long continental tradition of 
material control is abandoned and the essence of - which is attributed to the 
authorities of the country of the registered office - no longer focuses on the 
products ... but the undertaking itself, its solvency, its shareholding and its 
management" (ibid, p 3). This should maximise competition in terms of 
products and increase innovation. However, there is a problem in terms of 
the 'general good' where Member State supervisory authorities may outlaw a 
product if it is deemed risky. Obviously, this allows the prescribed Member 
States a modicum of protection. 
In general terms, the directive outlined a compromised framework which 
once in place relies on mutual recognition (given the concept of the general 
good). Once harmonisation has taken place, a form of confrontation will take 
place and 
... this confrontation with regulations should result in the 
different national rules being brought into line with each other: 
states which have a tradition of strict control will have to ease 
their regulatory constraints if they want to avoid penalising their 
own national undertakings ... In the final analysis, the logical 
consequence would be that a less strict system of control would, 
in time, set the European standard (ibid). 
This, of course, could only occur following an initial period of harmonisation 
or re-regulation. Effectively, the Commission saw the creation of the SEM as 
being pursued through three fundamental means; minimum harmonisation, 
mutual recognition and home country control. However, the: 
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... principle of mutual recognition as a rule only applies to a list 
of activities generally annexed to the directives (either adopted 
or in the process of being so) in financial services ... The 
approach by the Community authorities in directives on 
financial services is essentially institutional and sectoral. The 
specific features of each of these financial services sectors mean 
that they will be regulated by a body of formally and materially 
distinct regulations even though overall these texts are based on 
the same principles (adopted by the single licence) (Loheac, 1991; 
p 408 author's brackets). 
Basically, in each specific sector there needs to be agreement on basic rules and 
these minimum harmonisation's are only possible because "... common 
interest, mutual confidence and a degree of economic convergence exist 
between EEC Member States" (ibid, p 409). It is on the agreement of this basic 
legislation that mutual recognition relies. 
The liberalisation of the system should suit the UK life insurance industry 
and Loheac is correct when he notes that "... for British operators, an 
integrated European insurance market functioning on the basis of rules 
similar to the model they are used to ... should be a favourable 
environment" (Loheac, 1992; p 4). However, although this may be the case, 
the UK would also need to make changes to its supervisory structure and the 
lack of contract legislation may negate any advantage. Finally, it was 
recognised that it was ". .. essential to overcome ... differences in legal 
systems and regulations in individual Member States in order to create an 
integrated European insurance market" (ibid). 
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The Supervisors and the European Union 
Also involved in the harmonisation process are the Member State 
supervisors. Russell (1988) considered that there were two issues to be looked 
at in the creation of the SEM. Firstly, regulatory concerns regarding the 
achievement of protection for the consumer and the investor; and secondly, 
the furtherance of market opportunities and the elimination of barriers to 
trade for the life insurance industry. These areas were problematic for all 
Member States. However, the UK attitude and philosophy is in most cases 
unlike the majority of Member States. The main difference between the UK 
and most of its partners revolves around the close supervision surrounding 
premium levels, policy conditions and permitted investments. The 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) felt that supervision to this extent 
reduced the scope with regard to competition, efficiency and choice. 
In 1988, the need for harmonisation was admitted by the DTI. "On the one 
hand there is understandable pressure for a harmonisation of regulatory 
regimes and we are the odd man out among the European supervisors. On 
the other hand we believe that it is within the interest of our industry and 
European consumers that there should be more competition within Europe" 
(Russell, 1988; p 3)4. Russell was posing the question: how can it be ensured 
that the framework directive would allow the UK life insurance industry 
maximum opportunity when it competed in the SEM? "Many Member States 
have perfectly legitimate fears" (ibid) about a number of areas: 
(a) how the freedom of trade would affect tax collection and the balance of 
payments; 
4 Arthur Russell was the DTI representative involved in the formulation of the Third Life Assurance Directive. 
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(b) the effect freedom of trade will have on developing industries (they may 
be overwhelmed by freedom of competition). 
However, the situation was that the financial services sector had lagged 
behind other harmonisation programmes in the EU. Indeed, ". .. progress in 
the common market is a question of bargaining, and we have to face the 
situation as it is not as we would like it to be" (ibid, p 6). 
With the finalisation of the White Paper 'Completing the Internal Market' 
(1985) and the signing of the SEA, the Member States indicated their political 
will regarding the realisation of the SEM. Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 
made it apparent that ". .. there must be a readiness to compromise. And to 
accept proposals which might be unpalatable if taken in isolation for the sake 
of a programme as a whole ... No state can afford to be isolated, and needs 
allies ... sufficient to block measures which they dislike. Often this can result 
in an unholy alliance where several states disagree on a particular proposal 
for many different reasons. And bridge building and trade-offs may often be 
necessary" (Russel, 1988; pp 7-8). Under the co-operation procedure set up by 
the SEA, decision-making became so much easier and a new impetus was 
given to the EU. However, the DTI undertakes its greatest participation in the 
process once the proposed legislation has entered the realms of the Council. 
"The DTIs main contribution is during the Council stage of negotiations 
where we send staff to participate in the working group ... and brief the 
United Kingdom Permanent Representation ... for COREPER discussions. 
The DTI depends on the BIIC for the views of the industry which interacts 
with the CEA and BIPAR to get an overall view of the European industry. 
They provide the DTI in the first place with industry's views on the overall 
shape of the directive and give invaluable assistance in resolving difficulties 
of a technical nature" (ibid, p 9). Clearly, interest groups are a very important 
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part of the decision-making process. They create areas of certainty, allow for 
the dissemination of information and encompass vehicles for compromise. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has overviewed the interaction between the insurance sector, 
interest groups and -the supranational aspects of the EU decision-making 
institutions. However, it also recognises intergovernmental influences (e. g. 
the Council). Indeed, there is a tentative contention that multi-level 
governance processes may best describe the dynamics of European 
integration, recognising that multi-level governance shares both 
intergovernmental and neo-functional premises. In other words, both 
intergovernmental and neo-functional processes are at work in the 
formulation of European Union. 
Finally, this chapter provided an overview of some recent interest group 
studies and recognised some of the difficulties in lobbying at the EU level. 
The most fundamental problem is the non-existence of a single decision- 
making body and that twelve (now fifteen) Member States have to be dealt 
with in the creation of policies and the uncertainty that this engenders. 
Interest groups that are involved in the policy process as representatives of a 
sector are a means of overcoming this. However, this chapter also recognises 
the intergovernmental aspects of interest groups, they ". . must also take care 
not to neglect the national dimension of EC lobbying since the final decisions 
on policies are taken not by a directly elected European government, but by 
national officials and ministers" (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; pp 212-213). 
The institutional inter-play involved in the formulation of the Third Life 
Assurance Directive provides an illustration of how a harmonisation process 
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is at work between the Member States. Each institution attempts to prioritise 
its understanding of what SEM legislation should entail. However, what is 
the overall process in terms of harmonisation and further integration? When 
do the individual Member States realise that they need to be part of the 
negotiations that create the legislation for the new market place? Do they 
realise that this is necessary? This and the previous chapter have indicated 
that there are different models of ideal legislation and regulation in separate 
Member States. We now question how these different ideals are 
compromised at the EU level? How far does self-interest give impetus to 
European integration? 
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Chapter Seven 
Decision-Making Models and Processes of Integration: The Interview 
Programme 
I am European, I am no doubt a European 
intellectual, and I like to recall this to myself, and 
why would I deny it? In the name of what? But I 
am not nor do I feel European in every part that is 
European through and through (Derrida, 1992; p 
82). 
Introduction 
In Chapter Five we examined the different understandings of regulatory 
environments that Member States hold. The survey indicates the amount of 
regulation a Member State would feel most acceptable and the demands it 
would make to ensure its interests. Chapter Six discussed and illustrated the 
different groups influencing the EU decision-making process; and this chapter 
builds an understanding of how the different positions (regarding regulatory 
environments) are compromised by the Member States at the European level. 
To do this and to indicate how the actions of sectors /companies are 
influential in the process, the analysis uses: 
(a) An amended 'demand flow' model. This suggests how interests transfer 
into demands and how these demands are channelled into decisions (Easton 
1965, see Fig 7.1 p 214). 
(b) A European Demand Model which clarifies this process at the EU and 
Member State level (see Fig 7.2 p 215). 
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(c) A decision-making model derived empirically through interviews with 
representatives of EU and Member State level decision-makers (The 
European Decision-Making Model Fig 7.3 p 243). 
(d) A Survey of UK life insurance companies. 
The thesis considers that there is an interaction between economic sectors and 
political institutions in the decision-making process and that such an 
interaction may be located in the processes apparent at the EU level. This 
process is evident in the life insurance sector because of the amount of 
differing legislation and the consequent difficulty in establishing an SEM. 
This provides an example of supranationalism in the integration process. 
Overall, through the interaction between interest groups and the EU certainty 
and clarity are provided. The ground rules are indicated and the parameters 
of policy formulated. However, in the context of supranationalism just 
... as the European Community is itself still developing its 
institutions and policies, so the interest group system 
surrounding the EC has yet to reach a stable state. We are still in 
the relatively early stages of group adjustment to a shift in the 
locus of power and it, therefore, is not surprising that the process 
of interest group intermediation is in a state of flux (ibid, p 213). 
Building on the process outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter, 
questions the extent of the flux and locates the process in a theoretical 
framework. 
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Easton's Demand Flow Model 
David Easton (1965) developed a general model of how institutions may 
channel conflicts into merged ideological patterns. Indeed, this thesis posits a 
number of scenarios based on the Easton model. For Easton there are a 
number of demands on the political system and he considered that ".. . 
conflicts over demands constitute the flesh and blood of all political systems 
from the smallest to the largest, from the simplest to the most complex" 
(Easton, 1965; p 48). 
In his model, Easton illustrates how expectations, public opinion, 
motivations, ideologies, interests and preferences transfer into wants which 
become system inputs. With reference to the life insurance industry and the 
EU, one may consider that there is an over-riding ideology indicated by socio- 
historic circumstances out of which the other variables emanate; thus 
ideology takes the form of Member State understanding of the amount of 
regulation that is necessary for their environment, i. e. totally free, prescribed, 
state controlled. Interests may be viewed as a Member State's most desired 
point in relation to the specific enviromnents, the most favoured conditions. 
This illustrates the need for interest groups at a European and national level 
because they are the most appropriate vehicles to enable compromise. 
Preferences are linked closely to both ideology and interests and denote those 
areas most likely to be accepted (the extent of compromise). Motivations 
include the need to be involved in the discussion process to ensure 
legislation as close to one's desired position as possible so as not to 
undermine trading capabilities (to allow for profit maximisation and 
certainty). These variables are subsequently transferred into demands. 
208 
Demands effectively threaten the system and have to be dealt with. Indeed, 
any surviving system must have created the means by which demands from 
different parts of the system can be resolved. Easton (1965) considers that there 
is a general sequence that deals with the stress that demands create: 
Stimulus > System > Response > Outcome. 
Demands create a disturbance or stimulus and the system feels the effects; 
system members respond or fail to respond; the result or outcome reveals 
how well the system has coped with the stress created by the disturbance. 
Without demands, the system would not know which decisions to make, as it 
would be unaware of interests. 
Consequently, demands are central to Easton's model as they constitute an 
expression of opinion that forces the decision-making body to deal with the 
problem. Easton considers that demands may be: 
(a) Specific. 
(b) Generalised. 
(c) Ideological (a set of demands). 
These demands are always directed toward the authoritative body (in this case 
the EU institutions) to take the desired action (one would consider that this 
held preferences). Effectively, Easton considers that all demands are the same; 
only the directions are different i. e. those that push for desired action and 
those that do not. 
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Easton defines interests as the means by which a person or group attempts to 
implement fundamental goals. In such a way a law or policy could be said to 
be made in a person's or group's interest, the realisation of the interest 
fulfilling a basic goal. Indeed, ". .. interests might easily 
be confused with 
demands. However close a connection there may be between the two, it is 
important to recognise that conceptually, they are quite separate" (Easton, 
1965; p 45). He emphasises this point through delineating interests into 
categories, i. e. subjective and objective interests. 
Subjective and Objective Interests 
Easton defines interests as: 
... instrumental values, those means through which a person or 
group seeks to implement what may be considered to be his or 
its fundamental goals. In this sense, a person may speak of a law 
or administrative decree or policy as being in his interest ... In 
this instrumental sense, we may describe interest as either 
subjective or objective (ibid). 
A subjective interest is one where one's own interpretation of what is 
necessary is paramount, if broader goals are to be recognised. In this context, 
the analysis will investigate how fundamentally desirable interests of 
European Member State life insurance industries are met and compromised 
to ensure desirable system changes, i. e. the move from a national market to 
cross-border trade. 
From the subjective point of view, the interest of a person is to 
be found in his own interpretation of what is necessary if he is to 
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realise his broader goals.... More usually, in politics, subjective 
interests would be attributed to groups, as where they are 
perceived and voiced by an organisation that presumes to speak 
for its membership at the very least (Easton, 1965; p 45). 
An objective interest could specify criteria that has no regard for the interests 
of the industry. "An objective interest may be described as those instrumental 
needs which others attribute to a person or group according to criteria quite 
independent of the subjective perceptions of that person or group" (ibid). 
Easton illustrates the difference between objective and subjective interests; 
the interviews in the thesis attempt to identify the insurance industry's 
subjective interests in relation to the objective interests of the EU. A 
subjective interest is one which the industry recognises itself and interprets 
what is necessary if broader goals are to be achieved. 
A subjective interest becomes a demand if it is not met; an objective interest 
becomes a demand if it is not what the industry requires (some of the 
difficulties regarding this are illustrated in the previous chapter). In this 
context interaction between the conflicting areas is necessary. 
Chapter Five identified subjective interests and Chapter Six and Seven 
explore how subjective interests are agreed upon? Who voices the interests? 
And how do these interests transform into demands? An objective interest 
may be described as others interpreting the interests of the group. Such an 
interest would take into consideration external needs that ensure the goal i. e. 
the regulatory environment. In respect of the life insurance industry, this 
would take into consideration cross-border trade and the long term effects of 
this on the life insurance industry. At this juncture one would be forced to 
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ask from where an objective interest would obtain the information of what is 
necessary for the industry's survival? And how happy would the industry be 
in leaving its fate in Europe to objective interests? However, as Easton 
indicated, ". .. the expression of an interest in a matter 
is not identical with 
the input of a demand. To become a demand, there needs to be voiced a 
proposal that authoritative action be taken with regard to it" (ibid, p 47). 
An Applied Demand Flow Model 
In a post-SEA Europe, the decision makers at the EU level have become much 
more prominent in Easton's system change and system insurance processes. 
When changes are to be made at the EU level, are subjective interests (the 
interests of the life insurance industry) brought to the attention of the 
national legislature which subsequently relays them to the European 
decision-making institutions? If this were the case, would the national 
legislature relay these interests to the European level with its own objective 
interests added to those of the life insurance industry's interests? Or would 
the life insurance sector relay its own subjective interests directly to the 
European decision-making institutions which would have their own 
subjective interests? Fundamentally, how and in what form 
(objective/ subjective) are the interests brought to the attention of the 
European and national decision-making institutions and formulated into 
demands? This thesis considers that subjective interests are formulated at the 
national level through the national companies and national interest groups. 
These interests are formulated further at the European level and interact with 
the objective interests of the EU to create European legislation. However, not 
all interests become demands. "Whether we accept a subjective or objective 
interpretation of interests or recognise them as mutually compatible ways of 
delineating and classifying interests, my point is that we cannot automatically 
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conclude either that interests are synonymous with demands or that every 
interest must become incorporated into a demand (ibid, p 46). 
This thesis applies Easton's model to the EU which (see Fig 7.1 p 214) allows 
an understanding of what takes place between the different European 
institutions (Commission, Parliament and Council), interest groups and 
insurance companies. One may contend that interest group-Commission- 
Parliament interaction takes place between points A and B; Commission- 
Parliament-Council interaction between points B and C; and from point C on 
the members of the Council negotiate the end result. This is best illustrated by 
inputs D7, D8 and Dn = W. The different Member State demands are 
compromised at point R following interaction between national interest 
groups at the European level, this involves Parliament and the Commission; 
while interaction between the Commission, Council and Parliament is 
affected between B and C. Finally, legislation is agreed at the Council level, or 
between C and outputs. These outputs revert to wants and demands and 
illustrate the spillover process. With regard to the rest of the model: S is a 
failed piece of legislation, T is uncontroversial and does not necessitate 
compromise, U illustrates different demands but the process following a 
compromise (at point R) does not illustrate the EU in general terms (because 
it does not provide for the interactions between the European institutions). V 
illustrates only one demand. 
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ELG Z1 EASTON'S DEMAND FLOW MODEL 
Environment 
Boundary Environment threshold 
s ,. ý. -ý The political system s 
Expectations 
Public 
Opinion 
Motivations 
Wý 
Ideology 
Interests 
Preferences 
D- Dn Voicing of demands. 
Flow channels and patterns. 
AR 
Reduction and combining of points. 
OI 
Conversion to issues - demands transformed into issues. 
Oa- On Conversion to outputs. 
Feedback - Although this is only one line it represents numerous feedback channels. 
(EASTON, 1965; pp 74-75) 
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Ultimately, one may consider that demands are fed into the system by the 
companies, either straight to legislatures, or they are channelled by interest 
groups. 
This thesis concentrates on the European side and claims that demands in 
respect of European needs are formulated at Member State and European 
interest group levels. Easton's adapted flow model considers that at the EU 
level, a compromise is reached between the Member State life insurance 
industries while an interaction takes place with EU institutions. Of course, 
other routes may be taken, as is illustrated in the European Demand Model, 
Fig 7.2. The investigation intends to clarify this process. 
FIG 7.2 
THE EUROPEAN DEMAND MODEL 
National Parliament f Council -º Directive 6 Aspects f Demand Demands (Possible route) 
of Wants Formulation 
*CEA 
Meetings f EU = Commission f Directive 
Further formulation Parliament (Probable 
taking 12 sets of Council route) 
demands into account 
The European Demand Model (Fig 7.2) provides a bridge between Easton's 
adapted Flow Model (Fig 7.1) and the European Decision-Making Model (Fig 
7.3 p 243). The Demand Model attempts to assess the decision-making routes 
taken by the Member State life insurance industry once legislation for their 
sector has been proposed. The European Decision-Making Model (Fig 7.3) is 
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initially grounded out of the previous two models, then added to and 
constructed further through the interview programme. 
The emphasis on the European dimension intensifies as integration gathers 
pace and the need to be involved at the European level becomes increasingly 
apparent. The growth in the number of interest groups and lobbying bodies 
between direct elections in 1979 and the SEM in 1992 seems to indicate this, as 
does the growth in the post-SEA era. 
There are a number of insurance interest groups at the EU level the most 
important of which is the CEA. At this point both Member State interest 
groups and insurance companies consider national differences and attempt to 
reach compromise positions in respect of national ideologies, interests, 
preferences etc. 
Regarding these problems, the areas that need investigation are: 
(1) How does the national /European life insurance industry recognise its 
subjective interests with specific reference to the SEM? 
(2) Do these interests transfer into demands and how are these demands 
made of the national or European legislatures? 
To enable some answers to these questions, there are five areas that may be 
investigated and each engenders a certain route that demands may take. 
These are: 
(a) National industries make demands of national legislatures prior to 
formulation at the European level. 
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(b) The formulation of demands between national interest groups are 
compromised between Member State insurance industries at the European 
level then made of the European and national legislatures. 
(c) Companies or national interest groups make demands of their national 
legislatures which make decisions and without further consultation 
transpose these to the European legislature. 
(d) The national legislatures formulate the requirements of the industry 
without consultation. 
(e) The European legislature formulates market legislation without 
consultation. 
A number of these questions were investigated by Mazey and Richardson 
(1996) who interviewed more than forty Commission officials and surveyed 
fifty officials from a number of DGs. Indeed, ". .. it was clear that officials 
placed enormous importance on the consultation of interest groups, typical 
responses were: I see consultation as an important and very useful source of 
information to ensure that EC legislative measures are efficient and effective 
in the real world (Dutch Official DG XV). We strongly value open, extensive 
and continuing consultation, formal and informal - our whole activity is 
based on this (British official DG XII). Consultation is in general positive as it 
allows us to broaden the perspective on a given-issue (Spanish official DG 
XVII)" (p 201). 
The above questions were investigated in the interviews that were 
undertaken with individuals involved in the formulation of the Third Life 
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Assurance Directive. Each of the five strategies necessitates different routes in 
the decision-making process and these may differ among the Member States. 
However, a specific model may be posited, different routes illustrated and the 
most rational strategy indicated. 
The Interview Process 
Through a series of interviews with EU decision-making bodies this chapter 
provides an investigation of where interest groups predominantly level their 
demands, and how they are dealt with by EU institutions. 
The survey data illustrated the way the life insurance sector perceives the EU 
and how it attempts to mould a future regulatory environment (Life 
Insurance Regulation Matrices One and Two, pp 157 and 160). These 
ideological preferences are provided by different cultural existence. The 
decision-making process in the EU and the regulatory environment to be 
formed through such a process may tell us much about the way future trading 
in the EU may develop. 
Interviews were undertaken with a number of key individuals concerned in 
the decision-making process at the European level. The interviews at the both 
the EU and UK level provide information that may allow the thesis to deduce 
a similar process among all Member States. Interview outlines (see p 991 and 
Appendix B) and survey B (see Appendix A) were sent to other Member State 
interest groups and the responses allow some deduction of processes at work 
throughout the EU. 
The key individuals who were personally interviewed by the author were 
representatives from the following institutions. 
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Directorate-Generale XV. (DG XV) (Finance). M. De Frutos. 12-30 pm 11 
September, 1993, DG XV, Brussels; 
The Council Permanent Representative for UK in Finance. Mr R. Quinn. 
11.00 am 6 August, 1993,6 Round Point, Robert Schuman, Brussels; 
The Department of Industry & Trade (DTI). Mr M. Ingram. 2.30 pm 22 July, 
1996,1 Victoria St, Westminster, London; 
Committee for European Assurance (CEA). M. Binon, 10.00 am 14 September, 
1993. Rue Belliard, 9. Brussels. Herr Werle 2.30 pm 23 February, 1996. Paris; 
Bureau International des Producteurs d'Assurance & de Reassurance 
(BIPAR). Herr H. Krauss, 11.00 am 8 September, 1993. Avenue Albert 
Elizabeth, 40 Brussels; 
Association of British Insurers (ABI). Ms J. Frost 2.30 pm 17 May 1996.51, 
Gresham St, London. 
British Insurers International Committee (BIIC) Mr A. 0' Leary 2.30 pm 7 
August 1995 (home address) Cheltenham. 
Interview outlines (as indicated in Appendix B) were returned by the: 
Irish Insurance Federation (IIF). Mr J. White; 
Council Permanent Representative for France. (Attache financier). P. 
Charlier. 
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Each interviewee was an individual who dealt explicitly with the Third Life 
Assurance Directive and each illustrated interaction with others. The 
questions were codified so that each set of interview questions related to each 
other. This allowed a general perspective of the EU decision-making process 
and illustrated the interactions between the key players. 
Formulating and Coding Semi-Formal Interview Questions 
Grounded theory entails two basic analytical procedures. Firstly, one 
continually makes comparisons and secondly one asks questions. As-noted 
above these processes have been adhered to in earlier parts of the study. 
However, at this point the study wishes to identify the process in relation to 
the interviews. Questioning opens up the data and through using the 
categories properties and dimensions constructed earlier in the study the 
researcher is able to ask precise and revealing questions in the interviews. 
There are general questions that can be drawn from the data which can 
stimulate a series of questions which in turn ". .. lead to the development of 
further categories, properties and dimensions. The basic questions are Who? 
When? Where? What? How? How Much? and Why? " (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990; p 77). The interview questions (see below p 221) build on the basic 
questions and the previous categories that were generated above. Indeed, the 
difficulties that were created through the categorisation of the European life 
insurance industry provide the basis and strategy of the interview questions. 
They emerge to deal with the problems and contradictions that the study has 
uncovered. 
The interviews were conducted on a semi-formal basis and centred around 12 
core questions these were; 
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(1) What are the major functions of the CEAIBIPARIABIlthe 
Commission1the CouncilINational Supervisors and how do these fit with 
each other at; 
(A) The EU level. 
(B) The national level. 
(2) To what extent are decisions made with interest 
groupICOREPERICommissionINational Supervisor in-put. 
(3) Is it interest groups, national supervisors, the Council of Ministers or the 
Commission that define decision parameters. 
(4) Does the Council, the Commission, national legislatures and interest 
groups reach a compromise prior to a decision reaching the Council. 
(5) Does an interaction exist between the Councillthe CommissionInational 
supervisors and specific interest groups at a national and European level. 
(6) How does the Councillhational supervisor know what to insist upon in 
respect of national interest. 
(7) Does an interaction exist between interest 
groupsICommissionICouncillnational supervisor and the Insurance 
Committee 
(8) Are different Member States looking for specific types of life insurance 
regulatory environments for the SEM which is different from other member 
states. 
(9) Are there differences between the; 
(a) The French ideal 
(b) The German ideal 
(c) The Dutch ideal 
(d) The UK ideal 
(e) The Italian ideal 
Please illustrate these differences. 
How does your market ideal fit into these? 
(10) Is a compromise reached between the different national interest groups 
prior to the Commission initially drawing up draft legislation or is there an 
interaction between the interest group at the European level and the 
Commission which takes into consideration a compromise reached by the 
Member State interest groups e. g. ABI through membership of the European 
interest group CEAIBIPAR. 
(11) Where possible have compromises been reached between the Council, 
the Commission and Parliament before the final negotiations to enable a 
more efficient means of decision making? 
(12) What takes precedence in the formulation of a directive Member State or 
sector interests? 
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The questions were coded into categories so the same could be asked of each 
interviewee. This allowed the following categories to emerge from the 
interviews: Understanding; Negotiation; Interaction; Difference; and 
Compromise (see the interview results below). 
The Interview Results 
In general, the interviews indicated agreement on a number of points. The 
Third Life Assurance Directive was unanimously perceived as a means of 
providing the environment that would allow mutual recognition to be 
achieved; it was also acknowledged that many influences went into the 
drafting of a directive. Since 1988 interaction between industries and the 
Commission has become more apparent at the EU level. The representative 
of DG XV considered that consistent contact with the life insurance industry 
was imperative in respect of legislative input. 
Question One (Understanding) 
What are the major functions of the Permanent 
Rep resen ta tivelCom miss ionICEAIBIPARIAB IID TI and how do these fit in 
with the functions of other finance interest groups and governmental 
institutions at: 
(A) The EU level? 
(B) The national level? 
The Directorate General XV deals primarily with the CEA and BIPAR. 
However, the impetus for legislation may come through the Member States 
or from the Commission itself. The CEA sees its role as bringing together a 
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combined understanding of the direction negotiations should take. The CEA, 
BIPAR and DG XV representatives all considered that the Commission 
prefers to deal with a European-wide interest group. Both the ABI and BIIC 
agreed with this view and thought that the ABI and BIIC worked through the 
CEA as these days (post-SEA) it was easier to get unanimous views in the 
latter organisation. This they felt was due to the general acceptance of the 
UK's understanding of a regulatory structure, but this was disputed by other 
interviewees and survey A. Initially, the European life insurance industry 
was divided but through the integration process and the recognition of the 
necessity of a united front, a more compromisory situation is now sought. 
Consequently, the importance of the CEA has continued to grow. This allows 
for negotiations to be more specific because individual company and national 
interest group involvement creates too much information and creates the 
difficulty of turbulence. Turbulence is the concept initiated by Haas which 
posited that in the integration process there is too much information which 
serves only to cloud the situation (Haas 1976). In this context, interest groups 
in general and European interest groups in particular create wholes that 
enable shared belief systems and focal points that define, for those, involved 
what constitutes co-operation (Haas, 1975; Garrett and Weingast, 1993). 
Additionally, the BIIC also communicates with the national government 
through the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). This ensures that 
proposed legislation is acceptable to all of the parties concerned and successful 
at the Council level. Once the Commission and the industry are committed to 
a policy approach, the BIIC supports it with information and attempts to 
prevent backtracking (BIIC Representative). The ABI and the IIF do the same 
work as the CEA at the national level. In this context, the ABI through the 
BIIC interacts with the DTI on a regular basis to ensure that government fully 
understands what the industry needs. However, the DTI did point out that 
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although it was also interested in the needs of the consumer, in general terms 
the understanding of the insurance directorate is developed through the 
industry. At the EU level, the DTI is involved in Council working groups and 
gets involved in bilateral discussions on an ad hoc basis in an attempt to 
swing other Member States toward the UK's stance. The discussions pave the 
way for some kind of consensus in the working group. In this context, more 
of an intergovernmental perspective may be observed. However, this would 
incorporate "advice received from the industry" (DTI Representative) 
through the use of interest groups. The BIIC ". .. advises ... on a regular 
basis 
and as the BIIC meeting precede the Council working group by two weeks, we 
go in broadly knowing what the industry wanted" (ibid). The IIF represented 
the Irish life insurance industry's interests at the EU level through lobbying. It 
would also have regard for other finance interest groups: these may be seen as 
allies or competitors. However, through the CEA compromise is usually 
reached. This illustrates more of a neo-functional rather than an 
intergovernmental perspective. 
Questions Two and Three (Negotiation) 
To what extent are decisions made with interest 
grouplCommissionlPermanent RepresentativelDTI input? 
Is it nationallEuropean interest groups, national supervisors the Council 
Ministers or the Commission that define decision parameters? 
The Commission looks towards creating a common understanding between 
the Member States. It will interact with Member State interest groups, e. g. the 
ABI or even directly with companies. But its main contacts are the European 
interest groups because they allow a European perspective and this is what 
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the Commission wants (this was substantiated by the European interest group 
representatives). In this context, the CEA has little to do with national 
governments, leaving this area to national interest groups. As well as 
attempting to influence in this area, national interest groups will hold direct 
talks with Commission representatives occasionally, but usually through 
European interest groups. National interest groups deal with MEPs at the 
European level. The IIF representative considered that "generally interest 
group input is taken fully on board" (IIF Representative). However, interest 
group input is not the sole factor. 
The creation of a consensus between Member States allows for successful 
legislation when it reaches the Council because it has been partially agreed in 
the initial stages. Of course, problems may occur once negotiations take place 
in the Council. However, successful legislation may be more apparent if there 
has been agreement in the initial stages. This was substantiated by the DTI 
representative. 
The CEA representatives both considered that the CEA played an interactive 
part in the creation of European legislation, as did those representatives of the 
ABI, BIIC and BIPAR with reference to these organisations. Parameters in 
terms of decision-making are created through this process. 
There are many influences built into a proposal: 
(a) The individuals in control, e. g. Delors, Brittan. 
(b) The institutions in control, e. g. the Commission, Court of Justice, 
Parliament, Council. 
(c) The economic sectors' perceptions of the legislation necessary. 
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However, it is the economic sectors that act as a stimulus and interact with 
the European political institutions. There is much input by trade associations 
who look to make their influence felt as early as possible. In this respect, the 
insurance interest groups interact with the Commission at the following five 
levels of proposal formulation: 
(1) The forming and influencing of ideas. 
(2) Discussing the general problem. 
(3) Having an input into draft working papers. 
(4) Having an input into formal proposals. 
(5) Lobbying Commission discussions. 
(These levels were indicated by DG XV, CEA and BIPAR Representatives) 
Theoretically, by level 5, the 'Commission discussions', agreement should 
have been reached. However, there could be minor disputes. At this point 
the proposed legislation is passed on to the European Parliament which gives 
its opinion as it would also have been lobbied by the given groups. Recently, 
(1996) the "European Parliament invited CEA representatives along with 
seven other large European interest groups to indicate that it would like to 
deal specifically- with them rather than the large number of bodies that 
currently attempt to lobby it" (CEA Representative). 
It was thought by the Council representative (UK Permanent Representative) 
very likely that the Council would support the major areas of proposals. 
However in some cases, it would not. Proposed legislation does not always 
totally reflect an industry's opinion in the way that the Commission's 
representative implied (DG XV Representative). However, legislation is 
easier to implement with consensus: yet if this is not possible, the proposal is 
still constructed. If the proposal is constructed without general consensus of 
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the sector, implementation becomes much more difficult and in some cases 
impossible. The insurance contract directive was a case in point that was 
taken up by the DG representative in relation to this area. This was mirrored 
by the French Permanent Representative, who considered that interest group 
input into the decision-making process was high and of an interactive nature. 
The role of the COREPER is to provide consensus and the greater agreement 
there is prior to their involvement, the easier their role becomes. 
The BIIC representatives thought that interest groups were extremely 
influential in the building of legislation and that this helps in the initiation 
successful legislation. - O'Leary considered that the Commission was very open 
but had no programme: it also had to face a division of opinion throughout 
the EU. Interest groups at the European level have helped to overcome these 
divisions. Frost considered that the trend these days was to seek 
compromises. However, in some cases Member States were reluctant to shift 
away from their preferred regulatory system, but she added that the UK has 
and will continue to shift when necessary. 
Ultimately, the CEA is a pivotal body that allows an all-round or complete 
perspective of the sector's demands for the decision-making bodies. There was 
an increase in CEA activity in the mid-eighties following the Commission 
White Paper (1985) and the SEA which indicated the creation of the SEM. The 
CEA sees itself as a facilitator and a negotiator of turbulence (as indicated by 
Haas 1975). European interest groups provide the means for an all-round 
European view and this allows for more successful legislation (CEA 
Representative). 
Consumer product protection is provided by contract law. However, this is an 
area where harmonisation has proved difficult to achieve and allows an 
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illustration of the difficulties involved in harmonisation when areas more 
sensitive to national sovereignty are broached. After fourteen years the 
insurance contract directive proved impossible to agree and finally it was 
abandoned. This does not provide the environment necessary to allow a SEM 
in life products because a Member State can theoretically block a product from 
crossing its border. De Frutos pointed out that a host country could not 
impose regulations in a "willy nilly" manner but only in the context of the 
'general good". Of course, one has to determine what is meant by this concept 
as it is open to a number of interpretations. One Member State's 'general 
good' providing another's trade barrier. However, De Frutos indicated that 
the Commission was continuing to monitor the situation. 
It was apparent that it had been difficult to get agreement on the simplest 
parts of the insurance contracts directive. This gives an understanding of the 
problems the EU has if it does not undertake consultation with industries and 
interest groups. If it presses ahead alone difficulties are likely to be apparent at 
the Council level. A high level of consensus is necessary if proposals are to 
become legislation. It also illustrates the situation when the EU interferes 
with areas fundamental to the idea of Member State sovereignty e. g. contract 
law in general, taxation or pensions, etc. When the EU attempts interference 
in such areas it is effectively tampering with civil systems and this ruffles the 
nationalist feathers (for a further discussion see Chapter Five and the 
Spillover Model, Figs 5.1,5.2 and 5.3 pp 277-81). 
In general, decision parameters are defined by different organisations at 
different times during the creation of the legislation. The national interest 
group informs national government what the national industry needs. 
However, these needs are curtailed by other Member State industries and it is 
here that the European interest group comes into play. The Commission 
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initiates the legislative process but needs the inputs of the interest groups to 
engender successful legislation. It must also remain loyal to the spirit of the 
treaty. Ultimately, the Council may amend a proposal as long as the vote is 
unanimous. 
Each organisation is involved in defining decision parameters because 
without the input of each Member State, the insurance industry and EU 
institutions legislation would not hold the essential ingredients to ensure its 
successful passage. This was emphasised by the French Permanent 
Representative who considered that interest groups define decision 
parameters regarding their area of interest. However, this is not the general 
interest and this is where the Commission and the Council provide a balance. 
The Council provide parameters once the legislation has reached them ". -. at 
the general level and often negotiate precise texts for validation" (French 
Permanent Representative) but it is the Commission that has the "power of 
proposition and objection" (ibid). 
The ideal is consensus. However, this is difficult to achieve without 
fundamental changes to the decision-making structures and an undermining 
of national sovereignty in the areas of legal structure and fiscal and monetary 
policy. 'General good or best practice' may be a means toward enabling this. 
Werle contended that on a number of occasions agreement has not been 
reached by Member States and in these cases 'best practice' is brought into 
play. At the interest group level, they pursue unanimity: however this is 
always difficult and in some cases impossible. 
In principle, the Commission defines the decision-making parameters. 
However, as illustrated above, one may argue that it does not do this alone. 
Because the Council provides the decisions it could be said that it is this 
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institution that provides the parameters. Additionally, if one takes into 
consideration interest group input, one may consider that these define 
parameters prior to the involvement of any institution or through an 
interaction with the Commission. Werle commented on the role that the 
CEA played in the European decision-making process. "The Commission 
provides a framework for the CEA. Then the CEA undertakes negotiations 
with its membership" (CEA Representative). 
Questions Four, Five, Six and Seven (Interaction) 
Did the CommissionlCouncillParliament, national legislatures and interest 
groups interact and reach a compromise prior to the Third Life Assurance 
Directive proposal reaching the Council? 
Does an interaction exist between the Comm iss ionlCo u ncillPa rlia men t and 
the specific interest group on a national (ABI) andlor European level (CEAR 
How does the Comm iss ion/Co uncillPa rlia men t know what to insist upon 
in respect of European interests i. e. in terms of insurance policy that is 
acceptable to all Member States? 
Does an interaction exist between Permanent Representatives, interest 
groups, the DTI and DG XV? Is this interaction undertaken through the 
Insurance Committee (if so how effective is the Insurance Committee)? 
There is an interaction between the European and national institutions; the 
Council and Commission have college meetings where policy lines and 
strategies to pursue these policy lines are decided. Parliamentary opinions and 
assent are taken into consideration with a greater importance given to these 
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since the Maastricht Treaty. However, this was minimal in respect of the 
Third Life Assurance Directive. As stated above, the Commission and 
Council acknowledged that there was an interaction with interest groups on a 
European and national level. Indeed, that the Commission would primarily 
go to European interest groups because such would provide an overall picture 
of the industry. The UK Permanent Representative considered that the 
Council does not really deal with interest groups directly but CEA papers are 
forwarded to both it and the insurance committee. Whereas, the French 
Permanent Representative considered that they ". .. have contact with 
representatives of specific interest groups when there is a need of 
information" (ibid). Of course, this could be similar to the UK position or 
more informal. However, the French Permanent Representative was quite 
clear on the extent of compromise between the different groups before 
decisions reach the Council. To the question, ". .. do the Council, the 
Commission, national legislatures and interest groups reach a compromise 
prior to a decision reaching the Council" the French Permanent 
Representative answered yes, this is always the informal rule of 
procedure". 
De Frutos contended that DG XV knew what to insist upon in respect of what 
was necessary for a proposal by examining the green papers and treaties. 
However, he did admit that input from the specific industry or sector had to 
be seriously considered. 
The representatives of the ABI/BIIC considered that normally the Council, 
Commission, national legislatures and interest groups reach a compromise 
prior to the legislation reaching the Council. It is unusual for something to 
reach the Council without a compromise being agreed (ABI Representative). 
The BIIC representative considered that the consensus view was created by 
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the Commission with the use of interest group input. However, there is no 
interaction between the Council and the national interest group. In this 
context, lobbying is undertaken through the DTI. It is through this process 
that the Council identifies what the national industries will accept or need 
and the DTI is always willing to speak to national interest groups but they 
may also have their own agenda (but they know what is needed because they 
talk to interest groups). 
It was generally agreed that the CEA and BIPAR both illustrate points where 
European compromises may be met which allows an easy interaction between 
the Commission, the Council, and Member States. Decision parameters are 
built up through four interacting areas: 
(a) The Treaties' aims. 
(b) The European institutions (i. e. through college meetings and decision- 
making procedures). 
(c) Member States. 
(d) Industries (interest groups and companies). 
An indication of the need for interest group interaction is exemplified in the 
formation of the Insurance Committee Directive (91/675/EEC). This has 
allowed an expertise at the Commission level to ensure that there is an 
understanding between the industry and the Commission with reference to 
technical issues. The Insurance Committee is a new phenomenon which is 
being used to greater effect at an increasing rate. 
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The ABI/BIIC does interact with the insurance committee, as does the CEA. 
The Committee allows problems to be discussed and overcomes difficulties 
with interpretation. 
In this context, the EU institutions find the committee helpful. It also makes 
technical adjustments to financial instruments and provides a sounding 
board for the Commission (ABI Representative). However, the French 
Permanent Representative considered that although such a process did exist 
the interaction was one of an informal nature, i. e. through professional 
contact. 
Questions Eight and Nine (Difference) 
Were different Member States looking for specific types of life insurance 
market environments for the Single European Market (SEM) which were 
different from other Member States? (Could you indicate these differences, 
please). 
Are there set parameters from which the CommissionlCouncil should not 
stray in the decision-making process? (Could you indicate how these are 
reached , please). 
In general, each interviewee agreed that different Member State industries 
wished the EU to create conflicting regulatory environments. Werle 
contended that there were different concepts of what a regulatory 
environment entailed between the Member States and that this was due to 
differing normative and historical experiences. If it was accepted that there 
were different understandings of regulatory enviror-anents, it was agreed that 
European-wide interest groups were necessary to bring about consensus. He 
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saw the necessity of best practice and how mutual recognition may overcome 
this. However, he agreed that a lack of contract legislation could undermine 
an SEM in life insurance. 
The BIIC representatives agreed that there were different concepts of the 
regulatory environment in terms of products, cultural norms, technical and 
product barriers. Each indicated that there were market ideals pursued by 
different Member States: these were agreed in general by all those 
interviewed: 
French Ideal = Nationalised/Prescribed. 
German Ideal = Prescribed. 
Dutch Ideal = Liberal. 
UK Ideal = Liberal. 
Italian Ideal = Prescribed/Liberal. 
Eire Ideal = Liberal/Prescribed. 
The individual regulatory environments were considered to be very different 
from one another and as the Life Insurance Regulation Matrices One and 
Two illustrated (see Figs 5.1 and 5.2 pp 157 and 160), each accepted that some 
form of compromise had to be reached if harmonisation was to be successful. 
Questions Ten, Eleven and Twelve (Compromise) 
Is a compromise reached between the different national interest groups prior 
to the Commission initially drawing up draft legislation or is there an 
interaction between the interest group at the European level, i. e. CEA and the 
Commission, which takes into consideration a compromise reached by the 
234 
Member State interest groups i. e. ABI through membership of the European 
interest group? 
Where possible have compromises been reached between the Council, the 
Commission and Parliament before the final negotiations? Would this allow 
a more efficient means of decision -making? 
What took precedence in the formulation of the Third Life Assurance 
Directive, Member State, European (Commission) or life insurance industry 
interests? 
To ensure successful legislation, compromise between these areas needs to be 
reached. Consequently this is pursued before the final negotiations to enable 
more efficient decision-making. "Compromises are achieved through 
working parties where agreements are reached and Member State and interest 
group policy lines merged" (UK Permanent Representative). "It occurs 
sometimes especially when there is a European organisation for a profession" 
(French Permanent Representative). However, ". .. the Commission never 
loses sight of the spirit of the proposal" (DG XV Representative). 
"Compromises are reached through IN involvement in a European interest 
group" (IIF Representative). 
The formulation of the proposal and consequent directive must take into 
consideration all input. However, precedence of input is difficult to 
distinguish. The Commission, as noted, concentrates on the "spirit of the 
Treaty" (DG XV Representative) or the EU interest; to do this it must take on 
board national interests and industries' interests and minimise the difference 
to ensure passage through the Council. This, one may argue, can only be 
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achieved through the use of interest groups and more importantly European- 
wide interest groups. 
In a post-SEA Europe, industry in general has recognised that it is in their 
interest to have an input into forging the new market and have co-operated 
because they consider the SEM acceptable. Pre-1988, there was a conflict 
between the EU and industry: effectively, they seemed to be in opposition. It 
was the SEA that gave the impetus to the SEM which forced the Member 
State industries to be involved in the formulation of their evolving home 
market. 
Interest groups became more aware of what was necessary for creating 
European Union in a post-1986 scenario. Of course, there are a number of 
difficulties in attaining agreement continually and Member State interest 
groups and companies will continually attempt to influence the decision- 
making bodies themselves. However, the European decision-making bodies 
make it clear that negotiations should be undertaken through the CEA or 
other European interest groups i. e. BIPAR. The CEA interacts with many 
other groups at the EU level e. g. banking employers groups and trade unions. 
Indeed, the CEA attempts to become part of the process as early as possible and 
to this extent it has a good relationship with DGXV (ABI Representative). 
When the proposal reaches the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) at the Council level, Permanent Representatives are urged to 
reach a compromise and ultimately a decision is formulated. There are 
varying accounts of the extent to which a sector/industry may be listened to at 
Council level. Consequently, it is important for the sector/industry to have 
the support of its Member State in respect of the legislation being discussed. 
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However, the further the discussions go in the Council process, the weaker 
the economic variables become. 
A proposal is automatically despatched to Member State legislatures and 
relevant bodies, e. g. the DTI in the UK, and opinions on the proposal are 
sought. Interest groups also lobby at the national level. Consequently, 
legislation has support built into it through different avenues. The initiation 
of legislation is often a "blurred" (unclear in terms of initiation) activity. 
However, the industries/ economic sectors are predominant in this initial 
area. When the proposal reaches the Council, concessions may have to be 
made to secure main points. The Third Life Assurance Directive was one 
where most difficulties seemed to be overcome in the initial stages. Germany 
pushed for more prescription but further compromise was reached (UK 
Permanent Representative). 
It was accepted by the UK Permanent Representative that the move between 
the Member States trading situation and their negotiating positions indicate 
the changes the Member State wishes to bring about in its own regulatory 
environment. This allows the Member State to make changes without too 
much upheaval in respect of Member State legislation and regulation. It also 
provides the basis which the Member State uses when it approaches the 
negotiating process: it is listening to its sector/industry that has been lobbying 
at both the EU and national level. However, if it needs to ensure the 
legislation necessary it will bargain with its sector's/ industry's wishes. This is 
once again indicated by the Council representative ". .. when it is considered 
that political variables take precedence at the Council level" (ibid). 
The CEA does not only represent Member States but it does include the 
fifteen Member States (then twelve) in its membership of twenty three. It 
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deals mainly with national interest groups which are its membership. 
However, it will also interact with individual companies. Once the EU has 
created a framework, discussions will be undertaken in a number of working 
groups which are made up of national interest groups representatives and 
company representatives. Consequently, much discussion is undertaken in 
the pursuit of a common understanding between the Member States 
regarding the most amenable legislation. Of course, the Commission pursues 
the spirit of the treaty but also needs to know what is workable at the EU 
level. However, conflict between Member States creates uncertainty in what is 
necessary to enable the SEM: if separate Member State sectors all lobby the EU 
with different ideas, difficulties will arise. Basically, the European interest 
groups are central to the creation of the SEM because they create agreement 
and the consequent successful legislation. This illustrates the important role 
of European interest groups and the supranational bodies in the creation of 
the SEM. 
Under the five main categories of Understanding, Negotiation,, Interaction, 
Difference and Compromise a general comprehension of European 
integration is identified. The interview coding illustrates the parts individual 
institutions play in the formulation and construction of legislation. Primarily 
the five main coding categories are continually re-affirmed as the main 
processes of European integration. Indeed, this is further illustrated by the 
European Decision-Making Model below. 
Survey B (see Appendix Ap 291) was initiated to provide a general 
understanding of what UK Members of the European Parliament Finance 
Committee and lobbying groups considered to be the situation regarding life 
insurance regulatory environments. However, the response was low and 
shed minimal light on the situation. There was little difference in how the 
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UK political parties saw the situation. Each considered that the EU market in 
life insurance was liberal/prescribed and that was how it should remain. 
Interest Group Membership in the UK 
Finally, the model is further added to by survey C (see Appendix A). This 
survey asked the UK insurance companies the extent to which they used 
interest groups at the national and European level. Seventy questionnaires 
were despatched and twenty seven companies responded. 
When the companies were asked if they used a European interest group in 
their participation in the formulation of the Third Life Assurance Directive, 
81.4% said no, while 81.5% considered that they used a national interest 
group, in most cases the ABI and BIIC. The direct link between the European 
and national interest groups was further substantiated by questions three and 
four. 85.2% didn't directly use European interest groups at all, 74.0% 
contending that they didn't even subscribe to one. However,, 100.0% of 
respondents subscribed to a national interest group (see appendix A). Even 
when their European interests were threatened, 77.7% of companies did not 
directly approach European institutions. whereas 51.8% would approach their 
national government. However, 59.2% would usually use interest groups to 
lobby on their behalf at the European level and 89.9% at the national level. 
When asked if they prefer to use interest groups at the European level to 
enable the life insurance industry to make European-wide compromises, 
81.5% of respondents rejected this idea. However, 85.2% used interest groups 
at the national level because this enabled nation-wide compromise. As the 
interviews have illustrated, it is then that the national interest group 
interacts with the EU and in the main it does this through European-wide 
239 
interest groups. In general, it is at this point that European-wide compromises 
are reached and the importance of European interest groups emphasised. 
Of those respondents who indicated which interest groups they were 
members of, twenty were members of the ABI and two of BIIC; these two 
considered that through their membership of the BIIC they were affiliated to 
the CEA (the others did not say to which interest groups they were affiliated). 
However, none of the companies considered they were direct members of a 
European interest group. One respondent did point out that his/her company 
was a member of other national interest groups in other Member States that 
would seek to influence their views on important European matters. 
The European Decision-Making Model 
The European Decision-Making Model builds on Easton's (1965) model and 
illustrates how interests, preferences, motives and an overriding ideology 
transfer into demands in the national socio-economic environment and how 
a normative perspective of what is necessary is proposed at the European 
level by a particular Member State. This analysis investigates how such a 
proposal is subsequently presented at the EU level. One could list the above 
variables as requirements which are materialised within a definite ideological 
framework. Consequently, the model concentrates on the transfer of wants of 
a specific industry into demands at the domestic level and how these are then 
introduced to the political process at the European level. 
One may consider that there are micro and macro elements to the model. The 
micro element concentrating on companies, national interest groups and 
national legislatures; and the macro aspect involved with European interest 
groups (or the meeting point of the national interest groups at the European 
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level) and EU decision-making institutions. The macro model would pick up 
on the micro model output and attempt to illustrate the process within a EU 
context. However, the two areas are interactive. 
At the European level, there is an interaction between the subjective interests 
of the different Member State industries and the objective interests of the 
European institutions. This thesis considers that a compromise is reached at 
the European interest group level through the industries both interacting 
with one another and with the Commission and Parliament. The proposed 
legislation that goes through to the Council has been agreed by the Member 
State sectors/ industries who either progressively or subsequently inform 
their own government of the situation in relation to the agreed legislation. 
During the process there may be disagreements between the Council and the 
other institutions. 
Once the draft legislation is in the realms of the Council, certain agreements 
may be disposed of. However, one would expect the main tenets of the 
legislation to become law because the national sectors/ industries would have 
compromised their positions at an earlier stage. Consequently, one would 
have expected them to lobby their government to accept the proposed 
legislation: the Council consists of representatives of the Member States. 
Indeed, it is the intergovernmental aspect of the EU decision-making 
institutions. If the draft legislation is extensively interfered with by the 
Council, under the Co-decision procedure, the European Parliament may 
intervene. 
The interviews indicated agreement on a number of points: the Third Life 
Assurance Directive was unanimously perceived as a means of providing the 
environment that would allow mutual recognition to be achieved; it was also 
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acknowledged that many influences went into the drafting of a directive. 
Since 1988, interaction between industries and the Commission has become 
more apparent at the EU level. The representative of DG XV considered that 
ongoing contact with the life insurance industry was imperative in respect of 
legislative input. Most importantly, the interviews illustrate the interactory 
procedures at work in the formulation of the Third Life Assurance Directive 
and the extent of the use of interest groups in the process. However, what is 
also clear is the intergovernmental aspects. The following understanding of 
the process and decision-making model (see Fig 7.3 p 243) was accrued from 
the interviews and survey C. 
For the purpose of this study, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is not 
discussed. There are a number of issues that need to be explained with regard 
to the model. Firstly, the survey regarding Member State interest group 
membership and the interviews illustrated that the majority of life insurance 
companies were members of national interest groups. Further interviews 
indicated that national interest groups were affiliated to interest groups at the 
EU level (mainly the CEA and BIPAR). Secondly, in the formulation of 
legislation (although Member State interest groups may approach the 
European institutions), the Commission and European Parliament preferred 
to deal with European-wide interest groups because these allow a European 
picture of the situation. Thirdly, because the sector understands what is 
necessary for the successful operation of the embryonic regulatory 
environment, it is highly likely that they will confer and reach some 
agreement prior to national, i. e. Council or intergovernmental interference. 
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Finally, the interviews with the CEA, the ABI, the BlIC and members of EU 
decision-making institutions substantiated that other Member State 
insurance industries actively participated in the creation of EU legislation 
through interest groups. 
There are two general directions that could be taken regarding decision- 
making procedures identified on the model shown in Fig 7.3. These are 
indicated by arrows A and B; process A considers that demands are 
formulated through the national legislature prior to formulation at the EU 
Amendment 
PARLIAMENT 
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level, whereas route B illustrates demand formulation being compromised at 
the EU level prior to the involvement of the national legislature. Route A is 
a stronger intergovernmental approach whereas route B illustrates more of a 
neo-functional process. Of course, the situation is not as straight forward as 
the model outlines. Indeed, elements of both routes were in use, but in 
general the interviews emphasised route B (see Fig 7.3). 
The European interest group rarely had any dealings with the national 
legislature and interaction between the two was undertaken between the 
national interest group and the national governmental departments (the DTI 
in the UK). Consequently, at this point there is intergovernmental 
involvement even though it is minimal and in most cases the DTI adheres to 
decisions already made at the EU interest group level. More importantly, 
there is intergovernmental involvement apparent in the Council. However, 
sincelhe SEA and QMV, this has been minimised because if a directive is to 
be successful it needs only the support of a qualified majority of Member 
States, not all of them. 
The interviews illustrate that agreement is sought at the European interest 
group level and through negotiations with the Commission and Parliament 
usually established. Indeed, if legislation is being negotiated by the industry 
through interest group involvement with a supranational institution (EU 
decision-makers) the research has uncovered elements of neo-functionalism. 
If a compromise is not reached at the EU level, then each Member State 
industry would pursue its own ideal market type (as indicated by the matrices 
see figs 5.1 and 5.2) and compromise would be difficult if not impossible to 
achieve. To enable successful acceptable legislation at the EU level, the 
interviews and surveys illustrate that both neo-functional and 
intergovernmental processes need to be at work. Indeed, even if a total neo- 
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functional process is not at work, it is at least a form of multi-level 
governance. 
Conclusion 
This thesis considers that the interviews identify a process that is formalised 
through the models. Easton's Demand model illustrates the process in 
abstract terms (see Fig 7.1). This is transferred into a European Demand Model 
(see Fig 7.2) Indeed, this illustrates the six aspects of wants becoming demands 
on the European Union and national legislatures. Finally, through the use of 
the European Demand Model, Easton's adapted Demand Model and the 
interviews, an EU Decision-Making Model is formulated (see Fig 7.3). 
The Commission initiates legislation at the EU level. Indeed, ". .. the 
Commission is a critical actor in the policy initiation phase ... Af ter 
surveying the evidence one cannot conclude that the Commission serves 
merely as an agent of state executives" (Hooghe and Marks, 1997; p 28). 
Indeed, ". -. if supranational policy-making institutions emerge there is an 
inherent "logic' of interest group interest group behaviour which will lead 
interest groups to re-target their lobbying strategies to take account of the new 
distribution of power.... If power has shifted to a new level of government, 
any sensible interest group is bound to attempt to influence at the new level. 
As one American interest group official put it, you need to shoot where the 
ducks are! " (Mazey and Richardson, 1996; p 200). 
The empirical work identified that interest groups were central to the 
decision-making process. Indeed, in relation to the Decision-Making Model 
the route provided by the B arrows is the one best supported by the 
interviews. Compromises are initially formulated at the national level which 
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are then relayed to the European interest group. Through interaction and 
compromise a European perspective is sought and eventually put to the 
national and European decision-making institutions. Of course, there is also 
input from the national and EU legislatures while this European-wide stance 
is being formulated. Effectively, an all-round compromise is created which 
should enable successful legislation. Theoretically, once the Council level is 
reached, there should be general acceptance of the proposed legislation. 
In general, the industry/sector creates an understanding of the preferred 
regulatory environment at the national interest group level: this 
understanding is consequently negotiated and compromised at the European 
interest group level. Through interaction with the Commission and 
Parliament, the institutions and the European interest groups come to an 
understanding on legislation that is acceptable to the majority of Member 
States. In some instances national interest groups and individual companies 
will attempt to interact with the Commission. However, the Commission 
does make it clear that it prefers to negotiate with European interest groups 
because this enables a European-wide perspective. This was made clear by all 
of those interviewed. Once the legislation has been agreed at this level it 
needs to go through the European legislative process. When the proposals 
reach the Council level, difference should have been minimised either 
because the Member State interest groups or the European interest groups 
would have informed governments of the industry's/ sector's general 
acceptance of the directive. If there is no general agreement the directive will 
either fail or remain on the table. There are exceptions to this process and 
certain parts of proposed legislation may be discarded. However, in a post- 
SEA and SEM Europe there has to be a general means of reaching a 
compromise in terms of effective legislation. 
246 
The thesis considers that a means of reaching a compromise is illustrated 
here and that in the above context elements of a neo-functional process are 
observable. The work illustrates a supranational body toward which national 
organisations have partially shifted their allegiance. If European interest 
groups and supranationality are employed in the creation of legislation then 
neo-functionalism as well as intergovernmentalism is apparent in the 
integration process. Indeed, if the above is considered to be the norm in a 
post-SEA EU, then one may posit that this process will also involve spillover 
in the financial services sector. The following chapter explores such a 
scenario. 
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Chapter Eight 
European Financial Services Legislation: A Case of Spillover? 
It is obvious that no matter how complete the 
theory may be, a middle term is required between 
theory and practice providing a link and a 
transition from one to the other. For a concept of 
the understanding, which contains the general rule, 
must be supplemented by an act or judgement 
whereby the practitioner distinguishes instances 
where the rule applies and where it does not (Kant, 
1995; p 61). 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the amount of legislation currently in operation and 
the amount that is necessary to create a single market in financial services 
and capital movements. The thesis accepts the above understanding of the EU 
decision-making process and posits that through this a spillover process is 
identifiable in the EU with regard to insurance and financial services 
legislation. It generalises the processes identified through the interviews and 
considers extending the model and its theoretical implications. Indeed, a 
qualitative analysis extrapolates from one specific situation to another similar 
situation, rather than from a sample of a population to the total population. 
Consequently, this thesis posits that, the process taking place with regard to 
life insurance is likely to be happening from industry to industry and from 
sector to sector. The thesis does recognise the limitations of such a 
generalisation and does so with these in mind. Indeed, industries and sectors 
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are on the one hand isolated entities concerned with their own situation in 
the wider market place. However it is through this self interest that they must 
be aware of what is happening in other industries and sectors. This in turn 
makes them initiators of and reactors to the actions of other industries and 
sectors. Consequently, there exists a process of spillover. 
Neo-functionalists such as Haas, purport to describe the 
mechanism of the linkage between integration in economic and 
political sectors through the concept of spillover. They use the 
concept to describe a dynamic and more or less automatic 
integrative process, gradually encompassing ever more 
functional sectors until, the final stage, a political union is 
reached (Kirchner, 1976; p 2). 
The objective of this chapter is to identify the links between the legislation in 
financial services, discuss the concept of spillover and the implications this 
has for European integration. , 
The current ascendancy of a qualified supranational style of 
decision-making is shown by the way in which, thanks to the 
Single Act, the Council now functions. ... The revival of a 
supranational. style of decision-making and the strengthening of 
European institutions in the Single Act resulted most 
immediately from decisions by governments to press in their 
own interests, for a removal of internal economic barriers and 
for institutional change that would permit such a policy to be 
carried out (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991; pp 16-17)1. 
I At the time of writing, an impasse was apparent regarding pensions, taxation and capital markets, because they come under the unanimity rule. However, these one may assume, will have to be overcome 
either just before or, more likely, following monetary union. 
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Indeed, the thesis considers that spillover may be divided into two areas: 
intergovernmental and neo-functional. Intergovernmental spillover 
provides the Treaties and decisions made at intergovernmental conferences, 
e. g. the creation of the ECSC and the shift to the EEC. Neo-functional 
spillover can be broken down into three areas: vertical spillover (within the 
same industry); horizontal specific spillover (within the same sector); and 
horizontal general spillover (sector to sector). Through an interaction 
between intergovernmental and neo-functional spillover integration is 
intensified (for an illustration of this see the Spillover Model, Figs 8.1,8.2 and 
8.3 pp 277-81). Consequently, the thesis recognises that intergovernmental 
processes are at work within the creation of the single market, i. e. in the guise 
of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty. Fundamentally, it is considered that ". . 
. spillover requires prior programmatic agreement among governments.. 
expressed in an intergovernmental bargain. Such a bargain is clearly 
important in accounting for the Single European Act" (Keohane and 
Hoffman, 1991; p 17). However, it is also thought that neo-functional 
processes are also providing an impetus to harmonisation and integration. In 
this context, the thesis contends that intergovernmental spillover provides 
the environment for neo-functional spillover to take place i. e. through the 
ECSC, the EEC, the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty. However, it also considers 
that the Member States are pushed in this direction by the dynamics of neo- 
functional spillover. Indeed, as it becomes more difficult to pass further 
directives/ regulations in an area, further amendments to the Treaties are 
needed. This was apparent with regard to the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty 
and may become even more explicit with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 
actuality of monetary union. The accumulation of legislation towards 
monetary union, which in itself overcomes a number of difficulties (as an 
element of intergovernmental spillover) adds impetus to further 
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harmonisation. Finally, this chapter overviews elements of 
intergovernmental and neo-functional spillover in respect of: the Cecchini 
Report, the White Paper (1985), freedom of establishment and services, 
harmonisation, mutual recognition, the SEA, the SEM, the Maastricht Treaty, 
EMU, and relevant European Court judgementS2. 
Financial Services and Intergovernmental Spillover 
The Cecchini Report was put forward as a rational argument for the 
provision of an actual SEM. Indeed, following the White Paper, the report 
illustrated the need for the SEA if the impasse that European integration had 
reached was to be overcome. If a common market was to be realised then 
further intergovernmental spillover was necessary. Cecchini proposed that 
national standards and regulations were what European businesses perceived 
as the second most important NTB to be removed (Cecchinij 1988; p 5). The 
importance of the service sector was not under-estimated in the report, 
although the extent to which the figures may now be relied upon are 
debatable. The thesis does not wish to give a prognosis on the validity of 
Cecchini's calculations. It does, however, wish to draw on certain qualitative 
conclusions that the report displayed. 
Cecchini contends that the role of the service sector in Europe is one of " 
growing importance .- ." and that ". .. the potential for much more 
significant growth is being artificially pinned back by regulations which 
ju 2 There have 
' 
been two major ' dgements regarding financial services. The first was made in 1979 in the Cassis de Dijon case v lowed mutual recognition (see below). The second was made in 1986 in 
response to four Member States (Denmark, Eire, France and Germany) that were imposing Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) to prevent insurance companies in other Member States from entering their markets. The judgement in the second case considered that the NTBs were parti4lly illegal but partially justified. The judges felt that they were justified with regard to consumer protection which in the field of insurance is partkularly important. However, the judges excluded from this all those risks for which such protection was not 
necessary i. e. lar e scale risks whose expertise would not necessitate special consumer protection. The benefits of this juTgIernent were included in the insurance directives of the following years. 
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significantly inhibit the free flow of services and thus the free play of 
competition between companies .. ." (ibid, p 37). Cechinni spoke of the 
pivotal role that financial services would have in the creation of the single 
market. 
Basing its figures on a survey conducted on the three main areas 
of financial services activity ... the report forecasts gains of ECU 
22,000 million for the eight Community countries Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and 
the UK ... the value-added generated by the credit and insurance 
sectors alone accounted for some 6.5% of the Community's gross 
domestic product in 1985.... The benefits would be even greater 
if the freedom to provide within a European financial common 
market could be linked immediately to a common currency, 
since exchange costs would disappear and businesses and 
individual consumers could achieve substantial savings 
(European Document, 4/1989; p 7). 
Additionally, the freedom to provide cross-border financial services in 
tandem with liberalised capital movements would create a more attractive 
environment for financial business and produce a better means of 
channelling savings into investment projects. The difficulties created by 
national capital markets in the EU were highlighted in a Commission report 
dated April 1983. It contended that even though gross savings in the EU 
amounted to ECU 430,000 million and in the USA, ECU 340,000 million, the 
amount mobilised for investment in the EU five leading markets (France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK) was less than in the USA (ECU 
212,000, million in the USA, ECU 142,000 million in the EU). This illustrated 
the difficulty of mobilising capital in smaller national financial markets (ibid). 
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"Financial services such as banking and insurance will be among those to 
benefit most from the removal of all barriers and the completion of a large 
intemal market" (ibid, p 18). 
By the early 1980s it had become clear that the EEC was far from a common 
market: fundamentally it was an uncommon market3. Indeed, NTBs were 
ensuring that a true common market could not develop. In 1985, the 
Commission put forward plans to remove physical, technical and fiscal 
barriers between Member States by 1992. "Financial services ... including 
insurance, were to be governed by three major principles, i. e. minimum co- 
ordination of individual national rules, mutual recognition and home 
country control" (ibid). This indicated the need for Treaty amendments and 
these were encapsulated in the SEA. 
The SEA necessitated a number of amendments concerning the free 
movement of services and capital that are displayed in Articles 52-73 of the 
amended Treaty. These illustrate intergovernmental spillover and are the 
basis from which further neo-functional spillover could take place: 
(1) Right of Establishment (Arts 52-58). 
(2) Services (Arts 59-66). 
(3) Capital (Arts 67-73). 
The programme of a SEM is a continuous process of change that is built on 
the basic tenets of the (Treaty of Rome, 1988; Arts 2 and 3) and one that will 
3 This term is taken from Stuart HoUand (1980) who considered that in 1980 the void between theory and 
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evolve as further treaties come into effect. This process of change had already 
begun and has carried on in a post-SEM Europe. 
Freedom to Provide Services and Freedom of Establishment 
The freedom of services and the freedom of establishment are material 
illustrations of the ways that the Treaty provides the environment for neo- 
functional spillover. The Treaty contends that the freedom to provide 
services and enable the freedom of establishment should have been realised 
by 1969. 
The Treaty states that freedom of establishment encompasses the 
taking up and carrying out of own-account gainful activities 
such as the founding of undertakings ... (and) that the 
freedom 
of banks and insurance companies to provide the services be 
established in step with the gradual liberalisation of capital 
movements (European Documentation, 4/1989; p7 author's 
brackets)4 
The difference between freedom of services and freedom of establishment 
may be illustrated in the following terms. Freedom of services is a temporary 
and occasional expansion of an activity normally carried out within the 
principal place that the business is situated in (the territory of another 
Member State). The freedom of services concludes and establishment begins 
when, in the course of business, the foreign insurer uses the services of an 
4 There is also some debate as to whether insurance services actually come under Article 59. To decide thi ' 
s' it 
rincipa is necessary to ascertain where the insurers perform their services; if business is performed in their p 
place of business then there is no freedom of services. If business is performed where the risk is incurred or 
where the activity takes place, then the service should be judged by Article 60 (1); this is where activities are 
carried out in another Member State for the purpose of performing the service. In the case of insurance, this is 
where insurance activities are carried on for the purpose of taking out or implementing insurance policies. 
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agency or an authorised representative within the Member State. With regard 
to this difficulty, the ECJ made the following point: 
In this respect it has to be admitted that an insurance enterprise 
of another Member State that maintains a constant presence in 
the Member State concerned is subject to the provisions of the 
Treaty on the right of establishment.... In view of the definition 
in Art 60 (1) of the EEC Treaty referred to, therefore, such an 
insurance enterprise cannot rely on Arts 59 and 60 of the EEC 
Treaty with regard to its activities in the Member State 
concerned (cited in Parliament Working paper, 1992; p 8)5. 
With the basis in place, there is a need for further clarification and in some 
cases more legislation. The problems concerning different types of regulation 
become more precise and these are dealt with through: harmonisation; 
mutual recognition; and home country control. 
Neo-Functional Spillover, Mutual Recognition and Home Country Control 
One may consider that one person's protective legislation is another person's 
trade barrier (see Chapter Five) and it is from such a premise that the EU 
undertakes a harmonisation process under a tripartite system: 
- the harmonisation of essential standards. 
5 Consequently, services with regard to life insurance are: (a) Performed by insurance enterprises that are licensed institutions with their principal V'ace of business in a Member State; (b) For a policy-holder or d insured person that is resident in another ember State; (c) For the purpose of taking out, administerin& or implementing insurance. policies; (d) Not included under the rules of establishment. Article 52 (ibid). 
. Basically, in the area of life insurance the liberalisation Article 59 (1) is subject to the provisions of Article 61 paragraph (2). 
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the mutual recognition of other Member State standards 
(based on the above) home country control and supervision. 
The liberalisation of insurance, banking and security markets is tied closely to 
the free movements of capital and the Treaties contend that the liberalisation 
of the banking and insurance sectors ". .. shall be effected 
in step with the 
progressive liberalisation of the movement of capital" (HMSO, 1988; Art 61). 
Thus, through intergovernmental spillover there is an opportunity for 
general horizontal neo-functional spillover (sector to sector or services to 
capital) and horizontal specific neo-functional spillover (industry to industry 
or banking to insurance) and vertical spillover (within the same industry Le. 
insurance) is created. This is a good example of intergovernmental spillover 
providing the initial impetus (see the Spillover Model, Figs 8.1,8.2 and 8.3 pp 
277-81)6. 
The Treaties indicated that the EU should be attempting to create a 
functioning SEM. However, it may be argued that intervention in legislative 
processes should be limited to the domains in which mutual recognition 
cannot ensure the protection of essential requirements. To assist in the 
convergence of legislation, the EU could take measures to promote the 
transparency of transposing legislation at the national level through 
exchanges of information and allowing the national courts a greater capacity 
for ensuring the adherence to EU legislation. 
6 As argued above, there are two processes of spillover at work: one at a national level and one at a 
supranational, sector and interest group level. The former may be identified as intergovernmentalism, the latter as neo-functionalism. The latter may be broken down into three areas: general horizontal spillover 
(services to ca. ital, etc); specific horizontal spillover (insurance to banking, Le sector bound); and vertical 
spillover (witVin insurance) The S illover Model identifies legislation that has incrementally been 
formulated since the inception of the The model identifies the legislation with a cross and number and 
these correlate with the iternisation included in the model below. Indeed, neofunctional spillover is identified 
through this iten-dsation whereas intergovenUT Lental spillover is indicated on the left hand side of the model 
through landmarks such as the SEA, Maastricht and EMU. 
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A legislative framework should respond to the objectives of free movement 
and the respect of essential requirements immediately. However, at the same 
time, it must also adhere to the objectives of a balanced social and economic 
development. 
To enable the achievement of an SEM, the Commission concluded that the 
regulatory framework may be achieved through mutual recognition and 
home country control. The 1985 White Paper proposed that the minimum of 
essential standards should be harmonised. The difficulty is how to interpret 
'essential' and **minimum' in respect of the proposed regulatory framework. 
As illustrated in Chapter Five, each Member State will have a different 
interpretation of these terms which will be reflected in its existing legislation 
and consequent regulatory environment. The thesis has proposed that norms 
of a legal nature must differ from state to state; consequently, a process of 
compromise may be discerned through the construction of the legal 
framework that will indicate both the future and present state of the SEM 
regulatory structure (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2 pp 157 and 160). Indeed, chapters 
Five, Six and Seven concluded that national legislation is compromised by 
Member States through the use of interest groups and supranational 
authorities (see the Decision-Making Model, Fig 7.3 p 243). Mutual 
recognition encapsulates an important mechanism in the pursuit of the SEM 
as it gives a framework for compromise. However, as the thesis has indicated 
(see Chapter Five) where diversity is so great, there will be a need for greater 
rather than less harmonisation of Member State legislation. 
The principle of mutual recognition ... pre-supposes agreement 
on a number of basic rules ... these minimum harmonisation 
requirements .. - are only possible because common interest, 
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mutual confidence and a high degree of economic convergence 
exist between EEC member states (Loheac, 1991; p 409). 
One has to question if "minimum harmonisation requirements" have been 
met in respect of the life insurance market. The achievement of such 
requirements is extremely rare and even if there is a ". .. high degree of 
economic convergence" in the life insurance market, the practical realities of 
achieving an SEM through mutual recognition alone are apparent (ibid). A 
convergence process must be undertaken prior to the actions of mutual 
recognition coming into play (see Figs 5.1 and 5.2). 
The idea behind mutual recognition suggests spontaneous legislative 
adaptation. However, it does not deal with all regulation and as a 
convergence point is necessary for mutual recognition to be effective it could 
be conceived as an impetus that encourages legislative change and 
compromise. 
Following intergovernmental spillover, the convergence process illustrates 
neo-functionalism because agreement between Member State industries has 
to be reached, as does agreement between the Commission and the industry 
in general. This allows the formulation of legislation that is agreeable to both 
the Member State industries and the EU and increases the chance that the 
legislation will be successful at the Council of Ministers' stage. Directives 
allow Member States to build legislation into their own legal frameworks and 
to allow this, they are quite broad in character. At this point, mutual 
recognition comes into play and the theory is that this will allow convergence 
through market forces. However, mutual recognition usually requires prior 
compromise and convergence. This thesis considers, that it is such a process 
as this that indicates neo-functional spillover in the creation of the legislation 
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that underpins regulatory structures. Indeed, the processes of legislation 
creation encompass the nuts and bolts of European integration. 
European Banking Legislation 
The banking sector has been affected by two co-ordination, directives. The First 
Banking Directive (77/780/EEC)7 cleared most obstacles to the freedom of 
establishment for banks and other credit institutions, introduced home 
country supervision and a common position for the granting of banking 
licences. However, problems were still apparent and certain obstacles needed 
to be removed before a genuine single market in banking could be achieved. 
The Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC)8 aimed at the removal of 
authorisation problems i. e. 12 different supervisors, a definition of banking 
activities and cross-border trade. Consequently, the second directive enabled a 
single banking licence, a list of banking activities and minimum capital levels 
(5m ECU laid down for new banks). The directive also provided supervisory 
rules in terms of internal management, audit systems and the amount of 
control of major shareholders. 
The Directive on Investment Firms and Credit Institutions (CAD) provides 
the framework for the Investment Services Directive (ISD) (93/22/EEC)9. The 
two directives engender an internal market in respect of investment services 
and give all institutions, whether credit or investment firms, the ability to 
offer investment services throughout the EU. This illustrates general 
horizontal neo-functional spillover (sector to sector or services to capital). In 
this context, the sectors are intrinsically linked. 
7 Oj L 322 17/12/77 
8 Oj L 386 30/12/89 
9 Oj L 141 11/06/93 
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In December 1992, the Council adopted the Directive on Monitoring and 
Controlling Large Exposures of Credit InstitutionslO. As part of the legislation 
necessary to create an SEM in the banking sector, it deals with the prudential 
treatment of large exposures with a single client. Large exposures are defined 
in the Own Funds Directive (89/299/EEC)II in which an exposure is 
considered large if it exceeds 10% of the credit institution's own funds. The 
Directive states that companies should make known the existence of all large 
exposures and none should exceed 25% of the credit institution's own funds. 
At the ECO/FIN Council on 23 Nov 1992, the Commission's approach to the 
BCCI affair was outlined by Sir Leon Brittan. He contended that the system of 
home country control and consolidated supervision did not need major 
reforms. However, he contended that in certain respects supervision may be 
strengthened and clarified, particularly with reference to: the transparency of 
group structures; greater exchange of information between supervisory 
authorities; the role of external auditors; and intensified co-operation 
between international prudential supervisors. The 35th meeting of the 
Banking Advisory Commission was consulted in respect of the draft 
proposals of the Commission. This concerned a directive to amend the 
Council directive on strengthening the supervision of credit institutions 
following the discussions on BCCI at the ECO/FIN meeting. The Banking 
Advisory Committee also discussed a broad outline by the Commission on 
amending the Council Directive concerned with the re-organisation and 
winding-up of credit institutions. 
10 Oj L 29 05/02/93 
11 Oj L 124 05/05/89 
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In general, during the nineties, there have been numerous decisions made by 
the Commission and Council as well as further directives with regard to the 
banking sector. For instance, Council Directive (96/13/EC)12 amends article 2 
(2) of (77/780/EEC)13 in respect of the list of permanent exclusions of certain 
credit institutions. Indeed, directive (96/10/EC)14 amends directive 
(89/647/EEC)15 regarding contractual netting by competent authorities; 
directive (95/15/EC)16 and (94/7/EC)17 amend the directive regarding 
solvency ratios. Effectively, the last directive in terms of banking that was not 
an amendment to a previous directive was (93/6/EC)18 which covered both 
investment firms and credit institutions and subsequently both security 
markets and insurance as well. Fundamentally, banking legislation and its 
consequent regulation spills over and necessitates legislation in other 
financial services industries. This process is illustrated by the interaction 
between security markets and banking. Indeed, one may consider that this is 
an example of neo-functional horizontal specific spillover; or spillover 
within the same sector. 
European Security Market Legislation 
The objective of an SEM in security markets is one in which companies are 
free to raise capital and be admitted to stock exchange trading in other 
Member States, as easily as they may in their own. The directive 
(80/390/EEC)19 was the first step in the process and it indicated the 
harmonisation of conditions for stock exchange listings and agreed mutual 
recognition in respect of any listing that met 1980s particulars. In 1993, a 
12 Qj L 066 16/03/96 
13 Oj L 322 17/12/77 
14 Oj L 085 03/04/96 
15 Oj L 125 05/05/89 
16 Oj L 125 08/06/95 
17 Oj L 089 06/04/94 
18 Oj L 14111/06/93 
19 Oj L 100 17/04/80 
261 
proposal to amend this Directive was posted20. The aims of the proposal were 
to simplify cross-border listing requirements for established companies and to 
facilitate the listing of companies on junior markets. The amendments are an 
extension of Article 6 and are based on the assumption that most of the 
information needed by investors already exists in the market. Therefore, its 
duplication to ensure consumer protection is no longer justified. 
The proposed amendments of (80/390/EEC) should engender more efficiency 
in the securities market as the proposed legislation is more beneficial to the 
realities of the existing market; the measures relating to cross-border listing 
would also assist the implementation and completion of the EUROLIST 
project which is to be launched by the Federation of Stock Exchanges at some 
point in the future. 
Directive (85/611/EEC) on undertakings for collective investment in 
transferable securities (UCITS)21 from October 1990 allowed an investment 
fund authorised in its home Member State to be sold anywhere in the EU. An 
amended proposal for a Council directive was adopted by the Commission in 
December 198922. This complemented the Second Banking Directive and 
provides for the liberalisation of security-related services provided by non- 
banking intermediaries. It introduced cross-border provisions in respect of 
broking, dealing and portfolio management. The directive also allows anyone 
authorised by their home country to be a member of their national stock 
exchange to be a member of any other Member State stock exchange. This is a 
major difficulty as there should be no dictate on how a Member State should 
run its own stock exchange. Discussions with Member States are at an early 
stage and progress is very slow. One may consider that this is because further 
20 Qj C 23 27/01/93 
21 Oj L 1995 375/3 
22 Com (89) 629 final-SYN 176 
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changes are necessary and these can only be realised through monetary union 
(intergoverrunental spillover through the Treaty of Maastricht). 
European Insurance Legislation 
Insurance legislation is an example of vertical neo-functional spillover or 
spillover within the same industry. Initially, there were two general 
programmes proposed to ensure that both the freedom of services and 
establishment would be realised in life insurance by the beginning of 1970. 
This was indicated through five main bi-annual target dates. 
1964 Reinsurance. Freedom of establishment and services. 
1966 Indemnity insurance. Freedom of establishment. 
1968 Life insurance. Freedom of establishment. 
1968 Indemnity insurance. Freedom of services. 
1970 Life insurance. Freedom of services. 
As may be observed, life insurance was to be harmonised in two stages which 
would have corresponded with the initial plans for Monetary Union. 
However, decision-making was difficult and the timetable too crowded. The 
programme was an over-ambitious attempt to align substantive law. During 
the 1970s, this was replaced with equivalence and mutual trust between 
Member States and the harmonisation of substantive law kept to a 
minimum. 
EU legislation has primarily taken a three dimensional approach to 
insurance. Following Council directive (64/225/EEC)23 that abolished 
restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services 
23 Oj L 56,04.04 1964; p 878 
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concerning reinsurance and retrocession, insurance has been broken down 
into non-life and life. Reinsurance was the easiest to harmonise because it 
was international by nature. Consequently, the harmonisation of national 
legislation was less of a problem. The life and non-life areas of insurance 
have had to deal with differing national regulations conceptualised in 
historical normative ideas of what constitutes insurance products, consumer 
protection and choice. These problems have affected non-life insurance. 
However, the most difficult problems to be overcome have been those that 
pertain to the life insurance market. 
In its proposal for, a the Third Life Assurance Directive, the Commission 
emphasised that ". .. the internal market in insurance represents a primary 
goal ... in view of the importance of this strongly expanding sector"24. The 
insurance industry considered that it needed priority treatment because it 
lagged behind the liberalisation of the other economic sectors within the 
financial services sector (omitting pensions). Directives in the securities and 
banking industry had already been implemented and as a consequence the 
insurance industry had been left at a competitive disadvantage in relation to 
these industries. Indeed, an example of horizontal specific neo-functional 
spillover (within the same sector) and with regard to Capital legislation, 
horizontal general neo-functional spillover (from sector to sector). 
In terms of vertical neo-functional spillover, the adopted insurance directives 
have taken form in three generations dating from the early 1970s: these are 
briefly overviewed below. Directives concentrating on more specific areas 
include the Council directive on measures to facilitate the effective exercise of 
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in respect of the 
activities of insurance agents and brokers (ex ISIC group 630) and in 
24 Com 9157 final SYN 329 p2 
1 
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particular, transitional measures in respect of those activities (77/92/EEC)25. 
The Co-Insurance Directive (78/473/EEC)26, the Credit and Suretyship 
Assurance Directive amending Directive (87/343/EEC)27, and the Legal 
Expenses Directive (87/344/EEC)28. The latest, more specific, directives 
include the Council Directive on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated 
Accounts of Insurance Undertakings (91/674/EEC)29 and the Council 
Directive setting up an Insurance Committee (91/675/EEC)30. The former of 
these Directives proposes the harmonisation of EU insurance accounting 
practices which is necessary if valuation and solvency indicators are to be 
uniform. The latter directive provided a committee to act as an intermediary 
between the industry and the Commission and to assist in implementation 
procedures. The committee also examines any questions relating to the 
application of existing directives and the preparation of new legislation 
proposals in the insurance sector. The Insurance Committee met in Brussels 
on 24-25 May 1993 where the most important items on the agenda consisted 
of consultation for a Directive which would take into account the BCCI 
experience; the problem of Member State legislation implementation; the 
proposal for an EC Co-operative Company and its effects on insurance 
supervision. All of this legislation is not depicted on the spillover model 
because this would make it unclear. However, elements could be included as 
each has an influence on the other and provides an illustration of neo- 
functional spillover (see the Spillover Model, Figs 8.1,8.2 and 8.3). 
Also under discussion during the early nineties was the proposal for a 
Council directive on the co-ordination of national laws, regulations and 
25 Oj L 26 31/06/77 
26 Oj L 15107/06/84 
27 Oj L 185 04/07/87 
28 Oj L 185 04/07/87 
29 Oj L 374 31/12/91 
30 Oj L 374 31/12/91 
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administrative provisions relating to insurance contraCtS3 1. This was 
discontinued in 1993. As discussed above protection against divergent 
contracts may be used as an NTB because unfair contract protection is 
different in the different Member States. However, the implementation of the 
EC Unfair Contract Terms directive in 1993 has reduced the extent to which 
insurance contracts can be used as NTBs. Indeed, ". .. by converting common 
law self regulatory Statements of 'Insurance Practice into statutory codes 
applying to all insurance companies trading in consumer risks within the UK 
market" (Ellis, 1995; p 54). According to Ellis this could be seen as "inward" 
spillover. One where a general piece of European legislation overcomes 
difficulties in specific sectors. Indeed, even though this does not completely 
deal with the difficulties that emerge from the lack of an insurance contracts 
directive. It does, however, allow a benchmark for contract terms that may be 
acceptable in the European Union. This illustrates spillover and provides a 
starting point for harmonisation in the European life insurance industry. Still 
under discussion is the proposal for a Council directive on the co-ordination 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the 
compulsory winding up of direct insurance undertakings32. 
Each of these proposals relate to consumer protection, while at the same time 
they attempt to ensure consumer choice and a competitive market. However, 
Member States have difficulty in reaching a compromise with the EU in these 
areas because of both sovereignty and regulatory environment issues. These 
directives are more generally known as the Contracts and Liquidation 
Directives. The first Council discussion on the contracts proposal was in 
198033 with the latest taking place in 198834. Council discussions on the 
31 Oj C 7128/07/79 
32 Oj C 7119/03/87 
33 Oj C 355 31/12/80 
34 Oj C 235 06/10/89 
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liquidation amendment began in the first six months of 1993. The problems 
in these areas reflect those experienced by the third generation life and non- 
life directives. 
Finally, in respect of further spillover, it is worth noting the overlap with 
regard to the legislation between these three areas: much of it will lay the 
basis for future legislation in areas not sufficiently touched upon, i. e. 
pensions and taxation. Financial services legislation has created difficulties 
for other sectors which has necessitated further legislation. This is general 
horizontal spillover as there is a task expansion from one sector to another, 
e. g. from services to capital. However, there is also spillover from one area of 
financial services to another, e. g. from banking to insurance, and this is 
specific horizontal spillover. Additionally there is vertical spillover and this 
is illustrated by legislation in one area of the sector, e. g. insurance, creating 
the necessity for further legislation in the same area (see below). The non-life 
insurance directives are, on the one hand, tied closely to the life insurance 
directives, while on the other, like their life insurance counterparts, they 
border banking and security services legislation. Effectively, there has been a 
task expansion throughout the sector and one may consider that this 
encompasses a form of spillover. 
The Life Assurance Directives 
As mentioned above, the life assurance directives illustrate specific neo- 
functional spillover (this is spillovers most simplistic form) with each 
generation creating the need for the next. However, each generation also 
created the need-for further legislation, both in insurance and other areas of 
financial services. The first generation of directives allowed for the freedom 
of establishment as long as conditions of contracts and tariffs were 
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approved by the Member State in which the company wished to establish. 
The First Life Assurance Directive dealt with the need for licensing and the 
means by which an insurance establishment would be approved and 
standardised. Additionally, the supervisory responsibility in respect of 
establishment competence was transferred to the Member State where the 
principal place of business was situated. However, there was little legislation 
regarding freedom of services in this directive. 
The Second Life Assurance Directive (90/619/EEC)35 provided the means for 
cross-border business and delineated the active and passive provisions of 
services. The directive takes the consumer as its starting point and provides 
for free movement through two regulations. Firstly, if policy-holders 
approach an insurer from another Member State, the legislation of the 
Member State where the insurer has its majority of business applies. 
However, secondly, if the insurer attempts to persuade the policy-holder to 
take out a policy, the legislative code of the Member State in which the 
insurer performs a service applies. This denied cross-border trade in life 
insurance and necessitated further harmonisation. This led to the Third Life 
Assurance Directive and a process of specific vertical spillover. 
The Third Life Assurance Directive (92/96/EEC)36 was adopted on 10 
November 1992 and implemented on 1 July 1994. Fundamentally, it creates a 
uniform system of control in that insurers need only to be granted approval 
where they have their headquarters and control should be administered by 
their own Member State. It amends both former directives and specifically 
removes the passive/active clause from the Second Life Assurance Directive 
(see Appendix C, Article 4 the Third Life Assurance Directive). In general 
35 Oj L 330 29/11/90 
36 Oj L 360 09/12/92 
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terms, host Member State legislation only applies if it is considered to be for 
the general good - this incorporates the permitted application of host country 
rules where there is no duplication in the country. The general good should 
also be applied without national discrimination and proportionate to the 
objective being pursued. 
The main provisions are as follows. Firstly, there is the single licence, this 
shifts responsibility for financial supervision (in terms of all business) to 
home country or head office supervision. This is whether policies are written 
through: 
(a) a head office; or 
(b) a branch in another Member State; or 
(c) a service basis. 
There is no need to seek authorisation. The undertaking should simply notify 
the authorities (see Appendix C, Articles 3 and 4 the Third Life Assurance 
Directive). 
Secondly, the directive pursues uniformity in terms the assets to be used to 
represent the solvency margin in respect of: 
(a) accounts of Mutuals; 
(b) preferential share capital; 
(c) subordinated loan capital; and 
(e) undated securities (see Appendix C, Article 8 the Third Life Assurance 
Directive). 
Thirdly, the directive indicates actuarial principles governing the calculation 
of technical provisions. It also requires premiums for new business, on 
reasonable actuarial assumptions, to enable insurers to establish adequate 
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technical provisions (see Appendix C, Article 17 the Third Life Assurance 
Directive). 
Fourthly, regulations on matching and localising assets representing the 
technical provisions are provided. This is done with regard to: 
(a) the currency matching of the asset representing the technical provision; 
(b) the extent that assets must be both adequately spread and diversified; 
(c) how far and which assets may be used to represent technical provisions; 
(d) the limitations of certain assets. 
It is also stated that Member States are not allowed to determine insurers 
investment categories (see Appendix C, Articles 20 and 21 the Third Life 
Assurance Directive). 
Additionally, the directive deals with qualifying holdings, composite 
insurers, contract cancellations and disclosure. Qualifying holdings are 
demarcated as 10%-plus of capital or voting rights; or that which enables 
significant influence over the management of the given undertaking (see 
Appendix C, Article 14 the Third Life Assurance Directive). The competent 
authorities need to be notified about existing qualifying holdings and if there 
are any changes to them. No new composite insurers are permitted. 
However, those already in existence may continue to write both life insurance 
and non-life insurance as long as each activity is separately managed. 
Contracts will be subject to a 14-30 day cancellation period and all relevant 
information should be provided both prior to and during the term of the 
contract. 
Finally, once the directive was in place, Member States no longer needed to 
require prior approval or give systematic notification of rates or policy 
conditions. However, the home Member State may ask for some systematic 
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notification of the technical bases used for calculating scales of premiums and 
technical provisions, but only to verify compliance with Member State 
provisions concerning actuarial principles. Host Member States will be 
allowed to require non-systematic notification of policy conditions and other 
printed documents, but not scales of premiums. However, insurance 
contracts must adhere to the national legislation of the host Member State 
and to this end it could forbid the contract if it is contrary to national rights or 
public interest. Consequently, the Member State has a means of disallowing 
an insurance company the right to provide a cross-border service. To create a 
European market in insurance products, particularly life, further directives 
will be necessary and the bulk of Member State legislation harmonised. Each 
piece of legislation necessitated and created the next, and this process has 
formed the basis of the SEM's regulatory structure in insurance and financial 
services. 
Spillover, Financial Services and European Integration 
Neo-functional spillover alone cannot bring about harmonisation; it can only 
go so far without the impetus of further intergovernmental spillover in 
terms of further political treaties. However, the necessity of further treaties is 
created through neo-functional spillover and the realisation of the four 
freedoms. In these terms, neo-functional spillover is a functional variable 
within the integration process. It could be argued that the attainable 
legislation in financial services has been reached in this period of integration 
and if further neo-functional spillover is to be achieved greater 
intergovernmental spillover is necessary. The thesis argues that there is an 
interplay between intergovernmental and neo-functional processes and 
further intergovernmental spillover was realised in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Indeed, the actuality of the SEM and the environment for EMU allows neo- 
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functional spillover to take place. However, further treaties 
(intergovernmental spillover) will be necessary to create the envirorunent for 
further harmonisation (neo-functional spillover) in the process of European 
integration. 
The Spillover Model (pp 277-81) illustrates this process: intergovernmental 
spillover is indicated in the left hand column and is made up of 
intergovernmental agreements and neo-functional spillover is illustrated on 
the right hand side of the model. As explained above, neo-functional 
spillover constitutes three processes and each figure attempts to clarify these. 
The crosses on the model represent pieces of legislation that have been passed 
in relation to the Treaties that existed at that time e. g. X1 relates to the 
reinsurance directive and X2 the coinsurance directive. Indeed, the model, in 
line with this chapter, attempt to illustrate a spillover process in the context 
of European integration. 
A SEM in financial services is intrinsically tied to the need for a single 
currency. However, whether EMU will materialise is debatable. One may only 
draw tentative conclusions about what the future situation entails. The 
Germans and French believe that stage three of monetary union is still on 
course and there are those who will be ready to make the transference. Yet 
there maybe those who are either unready or unwilling. In this context a two- 
speed Europe is not difficult to envisage. How the difference between being in 
the 'slow lane' or the 'fast lane' will affect the financial service sectors in the 
specific Member States remains to be seen. However, one cannot help 
thinking that the 'fast lane' may be more advantageous. To this end, it could 
be envisaged that a Member State financial services industry would want its 
goverrunent to ensure early entry. 
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Delors and the Commission ". .. portrayed EMU as functionally linked to the 
internal program and necessary for its success. ... The August 1990 EC 
Commission document, Economic and Monetary Union. -- declares: A single 
currency is the natural complement of a single market. The full potential of 
the latter will not be achieved without the former" (Sandholtz, 1994; p 274). 
Indeed, "' ... the argument is that complete capital liberation ... and exchange 
rate stability (in the EMS) are incompatible with divergent national monetary 
policies. It is illogical to expect that the EU can have; a single market, a fixed 
exchange rate, liberal capital movements and autonomous national monetary 
policies. Something must give because the "' --. first three bring about gains in 
efficiency ... the submersion of national monetary policy autonomy in a 
European monetary policy" (ibid, p 276) becomes imperative. However, there 
are two major problems with the spillover thesis. Firstly, the functional link 
is not clear, a SEM could function without a single currency. Effectively, there 
is little consensus on the desirability of EMU let alone its necessity. Secondly, 
if the neo-functional theory of spillover is to hold, then ". .. once an 
integrative step has been taken, actors discover that they must integrate 
further in order to realise benefits. In the case of EMU, that kind of learning 
cannot have taken place. ... The learning process postulated by neo- 
functionalists has not had time to occur" (ibid). 
These are valid points. However, it would be ludicrous to consider that the 
initiation and pursuit of a SEM had nothing to do with EMU. 
The 1992 programme produced a ... positive attitude toward the 
EC, was fertile soil for the EMU initiative. ... It bears 
remembering that the goal of monetary union had been 
established at the Hague summit in 1969, yet the EC made no 
real progress in that direction in the 1970s. The member states 
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reaffirmed monetary union as their objective at the creation of 
the EMS in 1979, but in succeeding years they failed to take any of 
the steps foreseen to achieve it. In 1988 and 1989, however, EMU 
became a movement. What had intervened was the 1992 project 
(ibid, 277). 
Without the SEA and SEM, monetary union would not have reached the 
agenda. The SEM gave the EU credibility. Sectors realised the potential of the 
market which together ". .. increased the credibility of the community as a 
source of solutions to common problems" (ibid, p 276). 
One may contend that economic sectors and political institutions perceive 
regulatory structures as externalities that affect their behaviour. However, it 
can be argued that a sector's and institution's behaviour both affect the 
regulatory environment and that they are subsequently affected by it; that 
there is a constant interaction between the two. Indeed, as illustrated above, 
this thesis has analysed the differing regulatory environments within the 
individual Member States and the legislation that displays how such 
differences may be discerned (see Life Insurance Regulation Matrices Chapter 
Five p 157 and 160). 
One may consider that legislation is a dynamic element of the integration 
process. In the USA, interest groups consider that the best means of 
government intervention is at the federal rather than state level. This is 
because legislative disharmony would create a fragmented market (Dehousse 
1991). In 1997, the EU life insurance market was still fragmented (although 
the application of the Third Life Assurance Directive is changing this) and it 
may be considered that the support for removal of trading barriers indicates 
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support by the sector for the SEM. But, at what cost in respect of their 
changing regulatory environments? 
Conclusion 
It could be posited that by the early 1980s financial services legislation had 
reached an impasse and that without the impetus of greater integration that 
the SEA allowed, the harmonisation process would have slowed down 
considerably. However, even with Maastricht, it is now apparent that only the 
less problematic areas of harmonisation have been achieved in the existing 
phase of integration. If a SEM in financial services is to be realised, further 
harmonisation will be necessary. As the Treaties indicate, single markets in 
banking and insurance are closely linked to the free movement of capital. 
However, to achieve the free movement of capital, one may contend that a 
single currency is essential and until this exists the idea of free capital 
movement is unrealistic. Only once monetary union has been realised can 
taxation and pension issues be discussed in detail and compromises pursued; 
only in the realisation of the Maastricht Treaty and EMU (intergovernmental 
spillover) will neo-functional spillover be intensified. 
This thesis argues that there are two processes of spillover at work; one at a 
state level and one at a supranational, sector and interest group level, The 
former may be identified as intergovernmental spillover, the latter as neo- 
functional spillover. The latter may be broken down into three areas: general 
horizontal spillover (sector to sector or services to capital etc); specific 
horizontal spillover (insurance to banking i. e. sector bound); vertical 
spillover (within insurance i. e. industry bound). Finally, the difficulties 
outlined above may be perceived in the pursuit of creating a single market in 
insurance and particularly in life insurance. Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
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discussed the problems involved in the negotiations that created the Third 
Life Assurance Directive and showed how agreement may have been 
impossible without QMV and the SEM. The need for interest groups, 
supranationality and both forms of spillover in the integration process 
suggests that integration is not simply driven by intergovernmental 
processes, but by neo-functional processes as well. Indeed, through 
generalising this decision-making process Chapter Eight posits a theory of 
spillover (that incorporates aspects of both intergovernmentalism and neo- 
functionalism) that provides an understanding of European integration. 
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FIG 8.2 
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X9. First Banking Directive. 77/780/EEC 
X10. Second Banking Directive. 89/646/EEC 
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FIG 8.3 
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X8. Third Non-Life Insurance Directive. 92/49/EEC 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions: Constructing a Substantive Theory 
What, then, is Europe? It is a kind of cape of the 
old continent, a western appendix to Asia. It looks 
naturally toward the west. On the south it is 
bordered by a famous sea whose role, or should I 
say function, has been wonderfully effective in the 
development of the European spirit with which we 
are concerned (Valery, 1962; pp 311-312)). 
Introduction 
This thesis has heeded the calls for empirical studies regarding European 
integration theory. Through an analysis of the European life insurance 
industry, it has constructed a substantive theory to enhance our 
understanding of European integration. This substantive theory joins the 
hierarchy of substantive /formal theories in the area of integration. It is a 
theory which questions and adds to neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism, and ultimately identifies elements of both in the 
process of European integration. Indeed, it adds to the formal theories and 
posits that certain parts may be fused to further our comprehension of 
European integration processes. The thesis pursued a grounded theory 
understanding of theory which considers that a theory's only replacement is 
another theory, that theories are modified rather than proved. In this context, 
the thesis's ontology was critical realist in outlook (taking the view that 
reality does exist beyond human construction but the human intellect is 
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flawed and unable to comprehend it perfectly). Indeed, the inquiry paradigm 
was postpositivist (Guba and Lincoln 1994). 
Theory Building 
Grounded theory techniques have been employed in the following ways. 
Firstly, open coding of concepts was undertaken through the categorisation of 
individual Member States' life insurance legislation and regulatory regimes. 
This allowed properties and dimensions to be identified which provided the 
basis of a regulation table and matrix. Indeed, categories emerged through the 
open sampling of the data. Further coding and sampling through a survey of 
Member State insurance industries refined the matrix. Coding at this point 
was primarily open, however, axial coding had begun to relate the categories 
and subcategories more specifically and indicate possibilities of process. In this 
context, sampling began to focus on the validation of the categories and the 
relationships between them. The validated table (Table 2.1) and matrix (Fig 
5-2) raised questions with regard to how legislative differences between 
Member States may be resolved. Through axial coding and selective coding, 
further interaction and process were identified and illustrated through the 
European Decision-Making Model. Initially the sampling was relational and 
variational, however it soon became more discriminate and pin-points those 
individuals that needed to be interviewed and identified the need for a 
further survey. Each part of the theoretical coding and sampling added to the 
tables, matrix and models which provide the building blocks of the 
substantive theory. 
The selective coding process is specifically illustrated by the matrix and the 
model fitting together around the core category of European integration 
Indeed, sub-categories the SEM, regulatiory environments, compromise and -- 
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the EU fit around the core category and provide the story-line. Axial coding 
draws all parts of the analysis together and it is the pivot or the axis of theory 
building. Selective coding identifies the core category and develops the core 
category in relation to sub-categories. Indeed, open, axial and selective coding 
interact in the process of theory building. This is illustrated through the 
Spillover Model, which extrapolates the process of legislation formulation 
identified in the European Decision-Making Model and postulates both neo- 
functionalism and intergovernmentalism in the process of European 
integration. Indeed, the generalisation is one usually employed in qualitative 
methodology i. e. from one setting to others. This provides high validity but 
low reliability. Furthermore, the four central criteria (fit, comprehendability, 
generality and control) of substantive theory are met in the theory building 
process. The theory draws on diverse data and attempts to be true to the 
reality under scrutiny (it should fit). Secondly, the fit should be made 
comprehendable. This has been achieved through using tables, matrices, 
models and diagrams to make the findings of the research process explicit. 
Thirdly, from the diverse data certain generalisations are made. However, the 
research makes clear the limitations of these generalisations and clarifies 
when the conditions apply to specific situations, there is control. 
In this context, substantive theory is formulated in relation to the formal 
theories of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Indeed, through 
grounded theory techniques a substantive theory is built to give an 
understanding of European integration and allow a greater comprehension of 
European integration, the SEM, and the European Union. Through open 
coding and comparative analysis the need for a survey is initiated (induction); 
this provides a deduction which considers that to create an SEM Member 
States need to compromise their normative regulatory environments; this 
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provides selective coding which indicates further induction through axial 
and selective coding. 
Finally, these procedures illustrate the need for a further survey which allows 
for data saturation and an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. 
Throughout the analysis induction and deduction go hand-in-hand. The 
researcher is continually analysing the data in the process of building theory 
and continually challenging theory through collecting and analysing data. 
Indeed, ". .. methodology is the theory of methods. .. (and the) ... grounded 
theory methodology is in itself a theory which is generated alongside 
substantive theory it is generating" (Glaser, 1992; p7 author's brackets). 
The substantive aspects of the theory have built up an understanding of the 
processes of integration through an analysis -of decision-making. This 
illustrated how Member States as political units were losing control over the 
creation of legislation and their subsequent sovereignty. The benefits of being 
a member of the EU are illustrated against these losses in terms of greater 
profitability and the consequent necessity of ensuring market conditions to 
maximise this. In this way, a calculation of benefit or loss may be posited. 
Ultimately, one may determine the rationale behind membership of the EU 
and the extent'to which sovereignty may or may not be surrendered. Neo- 
functionalism (a formal theory) is one of incremental integration through the 
transfer of allegiance to a supranational body, the use of interest groups and 
the concept of spillover. On the other hand, intergovernmentalism (another 
formal theory) considers that the nation-state is the main impetus behind the 
European integration process. The substantive element of the theory 
formulated in this thesis assesses to what extent the formal theories are 
supported by the evidence. 
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If sectors/ industries (in this case, the insurance industry) are involved in the 
construction of the SEM'and furthering European integration, then the 
process is not purely intergovernmental (or state-centric): other actors are 
involved. However, as the Council of Ministers passes legislation, an 
intergovernmental element still remains quite strong. But even at this level, 
--- state executives do not determine the European agenda 
because they are unable to control the supranational institutions 
they have created at the European level. The growing diversity 
of issues on the Council's agenda, the sheer number of state 
executive principals and the mistrust that exists among them, 
and the increased specialisation of policy-making have made the 
Council of Ministers reliant upon the Commission to set the 
agenda, forge, compromises, and supervise compliance. ... 
Policy-making in the EU is characterised by mutual dependence, 
complementary functions and over-lapping competencies 
(Marks et al, 1996a; p 372) 
The substantive theory developed here considers that industries /sectors 
compromise their own interest at the EU level (this is achieved through 
national interest groups, e. g. the ABI, and European interest groups,, e. g. the 
CEA). This too illustrates aspects of neo-functionalism as the use of interest 
groups, particularly European interest groups, is central to a neo-functional 
understanding of European integration. Compromise between the EU-wide 
sector/industry and the Commission is reached primarily through European 
interest groups. The use of EU-wide interest groups is emphasised in the 
interaction and compromises that are reached between the EU legislative 
bodies and the EU-wide interest groups in the creation of European 
legislation. However, the national interest groups still play an important role 
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in the process by reporting back to national governments. In general, the 
substantive theory concludes that there has been a shift in allegiance from the 
national legislature to the EU with regard to certain issues. However, the 
Member States still played an important role in the decision-making process. 
Indeed, through multi-level governance, there has been a shift toward joint 
sovereignty in the creation of EU legislation. This is illustrated through the 
concepts of intergovernmental and neo-functional spillover; the former 
creates the environment through the Treaties, whereas the latter pushes this 
forward through the need for industries /sectors to ensure their advantage in 
the evolving EU. This process initiates a shift away from economic 
interdependence toward an intensification of integration, a move away from 
intergovernmental process of integration toward neo-functional. Not simply 
state-centric governance, but governance of a multi-level nature. Governance 
that illustrates a shift in sovereignty. "In practice, the erosion of national 
sovereignty means the erosion of the power of the Member States to decide 
exclusively much of their public policy.... Empirically, it is beyond dispute 
that the EU level is now the level at which a high proportion (possibly 60 per 
cent) of what used to be regarded as purely domestic policy-making takes place 
... therefore power has shifted. A much more complex structure of policy- 
making has developed" (Richardson, 1996a; p 3). 
Formal Theories 
Neo-functionalism, is grounded in Kantian political thought and considered 
peace-oriented in terms of a specific region. It is a peaceful process directed at a 
peaceful end and wishes to ensure a 'civic constitution' under the auspices of 
perpetual peace (Kant 1995). Neo-functionalism proposes that the EU is a 
supranational entity which through its growing authority encourages the 
transferral of allegiance away from national institutions and towards the 
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European. The main body of the research in this thesis investigates whether 
such a process is at work in the creation of the SEM through grounded theory 
techniques and an empirical study of a specific sector. It considers that, unlike 
federalism, the neo-functional supranational entity is a step towards 
functional ends, i. e. that supranationality is a process and an element in a 
transformation away from the nation-state toward an international entity. 
Indeed, it is considered, that the dynamism of this process is spillover and the 
enhancement of supranationality. 
On the other hand, intergovernmentalism argues that the nation-state is 
central to the process and will remain so. "The intergovernmentalist 
argument implies that states form their preferences via some hermetic 
national process, then bring those interests to Brussels. The implication is 
that EC institutions have no impact on the formation of state interests" 
(Sandholtz, 1994; p 260). Indeed, the interviews and the European Decision- 
Making Model illustrate that ". .. national interests of EC states do not have 
independent existence; they are not formed in a vacuum then brought to 
Brussels.... States define their interests in a different way as members of the 
EC than they would without it" (ibid). However, this thesis acknowledges that 
through intergovernmental spillover the environment'for further and more 
intensive neo-functional spillover is created. This again allows an extension 
in supranational decision-making. 
The empiricism is bound up in the changes that are taking place as the EU 
evolves, especially now that the process has intensified. Indeed, the idea of 
neo-functional transformation has re-emerged (in the aftermath of the SEA, 
the SEM and the plans for EMU) and the evolving EU is where the process 
may be further identified and best observed. As Haas pointed out, 
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... for the political scientist the unification of Europe 
has a 
peculiar attraction quite irrespective of merits and types. He may 
see it, as I do, an instance of voluntary "integration' taking place 
before his eyes, as it were under laboratory conditions. He will 
wish to study it primarily because it is one of the very few 
current situations in which the decomposition of old nations 
can be systematically analysed within the framework of the 
evolution of a larger polity, perhaps, to develop into a nation of 
its own (Haas, 1958; p xxxi). 
This thesis proposes that through the political impetus of the SEA (1987) the 
harmonisation of legislation and regulation, as pointed out by Cecchini 
(1986), is being reformed to meet what is considered the normative 
conception of the evolving SEM. However, it also proposes that the 
normative concept of the SEM is tempered by the ideas that the industries 
have of their own trading structures and that these will differ from one 
Member State to the next, because each is acclimatised to trading in a specific 
regulatory environment. Such has been indicated by the results of the 
European survey and is explicit in the Third Life Assurance Directive, with 
reference to both the process of formulation and the end result (as indicated 
through the interviews). This allows the author to suggest that both 
supranational and spillover tendencies are at work. 
(a) Supranationality is observed in terms of industry's interaction with the 
EU's institutions and the creation of the legislation that makes further 
interaction necessary, i. e. directives and further treaties. 
(b) Spillover is observed in terms of the need for further legislation in the 
European life insurance industry and other financial services (non-life 
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insurance, banking and pensions) and sectors (capital) related to it. It is 
suggested that EMU will intensify the need for harmonisation in these areas 
and it is in this context that intergovernmental and neo-functional processes 
can be observed. In intergovernmental terms, spillover can be seen in the 
creation of the Treaties and agreements that further integration i. e. ECSC, 
EEC, Enlargement, Direct Elections, SEA, SEM, EMU. While in neo-functional 
terms, spillover may be observed in three areas (a) in one industry (the 
insurance industry) vertical spillover; (b) spillover from industry to industry 
(from insurance to banking) horizontal specific spillover and; (c) from sector 
to sector (from services to capital) horizontal general spillover (see Figures 
8.1,8.2 and 8.3 pp 277-81). 
The argument is emphasised by Sandholtz (1994) who considers that 1992 ". .. 
increased the level of support, among publics and political leaders, for EC- 
level initiatives. Widespread enthusiasm for the 1992 project tilted 
preferences toward programs that could be seen as cementing the gains from 
the single-market program" (p 274). This was a case of spillover in that ". .. 
integration in one issue area would reveal functional linkages to other issue 
areas; as a result, the desire to obtain the full benefits of integration in the first 
area would lead to pressure for integration in a second, linked sector" (ibid, pp 
274-275). However, spillover, as deterministic process toward greater 
integration was criticised and ". .- theorists wrote about 'spill-backs' and 'spill- 
around. ' What was not refuted was the notion that spillovers could occur; 
indeed, if issues are linked, then the potential for spillovers always exists. The 
process is simply not automatic or one directional" (ibid, p 275). 
Overall, the thesis has identified a number theoretical propositions suggested 
by neo-functionalism through an empirical analysis of the Member States life 
insurance industries and the EU's decision-making processes. The survey 
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proposes that differences exist between the Member state concepts of the best 
regulatory environment. At some point, these differences needed to be 
resolved if the European life insurance industry was to be unified in what 
was considered to be the best regulatory environment for the industry as a 
whole. In its negotiations with the Commission there needed to be some 
common ground if the legislation being formulated was not supported by 
enough of the Member State industries, it could be blocked at the Council 
level. In this context, there is a need to negotiate with the supranational body 
through the use of European interest groups to ensure successful legislation 
and, through compromise, the most comfortable trading conditions. Through 
the need to be involved in the decision-making process, one may consider 
that supranationality and spillover are at work. The need to ensure regulatory 
conditions as similar as possible to one's own forces Member State 
industries /sectors and governments to become further and further involved 
in the integration process. 
As the free movement of services is being attempted and monetary union is 
no longer perceived as unattainable, more and more difficulties become 
apparent. Consequently, it becomes ever more necessary for Member States to 
make mutual concessions. Compromise becomes the central factor and any 
national assertion in the face of the need for pragmatism slows up or destroys 
the process. However, as the process becomes more intense,, agreements are 
harder to win, as Lindberg argued, 
There is no paradox between the progress of economic 
integration in the Community and sharpening political 
disagreement; indeed, the success of economic integration can be 
a cause of political disagreement. The Member States are engaged 
in the enterprise for widely different reasons, and their actions 
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have been supported or instigated by elites seeking their own 
particular goals. Therefore, conflicts would seem endemic as the 
results of joint activity come to be felt and as the pro-integration 
consensus shifts (Lindberg, 1963; p 80). 
These conflicts may be illustrated through the intergovernmental role in the 
integration process. As international difficulties with regard to European 
competitiveness became paramount, pressure was put on governments by 
industries /sectors to further a common market in Europe. This created the 
necessity to agree the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty at the Member State 
level, and indicated the part played by industries /sectors in pursuing self- 
interest. - 
The SEA, the SEM and the Maastricht Treaty create clarity of objectives and 
what is necessary if these objectives are to be realised. It also becomes 
necessary for each area to be looked at in the context of its own specifics and 
this necessitates the involvement of interest groups and sectors. The sword is 
double edged: what needs to'be changed becomes clearer but winning these 
changes becomes harder. However, clarity negates Haas' "turbulence" and 
creates "wholes". It provides for "focal points" and "shared belief systems" 
(Garrett et al, 1993; p 176). 
The knowledge of national trading structures and what is necessary for 
harmonisation (focal points) negates turbulence. Working parameters are 
drawn up by the actors involved and, through the neo-functional processes 
of spillover and supranationality, compromise is reached and integration 
intensified. However within the process, there is an intergovernmental 
element,, i. e. the Council of Minister's and the sectors' interaction with 
national governments, but as integration intensifies this aspect of the process 
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diminishes and Morganthau"s understanding that political change will be 
linked to its historical circumstances is verified (Morganthau, 1973). Indeed, 
the process of integration is neither purely intergovernmental nor totally 
neo-functional, but as has been illustrated, an amalgamation of both and in 
this context it carries elements of realism and functionalism. 
Neo-functionalism is at work in the process of European integration. It is a 
peaceful process looking toward a peaceful end. However, the actual end 
cannot be foreseen. Indeed, can any end be categorically stated? With regard to 
European Union one may question what Europe actually is. Where does it 
end? Neo-functionalism could be seen as a step in the direction of an 
international civic constitution and could be seen as a means of attaining a 
functional end. 
The Substantive Theory 
As outlined above, the substantive theory is built through coding, 
categorisation and process. The regulation table and matrices provide the 
basis of the substantive theory in that they acknowledge that separate Member 
States pursue different regulatory regimes. This sets up the problem of 
understanding how compromise is reached. The interviews, observations 
and survey C further construct the substantive theory with regard to the EU 
decision-making process. This substantive theory has implications for the 
formal theories of intergovernmentalism (state-centric governance) and neo- 
functionalism (multi-level governance) in terms of spillover, 
supranationality and interest group utilisation. 
"A substantive theory generated from the data must be formulated, in order 
to see which of diverse formal theories are, perhaps, applicable for furthering 
293 
additional substantive formulations" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; p 34). This 
illustrates that theories are never complete but processes in themselves. In 
this context, one may question the extent to which neo-functionalism may be 
labelled a formal theory, and question the extent to which it is a substantive 
theory of integration theory in that it has not really emerged from studies 
under different types of situations i. e. integration processes external to 
western Europe. Indeed, one may question the extent to which neo- 
functionalism or intergovernmentalism may be labelled formal theories. 
The substantive theory is illustrated by the table, scale, matrices and models 
that have been built by the on-going research (see below) and from it a 
number of conclusions may be drawn. Diagrams are a fundamental aspect of 
grounded theory, they allow a visual representation of the substantive theory 
and illustrate the relationships between the concepts and how different parts 
of the research relate to one another. 
Regulation and Legislation Table (Table 2.1) p 43. 
Regulation Scale (Table 5.1) p 138. 
Life Insurance Regulation Matrix One (Figure 5.1) p 157. 
Life Insurance Regulation Matrix Two (Figure 5.2) p 160. 
Easton' s Amended Demand Flow Model (Figure 7.1) p 214. 
The European Demand Model (Figure 7.2) p 215. 
The European Decision-Making Model (Figure 7.3) p 243. 
The Spillover Model (Figures 8.1,8.2 and 8.3) pp 277-81. 
Indeed, the substantive theory itself may be summarised in the following 
way. 
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(a) Sectorslindustries (in this context the life insurance industry) are 
involved in the construction of the SEM and consequently further and 
intensify European integration. 
(b) They participate in the decision-making process in a number of ways but 
primarily through the use of national and European interest groups. 
W Each Member State's sectorlindustry compromises its own interest at the 
EU level (this is achieved through national interest groups, e. g. ABI, and 
European interest groups, e. g. CEA). 
(d) Compromise between the EU-wide sectorlindustry and the Commission is 
reached primarily through European interest groups. 
(e) Compromise between the EU legislative bodies, national legislatures and 
interest groups takes place throughout the creation of European legislation. 
(0 There is a shi in allegiance (by the national sector industry) from the 
national legislature to the EU with regard to certain issues. However, the 
Member States still play an important role in the decision-making process. 
Indeed, there has been a shi toward joint sovereignty in the creation of EU Vt 
legislation. Through this process integration is intensified. 
(g) The intensification takes the form of spillover in intergovernmental and 
neo-functional terms. This creates the impetus for further integration. 
W European integration is given impetus by economic industries/sectors 
pursuing their self-interest in the creation of EU legislation. However, this 
allows welfare for Europeans in terms of greater prosperity and peaceful co- 
existence. Again, this intensifies European integration. 
European integration is the core-category and the impetus for the interaction 
between Member States and sectors. An interaction that has been identified 
through open, axial and selective coding. 
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As mentioned above, the substantive theory was constructed through an 
induction/ deduction process. The inductive element encompassed the 
creation of a table and matrices through coding and categorisation. This was 
added verified and enhanced by a survey. This led to a number of deductions 
which initiated further inductive research through a series of semi-formal 
interviews. Once again, this created further deductions which were verified 
by another survey. In practical terms, this meant that through the 
construction of the table and matrices, we discover that different Member 
States pursue different concepts of a regulatory environment. Ultimately, this 
led the thesis to question how Member States overcome their differences. The 
interviews provided an understanding of how compromise is pursued and 
indicated some generalisations. 
Finally, the substantive, theory identifies that a multi-level understanding of 
governance is apparent at the EU level. This does not mean that the Member 
State is not involved, but it does indicate the difficulties with a purely state- 
centric view. 
Multi-level governance does not confront the sovereignty of 
states directly. Instead of being explicitly challenged, states in the 
European Union are being melded gently into a multi-level 
polity by their leaders and by the actions of numerous sub- 
national and supranational actors. State-centric theorists are 
right when they argue that states are extremely powerful 
institutions that are capable of crushing direct threats to their 
existence. The organi(s)ational form of the state emerged because 
it proved an effective means of systematically wielding violence. 
--. One does not have to argue that states are on the verge of 
political extinction to believe that their control of those living in 
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their territories has been significantly weakened (Hooghe and 
Marks, 1997; p 38 author's bracket). 
The interviews suggested that in some cases state executives are unable to 
hold onto sovereignty. Indeed, collectively they are unable to define the 
agenda ". .. because they are unable to control the supranational institutions 
they have created at the European level" (ibid). Sectors (sub-national actors) 
circumvent the national legislature and directly lobby the EU institutions. It is 
apparent that decision-making at the European level ". .. is characterised by 
mutual dependence, complementary functions, and overlapping 
competencies" (ibid). Thus, there is an interaction between 
intergovernmental and neo-functional processes at the EU level. During the 
1960s and the 1970s, an intergovernmental system was in the ascendance and 
this provided the environment for the state-centric model. However, with 
the advent of the SEA in the 1980s and the added authority of the EU 
institutions a ýsystem of multi-level governance arose, in which the 
activities of supranational and sub-national actors diluted national 
government control" (ibid, p 39). The interviews illustrated that the Member 
States were ". .. no longer ... the exclusive nexus between domestic politics 
and international relations" (ibid). Indeed, sub-national actors were making ". 
-- direct connections ... in diverse political arenas. Traditional and formerly 
exclusive channels of communication and influence are being side-stepped" 
(ibid). Multi-level governance allows interest groups to be involved at both 
EU and national levels. However, as the interviews and subsequent Decision- 
Making Model illustrated, when we speak of European legislation, the shift is 
toward the supranational. 
The SEA and the Maastricht Treaty have led to discussions around the 
concept of sovereignty. "Several member-state governments, are themselves 
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deeply riven on the issues of integration and sovereignty. States and state 
sovereignty have become objects of popular contention - the outcome of 
which is as yet uncertain" (ibid, p 40). 
Further Research 
This thesis has reassessed the general literature on integration theory in an 
effort to allow a greater understanding of the process of European integration. 
Indeed, it has approached the subject matter through the methodology of 
grounded theory. This has allowed the author to overcome a number of 
problems identified with neo-functionalism. Grounded theory identifies the 
difficulties inherent in qualitative analysis and considers that there is no need 
to attempt to copy the quantitative process, usually the scientific method. 
There is no need for theory simply to predict and, in doing so, identify a 
dependent variable. Ultimately, theory should enlighten and this can be done 
by enabling understanding. This has been the objective of this thesis, to 
provide further understanding of European integration processes in general 
and neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism in particular. As indicated 
above the methodology was based on a postpositivist paradigm of inquiry. 
Indeed it considered that there is a reality external to humanity and that this 
may be imperfectly comprehended through recognising subjectivity in the 
pursuit of objectivity. However, during the analysis the author considered 
that if one's metaphysical beliefs leaned toward the ontology of historical 
realism (reality shaped by social, historical, ethnic economic or gender values 
and concretised over time) grounded theory and neo-functionalism could be 
perceived as critical theories of the prevailing historical realism's. On the one 
hand, the nation-state (an established historical phenomenon in institutional 
terms) and on the other positivist and postpositivist (established 
methodologies) modes of analysis. Indeed, grounded theory could be 
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understood as a dialectical shift between the paradigms of inquiry i. e. between 
postpositivism and critical theory. More research in terms of methodological 
processes may allow insights into the theories that provide further 
explanation and understanding of the European integration process. (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994; and Annells, 1996). 
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Survey A 
A Survey of the European Life Insurance Industry 
(1) How liberal or state controlled is your national life insurance market? 
(2) Where would you place the Single European Market (SEM) life insurance 
sector in respect of regulatory freedom? 
(3) What type of regulatory environment do you consider that the SEM 
should be to allow your company its greatest advantage? 
(4) What type of regulatory environment do you consider the SEM in life 
insurance should be to allow the greatest consumer protection? 
(5) What type of regulatory environment do you consider the SEM in life 
insurance should be to allow the greatest consumer choice? 
(Respondents were asked to give their answers on the regulation scale of 1-12 
which was fully explained to them) 
Survey B 
General Survey of Institutions involved in the Decision-Making Process 
(1) How liberal or state controlled is your national life insurance industry? 
(2) Where would your organisation's membership place the single 
European Market life insurance industry in respect of market freedom? 
(3) What type of market would your organisation's membership consider that 
the Single European Market should be to allow the life industry its greatest 
profitability? 
(4) What type of market would your organisation's membership consider that 
the Single European market should be to allow the greatest consumer 
protection? 
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(5) What type of market would your organisation's membership consider that 
the Single European Market should be to allow the greatest consumer choice? 
Survey C 
A Survey of the UK Insurance Industry Regarding Interest Group Usage. 
(1) Your company used organised interest groups at the European level i. e. 
the CEA in the formulation of the Third Life Assurance Directive. 
(2) Your company used organised interest groups at the national level i. e. the 
ABI in the formulation of the Third Life Assurance Directive. 
(3) Your company uses organised interest groups at the European level for 
most European issues. 
(4) Your company subscribes to a European interest group. 
(5) Your company subscribes to a national interest group. 
(6) Your company lobbies European institutions when its European interests 
are affected. 
(7) Your company lobbies the national government when European interests 
are affected. 
(8) Your company primarily uses interest groups to lobby on its behalf at the 
European level. 
(9) Your company primarily uses interest groups to lobby on its behalf at the 
national level. 
(10) Your company prefers to use interest groups at the European level 
because this allows European sector wide compromises. 
(11) Your company prefers to use interest groups at the national level 
because this allows nation-wide sector compromises. 
(Respondents were asked to give their answers on a Likert scale of 1-4) 
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The interviews were conducted on a semi-formal basis and centred and 
categorised around 12 core questions, these were: 
Interest Group Interviews 
(1) What are the major functions of the CEA/BIPAR/ABI and how do these 
fit in with the functions of other finance interest groups and governmental 
institutions at: 
(A) The EU level? 
(B) The national level? 
(2) To what extent are decisions made with interest group input? 
(3) Is it interest groups, the Council Ministers or the Commission that define 
decision parameters? 
(4) Do the Council, the Commission, national legislatures and interest groups 
reach a compromise prior to a decision reaching the Council? 
(5) Does an interaction exist between the Council and the specific interest 
group on a national and European level? 
(6) How does the Council know what to insist upon in respect of national 
interest? 
(7) Does an interaction exist between interest groups and the Insurance 
Committee? 
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(8) Are different Member states looking for specific types of life assurance 
market environment for the SEM which is different from other member 
states? 
(9) Are there differences between the: 
(a) The French market ideal? 
(b) The German market ideal? 
(c) The Dutch market ideal? 
(d) The UK market ideal? 
(e) The Italian market ideal? 
How does your market ideal fit into these? 
(10) Is a compromise reached between the different national interest groups 
prior to the Commission initially drawing up draft legislation or is there an 
interaction between the interest group at the European level and the 
Commission which takes into consideration a compromise reached by the 
member state interest groups i. e. ABI through membership of the European 
interest group CEA/BIPAR? 
The COREPER Interviews 
( 1) What are the major functions of a Permanent Representative and how do 
these fit in with the functions of political institutions at: 
(A) The EC level? 
(B) The national level? 
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(2) To what extent are decisions made with interest group input? 
(3) Is it interest groups, the Council Ministers or the Commission that define 
decision parameters? 
(4) Do the Council, the Commission, National legislatures and interest groups 
reach a compromise prior to a decision reaching the Council? 
(5) Does an interaction exist between the Council and the specific interest 
group on a national and European level? 
(6) How does the Council know what to insist upon, in respect of national 
interest? 
Does an interaction exist between interest groups and the Insurance 
Committee? 
(8) Are different Member States looking for specific types of life insurance 
market environment for the SEM which is different from other member 
states? 
(Could you indicate these differences, please) 
(9) Are Permanent Representatives aware of a set of parameters from which 
they must not stray in the decision making process? (Could you indicate how 
these are reached, please). How do interest groups fit into the process from a 
Council perspective? 
(10) Is a compromise reached between the different national interest groups 
prior to the Commission initially drawing up draft legislation. Alternatively.. 
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is there an interaction between the interest group at the European level e. g., 
the CEA, and the Commission which takes into consideration a compromise 
reached by the member state interest groups through their membership of the 
European interest group? 
(11) Where possible, have compromises been reached between the Council, 
the Commission and Parliament before the final negotiations to enable a 
more efficient means of decision making? 
(12) What takes precedence in the formulation of a Directive Member State or 
sector interests? 
The Commission Interviews 
(1) What are the major functions of the Commission and how do these fit in 
with the functions of interest groups at: 
(A) The EU level? 
(B) The national level? 
(2) To what extent are decisions made with interest group input? 
(3) Is it interest groups, the Council Ministers or the Commission that define 
decision parameters? 
(4) Did the Commission, national legislatures and interest groups interact and 
reach a compromise prior to the Third Life Assurance Directive proposal 
reaching the Council? 
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(5) Does an interaction exist between the Commission and the specific interest 
group on a national (ABI) and/or European level (CEA)? 
(6) How does the Commission know what to insist upon in respect of 
European interests i. e. in terms of insurance policy that is acceptable to all 
Member States? 
(7) Does an interaction exist between interest groups and DG XV? Is this 
through the Insurance Committee (if so, how effective is the Insurance 
Committee)? 
(8) Were different Member states looking for specific types of life insurance 
market environments for the Single European Market (SEM) which were 
different from other member states? (Could you indicate these differences 
please) 
(9) Are there set parameters from which the Commission should not stray in 
the decision-making process? (could you indicate how these are reached 
please). 
(10) Is a compromise reached between the different national interest groups 
prior to the Commission initially drawing up draft legislation or is there an 
interaction between the interest group at the European level, i. e. CEA, and the 
Commission which takes into consideration a compromise reached by the 
Member State interest groups, i. e. ABI, through membership of the European 
interest group? 
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(11) Where possible, have compromises been reached between the Council, 
the Commission and Parliament before the final negotiations to enable a 
more efficient means of decision-making? 
(12) What took precedence in the formulation of the Third Life Assurance 
Directive, Member State, European (Commission) or life insurance industry 
interests? 
The Supervisors Interviews (UK) 
(1) What are the major functions of the DTI in the decision-making process 
and how do these fit in with the functions of other Goverrunent bodies at: 
(A) The EU level? 
(B) The national level? 
(2) To what extent are decisions made with DTI input? 
(3) Is it interest groups or the DTI, the Council of Ministers or the European 
Commission that define decision parameters? 
(4) Do the Council, the Commission, national legislatures and regulators 
reach a compromise prior to a decision reaching the Council? How is this 
achieved? 
(5) Does an interaction exist between the Council and the specific interest 
group on a national and European level prior to'DTI input? 
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(6) How does the Council know what to insist upon in respect of national 
interest? 
(7) Does an interaction exist between the DTI and the Insurance Committee? 
(8) Are different Member States looking for specific types of life insurance 
market environments for the SEM which is different from other member 
states? 
(9) Are their differences between the: 
(a) The French market ideal? 
(b) The German market ideal? 
(c) The Dutch market ideal? 
(d) The UK market ideal? 
(e) The Italian market ideal? 
Please illustrate these differences. 
(10) Is a compromise reached between the different national interest groups 
prior to the Commission initially drawing up draft legislation or is there an 
interaction between the interest group at the European level, i. e. CEA, and the 
Commission which takes into consideration a compromise reached by the 
Member State interest groups, i. e. ABI, through membership of the European 
interest group? How does the DTI fit into the process? 
(11) Where possible have compromises been reached between the Council, 
the Commission and Parliament before the final negotiations to enable a 
more efficient means of decision-making? 
(12) What takes precedence in the formulation of a Directive, Member 
State-or Industry interests? 
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ii 
(Acts wbose publication is not obligatory) 
COUNCIL' 
COUNCIL DIRECTTVE 92/96/EEC 
of 10 November 1992 
on the coordination of laws, - regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life 
assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (third life assurance 
Directive) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrMS, 
14aving regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular ArticlesS7 (2) 
and 66 thereof, 
take the initiative in entering into a commitment with 
an assurance undertaking in another Member State, 
do not require special protection in the Member State 
of the commitment complete freedom to -avail 
themselves of the widest possible life assurance 
market; 
Ijaving regard to the proposal from the Commission (1), 
in cooperation with the European Parliament (2), 
14aving regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee (3), 
Whereas it is necessary to complete the internal 
market in direct life assurance, from the point of view both of the right of establishment and of the freedom 
to provide services, to make it easier for assurance 
undertakings with head offices in the Community to 
cover commitments situated within the Community; 
Whereas the Second Council Directive 90/619/EEC 
of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide 
services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (4 ) has 
already contributed substantially to the achievement 
of the internal market in direct life assurance by 
granting policy-holders who, by virtue of the fact that 
they 
(1) Oj No C 99,16.4.1991, p. 2. 
(2) Oj No C 176,13.7.1992, p. 93; and 
Decision of 28 October 1992 (not yet published in the Official 
journal). 
(S) Oj No C 14,20.1.1992, p. It. 
(4), Oj No L 330,29.11.1990, p. 50. 
3. Whereas Directive 90/619/EEC therefore represents 
an important stage in the merging of national markets 
into an integrated market and that stage must be 
supplemented by other Community instruments with 
a view to enabling all policy-holders, irrespective of 
whether they themselves take the initiative, to h; vc 
recourse to any assurer with a head office in the 
Community who carries on business there,, under the 
right of establishment or the freedom to provide 
services, 'while guaranteeihg them adequate 
protection; 
4. Whereas this Directive forms part of the body of 
Cominunity legislation already enacted which includes 
the First Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 
1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking up and 
Pursuit of the business of direct life asiurance (P) and 
Council Directive 91/674/EEC of 19 December 1991 
on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of 
insurance undertakings (6); - 
-Whereas the approach adopted consists in bringing 
about such harmonization as is essential, necesSarY 
(1) Oj No L 63,13.3.1979. p. 1. Directive as last Amended by 
the Second Directive 90/619/EEC. (Oj No L330,29. It. 
1990, P. 50). 
V) Oj No L 374,31.12.1991, p. 7. 
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and sufficient to achieve the mutual recognition of 12. 
authorizations and prudential control systerns, ' 
thereby making it possible to grant a single 
authorization valid throughout the Community and 
apply the principle of supervision by the home 
Member State; 
6. Whereas, as a result, the taking up and the pursuit of 
the business of assurance are henceforth to be subject 
to the grant of a single official authorization' Rsued by 
the competent authorities of the Member State in 
which an assurance undertaking has its head office; 
whereas such authorization enables an undertaking to 
carry on business throughout the Community, under 
the right of establishment or the freedom to provide 
services; whereas the Member State of the branch or 
of the provision of services may no longer require 
assurance undertakings which wish to carry on 
assurance business there and which have already been 
authorized in their home Member State to seek fresli 
authorization; whereas Directives 79/267/EEC and 
90/619/EEC should therefore be amended along 
those lines; 
Whereas provision should be made fbr the 
specialization rule laid down . 
by Directive 
79/267/EEC to be relaxed so that those Member 
States which so wish are able to grant the same 
undertaking authorizations for the classes referred to 
in the Annex to Directive 79/267/EEC and the 
*insurance business coming under classes 1 and 2 in 
the Annex to Directive 73/239/EEC (1); whereas that 
possibility may, however, be subject to certain 
conditions as regards compliance with accounting 
rules and rules on winding-up; 
13. Whereas it is necessary from the ppint of view of the 
protection of lives assured that every assurance 
unaertaking should establish . adequate 
technical 
provisions; whereas the calculation of such provisions 
is based for the most part on actuarial principles; 
whereas those principles should be coordinated in 
order to facilitate mutual recognition of the prudential 
rules applicable in the various Member States; 
Whereas the competent authorities of home Member 
States will henceforth be responsible for monitoring 14. 
the financial heilth of assurance undertakings, 
including their state of solvency, the establishment of 
adequate technical provisions and the covering of 
those provisions by matching assets; * 
Whereas the pirformance 6f the operations referred to 
in Article 1 (2) (c) of Directive 79/267/EEC cannot 
under any circumstances affect the powers conferred 
on the respective authorities with regard to the entities 
holding the assets with which that provision is 
concerned; IS. 
Whereas certain provisions of this Directive define 
minimum standards; whereas a home Member State 
may lay down stricter rules for assurance 
undertakings authorized by its own competent 
authorities; * 
to. Whereas the competent authorities of the Member 
States must have at their disposal such means of 
supervision as are necessary to ensure the orderly 
pursuit of business by assurance undertakings 
throughout the Community whether carried on under 
the right of establishment or the freedom to provide 
services; whereas, in particular, they must be able to introduce appropriate safeguards or impose sanctions 
aimed at preventing irregularities and infringements of 
the provisions on assurance supervision; 
Whereas the provisions on transfers of portfolios must be adapted to bring them into line with the single legal authorization system introduced by this Directive; 
Wliereas it is desirablF, in the interests of prudence, to 
establish a minimum of coordination of rules limiting 
the rate of interest used in calculating the technical 
provisions; whereas, for. the purposes 'of such 
limitation, since emsting methods aýe all equally 
correct, Prudential, and equivalent, it ý seems 
appropriate to leave Member States a free choice as to 
the method to be used; 
Whereas the ruies governing the spread, localization 
and matching of the assets used to cover technical 
provisions must be coordinated in order to facilitate 
the mutual recognition of Member States' rules; 
whereas that coordination must take account of the 
measures on the liberalization of, capital movements 
provided for in Council Directive 48/361/EEC of 24 
June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the 
Treaty. (') and the progress made. by the Community 
towards economic and monetary union; 
16. WherM, however, the home Member State May not 
require assurance undertakings to invest the assets 
covering their technical provisions in particular 
First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July 1973 on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business 
of direct in=ance other thin life assurance (OJ No L 228, 
16.8.1973, p. 3). Directive as last amended by Directive 
90/61 S/EEC (OJ No L 330,29.11.1990, P. 44). 
(2) OJ No L 178,8.7.1988, p. S. 
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categories of assets, as such a requirement would be 
incompatible with the measures on the liberalization 
of capital movements provided for in Directive 
88/361/EEC; 
17. Whereas, pending the adoption of a directive on 
investment services harmonizing inter alia the 
definition of the concept of a regulated market, for 
the purposes of this Directive and without prejudice 
to such future harmonization that concept must be 
defined provisionally, to be replaced by the definition 
harmonized at Community level, which will give the 
home Member State of the market the responsibilities 
for these matters which this Directive transitionally 
gives to the assurance undertaking7s home Member 
State; 
18. Whereas the list of items of which the solvency 
margin required by Directive 79/267/EEC may be 
made up must be supplemented to take account of 
new financial instruments and of the facilities granted 
to other financial institutions for the constitution of 
their own funds; 
19. Whereas the harmonization of assurance contract law 
is not a prior condition for the achievement of the 
internal market in assurance; whereas, therefore, the 
oppportunity afforded to the Member States of 
imposing the application of their law to assurance 
contracts covering commitments within their 
territories is likely to- provide adequate safeguards'for 
policy-holders; 
20. Whereas within the framework of an internal market it is in the policy-holder's interest that he should have 
access to the widest possible range of assurance 
products available in the Community so that he can 
choose that which is best suited to his needs; whereas it is for the Member State of the commitment to 
ensure that there is nothing to prevent the marketing 
within its territory of all the assurance products 
offered for sale in the Community as longas they do 
not conflict with the legal provisions protecting the 
general good in force in the Member State of the 
commitment and in so far as the gencial good is not 
safeguarded by the rules of the home Member State, 
provided that such provisions must be applied 
without discrimination to aU undertakings operating in that Member State and be objectively necessary and in proportion to the objective pursued; 
provisions protecting the general good as are 
applicable; whereas the systems of supervisi6n to be 
employed nmst meet the requirements of an internal 
market but theii employment may not constitute. a 
prior condition for carrying on assurance business; 
whereas, fiam this standpoint, systems for the prior 
approval of policy conditions do not appear to be 
justified; whereas it is therefore necessary to provide 
for other systems better suited to the requirements of 
an internal market -which enable every Member State. 
to guarantee policy-holders adequate protection; 
'22. Whereas, for the purposes of implementing actuarial 
principles in conformity with this Directive, the home 
Member State may nevertheless require systematic 
notification of. the techakal bases used for calculating 
scales of premiums and technical provisions, with 
such notification of technical bases excluding. 
notification of the. general and special policy 
conditions and the undertakines commercial rates; 
23. Whereas in a single assurance market the consumer 
will have a wider and more varied choice of contracts; 
whereas, if he is td profit fuUy from this diversity and 
from increased competition, he must be provided with 
whatever information is necessary to enable him to 
choose the contract best suited'to his needs; whereas 
this information requirement is all the more important 
as the duration of commitments can be very long; 
whereas-the minmum provisions mu 
, 
st thcref6re be 
coordinated in oider for the consumer to -receive clear 
and accurate information on the essential 
characteristics of the products proposed to him. as 
well as the particular's of the bodies to which any 
complaints of policy-holders, assured persons or 
beneficiaries of contracts may be addressed-, 
24. Whereas publicity for ýisurance products is an 
essential means of enabling assurance business to be 
carried on effectively within the Community; whereas 
it is necessary to leave open to assurance undertakings 
the use of all normal means of advertising in'the 
Member State of the branch or of provision of 
services; whereas Member States may nevertheless 
require compliance with their national rules on the 
form and content of advertising, whether laid down 
pursuant to Community legislation on advertising or 
. adopted 
by Member States for reasons of the general 
good; 
Whereas the Member States must be able to ensure 
that the assurance products and contract documents 2S. Whereas, within the framework of the internal used, under the right of establishment or the freedom mark", no Member State may continue to prohibit to provide services, to cover commitments within the simultaneous carrying on of assurance business their territories comply with such specific legal within its territory under the right of establishment 
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and. the freedom to provide services; whereas the 
option granted to Member States in this connection 
by 
. 
Directive 90/619/EEC should therefore be 
abolished; 
26. Whereas provision should be made for -a system of 
penalties to be imposed when, in the Member State in 
which the commitment is entered into, an assurance 
undertaking does not comply with those provisions 
protecting the general good that are applicable to it; 
27. Whereas some Member States do not subject 
assurance transactions to any form of indirect 
taxation, while the majority apply special taxes and 
other forms of contribution; whereas the structures 
and rates of such taxes and contributions vary 
considerably between the Member -States in which 
they are applied; whereas it is desirable to prevent 
existing differences leading to distortions of 
competition in assurance services between Member 
States; whereas, pending subsequent harmonization, 
application of the tax systems and other forms of 
contribution provided for by the Member States in 
which commitments entered into are likely to remedy 
that problem and it is for the Member States to make 
arrangements to ensure that such taxes and 
contributions are collected; 
31. Whereas, pýxrsuant to Article 8c of the Treaty, 
account should be taken of the went of the effort 
which must be made by certain economics at different 
stages of development; whereas, therefore, 
transitional arrangements should be adopted for the 
gradual application of this Diiective by certain 
Member States, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECT; VE: 
TrrLE I 
DERNMONS AND SCOPE 
Ankle I 
For the purposes of this Directive: ', 
(a) assumnce und"king shall mean an undertaking 
which * has received official -authorization in 
accordance with Article 6 of Directive 79/267/EEC; 
28. Whereas it is important to introduce Community 
coordination on the winding-up of assurance 
undertakings; whereas it is henceforth essential to 
provide, in. the event of the winding-up of an 
assurance undertaking, that the system of protection 
in place in each Member State must guarantee 
equality of treatment for all assurance creditors, 
irrespective of nationality and of the method of 
entering into the commitment; 
29. Whereas technical adjustments to the detailed rules laid down in this Directive may be necessary from 
time to time to take account of the future development of the assurance industry; whereas the Commission will make such adjustments as and when 
necessary, after consulting the Insurance Committee 
set up by Directive'91/673/EEC (1), in the exercise of 
the implementing powers conferred on it by the Treaty; 
30. Whereas it 
* 
is necessary to adopt specific provisions intended to ensure smooth transition from the legal 
arrangements in existence when this Directive 
becomes applicable to those that it in 
, 
troduces; 
whereas care should be taken in such provisions not 
to place an additional workload on Member States! 
competent authorities; 
(1) OJ No L 374,31.12.199 1, p. 32. 
(b) branch shall mean an agency or branch of an 
assurance undertaking, having regard to Article 3 of 
Directive 90/619/EEC; 
(c) commitment shall mean a commitment iepresented by 
one of the, kinds of insurance or operations referred to 
in Article I of Directive 79/267/EEC; 
(d) home Member State' shaH mean the Member State in 
which the head office of the assurance u6dertaking 
covering the commitment is situated; 
(e) - Member State of the branch shaU mein the Member 
State in which the branch covering the commitment is 
situated; 
rvices shall mean '(f) Member State of the provision of se **' 
the Member State of the commitment, as defined in 
Article 2 (e) of Directive 90/619/EEC, if the 
commitment is covered by an assurance undertaking 
or a brahch situated in another Member State; 
(g) control shall mean the relationship between a parent 
undertaking and a subsidiary, as defined , 
in Article 1, 
of Directive 83 /349 /EEC('), -or a similar relationship between any natural or legal person and an 
un ertaking; 
(1) Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on Artide54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated 
amounts (OJ No L 193,19.7.1983, p. 1). Directive as last 
amended by Directive 90/605/EEC (Oj No L317,16.11. 
1990, p. 60). - 
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qualifying boldinj shall mean a direct or midirect 
holding in an undertaking which represents 10% or 
more of the capital or of the voting rights or which 
makes it possible to exercise a significant influence 
over the management of the undertaking in which a 
holding subsists. 
for the purposes of this definition, in the context of 
A. rticles 7 and 14 and of the other levels of holding 
referred to in Article 14, the voting rights referred to 
in Artide7 of Directive 88/627/EEC(1) shall be 
taken into consideration; 
(i) parent undertaking shall mean a parent undertaking 
as defincd in Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 
83/349/EEC; 
competent aýthoritiis shall mean the national 
authorities which are empowered by law or regulation 
to supervise assurazice undertakings. 
Article 2 
1. This Directive shall apply io the commitments and 
undertakings referred to in Article I of Directive 
79/267/EEC. 
2. In Article 1 (2) of Directive 79/267/EEC the words 
'and are authorized in the country concerned' shall be 
deleted. 
3. This Directive shall apply neither 'to classes of 
insurance or operations nor to undertakings or institutions 
to which Directive 79/267/EEC does not apply, nor shall 
it apply to the bodies referred to in Article 4 of that 
Directive. subsidiary. shaU mean a subsidiary undertaking as 
defined in Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 83/349/EEC; 
any subsidiary of a subsidiary undertaking shall also 
be regarded as a subsidiary of the undertaking which 
is those undertakings' ultimate parent undertaking; 
(k) regulated market shall mean a financial -market 
regarded by an undirtaking7s home Member State as a 
regulated market pending the adoption of a definition 
in a Directive on investment services and characterized 
by: 
- regular operation, and 
the fact that regulations issued or approved by thi 
appropriate authorities define the conditions for 
the operation of the market, the conditions for 
access to the market and, where Council Directive 
79/279/EEC of 5 March 1979 coordinating the 
, 
conditions for the admission of securities to 
official stock-exchange listing (2) applies, the 
conditions for admission to listing imposed in that Directive or, where that Directive does not apply, 
the conditions to be satisfied by a financial 
! nstrument in order to be effectively dealt in on the 
market. 
For the purposes of this Directive, a regulated market 
may be situated in a Member State or in a third 
country. In the latter event, the market must be 
recognized by the undertaking7s home Member State 
and meet comparable requirements. Any financial instruments dealt in must be of a quality comparable 
to that of the instruments dealt in on the regulated 
market or markets of the Member State in question; 
(1) Council Directive 881627/EEC of 12 December 1988 on the information to be published- when a major holding in a listed 
company is acquired or disposed of (OJ No L 348,17.12. 
1988, P. 62). 
OJ No L 66,13.3.1979, p. 21. Directive as last amended by Directive 82/148/EEC (OJ No L 62, S. 3.1982, p. 22). 
TULE 11 
THE TAJONG-UP OF THE BUSINESS OF LIFE ASSURANCE 
Artick 3 
Article 6 of Directive 79/267/EEC' shall be replaced by 
the following: 
'ArticLe 6 
-The taking-up of the activities covered by this Directive 
shall be subipct to prior official authorization. 
Such authorization shall be sought from the authorities 
of the home Member Staie by: 
(a) any undertaking which estiblishes its head- offici 
in the territory of that State; 
(b) any undertaking which, having received the 
authorization required in the first subparagraph, 
extends its business to an entire class or to other 
classes. ' 
Article 4 
Article 7 of Directive 79/267/EEC shall be replaced by 
the following: I 
'Articý 7 
I. Authorization shall be' valid for the entire 
Community. It shall permit an undertaking to carry on business there, under either the right of establishment 
or freedom to provide services. 
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2. Authorization shall be granted for a particular 
class of assurance as listed in the Annex. It shall cover* 
the entire class, unless the applicant wishes to cover 
only some of the risks pertaining to that class. 
The competent authorities may restrict authorization 
requested for one of the classes to the operations set 
out in the scheme of operations. referred to in 
Article 9. 
Each Member State may grant authorization for two or 
more of the classes, where its national laws permit such 
classes to be carried on simultaneously. ' 
in the case of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: 
ýpaaznloze vennootschap", sonderlinge 
waarborgmaatschappij", 
in the case of the United Kingdom: 
incorporated companies limitid by shares or by 
guarantee or unlimited, societies registered 
under the Industrial and Provident Societies 
Acts, societies registered or incorporated under 
the Friendly Societies Acts, the association of 
underwriters known as Lloyd's, 
in the case of the Hellenic Republic: *av6)vuttq 
natpia", 
Artick S 
Article 8 of Directive 79/267/EEC shall be replaced by 
the following: 
'Article 8 
in the case of the Kingdom of Spain: *sociedad 
anonima", "sociedad mutua", 'sociedad 
ýoopcrativa", 
- in . the 
'case * oi the Portuguese Republic: 
*sociedade an6nima", *mutua de seguros". ' 
1. The home Member State shall require every An assurance tindertaking may also adopt the forni of a 
assurance undertaking for which authorization is European company when that has been established. 
sought to: 
(a) adopt one of the following forms: 
- in the case of the Kingdom of Belgium: *sociit6 
anonyme/naamloze vennootschap", *socikti en 
commandýite par actions/ commanditaire 
vennootschap op aan , 
delen", 
. 
*association 
d'assurance mutuelle/onderlingc vcrzeke- 
ringsvereniging7, "socikti coopirative/co6pera- 
tieve vennootschap", 
in the case of the Kingdom of Denmark: 
aaktieselskaber", Ugensidige selskaber", 
"pensionskasser omfartet af lov om 
forsikringsvirksomhed (tvxrglende pensions- 
kasser)", 
in the case of the Federal Republic of 
Germany: *Aktiengesellschaft", *Versiche- 
rungsverein auf Gegenscitigkeii", "Went- 
lich-rechtliches Wettbevyerbsversicherungsun- 
ternehmen", 
- in the case Of the French Republic: 'sociiti 
anonyme", "Soci&6 d'assurance mutuelle", 
'institution de privoyance rigie par le code de 
la sicurit6 sociale", "institution de privoyance 
rigie par le code rural" and 'mutuelles rigies 
par le code de la mutualiti", 
in the case of Ireland: incorporated companies limited by shares or by guarantee or unlimited, 
societies registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts and societies registered 
under the Friendly Societies Acts, 
in the case of the Italian Republic: *societi per 
azioni", 'societi cooperativa", *mutua di 
assicurazione", 
in the case of . the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: "socikti anonyme", *sociit6 en 
commandite par actions", 'association 
d'assurances mutuelles", *soci6t6 coop6rative", 
Furthermore, Member- States may, where appropriate, 
set 'up undertakings in any public-law form provided 
that such bodies have as. their object insurance 
operations under conditions equivalent to those under 
which private-law undertakings operate; 
(b) limit its objects'to the ýusiness provided for in this 
Directive and operations directly axising 
&refrom, to the exclusion of all other commercial 
busi ness; 
(c) submit a scheme of operations in accordance with 
Article 9:, 
(d) possess the minimum guarantee fund provided for 
. in Article 20 (2); 
(e) be effectively run by persons of good repute with 
appropriate professional qualificationj or 
experience. 
An undertaking Seeking authorization to extend 
its business to other classes or to extend an 
authorization covering only some . of the risks 
pertaining to one class shall be required to submit a 
scheme of ogerations in accordance with Article 9. 
It shall, furthermore, be required to show proof that it 
possesses the solvency margin provided for in 
Article 19 and the guarantee fund '. referred to in 
Article 20 (1) and (2). 
3. Member States shall not adopt provisions 
requiring the prior approval or systematic notification 
of general and special policy conditions, of scales of 
premiums, of the technical bases, used in particular for 
calculating scales of premiums and technical provisions 
or of forms and other. printed documents which an 
assurance undertaking intends to use in its dealings 
with policy-holders. 
TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
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Member State carries on business' through a bTanch, 
the competent authorities of the home Member. State 
may, after having first informed the competent 
authorities of the Member State of the branch, carry 
out themselves, or through the intermediary of persons 
they appoint for that purpose, on-the-spot verification 
of the information necessary to ensure the financial 
supervision of the undertaking. The authorities of the 
Member State of the branch may participate in that 
verification'. 
Article 10 
Article 23 (2) and (3) of Directive 79/267/EEC shall be 
replaced by the following: ' 
Artkk 11 
1. Article 6 (2) to (7) of Directive 90/619/EEC shall 
be deleted. 
2. Under the conditions laid down by national law, 
each Member State shall authorize assurance undertakings 
with head offices within its territory to transfer all or part 
of their portfolios of contracts, concluded under either the 
right of establishment or the freedom to provide services, 
to an accepting office established within the Community, 
if the competent authorities of the home Member State of 
the accepting office certify that after taking the transfer 
into account the latter possesses the necessary solvency 
margin. 
'2. Member States shall require assurance 
undertakings with head offices within their territories 
to render periodically the returns, together with 
statistical documents, which are necessary for the 
purposes of supervision. The competent authorities 
shall provide each other with any documents and 
information that are useful for the purposes of 
supervision. 
3. Every Member State shall take all steps necessary 
to ensure that the competent authorities have the 
powers and means necessary for the supervision of the 
business of assurance undertakings with head offices 
within their territories, including business carried on 
outside those territories, in accordance with the 
Council directives governing those activities and for the 
purpose of seeing that they are implemented. 
These powers and means must, in particular, enable 
the competent authorities to: 
(a) make detailed enquiries regarding the 
undertakines situation and the whole of its 
business, inter alia by: 
gathering information or requiring the 
submission of documents concerning its 
assurance business, 
- carrying out on-the-spot investigations at the 
undertaking's prernises; 
(b) take any measures, with regard to the undertaking, its directors or managers or the persons who 
control it, that are appropriate and necessary to 
ensure that the undertakines business continues to 
comply with the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions with which the 
undertaking must comply in each Member State 
and in particular with the scheme of operations in 
so far as it remains mandatory, and to prevent or 
remedy any irregularities prejudicial to the interests 
of the assured persons; 
(c) ensure that those measures are carried out, if need be by *enforcement, where appropriate through 
judicial channels. 
Member States may also make provision for the 
competent authorities to obtain any information 
regarding contracts which are held by intermediaries. ' 
3. Where a branch proposes to transfer all or part of its 
portfolio of contracts, concluded under either the right of 
establishment or the freedom to provide services, the 
Member State of the branch shall be consulted. 
4. In the circu! nstances referred to in paragraph 2 and 
3, the authorities of the home Member State of the 
transferring undertaking shaU authorize the transfer after 
obtaining the agreement of the competent authorities of 
the Membi! r States of the commitment. 
3. Ile competent authorities of the Member States 
consulted shall give their opinion or consent to the 
competent authorities , of the 
home Member State of the 
transferring assuratice undertaking within three months of 
receiving a request; the absence of any ! esponse within 
that period from the - authorities consulted shall be 
considered equivalent ; o, a favourable opinion or tacit 
consent. 
6. A transfer authorized in accordance with this Article 
shall be published is. laid down by national law in the 
Member State of the cominitment. Such transfers shall 
automatically be valid against policy-holders, the assured 
persons and any other person having rights or obligations 
arising out of the contracts transferred, , 
This provision shall not affect the Mcmbir States! rights to 
give policy-holders the option of cancelling contracts 
within a fixed period after a transfer. 
Article . 12 
1. Article 24 of Directive 79/267/EEC shall be 
'replaced by the following: 
"Article 24 
1. If an undertaking does not comply with 
Article 17, the competent authority of its home 
Member State may prohibit the free disposal of its 
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assets after having communicated its intention to the 
cornpetent authorities of the Member States of 
Commitment. 
on business for more than six months, unless the 
Member State concerned has made provision for 
authorization io lapse in -such cases; 
2. For the purposes of restoring the financial 
situation of an undertaking the solvency maigin of 
which has fallen below the minimum required under 
A. rticle 19, the competent authority of the home 
Niember 
- 
State shall require that a plan for the 
riestoration of a sound financial position be submitted 
for its approval. 
In exceptional circumstances, if the competent 
authority is of the opinion that the financial situation 
of the undertaking will further deteriorate, it may also 
restrict or prohibit the free disposal of the 
undertaking's assets. It shall inform the authorities of 
other Member States within the territories of which the 
undertaking carries on business of any measures it has 
taken and the latter shall, at the request of the former, 
take the same measures. - 
3. If the solvency margin falls below the guara ntee 
fund as defined in Article 20, the competent authority 
of the home Member State shall require the 
undertaking to submit a short-term finance scheme for 
its approval. 
it may also restrict or prohibit the free disposal of the 
undertaking7s assets. It shall inform the authorities of 
other Member States within the territories of which the 
undertaking carries on business accordingly and the 
latter shall, at the request of the former, take the same 
measures. 
4. The competent authorities may further take all 
rneasures necessary to safeguard the interests of the 
assured persons in the cases provided for in 
paragraphs 1,2 and 3. 
5. Each Member State shall take the. measures 
necessary to be abli in accordance with its national law 
to prohibit the free disposal of assets located within its 
territory at the request, in the cases provided for. in 
paragraphs 1,2 and 3, of the undertaking's home 
, %4ember State, which shall designate the assets to be 
covered by such measures. ' 
Article 13 
A aricle 26 of Directive 79/267/EEC shall be replaced by 
the following: 
'Article 26 
1. Authorization granted to an assurance 
undertaking by the competent authority of its home 
1,4ember State may be withdrawn by that authority if 
that undertaking: 
(a) does not make use of the authorization within 12 
months, expressl. y renounces it or ceases to carry 
(b) no longer fulfils the condinions for'admission; 
(c) has been unable, ivithin the time allowed, to take 
the measures specified in the restoration plan or 
finance scheme referred to in Article 24; 
(d), fails seriously '111' iti obligations . under the regulations to which it is subject. 
In the event of the withdrawal or lapse of the 
authorization, the competent authority of the home 
Member State shall notify the competent authorities of 
the other Member States accordingly and they* ihall 
tike appropriate* measures to prevent the undertaking 
from commencing new operations , within their 
territories, under either the freedom of establishment or 
the freedom to*provide services. The home Member 
States competent authority shall, in conjunction with 
those authorities, take all necessary measures to 
safeguard the interests of the assured persons and shall 
restrict, in particular, the free disposal of the assets of 
the undertaking in accordance with Ariide 24 (1), (2), 
second subparagraph, or (3), second subparagiaph. 
2. Any decision to withdraw an authorization iball 
be supported by precise reasons and notified to the 
undertaking in question. ' 
Article 14 
1. ' Member States shall require any natural or legal 
person who proposes to acquire, directly or indirectly, a 
qualifying holding in an assurance undertaking first to 
inform the competent authorities of the home Member 
5tate, indicating the size of the intended* holding. Such a 
person must likewise inform the competent authorities of 
the home Member State if he proposes to increase his 
qualifying holding so that 'the proportion of the voting 
rights or of the -capital held by him would reach or exceed 
20,33 or SO"/* or so that the"assurance undertaking 
would become his subsidiary. 
The competent authorities'of the home Member Staie shall 
have a maximum of three months from the date of the 
notification provided for in the first subparagraph to 
oppose such a plan lf, in view of the need to ensure -sound 
and prudent management of the assurance undertaking, 
they are not satisfied as to the qualifications of the person 
referred to in the first subparagraph. If they do not oppose 
the. plan in quesfion they may fi3. a maximum period for 
its implementation. 
2. Member States shaU require any n2tural or legal 
person who proposes to dispose, directly or indirectly, of a 
qU21ifying holding in an assurance undert2ldng first to 
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inform ýhe competent authorities of the , home Member 
State, indicating the size of his intended holding. Such a 
pers9n must likewise inform the competent authorities if 
he proposes to reduce his qualifying holding so-that the 
proportion of tfie voting rights or of the capital held by 
him would fall below 20,33 or 50% or so that the 
assurance undertaking would cease to be his subsidiary. 
3. On becoming aware of them, assurance undertakings 
shall inform the competent authorities of their home 
Member States of any acquisitions or disposals of holdings 
in their capital that cause holdings to exceed or fall below 
one of. the thresholds referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
They shall also, at least once a year, inform them of the 
. names of shareholders and members possessing qu'Alifying holdings and the sizes of such holdings as shown, for 
example, by the information received at the annual general 
meetings of shareholders and members or as a result of 
compliance with the regulations relating to companies 
listed on stock exchanges. 
4. Member States shall require that, if the influence 
exercised by the persons referred to in paragraph I is likely 
to operate to the detriment of the prudent and sound 
management of the assurance undertaking, the competent 
authorities of the home Member State shall take 
appropriate measures to put an end'to that situation. Such 
measures may consist, for example, in injunctions, 
sanctions against directors and managers, or the 
suspension of the exercise of the voting rights attaching to 
the shares held by the shareholders or members in 
question. 
Similar measures shall apply to natural or legal persons failing to comply with the obligation to provide prior information, as laid down in paragraph 1. If a holding is 
acquired despite the ' opposition of the competent 
authorities, the Member States shall, regardless of any. 
other sanctions to be adopted, provide either for exercise 
of the corresponding voting rights to be suspended, or for 
the nullity of votes cast or for the possibility of their 
annulment. 
Nevertheless, where an assurance undertaking has been 
declared bankrupt or is being compulsorily wound up, 
confidential information which does not co'ncem third 
parties involved in attempts to rescue that undertaking 
may'be divulg ed in civil or commercial proceedings. 
2. - Paragrapý I 
ihall not prevent the competent 
authorities of the different Member States from 
exchanging information in accordance with the directives 
applicable to assurance undertakings. That information 
shall be subject to the conditions of professional secrecy 
indicated ýn paragraph 1. 
3. Member States* may conclude cooperation 
agreements, providing for exchanges of information, with 
the competent authorities of third countries only if the 
information disclosed is subject to guarantees of 
professional secrecy at least eýquivalent to those referred to 
in this Article. 
4. Competent authorities receiving confidential 
information under paragraphs I or 2 may use it only in 
the course of their duties: 
to check that the conditions governing the taking-up of 
the business of assurance are met and to facilit2te 
monitoring of the conduct of such business, especially 
with regard to the monitoring of technical provisions, 
solvency margins, administrative and accounting 
procedures and internal control mechanisms, Pr 
to impose sa&tions, or 
in administrative appeals against decisions of the 
competent authority, or 
in court proceedings initiated pursuant to Article 30 or - 
under special provisions provided for in the directives 
adopted in the field of assurance undertakings. 
5. Paragraphs I and 4 shall not preclude thi exchange 
of information within a Member State,. where there are 
two or more competent authorities in the same Member 
State, or, between Member States, between competent 
authorities and- 
Article IS 
I. The Member States shaU provide that aU persons 
working or who have worked for the competent 
authorities, as weU as auditors or experts acting on behalf 
of the competent authorities, shall be bound by -the obligation of professional secrecy. This means that no 
confidential information which they may receive in the 
course of their duties may be divulged to any person or 
authority whatsoever, except in summary or aggregate form, such that individual assurance undertakings cannot be identified, without prejudice to cases covered by 
criminal law. 
authorities responsible for the official supervision of 
credit institutions and other financial b. rganizanons and 
the authorities responsible for the supervision of 
financial markets, 
bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of 
assurance undertakings and in 6ther similar 
procedures, and 
persons responsible for cirr 
. ying out statutory audits of the accounts of assurance undertakings and other financial institutions, 
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In the discharge of their supervisory 
functions, and the 
disclosure, to bodies which administer (compulsory) 
winding-up proceedings or guarantee funds, of 
inforrnation necessary to the performance of their duties. 
The information received by these authorities, bodies and 
persons shall be subject to the obligation of professional 
secrecy laid down in paragraph 1. 
6. In addition, notwithstanding paragraphs 1' and 4, 
N4crnber States may, under provisions laid down by law, 
authorize the disclosure of certain information to other 
departments of their central government administrations 
, responsible 
for legislation on the supervision of credit 
institutions, financial institutions, investment services and 
assurance undertakings and to inspectors acting on behalf 
of those departments. 
140vvever, such disclosures may be made only where 
nccessary 
for reasons of prudential control. 
, 4bvvcvcr, Member States shall provide that information 
Ircccived under paragraphs 2 and 5 and that obtained by 
tricans of the on-the-spot verification referred to in 
Article 16 of Directive 79/267/EEC may never be 
disclosed in the cases referred to in this paragraph except 
, vvith the express consent of the competent authorities 
which disclosed the information or of the competent 
, Uthorities of the Member State in which on-the-spot 
, vcrifkication was carried out. 
both of the activities covered by this Directive and by 
Directive 73/239/EEC may continue to do so, 
provided that each - activity is separately managed in 
accordance with Article 14. 
4. Member States may provide . that the 
undertakings referred to in paragraph 2 shall comply 
with the a&ounting rules governing undertakings 
authorized pursuant to this Directive for all of their 
activities. Pending coordination in this respect, 
Member States may also provide that, with regard to 
rules on winding-up, activities relating to the risks 
listed in classes I and 2 in the Annex to Directive 
73/239/EEC carried on by the undertakings referred 
to in paragraph 2 shall be governed by the rules 
applicable to life assurance activities. 
S. Where an undertaking carrying on the activities 
referred to in the Annex to Directive 73/239/EEC has 
financial, commercial or administrative links with an 
undertaking carrying on the activities covered by this 
Directive, the supervisory aýthorities of the Member 
States within whose territories the head offices of those 
, undertakings are situated shall ensure that the accounts of the undertakings in question are not distorted by 
agreements between these undertakings or by any 
arrangement which could affect the apportionment of 
expenses and income. 
6. Any Member State may require undertakings 
whose head offices. are situated in its territory to cease, 
within a period -to be determined by the Member State 
concerned, the simultaneous pursuit of activities in 
which they were engaged at the time of notification of 
this Directive. I. 
Artick 16 
, Article 
13 of Directive 79/267/EEC shall be replaced by 
, he following: 
7. The provisions of this Article shall be reviewed 
on the basis of a report from the Commission to the 
Council in the light of future harmonization of the 
rules on winding-up, and in any case -before 31 
December 1999. ' 
'Article 13 
1. Without prejudice to paragraphs 3 and 7, no 
undertaking may be authorized both pursuant to this 
pirective and pursuant to Directive 73/239/EEC. 
Article 17 
Article 35 of Directive 79/267/EEC and Article 18 of 
Directive 90/619/EEC shall be deleted. 
2. However, Member States may provide that: 
undertakings authorized pursuant to this Directive 
may also obtain authorization, in accordance with Article 6 of Directive 73/239/EEC for the risks listed in classes 1 and 2 in the Annex to that Directive, 
undertakings authorized pursuant to Article 6 of Directive 73/239/EEC solely for the risks listed in 
classes I and 2 in the Annex to that Directive may 
obtain authorization pursuant to this Directive. 
Chapter 2 
Artick 18 
Article 17 of Directive ý9/267/EEC shall be replaced by 
the following: 
3. Subject to paragraph 6, undertakings referred to 
in Paragraph 2 and those which at the time of 
norification of this Directive carry on simultaneously 
'Article 17 
1. The home Member State shall require every 
assurance undertaking to establish sufficient technical 
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provisions, including mathematical provisions, in 
respect of its entire business, 
provisions for the contract at any time shall 
be at least as great as the value guaranteed at 
that time. 
The amount of such technical provisions shall be 
determined according to the following principles: 
A. (i) The amount of the technical life-assurance 
provisions shall be calculated by a sufficiently 
prudent prospective * actuarial valuation, 
taking account of all future liabilities as 
determined by the policy conditions for each 
existing contract, including: 
B. The rate of interest used shall be chosen prudently. 
It shall be determined in accordance with the rWes 
of the competent authority in the home Member 
State, applying the following principles: 
(a) for all contracts, the competent authority of' 
ýhe undertakin& home Member State shall fLx 
one or more maximum rates of interest, in 
particular in . accordance wiih the 
following 
rules: 
- all guaranteed benefits, including (i) when contracts I contain -an interest rate 
. 
guaranteed surrender values, guarantee, the competent authority in the 
home Member State shall set a single 
- bonuses to which policy-holders are maximum rate of interest. it may differ 
already either collectively or individually according to the currency in which the 
entitled, however those bonuses are contract is denominated, provided that it described - vested, declared or allotted, is not more than 60 % of the rate on, 
bond issues by the State in whose 
all options available to the policy-holder currency the contract is denominated. In 
under the terms of the contract, 'the case of a contract denominated in 
ecus, this limit shall be set by reference to 
expenses, including commissions; ecu-denominated . 
issuis by the 
Community institutions. 
taking credit for future premiums due; 
If a Member State decidei, pursuant to 
the second sentence of the preceding 
(ii) the use of a retrospective method is allowed, paragraph, to set a maximum rate of 
if it can be shown that the resulting technical interest for contracts denominated in 
provisions are not lower than would be another Member State's currency, it shall 
required under a sufficiently prudent first consult the competent autho rity of 
prospective calculation or if a prospective . the Member State in whose currency the 
method cannot be used for the type -of contrict is denominated; 
contract involved; 
(ii) however, when the assets of the 
undertaking are not . ýaiued at their (iii) a prudent valuation is not a "best estimate" purchase price, a Member State may 
valuation, but shall include an appropriate stipulate that one or more maximum 
margin for adverse deviation of the relevant rates may be calculated taking into factors; 
account the yield on the corresponding 
assets currently held, minus a prudential 
(iv) the method of valuation for the technical margin and, 
in particular for contracts 
provisions must not only be prudent in itself, with periodic premiums, 
furthermore 
but must also be so having regard to the taking into account the. anticipated yield 
method of valuation for the assets covering on 
future assets. The prudential margin 
those provisions; and the maximum rate or rates of interest 
applied to the anticipated yield on future 
assets shall be fixed by the competent (v) technical provisions shall be calculated authority of the home Member State; 
separately for each contract. The use of 
appropriate approximations or establishment of a maximum rate of (b) the 
generalizations is allowed, however, where , interest shall not imply that the undertaking is they are likely to7give approximately the same bound to use a rate as high as that; 
result as individual calculations. The 
principle of separate calculation shall in no (c) the home Member State may decide not to 
way prevent the establishment of additionai apply (a) to the following categories of provisions for general risks which are not contracts: individualized; 
unit-linked contracts, 
(vi) where the surrender value of a contract is single-premiurn contracts for a period of 
guaranteed, the amount of the mathematical up to eight years,. 
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- wittiout-profits contracts, and annuity calculation of the technical' provisions, including 
contracts with no surrender value. provisions for bonuses. 
In the cases referred to in the last two indents 
of the first subparagraph, in choosing a 
prudent rate of interest; account May be taken 
of the currency in which the contract is 
denominated and corresponding assets 
currently held and where the undertaking's 
assets are valued at their current value, the 
anticipated yield on future assets. 
Under 'no circumstances may the rate of 
interest used be higher than the yield on assets 
as calculated in accordance with the accounting 
rules in the home Member State, less an 
appropriate deduction; 
(d) the Member State shall require an undertaking. 
to set aside in its accounts a provision to meet 
interest-rat6 commitments Vis-h-Vis 
policy-holders if the present or foreseeable 
yield on the undertaking's assets is insufficient 
to cover those commitments; 
3. The home Member State shall require every 
assurance undertaking to cover the technical provisions. 
in respect of its entire business by matching assets, in 
accordance with Article 24 of Directive 92/96/EEC. In 
respect of business written in the Community, these 
assets must be localized within 'the Community. 
Member States shall not require assurance undertakings 
to localize their assets in a particular Member State. 
The home Member State may, however, permit 
relaxations in the rules on the localization of assets. 
4. If the liýmý Member State allows any technical 
provisions to be covered by claims agamsticassurers, it 
shall fix the percentage so . allowed. In sich case, it may 
not require the localization of the assets representing 
such claims. ' 
Artick'19 
(e) the Commission and the competent authorities 
of the Member States which io request shaU be 
notified of the maximum rates of interest set 
under (a). 
C. The statistical elements of the valuation and the 
allowance for expenses used shall be chosen 
prudently, having regard to the State of the 
commitment, the type of policy and the 
administrative costs and commissions expected to be incurred. 
ID. In the case of participating contracts, the method 
of calculation for technical provisions may take into account, either implicitly or explicitly, future bonuses of all kinds, in a manner consistent with 
the other assumptions on future experience and 
with the current method of distribution of bonuses. 
Allowance for future expenses may be . made implicitly, ' for *tance by the use of future 
premiums net of management charges. However, 
the overall allowance, implicit or explicit, shall be 
not less than a prudent estimate of the relevant future expenses. 
F. The method of calculation of technical provisions 
shall not be subject to discontinuities from year to 
year arising from arbitrary changes to the method 
or the bases of calculation and shall be such as to 
recognize the distribution of profits in an 
appropriate way over the duration of each policy. 
2. -Assurance undertakings shall riiýke available to 
the public the bases and methods used in the 
Premiums for new business 'shall be sufficient, on 
reasonable actuarial assumptions, to enable assurance 
undertakings to meet al I, their commitments and, in 
particular, to establish adequate technical provisions. 
For this purpose, all aspects of the financial situation of in 
assurance undertaking may be taken into account, without 
the input from resources other thin premiums and income 
earned thereon being systematic and permanent in such a 
way that it may jeopardize the undertaking's solvency in 
the long term. 
Article 20 
The aisets covering the technical provisions shill take 
account of the tM of business - carried on 'by an 
undertaking in such a way as to secure the safety, yield 
and marketability of its investznents' ' which the 
undertaking shall ensure are diversified and adiquately 
spread. 
I- 
Artick 21 .I 
1. , The home Member State may not' authorize 
assurance undertakings to cover their technical provisions 
with any but the foUowing categories of assets: 
A. Investments 
(a) debt securities, bonds and other money- and 
capital-market instruments; 
No L 360/14 Official Journal of the European Communities 9.12.92 
Ia. 
(b) loans; 
(c) shares and other variable-yield participations; 
(d) units in undertakings f(? r collective investment in 
transferable securities and other investment funds; 
4 
(e) land, buildings and immovable property rights; 
B. Debts and claims 
debts owed by reassurers, including reassurere shares 
of. technical provisions; V 
(g) deposits with and debts owed by ceding 
undertakings; 
(h) debts owed by policy-holders and intemediaries 
arising ou'"tof direct and reassurance operations; 
(i) advances against policies; . 
tax recoveries; 
(k) daims against guaranteefiincls;. 
Others 
tangible fixed assets, other than land and buildings, 
valued on the basis of prudent imortization; 
(m) cash at bank and in hand, deposits with credit 
institutions and any other body authorized to receive 
deposits; 
(n) deferred acquisition costs; - 
(o) accrued interest and ren4 other accrued income and 
prepayments; 
reversionary interests. 
In the caie of the association of underwriters known as 
Lloy&s, asset categories shall also include guarantees and 
letters of credit issued by cmait institutions within the 
meaning of Directive 7717801EEC (1) or by assur ce 
undertakings, together with verifiable sums arising out of 
life assurance policies, to the extent t9at they represent 
funds belonging to members. 
First Council Directive 77/7801EEC of 12 December 1977 on 
the coordination Of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the takimij up and Pursuit of the business 
of credit institutions (Oj No L 322,17.12.1977, p. 30). 
Directive as last amended by Directive 89/646/EEC (0j, No 
L 386,30.12.1989, p. 1), 
The inclusion of any asset or category of assets listed in 
the first subparagraph shall not mean that all these assets'- 
should automatically be accepted as cover for - technical 
provisions. The home Member State shall lay down more 
detailed rules fudng the conditions for _the 
use of 
acceptable assets; in this connection, it may require 
valuable security or guarantees, particularly in the case of 
debts oWed by reassurers. 
In determining and applying the rules which it lays down, 
the home Member State shall, in particular, ensure that 
the following principles are complied with: 
assets covering technical provisions shall be valued 
net of any debts ar sing out of their acquisition; ' 
(ii) all assets must be valued on a'prudent basis, 
allowing for the. risk of any amounts not being 
realizable. In particular, tangible fixed assets other 
than land and buildings may be accepted as cover 
for technical provisions only if they are valued on 
the basis of prudent amortization; 
(iii) loans, whether to undertakings, to a State or 
international organization, to local or regional 
authorities or to natural persons, may be accepted 
as cover for technical provisions only if there are 
sufficient guarantees as to their security, whether 
these are based on the status of the borrower, 
mortgages, bank guarantees or guarantees granted 
by assurance undertakings or other forms of 
security; 
(iv) derivative instruments such as options, futures and 
swaps in connection with assets covering technical 
provisions may be used in so far as they contribute 
to a reduction of investment risks or facilitate 
efficient portfolio manag * 
ement. They must be 
valued on a prudent basis and may be taken into 
account in the valuation of the underlying assets; 
(v) - transferrable securities which are not dealt in on a 
regulated market may be accepted as co. ver for 
technical provisions only if they can be realized in 
the short term or if they are holdings in credits 
institutions, in assurance undertakings, within the 
liniits permitted by Article$' of Directive 
79/267/EEC, or in investment undertakings 
established in a Member State; 
(vi) debts owed by and claims against a third party may 
be accepted as cover for the technical provisions 
only after deduction of all amounts owed to the 
same third Party; 
9.12.92 Official joumal of the European Communities No L 360115 
(Vii) the value of any debts and claims accepted as cover 
for technical provisions must be calculat 
" 
ed on a 
prudent bksis, with due allowance for the risk of 
any amounts not being realizable. In p2rticular, 
debts owed by policy-holders and intermediaries 
arising out of assurance and reassurance operations 
may be accepted only in. so far as they have been 
outstanding for not more than three months; 
(Viii) where the assets held include an investment in a 
subsidiary undertaking which manages all or part of 
the assurance undertaking's investments on its 
behalf, the home Member State must, when 
applying the rules and principles laid down in this 
Article, take into account the underlying assets held 
by the subsidiary undertaking; the home Member 
State may treat the assets of other subsidiaries in the 
same way; 
more thaw 40 %of its gross technical provisions in the 
loans or securities of issuing bodies and borrowers in 
each of which it invests more than S% of its assets; 
(c) 5% of its total gross techniýal provisions in unsecured 
loans, including I% for any single unsecured loan, 
other than * loans granted to credit institutions, 
assurance undertakings - in so far as Article 8 of 
Directive 79/267/EEC allows it - and investment 
undertakings established in a Member State. Ile 
limits may be raised to 8 and 2% respectively by a. 
decision taken - on a case-by-case basis by the 
-Competent 2uthorityof the home Member State; 
(d) 3% of its totai gross technical provisions in the form 
of cash in hand; 
(ix) deferred acquisition costs may be accepted as cover 
for technical provisions only to the extent that this 
is consistent with the calculation of the 
mathematical provisions. 
(C) 10% of its total gross technical provisions in shares, 
other securities treated as shares and debt securities 
which are not dealt in on a regulated market. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, in " exceptional 
circumstances and at an assurance undertaking's request, 
the home Member State may, temporarily and under a 
properly reasoned decision, accept other categories of 
assets as - cover for technical provisions, subject to 
Article 20. 
2. Ile absence of a limit in paragraph I on investment 
in any particular category does not imply that assets in 
that category should be accepted as cover for technical 
provisions without limit. The home Member State shall 
lay down more detailed rules fixing the conditions for the 
use of acceptable assets. In particular it shall ensure, ' in the 
determination and the application of those rules, that the 
following principles are ýomplied with: 
(i) assets covering' technical provisions must be 
divcrsified and spread in such a way as to ensure that 
Article 22 there is no excessive reliance on any particular 
category of asset, investment market or investment, 
1. As regards the assets covering technical provisions, 
the home Member State shall require every assurance 
(ii) investment 
' 
in particular types of asset which show 
undertaking to invest no more than: high levels of risk,, whether 
because of the nature of 
the asset or the quality of the issuer, must be 
restricted to prudent levels; 
(a) 10 % Of its total gross technical provisions in any one 
Piece of land or building, or a number of pieces of land or buildings close enough to each other to be (iii) limitations on particular categories of asset must take 
considered effectively as one investment; account of the treatment of reassurance in the 
calculation of technical provisions; 
(b) 5% of its total gross technical provisions in shares 
and other negotiable securities treated as shares, bonds, debt securities and other money- and 
capital-market instruments from the same 
undertaking, or in loans granted to the same borrower, taken together, the loans being loans other 
than those granted to a State, regional or local 
authority or to an international organization of which 
one or more Member States are members. This limit 
may be raised to 10 % if an undertaking invests not 
Ov) where the assets held include an investment in a 
subsidiary undertaking which manages all or part of 
the assurance undertakinjes investments on its behalf, 
the home Member. State must, when applying the 
rules and principles laid down in tlýis Article. take 
into account the underlying assets held by the 
subsidiary undertaking; the home Member State may 
treat the assets of other subsidiaries in the same 
way; 
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(v) the percentage of assets covering technical provisions 
which are the subject of non-liquid investments must 
be kept to a prudent level; 
NO where the assets held include loans to or debt 
securities issued by certain credit institutions, the 
home Member State may, when applying the rules 
and principles contained in this Article, take into 
account the underlying assets held by such credit 
institutions. J) is treatment may be applied only 
where the credit institution has its head office in a 
Member State, is entirely owned by that Member 
State and/or that State's local authorities and its 
business, according to its memorandum and art; des 
of association, consists of extending, through its 
intermediaries, loans to, or guaranteed by, States or 
local authorities or of loans to bodies closely linked 
to the State or to local authorities. 
3. In the context of the detailed rules laying down the 
conditions for the use of acceptable assets, the Member 
State shall give more limitative treatment to: 
any loan unaccompanied by a bank guarantee, a 
guarantee issued by ari assurance undertaking, a 
mortgage or any other form of security, as compared 
with loans accompanied by such collateral, 
securities when these are issued by a credit institution 
which has its head office in a Member State and is subject 
'by law to special of4c: ial supervision designed to protect 
the holders of those debt securities. In particular, sums 
deriving from the issue of such debt securities must be 
invested in accor dance witli the law in assets which, 
during the whole period of validity of the debt securities, 
are capable of covering claims attaching to debt securities 
and which, in the event of failure of the issuer, would be 
used on a priority basis for the reimbursement of the 
principal and payment of the accrued interest. 
5. Member States shall not require assurance 
undertakings to invest in particular categories of assets. 
6. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, in exceptional 
circumstances and at the assurance undertakines request, 
the home Member State may, temporarily and under a 
properly reasoned decision, allow exceptions to the rules 
laid down in paragraph. I (a) to (e), subject to Article 20. 
Article ;3 
- UCITS not coordinated within the meaning of 
Directive 85 / 611 / EEC (1) and other investment funds, 
as compared with UCITS coordinated within the 
meaning of that Directive, 
- securities which are not dealt in on a regulated market, 
as compared with those which are, 
- bonds, debt securities and other money- and 
c2pital-market instruments not issued by States, local 
or regional authorities or undertakings belonging to Zone A as defined in Directive 89/647/EEC (2), or the issuers of which are international organizations not 
numbering at least one Community Member State 
among their members, as compared with the same financial instruments issued by such bodies. 
1. - Where the benefits provided by a contract are 
directly linked to the value of units in an UCITS or to the 
value of assets contained in an intemal'fund held by the 
insurance undertaking, usually divided into units, the iechnical provisions in respect of those benefits must be 
represented as closely as possible by those units or, in the 
case where units are not established, by those assets. 
2. Where the benefits provided by a contract are 
directly linked to a share index or some other reference 
value other than those referred to in paragr2ph 1, the 
technical provisions in respect of those benefits must be 
represented as closely as -possible either by the units deemed to represent the reference value or, in the case 
where units are not established, by assets of appropriate 
security and marketability which correspond as closely as 
possible with those on which the particular reference value 
is based. 
4. Member States may raise the limit laid down in 
paragraph I (b) to 40 % in the case of certain debt 
V) Council Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 199S on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in 
transferable securities (UCITS) (Oj No L 375,31.12.1985, 
p. 3). Directive as amended by Directive 88/2.20/EEC (Oj No 
L 100,19.4.1988, p. 31). 
(1) Council Directive 89/647/EEC of 19 December 1989 on a 
solvency ratio for credit institutions (Oj No L 386,30.12. 
1989, p. 14). 
3. Articles 20 and 22 shall not apply to assets held to 
match liabilities which are directly linked to the benefits 
referred to in paragraphs I and 2. References to the- 
technical provisions in Article 22 shall be to the technical 
provisions excluding those in respect of such liabilities. 
4. Where the benefits referred to in paragr2ph I and 2 include a guarantee of investment performance or some 
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other guaranteed* benefit, the corresponding additional 
technical provisions shall be subject to Articles 20,21 and 
2-2. 
Article 24 
1. For the purposes of Articles 17 (3) and 28 of 
Directive 79/267/EEC, Member States. shall comply with 
Aýnnex I to this Directive as regards the matchirig rules. 
IMis Article shall not apply to the commitments 
referred to in Article 23 of this Directive. 
Article 2S 
cumulative preferential - share capital and 
subordinated loan capital may be included but; 
if so, only up to 50 % of the margin, no more 
than IS % of which shall consist of 
subordinated loans with a fixed maturity, or 
fixed-term cumulative preferential share 
capital, if the following minimum criteria are 
met: 
(a) in the event of the bankruptcy or 
liquidation of the assurance undertaking, 
binding agreements must exist under 
which the subordifiated loan capital or 
preferential share capital ranks after the 
claims of all other creditors and is not to 
be repaid until all other debts outstanding 
at the time have been settled. 
Article 18, second subparagrapý, point 1 of Directive 
79/267/EEC shall be rep! aced by the following: 
the assets of the undertaking free of any 
foreseeable liabilities, less any intangible items. In 
particular the following shall be included: 
- the paid-up share capital or, in the case of a 
mutual assurance undertaking, the effective 
initial fund plus any members! accounts which 
meet all the following criteria: 
(a) the memorandum * and articles of 
association must stipulate that payments 
may be made fropi these accounts to 
members only in so far as this does not 
cause the solvency margin to fall below the 
required level, or, after the dissolution of 
the undertaking, if all the undertaking's 
other debts have been settled; 
(b) the memorandum and articles of 
association must stipulate, with respect to 
any such payments for reasons other than 
the individual termination of membership, 
that the competent authorities must be 
notified at least one month in advance and 
can prohibit the payment within that 
period-, 
(c) the relevant provisions of the 
memorandum and articles of association 
may be amended only after the competent 
authorities have declared that they have no 
objection to the amendment, without 
prejudice to the criteria stated in (a) and 
(b), 
- one half of the unpaid share capital or initial 
fund, once the paid-up part amounts to 2S% 
o. f that share capital or fund, 
- reserves (statutory reserves and free reserves) 
not corresponding to underwriting liabilities, 
- any profits brought forward, 
Subordinated loan capital must also Wd the 
following conditions: 
(b) only fuUy paid-up funds may be taken into 
account; 
(c) for loans with a fixed maturity, the 
original maturity must-be at least five 
years. No later than one year before the 
repayment date the assurance undertaking 
must submit to the competent authorities 
for their appioval a plan showing how the 
solvency margin will be kept at or brought 
to the re4uired level at maturity, unless the 
extent to which the loan may rank as a 
component of the solvency margin is 
gradually reduced during at least the list 
five years before the repayment date. The 
competent authorities may authorize the 
early repayment of such loans provided 
application is made by the . 
issuing 
assurance undertaking and its solvency 
margin will not fall below the, required 
level; 
(d) loans the maturity of which is not fixed 
must'be repayable only subject to five 
yeare notice unless the loans are no longer 
considered as a component of the solvency 
margin or unless the prior consent of the 
competent authorities is specifically 
required for early repayment. In the latter 
event the assurance undertaking must 
notify the competent aýthorities at least 
six months before the date . of the proposed 
repayment, specifying the actual and 
required solvency margin both before and 
after that repayment. The competent 
authorities shall authorize repayment only 
if the assurance undertaking's solvency 
margin will not fall below the required 
level; 
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(C the loah agreement must not include any 
clause providing that in specified 
circumstances, other than the winding-up 
of the assurance undertaking, the debt will 
become repayable before the agreed 
repayment dates; 
2. . Subject to Article 17 (3), Article 24 (1), 
(2), (3) 
and (5) and the second subparagraph of Article 26 (1), 
Member States shall not restrain the free disposal of 
those assets, whether movable or immovable, that form 
part of -the assets of authorized assurance 
imdertakings. 
(f) the loan agreement may be amended only 
after the competent authorities have 
declared that they have no objection to the 
amendment, 
- securities with no specified maturity date *and 
other instruments that fulfil the following 
conditions, including cumulative preferential 
shares other than those mentioned in the 
preceding indent, up to 50% of the margin for 
the total of such securities and the subordinated 
loan capital referred to in the preceding 
indent: 
(a) they may not be repaid on the initiative of 
the bearer or without the prior consent of 
the competent authority; 
(b) the contract of issue must enable the 
assurance undertaking to defer the payment 
of interest on the loan; 
(c) the lender's claims on the assurance 
undertaking must rank entirely after those 
of all non-subordinated creditors; 
(d) the documents *governing the issue of the 
securities must provide for the 
loss-absorption capacity of the debt and 
unpaid interest, while enabling the 
assurance undertaking to continue its 
business; 
(e) only fuUy paid-up amounts may be taken 
into account. ' 
Article 26 
No more than three years after the date of application of 
this Directive, the Commission shall submit a report to the Insurance Committee on the need for further harmonization of the solvency margin. 
Article 27 
Article 21 of Directive 791267/EEC shall be replaced by 
the following: 
'Artick 21 
1. Member States shall not prescribe any rules as to 
the choice of the assets that need not be used as cover for the tecInical provisions referred to in Article 17. 
3. Paragraphs I and 2 shall not preclude any 
measures which Member States, while safeguarding the 
interests of the lives assured, are entitled to take as 
owners or members of or partners in the undertakings 
in question! I 
Chapter 3 
Article 28 
The Member State of the commitment shall not prevent a 
. policyholder from conducting a contract with an 
assurance undertaking authorized under the conditions of 
Article 6 of Directive 79/267/EEC, as long as that does 
not -conflict with legal provisions protecting the general 
good in the Member State of the commitment. 
Artick 29 
Member States shall not adopt provisions'requiring the 
prior approval or systematic notification of general and 
special policy conditions, scales of premiums, technical 
bases used in particular for calculating scales of premiums 
and technical provisions or forms and other printed 
documents which an assurance undertaking intends to use 
- in its dealings with poiicy-hoiaers. 
Notwithstanding the first ýubparagraph, for the sole 
purpose'of verifying compliance with national provisions 
concerning actuarial principles, the Member State of origin 
may require systematic communication of the technical 
Bases 'used in particular for calculating scaies of premiums 
and technical provisions, . without that requirement 
constituting a prior condition for an undertaking to carry 
on its business. -- 
'Vapplication of Not later than five years afýer'the date 0 
this Directive, the Commission shall submit. a report to the 
Council on the implementation of those provisions. - 
Article 30 
In the first subparagraph of Article 15 (1) of 
Directive 90/619/EEC the words 'in one of the cases 
referred to in Title nr shall be deleted. 
9.12.92 Official Journal of the European Communities No L 360119 
2.. ArtidelS(2) of Directive 90/619/EEC- shall be 
replaced by the follo. wing: 
I. The Member States need not apply paragraph 1 
to contracts of six monthe duration or less, nor where, because of the status of the policy-holder or the 
circumstances in which the contract is concluded, the 
policy-holder does not need this special protection. 
Member States shall specify in their rules where 
paragraph 1 is not applied. ' 
Article 31 - 
1. Before the assurance contract is concluded, at least 
the information listed in point A of Annex 11 shall be 
conununicated to the policy-holder. 
2. The policy-holder shall be kept informed throughout 
the te 
* rm of the contract of any change concerning the information listed in point B of Annex II. 
3. The Member State of the commitment may require 
assurance undertakings to furnish information in addition 
to that listed in Annex 11 only if it is necessary for a proper 
understanding by the policy-holder of the essential 
elements of the commitment. 
4. The detailed rules for implementing this Article and Annex-11 shall be laid down by the Member State of the 
commitment. 
TrME IV 
(b) a scheme of operations setting out inter alia_ the 
types of business envisaged and the structural 
organization of the branch; .: 
(c) the address in the Member State of the branch 
from which documents may be obtained and to 
which they may be delivered, it being understood 
that that address shall be the one to which all 
communications to the authorized agent are sent;. 
(d) the name of the branch's authorized agent, who 
must possess sufficient powers to bind the 
undertaking in relation to third parties and to 
represent it in relations with the authorities and 
courts of the Member State of the branch. With 
regard to Uoyd's,. in the event of any litigation in 
the Member State of the branch arising out of 
underwritten commitments, the assured persons 
must not be treated less favourably than if the 
litigation had been brought against businesses of a 
conventional type. The authorized agent must, 
therefore, * ' possess sufficient powers for 
proceedings to be taken against him and must in 
that capacity be able to bind the Lloyds 
underwriters concerned. 
3. Unless the 'competent authorities of the home 
Member State have. re2son to doubt the adeqU2CY Of 
the administrative structure or the financial situation of 
the assurance undertaking or the good repute and 
professional qualifkation or experience of the directors 
or managers or the authorized agent, taking into 
account the business planned, they shall witbin three 
months of receiving 211 the information referred to in 
paragraph 2 communic2te that inform2tion to the 
competent authorities of the Member State of the 
branch and shall inform the undertaking concerned 
accordingly. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO RIGHT OF ESTABUSHMENT 
AND FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES 
A rtick 32 
Article 10 of Directive 79/267/EEC shaU be replaced by the following: 
'Article io 
I. An assurance undertaking that proposes to establish a branch within the territory of another Member State shall notify the competent authorities of its home Member State. 
2. The Member States shall require every assurance 
undertaking that proposes to establish a branch within the territory of another Member State to provide the following information when effecting the notification 
provided for in paragraph 1: 
(a) the Member State within the territory of which it 
proposes to establish a*branch; 
The competent authorities of the home Member St2tC 
shall ASO 2ttCSt that the assurance undertaking has the 
minimum solvency margin calculated in accordance 
with Articles 19 and 20. 
Where the competent authorities of the home Member 
State refuse to communicate the information referred to 
in paragraph 2- to the competent authon'ties of the 
Member State of the branch they shall give the reasons 
for their refusaf to the undertaking concerned within 
three months of receiving all the information in 
question. That refusal or. failure to act shall be subject 
to a right to apply to the courts in the hoiqe Member 
State. 
4. Before the branch of in assurance undertaking 
starts business, the competent authorities of the 
Member State of the branch shall, within two months 
of receiving the information referred to in paragraph 3, 
inform the competent authority of the home Member 
State, if appropriate, of the conditions under which, in 
the interest of the general good, that business must be 
carried on in the Member State of the branch. 
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S. On receiving a communication from the 
competent authorities of the Member State of ýhe 
branch or, if no communication is received from them, 
on expiry of the period provided for in paragraph 4, 
the branch may be established and start business. 
6. In the event of a change in any of the particulars 
communicated under paragraph 2 (b), (c) or (d), an 
assurance undertaking shall give-wrirten notice of the 
change to the competent authorities of the home 
Member State and of the Member State of the branch 
at least one month before making the change so that 
the competent authorities of the home Member State 
and the competent authorities of the Member State of 
the branch may fulfil their respective roles under 
paragraphs 3 and 4. ' 
Article 33 
2. Where the competent authorities of the home 
Member State do not communicate the information 
referred to in paragraph 1 within the period laid down, 
they shall give the reasons for their refusal to the 
undertaking within that same period. The refusal shall 
be subject to a right to apply to the courts in the home 
Member State. 
3. The undertaking may start business on the 
certified date on which it is informed of, the 
communication provided for in the first subparagraph 
of paragraph V 
Artick 36 
Article 17 of Directive 90/619/EEC shall be replaced by 
the following: 
Article 11 of Directive 79/267/EEC shall be deleted. 
Article 34 
'Article 17 
Any change which an undertaking intends to make to 
the information referred to in Article 11 shall be 
subject to the procedure provided for in Articles 11 and 
14. ' 
Article 11 of Directive 90/619/EEC shall be replaced by 
the following: I 
'Article 11 
Any undertaking that intends to carry on business for 
the first time in one or more Member States under the 
freedom to provide services shall first inform ' 
the 
competent authorities of the home Member State, 
indicating the nature of the commitments it proposes to 
cover. ' 
Article 3S 
Article 14 of Directive 90/619/EEC shall be replaced by 
the following: 
'Article 14 
Article 37 
Articles 10,12,13,16,22 and 24 of Directive 
90/619/EEC shall be deleted. 
Article 38 
The competent authorities of the Member State of the 
branch or the Member State of the provision of services 
may require 'that the information which they are 
authorized under this Directive to request with regard to 
the business of assurance undertakings operating in the 
territory of that State shall be supplied to them in the 
official language or languages of that State. 
1. Within one month of the riýtification provided for in Article 11, the competent authorities of the home 
Member State shall communicate to the Member State 
or Member States within the territory of which the 
undertaking intends to carry on business by way of the freedom to provide services: 
(a) a certificate attesting that the undertaking has the 
minimum solvency margin calculated in 
accordance with Articles 19 and 20 of Directive 
79/267/EEC; 
(b) the classes- which the undertaking has been 
authorized to offer; 
(c) the nature of the commitments which the 
undertaking proposes to cover in the Member 
State of the provision of services. 
At the same time, they shall inform the undertaking 
concerned accordingly. 
Ankle 39 
1. Article 19 -of Directive 90/619/EEC shall be 
deleted. 
2. The Member State of the brinch or. of provision of 
services shall not lay down provisions requiring the prior 
approval or systematic notification of general and special 
policy conditions, scales of premiums, technical bases used 
in particular for calculating scales of premiums and 
technical provisions, forms and other printed documents 
which an undertaking intends to use in its dealings*with 
policy-holders. For the purpose of verifying compliance 
with national provisions concerning assurance contracts, it 
may require an undertaking that proposes to carry on 
assurance business within its territory, under the right of 
establishment or the freedom to provide services, to effect 
only non-systematic notification of those policy conditions 
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and other printed documents without that requirement 
constituting a prior condition for an undertaking to carry 
on its business. 
Article 40 
8. If an undertaking which has committed an 
infringement his an* establishment or possesses property in 
the Member State concerned, the competent authorities of 
the latter may, in accordance with national law, apply the 
administrative penalties prescribed for that infringement 
by way of -enforcement against that establishment or 
property. 
1. Article 20 of Directive 90/619JEEC shall be 
deleted. 
2. Any undertaking carrying on business under the 
right of establishment or the freedom to provide services 
shall submit to the competent authorities of the Member 
State of the branch and/or of the Member State of the 
provision of services all documents requested of it for the 
purposes of this Article in so far as undertakings the head 
office of which is in those Member States are also obliged 
to do so. 
3. If the competent authorities of a Member State 
establish that an undertaking with a branch or carrying on 
business under the freedom to provide services in its 
territory is not complying with 
. 
the legal provisions 
applicable to it in that State, they shall require the 
undertaking concerned to remedy that irregular situation. 
4. If the undertaking in question fads to take the 
necessary action, the competent authorities of the Member 
State concerned shall inform the competent authorities ' of the home Member State accordingly. The latter authorities 
shall, at the earliest opportunity, take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that the undertaking concerned 
remedies that irregular situation. The nature of those 
measures shall be communicated to the competent 
authorities of the Member State concerned. 
9. Any measure adopted under paragraphs 4 to 8 
involving penalties or restrictions on the conduct of 
assurance business must be properly reasoned and 
communicated to the uhdcrtaking concerned. 
10. Every two years, the Commission shall submit to 
the - Insurance Committee a report summarizing the 
number and type of cases in which, in each Member State, 
authorization has been refused pursuant io Article 10 of 
Directive 79/267/EEC or Article 14 of Directive 
90/619/EEC as amended by thi's Directive or measures 
have been taken under paragraph S. Member States shall 
cooperate with the Commission by providing it with the 
information required for that report. 
Artick 41 
Nothing in -this Dnvmve shall prevent assurance 
undertakings with head offices in other Member States 
from advertising their serviýcs through all available means 
of communication in the Member State of the branch or 
Member State of the provision of services, subject to any 
rules governing the form and content of such advertising 
adopted in the interest of the general good. 
Arti; k 42 
5. If, despite the measures taken by the home Member 
State or because those measures ' prove 
inadequate or are lacking in that State, the undertaking persists in violating 
the legal provisions in ' 
force in the Member State 
concerned, the latter may, after informing the competent 
authorities of the home Member State, take appropriate 
measures to prevent or penalize further irregularities, 
including, in so far as is strictly necessary, preventing that 
undertaking from continuing to conclude new assurance 
contracts within its territory. Member States shall ensure 
that in their territories it is possible to serve the legal documents necessary for such measures on assurance 
undertakings. 
1. Article 21 of Directive 90/6191EEC shall be 
deleted. 
2. Should an assurance undertaking be wound up, 
commitments axising out of contracts underwritten 
through a branch- or under the freedom to provide services 
shaU be met in the same way as those arising out of that 
undertaking's other assurance contracts, without 
distinction as to nationality as far as the lives assured and 
th6 beneficiaries. are concerned. 
6. Paragraphs 3,4 and 5 shall not affect the emergency 
poNýer of the Member States concerned to take appropriate 
rneasures to prevent or penalize irregularities committed 
within their territories. This shall include the possibility of 
preventing assurance undertakings from continuing to 
conclude new assurance contracts within their territories. 
7. Paragraph 3,4 and 5 shall not affect the power of 
the Member States to penalize infringements within their 
temtones. 
. 
Artick 43 
1. Article 23 of Directive 90/619/EEC shall be 
deleted. 
2. Every assurance undertaking shall inform the 
competent authority of its home Member State, separately in respect of transactions carried out under the right of 
establishment and those carried out under the freedom to 
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provide services, of the amount of the premiums, without 
deduction of reassurance, by Member State and by each of 
classes I to IX, as defined in the Annex to Directive 
79/267/EEC. 
The competent authority of the home Member State shall. 
within a reasonable tim46 and on an aggregate basis 
forward this information to the competent authorities of 
each of the Member States concerned which so request. 
Article 44 
1. Article 25 of Dirictive 90/619/EEC shall be 
deleted. 
2. Without prejudice to any subsequent harmonization, 
every assurance contract shall be subject exclusively to the 
indirect taxes and parafiscal charges on assurance 
premiums in the Member State of the commitment within 
the meaning of Article 2 (e) ofPirective 90/619/EEC and 
also, with regard to Spain, I to the -surcharges legally 
established in favour of the Spanish 'Consorcio de 
compensaci6n de seguroe for the performance of its 
functions relating to the compensation of losses arising 
from extraordinary eKents occurring in that Member 
State. 
The law applicable to the contract pursuant to Article 4 
of Directive 90/619/EEC shall not affect the fiscal 
arrangements applicable. 
Pending future harmonization, each Member State shall 
apply to those undertakings which cover commitments 
situated within its territory its own national provisions for 
measures to ensure the collection of indirect taxes and 
parafiscal charges due under the first subparagraph. 
TULE V 
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article 4S 
Member States may allow assurance undertakings with head offices in their territories, and whose buildings and 
land covering their technical provisions exceed, at the time 
of the notification of this Directive, the percentage laid down in Article 22 (1) (a) a period expiring no later than 31 December 1998 within which to comply with that 
provision. 
Article 46 
1. Article 26 of Directive 90/619/EEC shall be deleted. 
2. Spain and Portugal, until 31 December 1995, and 
Greece, until 31 December 1998, may operate the 
following transitional arrangements for contracts in 
-respect of which one of those 
Member States is the 
Member State of the commitment: 
(a) by way of derogation from Article 8 (3) of Directive 
79/267/EEC and from Articles 29 and 39 of this 
Directive,. the competent authorities of the Member 
States in queition may require the communication, 
before use, of general and special insurance policy 
conditions; 
(b) the-amount of the technical provisions relating to such 
contracts shall be determined under the supervision of 
the Member State concerned in accordance with its 
own rules or, failing that, in accordance with the 
procidures established in that State in accordance 
with this Directive. Cover of tlýose ' technical 
provisions by- equivalent and matching assets and the 
localization . of those assets shall be effected under the 
supervision of that Member State in accordance with 
its rules and practices adopted in accordance with this 
Directive. 
T= vi 
RNAL PROVISIONS 
Artkle 47 
The following technical adjustments to bi made 
'to 
Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC and to this 
Directive shall be adopted in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in Directive 91/675/EEC: 
extension of the legal forms provided for W 
Article 8 (1) (a) of Directive 79/267/EEC, 
amendments io the list set out in the Annex to 
Directive 79/267/EEC, or adaptation of the 
terminology used in that list to take iaccount of the 
development of assurance markets, 
clarification of the items constituting the solvency 
margin listed in Article 18 of Directive 79/267/EEC 
to take account of the creation of new financial 
instruments,. 
alteration of the minimum guarantee fund provided for 
in Artide20(2) of Directive 79/267/EEC to take 
account of economic and financial developments, 
amendments, to take accEunt of the creation of new 
financial instruments, to the list of assets acceptable as 
cover for tichnical provisions set out in Article 21 of 
this Directive and to the rules on the spreading of 
investments laid down in Article n of this Directive, 
changes in the relaxations in the matching rules laid 
'down in Annex I to this Directive, to take account of 
the development of new currency-hedging instruments 
or progrtss made in economic and monetary union, 
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clarification of the definitions in oider to ensure 
uniform application of Directives 79/267/EEC and 
90/619/EEC and of this Directive throughout the 
Community, 
the technical adjustments necessary to the rules for 
setting the maxima applicable to interest rates, 
pursuant to Article 17 of - Directive 79 / 267 / EEC, as 
amended by this Directive, in particular to take 
account of progress made in economic and monetary 
union. 
3. -* If under the conditioný laid down by national law 
a Member State authorizes agencies and branches set 
up Within its territory and covered by this Title to 
transfer all or part of their portfolios of contracts to an 
agency or branch covered by this Title and set up 
within the territory of another, Member State it shall 
ensure that the competent authorities of the Member 
State of the accepting office or, if appropriate, of the 
Member State referred to in Article 30 certify that after 
taking the transfer into account the accepting office 
possesses. the necessary solvency margin, that the law 
of the Member State of the accepting office permits 
such a transfer and that the State has agreed to the 
transfer. 
Article 48 
1. Branches which have started business, in accordance 
, With the provisions in force in their Member State of 
establishment, before the entry into force of the provisions 
adcopted in implementation of this Directive shall be 
presumed to have been subject to the procedure laid down 
in Article !0 (1) to . (5) of Directive 79/267/EEC. They 
shall be governed, from the date of that entry into force, 
by Articles 17,23,24 and 26 of Directive 79/267/EEC 
and by Article 40 of this Directive. 
2. Articles 11 and 14 of Directive 90/619/EEC, as 
arnended by this Directive, shall not affect rights acquired 
by assurance undertakings carrying on business under the 
freedom to provide services before the entry into force of 
t]hc provisions adopted in implementation of this 
pirective. 
Article 49 
, Ibe following Article 31a shall be inserted in Directive 
79/267/EEC: 
'Article 31a 
1. Under the conditions laid down by national law, 
each Member State shall authorize agincies and branches set up within its territory and covered by this Title to transfer all or part of their portfolios of 
contracts to an accepting office established in the same Member State if the competent authorities of that Member State or, if appropriate, those of the Member 
State referred to in Article 30 certify that after taking 
the transfer into account the accepting office possesses 
the necessary solvency margin. 
2. 
. 
Under the conditions laid down by national law, 
each Member State shall authorize agencies and branches set up within its territory and covered by this 
Title to transfer all or part of their portfolios of 
contracts to an assurance undertaking with a head 6ffice in another Member State if the competent 
authorities of that Member State certify that after 
taking the transfer into account the accepting office 
possesses the necessary solvency margin. 
4. In the circumstances referred to in paragiaphs 1, 
2 and 3 the Member State in which the transferring 
agency or branch is situated shall authorize the transfer 
after obtaining the agreement of the competent 
authorities of the Member State of the commiftent, 
where different from the Member State in which the 
transferring agency or branch is situited. 
5. The competent authorities of the Member Staies 
consulted shall give their opinion or consent to the 
competent authorities of the hbme Member State of the 
transferring assurance undertakinj within three months 
of receiving a request; the absence of any response 
from the authorities consulted within that period shall 
be considered equivalent to a favourable opinion or 
tacit consent. 
6. A tranifer authorized in accordance with this 
Article shall be pýiblished. as laid down by national law 
in the Member State of the commitment. Such transfers 
shall automatically be valid against policy-holders, 
assured persons and any offier persons having rights or 
obligations arising out of the contracts transferred. 
This provision shall not affýct the Member Statee right 
to give policy-holders the opinion of cancelling 
contracts within a fixed period after a irapSfer. ' 
Article ýO 
Member States shA ensure that decisions taken in respect 
of an assurance undertaking under laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions- adopted in accordance with this 
Directive may be subject to the right to apply to the 
courts. I 
Article SI 
1. Member States shall adopt the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary for their compliance 
with this Directive no later than 31 December 1993 and 
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bring them into force no later than 1 July 1994. They shall Article S2 
forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
When they adopt such measures, the Member States shall 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
include references to this Directive or shall make such 
references when they effect official publication. The 
manner in which such references are to be made shall be Done at Brussels, 10 November 1992. 
laid down by the Member States. 
2. The Member States shall communicate to the For the Council 
Commission the texts of the main provisions of national The President law which. they adopt in the field covered by this 
Directive. R. NEEDHAM 
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ANNEX I 
MATCHING RULES 
The currency in which the assurees commitments are payable shall be determined in aawrdance with the 
following rules: 
1. Where the cover provided by a contract is expressed in terms of a paiticular currency, the assurees 
commitments are considered to be payable in that currency. 
2. Member States May authorize undertakings not to cover their technical provisions, including their' 
mathematical provisions, by matching assets if application of the above procedures would result in the 
undertaking being obliged, in order to comply with the matching principle, to hold assets in a currency 
amounting to not more than 7% of the assets existing in other currencies. 
3. Member States may choose not to require undertakings to apply the matching principle where 
commitments are payable in a currency other than the currency of one of the Community Member States, 
if investments in that currency are regulated, if the currency is subject to transfer restrictions or if, for 
similar reasons, it is not suitable for covering technical provisions. 
4. Undertakings are authorized not to hold matching assets to cover'an amount not exceeding 20 % of their 
commitments in a particular currency. 
However, total assets in all currencies combined must be at least equal to total commitments in all 
currencies combined.. 
S. Each Member State may provide that, whenever under the preceding procedures a commitment has to be 
covered by assets expressed in the currency of a Member State, this requiriment shall also be considered 
to be satisfied when the assets are expressed in ecus. 
a 
No L 360/26 Official journal of the European Communities 9.12.92 
ANNEX 11 
INFORMATION FOR POLICY-HOLD ERS 
The following information, which is to be communicated to the policy-hoWer before the contract is concluded 
(A) or during the term of the contract (B), must be provided in a clear and accurate manner, in writing, in an 
official language of the Member State of the commitment. 
However, such information may be in another language if the policy-hoWler so requests and the law of the 
Member State so permits or the policy-holder is free to choose the law awicable: 
A. Before concluding the contract 
Isdormation about the assurance undertaking Information about the commitment 
4 
(a) 1. The name of the. undertaking and its legal 
form 
(a) 2. The name of the Member State in which 
the head office and, where appropriate, the 
agency or bianch concluding the contract is 
situated 
(a) 3. The address of the head office and, where 
appropriate, of the agency or branch 
concluding the contract 
(a) 4. Definition of each benefit and each 
optim 
(A)S. 
- 
Tem of the contract 
(2)6. Means of terminating the contract 
(a) 7. Means of payme6t of premiums and 
duration of payments 
(a) S. Means of calculation and distribution of 
bonuses 
(a)9. Indication of surrender and paid-up 
values and the extent to which they are 
guamateed 
(a) 10. Information on the premiums for. 
each benefit, both main benefits 
and supplementary benefits, where 
! Ppropriate 
. 
(2)11. For unit-linked policies, definition of thý 
units to which the benefits are linked 
(a) 12. Indication of the nature of the underlying 
assets for unit-linked policies 
(a) 13. Arrangements for application of the 
cooling-off period 
(a) 14. General information on the tax 
arrangements applicable to the type of 
policy 
(a) 15. Ile - arrangements for . 
handling 
complaints concertung contracts by 
policy-holders, lives assured or 
beneficiaries under contracts including, 
where appropriate, the existence of a 
complaints body, without prejudice to 
the right to take legal proceedings 
(2)16. Law applicable to the contract where the 
parties do not have a Eree choice or., 
where the parties are free to choose the 
law applicable, the law the assurer 
proposes to choose 
w 
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B. During the term of the contract 
In addition to the policy conditions, both general and special, the policy4uAder must receive the following 
information throughout the term of the contract. 
Information about the assurance undertaking laformatiin about the commitment 
(b) 1. Any change in the name of the undertaking, 
its legal fonn or the address of its head 
office and, where appropriate, of the agency 
or branch which concluded the contract 
(b) 2. All the information listed in points (a) (4) 
to (a) (12) of A in the event of a change 
in the policy conditions or amendment of 
the Idw applicable to the contract. 
(b) 3. Every year, information on the state of 
bonuses 
